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Public Letters to Judges

by John Rasmussen

Please read a disclaimer for the statements I make on this website accusing judges, politicians, and activists of criminal actions.



March 31, 2009:    A Public Letter to the Judges of the Washington State Supreme Court:

Dear Judges of the Washington State Supreme Court:

         My name is John Rasmussen. My rights, and the rights of every citizen of Washington State, have been violated and diminished by the corruption and dishonesty of the Washington State Supreme Court.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

         I graduated from the Naval Academy in 1967 and, while I never served in combat, I put my life on the line to defend this Country from its enemies. In the Navy, I worked to deter the threat of Soviet submarine launched nuclear missiles. I believed that a nuclear attack from the Soviets was the greatest threat to our freedom and survival as a nation. But, in my experience that has not been the case. Instead, the greatest threat to my freedom as an American has come from federal judges and the judges of Washington State, including you the judges of our highest court. The dishonesty and corruption within our judiciary has taken away my constitutional rights and my land, and will destroy our Nation if it is not stopped.
       (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      "America will never be destroyed from the outside. If we falter and lose our freedoms, it will be because we destroyed ourselves." (Abraham Lincoln)

         The Washington State Supreme Court's refusal to correct Ray v. King County (2004) was a cowardly criminal act from the bench which covered-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and protected powerful people in King County who participated in the crime. Your denial of appeal was the last link in a chain of dishonesty and corruption that began in the mid 1990's. There is no possibility that you made an unintentional error in your denial of the Ray's appeal. The Ray opinion is so profoundly and obviously dishonest that it is impossible that you could have accidentally let it stand.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Read a detailed analysis of Ray v. King County (2004).

         Ray v. King County (2004) illegally allowed summary judgment in the face of a number of disputed material facts. The sacred right to establish and resolve the facts in a court of law was denied the Rays by your lower court. In denying a jury trial, the Ray judges violated the due process rules in the U.S. Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Washington. In denying a jury trial, the Ray judges violated the Washington State law which requires "All questions of fact [...] shall be decided by the jury" (RCW 4.44.080). Ray covered-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and coordinated perfectly with the dishonest legal analysis used by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein in King County v. Rasmussen (2001) and by Senior Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher in King County v. Rasmussen (2002). In hiding the ELS tax scheme, Judge Rothstein covered-up an Arthur Andersen accounting fraud prior to the Enron and WorldCom scandals. If Rothstein had upheld her oath to support the law, Arthur Andersen would have been under federal prosecution prior to Enron, and that scandal may have never happened. These federal and State decisions are criminal acts from the bench.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

         With your denial of the Ray's appeal, you joined the other judges in covering up the ELS federal tax fraud scheme. Your denial protected Washington State appeals judges Ronald Cox and Ann Schindler from federal prosecution. Your denial of the Ray's appeal, protected the federal judges who actively participated in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme from the bench. Your denial of appeal protected the King County Prosecutor, Norm Maleng, the King Count Executive, Ron Sims, the King County Council, and a number of other powerful folks in King County from federal prosecution. You, the judges of the Washington State Supreme Court, chose to protect dishonest public officials at the expense of the rights of citizens of the State. Your denial of appeal was a cowardly act from the bench. You didn't have the character to sign your names to a Washington State Supreme Court opinion confirming the dishonest analysis, violation of rights, and desecration of Washington property law found in Ray and its federal counterparts. When you let stand the criminal decision of your lower court, you did not resolve a lawsuit or establish precedent. Instead, you rendered the Washington State Supreme Court illegitimate. Because I believe in the Constitution and the rule of law, I no longer recognize your moral authority.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

         This letter justifies my above statements. It describes the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and identifies the active participants. This letter explains the profound dishonesty of Ray v. King County (2004). It directly addresses each Washington State Supreme Court judge and calls for the impeachment of those judges who denied the Ray's appeal. It calls for the legitimacy of our judicial system in Washington State to be reestablished, and warns of the consequences if that does not happen. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

Topics discussed in this letter: (Each topic is presented as a hyperlink.)

    * Introduction: (the above discussion)

    * Background:

      * The East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme

      * Norm Maleng's "legal theory": How King county hid its participation in the ELS federal tax fraud scheme.

      * Norm Maleng's influence in the legal community: Who got to you?

      * It was your duty to overturn Ray v. King County (2004).

      * Three intentional errors by the judges in Ray v. King County (2004) which you refused to correct.

        * 1. The illegal use of Summary Judgment denied the Ray's constitutional right of due process.

        * 2. The Ray court ignored and misapplied common law when it construed the Hilchkanum deed.

        * 3. The Ray court cherry-picked the Hilchkanum extrinsic evidence and misapplied the law in its analysis.

    * A Personal Note to each Washington State Supreme Court Judge:

      * Richard Sanders, where did the "magic" go?

      * Gerry Alexander, you are betrayed by your dissenting opinion in Brown.

      * Charles Johnson and Barbara Madsen, why did you not uphold your findings in Brown?

      * Justices Chambers, Owens, and Fairhurst, you destroyed rights and misapplied the law by denying Ray.

      * Debra Stephens, you must publicly demand impeachment of your fellow judges.

      * James Johnson, where do you fit?

    * Recap of the ELS tax fraud scheme and failure of the judiciary.

      * Your denial of appeal was a cowardly act.

      * The chain of judicial betrayal:

      * The effect of these judicial crimes:

    * Summary: The legitimacy of the Washington State Supreme Court must be reestablished.

    * Reference: A timeline of the events that lead to your participation in the ELS tax fraud scheme

Background:

    The East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme

           The Washington State Supreme Court's denial of the Ray appeal finalizes a chain of criminal acts that began with the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme in the mid 1990's. The tax fraud scheme involved King County accepting and certifying an illegal donation of the land under the East Lake Sammamish right-of-way in exchange for BNSF transferring the right-of-way to King County under the Rails-to-Trails Act. The parties who committed the tax fraud scheme were BNSF, the disgraced accounting firm Arthur Andersen, The Land Conservancy of Seattle and King County, and the leadership of King County headed by Prosecutor Norm Maleng. Norm Maleng appears to be the person most responsible for the success of the crime. His ability to influence judges and to avoid prosecution is seen in the three opinions I discuss on this website. King County v. Rasmussen (2001), King County v. Rasmussen (2002), and Ray v. King County (2004) are coordinated criminal acts from the bench that protected Maleng and the other participants in the tax fraud scheme. I'll tie these dishonest opinions together, but first we need to look at the basis of these dishonest opinions. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Read a detailed explanation of the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.

    Norm Maleng's "legal theory": How King county hid its participation in the ELS federal tax fraud scheme.

           The basis of the dishonest opinions leading to the Washington State Supreme Courts' denial of the Ray appeal, is a very dishonest legal argument that King County Prosecutor Norm Maleng contrived shortly after he participated in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. The dishonest argument built a legal excuse for King County's acceptance of the phony donation of land from BNSF, land which Norm Maleng knew the railroad didn't own. I've given this dishonest legal argument a name, "Norm Maleng's 'legal theory'", and I discuss it throughout this website.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

           Norm Maleng's "legal theory" was first published in a 1997 memorandum from Senior King County Deputy Prosecutor Bill Blakney to Faith Holste in the King County Office of Open Space. The memorandum "solved" a big problem for Norm Maleng. The phony donation of land from BNSF was the land under its East Lake Sammamish right-of-way. The use of that land for a railroad right-of-way had been obtained from settlers by the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway (SLS&E) in the late 1880's. About twenty SLS&E right of way deeds had already been contested in Washington State courts. All of the deeds were determined to be right-of-way easements, either by the court decisions or by the admission of King County. Further, these previously construed deeds were based on a "form deed" which was prepared by the SLS&E lawyers and therefore contained language identical to the East Lake Sammamish SLS&E right-of-way deeds. So, since the SLS&E form deed conveyed easements, and since BNSF was successor in interest to those easements, BNSF had no right to donate the land underlying the right-of-way to King County. BNSF had no right to take an illegal $40,000,000 tax write-off for the phony donation of that underlying land. Norm Maleng's "legal theory" fixed that problem. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

           Norm Maleng's "legal theory" claims that, in the Washington State Supreme Court opinion Brown v. State of Washington (1996), the judges threw out more than one hundred years of consistently upheld common law and established a new rule to construe railroad deeds. Since Brown v. State of Washington was decided after all of the prior determinations of SLS&E right-of-way deeds, it justified Maleng's claim that all the SLS&E deeds along East Lake Sammamish were conveyances in fee simple, in spite of the fact that all the previously contested SLS&E deeds had been determined to be easements. Perfect! Blakney summarized his 1997 memorandum by stating that: (with my emphasis) (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        "...Washington Supreme Court has laid down a bright line rule for determining whether a railroad deed conveyance describes an easement or a fee simple transfer..."
        [King County Deputy Prosecutor Bill Blakney memorandum, September 17, 1997 (annotated version)]

           This, of course, was a lie. There was no "bright line rule" changing one hundred years of consistently applied common law precedent in Brown v. State of Washington (1996). Norm Maleng's "legal theory" was repeated in all of the briefs by King County Deputy Prosecutor Scott Johnson in the lawsuits involving the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. In a brief to Federal District Judge Rothstein, Johnson claimed that, in Brown, the Washington State Supreme court effected a "sea change" in the way it construes railroad right-of-way deeds. For proof, Scott Johnson referred to a footnote in the Brown dissenting opinion. Perhaps you, the judges of the Washington State Supreme Court, would confirm that your Court signaled a "sea change" in Washington State common law in your Brown dissenting opinion. Maybe Justice Sanders would confirm he established a new "bright line rule" in his dissenting opinion. Ridiculous!
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Link to a discussion on King County Deputy Prosecutor Johnson's "sea change" briefing to Judge Rothstein.

           Deputy Prosecutor Scott Johnson briefed Norm Maleng's "legal theory" in both of the lawsuits associated with the 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E and, I assume, all the other ELS lawsuits. Further, he presented other dishonest legal argument in his claim of the County's ownership of the ELS right-of-way land. Unfortunately, the judges who decided these lawsuits adopted Norm Maleng's "legal theory" and dishonestly awarded the contested land to the County. This includes you, the judges of the Washington State Supreme Court. This adoption of Maleng's "legal theory" will be discussed, in greater detail, later in this letter. But first, we look at the influence Norm Maleng had with judges and the courts. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    Norm Maleng's influence in the legal community: Who got to you?

           Norm Maleng was one of the most powerful people in the Washington State legal community. As King County Prosecutor for about thirty years he developed relationships with judges and other legal professionals that allowed him the confidence to participate in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme knowing that he would not be held accountable for his crime. For example, I'm aware of two judges who had close friendships with Maleng and are on the Federal District Court which produced the treasonous decision, King County v. Rasmussen (2001). The following statement is taken from The Seattle Times article on May 26, 2007, titled "Maleng leaves a living legacy". (with my emphasis) (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        "U.S. District Judge Ricardo Martinez, who worked to create the drug court with Maleng, his former boss, said it never would have happened without the prosecutor's unwavering support."

           The other Federal District Judge, Robert Lasnik, appears to have been one of Maleng's closest friends. Judge Robert Lasnik is Chief Judge of the Federal District Court in Western Washington. Lasnik worked for fifteen years as Maleng's chief of staff, and went to Maleng's home to comfort his wife when he learned of Maleng's untimely death. The following statement is taken from The Seattle Times article on May 25, 2007, titled ""Longtime prosecutor Norm Maleng dies"". (with my emphasis)

        "Robert Lasnik, the chief U.S. district judge in Western Washington who worked closely with Mr. Maleng for years as chief of staff, praised Mr. Maleng as 'the heart and soul of justice in this community for more than 30 years.'

        'No one questioned his integrity or his honesty,' said Lasnik, who was driving to the Maleng home late Thursday night to be with Mr. Maleng's wife, Judy.

        Lasnik and William Downing, a King County Superior Court judge, are among a host of young prosecutors Mr. Maleng brought into office and helped rise to prominence in the legal community."

           Judge Lasnik's statement in The Seattle Times is a lie. Folks did question Maleng's honesty, integrity, and character. I questioned his honesty in an email to Maleng on January 30, 2000. As close personal friends, it would seem likely that Maleng shared that letter with Lasnik. Also, my Complaint of Judicial Misconduct in 2004 was sent to the Western District Court where Lasnik serves as a judge. That complaint described Maleng as a primary participant in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. There is no question that folks frequently criticized Maleng's honesty and integrity. Maleng lacked those two qualities and this was obvious to those he wronged.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

           The East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme was concocted in the mid 1990's. Judge Lasnik served as Norm Maleng's chief of staff until he became a King County Superior Judge in 1990, so Lasnik was not working for Maleng during the time of the fraudulent railbanking transaction in 1996. However, as shown above, they remained close friends. In 2002, I presented evidence of the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme to U.S. prosecutor Jeff Sullivan. Sullivan never got back to me. But, it appears that he worked a deal with Maleng and Lasnik because Sullivan refused to prosecute Maleng for federal tax fraud, and then Norm Maleng supported Sullivan's promotion to U.S. Attorney when that position opened with the firing of John McKay. After Maleng unexpectedly died in early 2007, Chief Judge Lasnik and the judges of the Federal District Court appointed Sullivan to U.S. Attorney. Here, it appears that Lasnik misused his power and influence to promote a federal prosecutor to U.S. Attorney after that prosecutor agreed to not prosecute his close friend, Norm Maleng, and a member of Lasnik's court, District Judge Barbara Rothstein.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

           U.S. Attorney Jeff Sullivan doesn't have a very good reputation for ethical behavior. When Sullivan earlier served as the Prosecutor of Yakima County, Superior Court Judge Susan Hahn took the unusual step of publicly accusing Jeff Sullivan of unethical conduct in her State of Washington v. Alexander Martinez opinion. It seems that Sullivan continued his unethical behavior when he became a federal prosecutor. I believe that Jeff Sullivan chose to promote himself with the evidence of federal tax fraud I gave him in 2002, rather than protect the American people from federal tax corruption. It appears that Jeff Sullivan fits in perfectly with the King County legal community which was so shaped and influenced by the very dishonest King County Prosecutor, Norm Maleng.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

           Judge Lasnik's Federal District Court produced the first legal opinion which covered-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. Federal District Judge Barbara Jacobs Rothstein decided King County v. Rasmussen (2001). This decision is a criminal act from the bench and is not a legal opinion. The irrational support of Rothstein's opinion in King County v. Rasmussen (2002) and the denial of appeal en banc is an act of treason by federal judges because it replaces the Constitution and the law with the anarchy of judicial power gone awry.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

           When judges committed crimes in King County, it appears to me that Norm Maleng forgave those crimes in order to buy favor in their courts. After it was discovered that Federal Circuit Judge Jerome Farris had removed more than 100 trees from a Seattle park to improve his view and increase the value of his property, Maleng could find no reason to prosecute. I've often wondered if that favor to Farris had any effect on the denial of my lawsuit by the Ninth Circuit, en banc. Ferris was one of the judges who denied that appeal and protected Norm Maleng from prosecution for his part in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Read Seattle Times article in January 2003: "Judge will not be charged for trees cut in Seattle park"

           Norm Maleng had great influence with the legal community. I don't know of any specific fact which proves he, or a surrogate, directly contacted or influenced you in your denial of the Ray's appeal. But, I do know that your refusal to correct that dishonest opinion protected Norm Maleng and the other participants in the ELS federal tax fraud scheme. Those "other participants" include the federal and State judges who covered up the tax fraud scheme with their opinions. As an outsider, I have no access to your private communications. The specific proof of your participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme is found in the violation of constitutional rights and the profound dishonesty of Ray v. King County (2004). That "specific proof" will be discussed next.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        View a study of how Norm Maleng covered up his participation in the East Lake Sammamish Federal Tax Fraud Scheme.

    It was your duty to overturn Ray v. King County (2004).

           Ray v. King County (2004) is a criminal act from the bench. You, the judges of the Washington State Supreme Court, failed in your duty, and violated your oaths, with your refusal to overturn and correct that opinion. There are many intentional errors in Ray and the King County v. Rasmussen opinions. Further, the same intentional errors are found in all three opinions. The judges used these errors to "justify" the award of the land under the ELS right-of-way to King County and to cover-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. I will discuss only three of these intentional errors in this letter. Many other errors may be observed by reading the annotated versions of these three treasonous opinions, hyperlinked directly below.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Read Ray v. King County (2004), annotated with detailed discussion.

        Read King County v. Rasmussen (2001), annotated with detailed discussion.

        Read King County v. Rasmussen (2002), annotated with detailed discussion.

    Three intentional errors by the judges in Ray v. King County (2004) which you, the Washington State Supreme Court, refused to correct.

      1. The illegal use of Summary Judgment denied the Ray's constitutional right of due process.

             Ray v. King County (2004) was decided by illegally allowing summary judgment. As you well know, summary judgment is allowed only when there is agreement with the material facts. You, the judges of the Washington State Supreme Court had no right under the Constitution of Washington State or the Constitution of the United States to manufacture facts or pick through disputed facts to use the ones you like best. But you, and the Ray judges, did exactly that in the resolution of the Ray's lawsuit.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

             A significant number of disputed material facts exist in Ray v. King County (2004), yet the Ray majority declared there was no disagreement with the facts, and then decided the lawsuit based on whichever material facts supported their predetermined outcome. In the version of Ray v. King County (2004) containing my detailed comments, I spell out a number of disputed material facts. Use the following hyperlink to go to that discussion.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          View a discussion of Chief Judge Ronald Cox' illegal use of summary judgment in Ray v. King County (2004).

             Since Ray v. King County (2004) copies the dishonesty of the federal King County v. Rasmussen opinions, I provide links to a discussion on the illegal use of summary judgment in each of these opinions. There isn't much original thought in Judge Cox' opinion.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          View a discussion of Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein's illegal use of summary judgment in King County v. Rasmussen (2001).

          View a discussion of Federal Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher's illegal use of summary judgment in King County v. Rasmussen (2002).

             It appears to me that illegal use of summary judgment is common in our courts. In his Ray v. King County (2004) dissenting opinion, Judge Baker disagrees with a number of material facts, but never insists that those disputed material facts be resolved by a jury. Here is a portion of Baker's dissenting opinion which specifically identifies disagreement with a material fact, but fails to call for a jury trial. In this case, the disputed material fact is the authorship of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. The majority found that Hilchkanum, an illiterate Native American, wrote all the words in his right-of-way deed. Baker disagrees. (citation with my emphasis)
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

               "The majority states that because Hilchkanum must have understood the nature and extent of his conveyance, the fact that the deed was handwritten by someone else is of no consequence. And the majority holds that because there is nothing in the record indicating that the drafter was an agent of the railway, Hilchkanum must have been the drafter. This conclusion wrongly focuses on the identity of the grantor instead of the identity of the drafter of the deed. It is undisputed that the deed's language was taken from the railroad's standard deed. And the affidavit by the Rays' expert creates a material question of fact concerning who actually drafted the document. Taking this affidavit in a light most favorable to the Rays as the nonmoving party, any ambiguities in the deed must be construed against the railroad.5"

            Open Ray v. King County (2004) (Dissenting) at the above citation. (This version contains my comments.)

            Open Ray v. King County (2004) (Dissenting). (Without my comments.) Go to the middle of page 2.

             The authorship of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway (SLS&E) is a disputed material fact which was required to be resolved by a jury. The overwhelming evidence would have caused a legitimate jury to establish the fact that the Railway lawyers wrote every word in the Hilchkanum deed. The precedent set in King County v. Squire (1990) would then establish that the Hilchkanum deed granted an easement. In construing the Squire right-of-way to the SLS&E, the Squire court identified which words were written by the SLS&E Railway lawyers, and which words were changed or added by Governor Watson Squire. By default, the granting words in the Squire deed were found to be written by the Railway lawyers and were construed to "strongly suggests conveyance of an easement". These granting words in the Squire deed are identical to the granting words in the Hilchkanum deed. Based on these contributing facts, a jury would have been required to find that the Hilchkanum deed was written by the Railway, that it granted an easement, and that the land under the Ray's right-of-way belonged to the Rays. But, Judge Ronald Cox and Judge Ann Schindler didn't want the Hilchkanum deed to grant an easement, so these two crooked judges made up the material fact that Hilchkanum was the author of his deed, not the Railway lawyers. They denied the Ray's right to jury resolution of this disputed material fact. Further, they refused to acknowledge the conclusions in King County v. Squire. This dishonesty in identifying Hilchkanum as the author of his deed, by judges Cox and Schindler, was critical to their award of the Ray's land to King County, their cover-up of the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme, and their protection of the participants in the tax fraud scheme from prosecution. The participants include a number of federal judges. The majority opinion in Ray v. King County (2004) is a criminal act from the bench. The Ray dissenting opinion fails in its most important responsibility to insist that the material facts be established before a jury. The following RCWs lay out the law with respect to this issue. (with my emphasis)
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          RCW 4.44.090
          Questions of fact for jury.
               All questions of fact other than those mentioned in RCW 4.44.080, shall be decided by the jury, and all evidence thereon addressed to them.

          RCW 4.44.080
          Questions of law to be decided by court.
               All questions of law including the admissibility of testimony, the facts preliminary to such admission, and the construction of statutes and other writings, and other rules of evidence, are to be decided by the court, and all discussions of law addressed to it.

             It is obscene that the Ray majority judges, Cox and Schindler, resolved "questions of fact" in direct violation of Washington State law. It is equally obscene that dissenting judge, Baker, failed to demand the disputed material facts be resolved by a jury. It is certain that this illegal act was intentional. When judges make up the material facts in a case, they have the ability to provide whatever outcome they wish.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          Open the portion of Ray v. King County (2004) where I discuss Judge Cox' illegally determination of who authored the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed.

          Understand that a comparison of the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds to the SLS&E destroys the Ray v. King County (2004) opinion that Hilchkanum authored his deed.

             Judges of the Washington State Supreme Court, it was your responsibility to send Ray v. King County (2004) back to King County Superior Court for a jury determination of the disputed material facts. You violated the Ray's right of due process and the laws of Washington State by your failure. It is impossible that you did this by mistake. The Constitution and the laws are clear with this issue. Because of your experience and knowledge, this violation becomes an intentional criminal act on your part.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      2. The Ray court ignored and misapplied common law when it construed the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed.

             In construing a railroad right-of-way deed to determine whether an easement or fee simple interest is conveyed, the most critical factor is to determine whether a "right-of-way" or "land" was granted. If a right-of-way is conveyed in the deed's granting clause or habendum, the deed has always been held to be an easement. At least that was the rule, for more than one hundred years, until it was overturned in the King County v. Rasmussen and Ray v. King County opinions. You, the judges of the Washington State Supreme Court, allowed that radical change in common law with your refusal to correct Ray v. King County (2004).
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

             The term "right-of-way" and the term "strip of land" are contradictory terms when used in the granting language of a railroad deed. Since this is so critical to understand, and because this is a public letter, I provide the following two hyperlinks. The first takes the reader to fourteen citations which show that the grant of a right-of-way has always been held to be an easement. The second hyperlink takes the reader to forty-four citations which explain how the term "right-of-way" is understood when used in a railroad deed. These citations are presented as hyperlinks. By clicking on the citation, it will be opened at its position in its full opinion. The crooked judges who determined King County v. Rasmussen and Ray v. King County have the habit of using short citations and then assigning a different meaning than is understood when the citation is read in context. Since most folks don't have a law library down the hall, they aren't aware of this dishonest practice. That won't happen here because the full opinion is readily available. (The citations are presented with my emphasis.)
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          View fourteen citations holding the grant of a right-of-way conveys an easement.

          View forty-four citations explaining the meaning of the words "right-of-way" in railroad deeds.

             It is important to understand that there is no citation supporting the substitution of the contradictory term "right-of-way" with the term "strip of land" in railroad deeds. The only occurrence of this irrational substitution is in the King County v. Rasmussen and Ray v. King County decisions.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

             From the above forty-four citations, one can understand that different rules are used to construe the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad than are used to construe the grant of a "strip of land" or "land" to a railroad. For the purpose of clarity on this website, I've given these rules names. The rules are shown below with hyperlinks. By clicking on a link, the reader will be taken to a discussion which explains the rule and provides the common law citations which are the basis of the rule.

          The Basic Rules to Construe a Deed: The primary objective in construing a deed is to carry out the intent of the parties to the deed. The intent of the parties should be determined primarily from the deed, but the court may also consider the circumstances surrounding the deed's execution, and the subsequent conduct of the parties.
          [Understand the Basic Rules to Construe a Deed, with supporting precedent.]

          Railroad Right-of Way Granting Rule: A deed conveying a right-of way to a railroad grants an easement.
          [Understand the "Railroad Right-of-Way Granting Rule", with supporting precedent.]

          Railroad Land Granting Rule: A deed conveying land to a railroad grants fee simple title unless there is a statement that the deed is for the purpose of a railroad right-of-way or if the deed is limited to railroad right-of-way use. A statement of right-of-way purpose or limitation will change the grant to an easement.
          [Understand the "Railroad Land Granting Rule", with supporting precedent.]

             Norm Maleng participated in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme by accepting a phony donation of the land under the ELS right-of-way that he knew BNSF didn't own. In order to make the donation a "legal" one, Maleng needed a legal argument to show that BNSF actually owned the land. This took Maleng back to the original 1887 right-of-way deeds to the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway (SLS&E). Those deeds defined BNSF's interest in the ELS right-of-way land. Essentially all of those deeds granted a right-of-way to the SLS&E in the granting clause of the deed. Previously, about twenty SLS&E deeds had been determined to be easements, either in legal opinions or by the admission of the King County Prosecutor. None had been found to be grants in fee simple. In my above discussion, I explained how Norm Maleng developed his dishonest legal argument which contended that all the deeds under the BNSF ELS right-of-way granted fee simple title. I call it Norm Maleng's "legal theory" and won't repeat that discussion here. For evidence of the presentation of Norm Maleng's "legal theory" to the courts, I provide a link to just one of the King County Prosecutor's briefs which shows his claim that the term "right-of-way" in the granting language of a railroad deed means a "strip of land". This same dishonest claim was made in all of King County's briefs. Then, I provide links to show this same dishonest substitution of contradictory terms was adopted in all of the opinions construing the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          In King County's "Brief in Support of King County's Motion for Summary Judgment" (February 15, 2001), Deputy Prosecutor Johnson repeatedly describes the grant of a "right-of-way" as a "strip of land".

          View a discussion of Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein's dishonest substitution of the term "right-of-way" with the term "strip of land" in King County v. Rasmussen (2001).

          View a discussion of Federal Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher's dishonest substitution of the term "right-of-way" with the term "strip of land" in King County v. Rasmussen (2002).

          View a discussion of Washington State Appeals Court Judge Ronald Cox' dishonest substitution of the term "right-of-way" with the term "strip of land" in Ray v. King County (2004).

             It is ridiculous to substitute contradictory terms in a deed and then construe the deed using the substituted language. This is exactly what happened with the substitution of the term "right-of-way" with the term "strip of land" in construing the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. One would expect this sort of stunt from a completely dishonest prosecutor's office, such as Norm Maleng's. But, in a legitimate court system this dishonesty stops with the judge. If a lower court judge adopts this dishonest argument, the appeals court corrects. In the case of the dishonest substitution of words in the Hilchkanum deed, the system of judicial review has failed at every level. You, the judges of the Washington State Supreme Court, have failed to uphold the law with respect to this issue.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      3. The Ray court cherry-picked the Hilchkanum extrinsic evidence and then misapplied the law in its analysis.

             Earlier in this letter I described the basic rules to construe a deed. Here they are again:

          The Basic Rules to Construe a Deed: The primary objective in construing a deed is to carry out the intent of the parties to the deed. The intent of the parties should be determined primarily from the deed, but the court may also consider the circumstances surrounding the deed's execution, and the subsequent conduct of the parties.
          [Understand the Basic Rules to Construe a Deed, with supporting precedent.]

             In construing a deed, the words of the deed are the intrinsic evidence of the parties intent. The circumstances surrounding the deed's execution and the subsequent conduct of the parties are the extrinsic evidence. In the section above, I described the King County Prosecutor's substitution of words in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed in order to change it's meaning. This was a manipulation of the intrinsic evidence. Further, I expressed my opinion that the federal and State judges adopted that dishonest argument. In this section I discuss the manipulation of the extrinsic evidence by the Prosecutor and the judges.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

             King County presented cherry-picked subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deeds as extrinsic evidence of the Hilchkanum's intent in their 1887 right-of-way deed to the SLSL&E. All of the cherry-picked subsequent Hilchkanum deeds excepted the right-of-way. The County had to look far and wide in order to "find" its extrinsic "evidence". For example, one of these cherry-picked deeds was not in the chain of title of either the Ray or Rasmussen lawsuits. Once the King County Prosecutor identified several subsequent Hilchkanum deeds which excepted the "right-of-way", the Prosecutor claimed that these deeds excepted the "land" under the right-of-way. (The Prosecutor has a real problem with substituting contradictory terms in deeds.) The Prosecutor then claimed that, since Hilchkanum excepted the land under the right-of-way in his subsequent real estate deeds, this was proof that he had intended to grant the land under the right-of-way to the SLS&E in his 1887 right-of-way deed. There were two serious problems with the Prosecutor's argument. First, only some of the Hilchkanum subsequent real estate deeds excepted the right-of-way. Many did not. Second, the exception of a "right-of- way" in a deed does not automatically except the "land" under the right of way. I'll discuss each.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

             Only some of the Hilchkanum subsequent real estate deeds excepted the right-of-way. In my lawsuit, none of the subsequent deeds, which conveyed Hilchkanum's homestead land to outside parties, excepted the right-of-way. Since the Prosecutor and judges found profound meaning in the subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deeds which excepted the railroad right-of-way, it should have been important to explain the implication of the deeds which did not except the right-of-way. The Prosecutor refused to address this inconsistency and instead carefully ignored the deeds which suggested his argument was invalid. In his analysis, the prosecutor claimed that the exception of the right-of-way is an exception of the land under the right-of-way. Additionally, the prosecutor claimed that Hilchkanum excepted the land under the right-of-way in his subsequent real estate deeds because he understood that he had previously conveyed the land under the right-of-way in his 1887 right-of-way deed to the Railway. All of the Hilchkanum judges agreed with this dishonest analysis. If Hilchkanum conveyed fee simple title of the land under his right-of-way in his 1887 right-of-way deed, as these judges claim, then Hilchkanum sold his land a second time when he failed to except the right-of-way in his subsequent deeds which conveyed this same right-of-way land. It is a basic rule in real estate that a person cannot sell the same piece of land to two different parties. Yet, all of the federal and State judges who agreed with King County's analysis of the exception of a right-of-way, refused to admit that this analysis would have Hilchkanum selling portions of his homestead a second time when he executed the subsequent real estate deeds which lacked exception language.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

             In common law, the exception of a "right-of- way" in a deed does not automatically except the "land" under the right of way. The King County Prosecutor claimed in his briefs that the "land" under the right-of-way was excepted in the subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deeds, and all the judges agreed. Below, I provide a link to this dishonest argument by the Prosecutor, and links to a discussion of this dishonest finding in all three opinions which construed the Hilchkanum deeds.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          In King County's "Brief in Reply to Defendants' Opposition to King County's Motion for Summary Judgment" (April 19, 2001), Deputy Prosecutor Johnson makes dishonest claims about the exception language in the Hilchkanum subsequent real estate deeds.

          View a discussion of Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein's dishonest analysis of the Hilchkanum subsequent real estate deeds (extrinsic evidence) in King County v. Rasmussen (2001).

          View a discussion of Federal Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher's dishonest analysis of the Hilchkanum subsequent real estate deeds (extrinsic evidence) in King County v. Rasmussen (2002).

          View a discussion of Washington State Appeals Court Judge Ronald Cox' dishonest analysis of the Hilchkanum subsequent real estate deeds (extrinsic evidence) in Ray v. King County (2004).

             The proper way to understand Hilchkanum's intentions in his subsequent real estate deeds is to consider all of his subsequent deeds. Since some of the deeds excepted the right-of-way and some did not, this inconsistency must be examined. The first step is to go to the original right-of-way deed to determine the interest conveyed to the railroad. Since the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed granted a right-of way to a railroad, under common law this language suggests an easement. This conclusion is confirmed by the precedent set in King County v. Squire (1990). The Squire deed to the SLS&E used exactly the same granting words as the Hilchkanum deed and the court found the Squire granting words "strongly suggests an easement". Having established the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed granted an easement, the exception of that right-of-way in Hilchkanum's subsequent deeds merely recognizes the easement. The exception of an easement in a deed is not required, but allowed. This explains the fact the exception of the right-of-way is found some of Hilchkanum's subsequent deeds, and not in others. Unfortunately, properly applying common law was not what happened here.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

             In Ray v. King County and King County v. Rasmussen, the Prosecutor and the judges didn't want the extrinsic evidence to support the idea that Hilchkanum intended to grant an easement to the SLS&E. So, the Prosecutor and judges cherry-picked the extrinsic evidence, considering only the Hilchkanum subsequent deeds which excepted the right-of-way. Then they dishonestly decided the exception of a right-of-way is really an exception of the land under the right-of-way. They misrepresented the legal meaning of the exception language in those deeds. Further, they ignored the subsequent Hilchkanum deeds that, when analyzed, destroyed their argument. This is an obscene and intentional misrepresentation of the law. This manipulation of extrinsic evidence aided the judges in their cover-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme by falsely representing Hilchkanum's intentions in his deeds.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

A Personal Note to each Washington State Supreme Court Judge:

    Justice Richard Sanders, where did the "magic" go?

           Justice Richard Sanders, you betray your participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme with your dissenting opinion in Brown v. State of Washington (1996). In your Brown dissenting opinion, you demonstrated your thorough knowledge of railroad right-of-way deed precedent. As you well know, all the deeds construed in Brown were found to convey "strips of land", and the majority found that all of those deeds granted fee simple interest to the railroad based on the "Railroad Land Granting Rule". In your dissent, you appeared frustrated that the majority insisted the term "right-of-way" was required in the granting clause or habendum in order to find the intention to grant an easement. You argued that the intention to grant an easement could be found in other language in those right-of-way deeds. One citation from your dissenting opinion sums up this issue. (citation with my emphasis)
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        "The majority in essence defeats the common sense of this rule of intent by holding an easement is not created unless the magic words 'right of way' are contained in the 'granting clause.'"
        [Brown v. State of Washington (1996)- Dissention Opinion]

           You indicated in your Brown dissent that all the judges agreed the words "right-of-way" were "magic" when used in the granting clause, causing the deed to be an easement. Since the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, which you construed in Ray v. King County, granted a "right of way" in its granting clause, where did the "magic" go?
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

           In another part of your Brown dissent, you discussed the disadvantage that settlers experienced, as parties with the railroad in their right-of-way deeds. You suggested that the railroad should be held responsible for the words in the deed, as its author. I'll cite your discussion here. (citation with my emphasis)
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        "Most of these deeds are on preprinted forms drafted by the railroad. The railroad was a sophisticated, well financed, and organized party, undoubtedly represented by counsel. Landowners stood at a disadvantage to railroads in the early 1900s. It approached the landowners to purchase their land after it had already laid out or even built its rail line over the land. /17 See A.E. Korpela, Annotation, Deed to Railroad Company as Conveying Fee or Easement, 6 A.L.R.3D 973, 1034-38 (1966) (citing Gates v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., 13 F. Supp. 466 (Okla. 1934) (deed in lieu of condemnation conveys a fee); Highland Realty Co. v. City of San Rafael, 46 Cal. 2d 669, 298 P.2d 15 (1956) (where railway built before the conveyance in lieu of condemnation proceeding, it is an easement)). The railroad and the landowners knew that the railroad possessed the power of eminent domain and would end up in possession of the right of way, if it were not already. These were not arm's-length transactions between parties of equal bargaining power. For these reasons, the deeds, at least the preprinted portions of them, must be construed against the railroad. "[C]ontract language . . . is construed most strongly against the party who drafted it, or whose attorney prepared it." Guy Stickney, Inc. v. Underwood, 67 Wn.2d 824, 827, 410 P.2d 7 (1966) (citations omitted). "[A] deed reference to a 'right of way' for road or railway purposes is usually construed as conveying only an easement, since most rights of way are indeed easements." ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.1, at 718 (1984). "[T]he wise drafter [here, the railroad] will make clear what sort of interest is intended." Id. At 718. /18 Construing these deeds against the drafter buttresses the easement conclusion."
        [Brown v. State of Washington (1996)- Dissention Opinion]

           Judge Sanders, how could you agree with the finding in Ray v. King County (2004) that Hilchkanum wrote his deed to the SLS&E? In your Brown dissenting opinion, you observed that settlers were at a disadvantage in their dealings with the railroad in the early 1900's. The situation with the Hilchkanum deed should have been even more compelling to you. Hilchkanum was an illiterate Native American landowner in the late 1880's who signed the Railway prepared form deed with an "X". He stood at a much greater disadvantage than the white settlers you described in Brown. What caused you to abandon this argument in your consideration of the Ray's appeal?
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

           How could you agree with the finding in Ray v. King County (2004) that Hilchkanum wrote his own deed in spite of the fact that the words in the deed were the same as the words on the SLS&E Railway's pre-prepared "form deed"? In your Brown dissenting opinion, you stated that the pre-printed language provided by the railroad should be construed against the railroad. In King County v. Squire (1990) the court identified which words came from the SLS&E form deed and which words were added or changed by Governor Squire. The granting words that the Squire court attributed to the Railway are identical to the granting words in the Hilchkanum deed, and show that the words in the Hilchkanum deed come from the Railway's pre-prepared form deed. In your Brown dissent, you concluded that these words should be construed against the railroad. Yet with the same circumstances in Ray v. King County, you let stand the opinion that words in the Hilchkanum deed should be construed against Hilchkanum. As you well know, this issue was a disputed material fact that should have been resolved by a jury, not by dishonest appeals court judges who violated the rules of summary judgment. What happened to your well stated dissent in Brown, cited above?
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        View a study comparing the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds to the SLS&E.

           Judge Sanders, Ray v. King County (2004) is not a legal opinion, but rather it is a criminal act from the bench. Its effect, and therefore its purpose, was to cover-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and protect the active participants from prosecution. Ray v. King County mirrored the federal King County v. Rasmussen opinions which had the same criminal purpose. It was your responsibility to reverse and correct Ray. You failed. Your guilt is made even more evident by your dissenting opinion in Brown, as I have discussed above. I'm sure that you have done some good things in your legal career, but they have all been wiped out by what you have done here. You have ignored the basic constitutional rights of the Rays in your court. You have allowed the desecration of Washington State property law. You have covered-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. The legitimacy of the legal system in Washington State is contingent on the right of appeal to a higher and moral court. You have destroyed the moral authority of the Washington State Supreme Court with your actions in Ray, and have shown that no citizen of the State can expect their rights, or the law, to be enforced in "your" court, or the courts below.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

           Judge Sanders, in November 2008 you gained national attention by yelling "tyrant!" at U.S. Attorney General Michael Mukasey, apparently in protest of the Bush administration's practices at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. What a complete phony you are. How dare you cry "tyrant!" at another public official after you have acted in exactly that fashion with your denial of the Ray's appeal.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    Chief Justice Gerry Alexander, you are betrayed by your dissenting opinion in Brown.

           Judge Alexander, in Brown v. State of Washington (1996) you dissented on only one of the deeds, the Simpson deed. Your reason for dissent is explained in this citation: (with my emphasis)

        "...I disagree with the majority only with respect to its determination of the effect of one deed, that from George Simpson to the Milwaukee Railroad, dated May 4, 1907. In my judgment, that deed conveyed only an easement. I, therefore, dissent in part.

        Most of the deeds, as the majority notes, expressly convey fee simple title with no limitation on the use of the land. I readily agree with the majority that those deeds convey fee simple title. The majority also correctly observes that "where there is no language in the deed relating to the purpose of the grant or limiting the estate conveyed, and it conveys a definite strip of land, the deed will be construed to convey fee simple title." Majority op. at 439-40. Finally, it correctly recognizes that where a deed indicates that the grantor intends to convey to the grantee "a right of way for railroad purposes," an easement is created even if the deed is in the form that usually conveys fee title. Majority op. at 439; Swan v. O'Leary, 37 Wn.2d 533, 537, 225 P.2d 199 (1950).

        Applying the aforementioned principles, it is apparent that the deed from Simpson to the Milwaukee Railroad, unlike the other deeds at issue in the case, does not convey a fee simple estate. Rather, it conveys an easement. I reach that conclusion for several reasons. First, the deed does not expressly indicate that fee simple title is being conveyed. Second, it is captioned a "Right of Way Deed," and it purports only to convey a strip of land "over and across" a much larger tract of land. Clerk's Papers at 561. Significantly, the deed contains language, not present in the other deeds before us, that the grantor, Simpson, released all damage claims "occasioned by the location, construction, maintenance and operation of a Railway over and upon the premises hereby conveyed." Clerk's Papers at 561. This language lends support to the argument that Simpson intended to convey only a right of way for railroad purposes."
        [Brown v. State of Washington (1996)- Dissention Opinion]

           The Hilchkanum deed contained all the elements you found so compelling in the above citation, but also expressly granted a "right of way" in its granting clause. By your standard, and by one hundred years of common law precedent, the Hilchkanum deed is an easement. To refresh you on the common law which holds that the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad is an easement, kindly use the following link to read fourteen citations (with my emphasis).

        View fourteen citations holding the grant of a right-of-way conveys an easement.

           Also, it might be good to review and compare the Simpson deed to the Hilchkanum deed.

        View the Simpson right-of-way deed to the Milwaukee Railroad, May, 4, 1907.

        View the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E, May 9, 1887.

           As I stated above, the Hilchkanum deed contains all the elements that you found so compelling in the Simpson deed. Hilchkanum "does not expressly indicate that fee simple title is being conveyed", just like Simpson. Hilchkanum is captioned "Right of Way Deed", just like Simpson. The Hilchkanum specifies the benefits from the "location, construction and operation" of the Railway as "consideration" or payment for the grant. Simpson refers to "the location, construction, maintenance and operation of a Railway" in a statement releasing the Railway from damage claims. In that case the Hilchkanum deed has stronger language relating to railroad right-of-way use. But the significant difference between the deeds is that Simpson grants a "strip of land", while Hilchkanum grants a "right of way". The majority found the Simpson deed conveyed a fee simple interest based on the "Railroad Land Granting Rule". By the standards discussed in the majority and dissenting opinions in Brown, you should have been found the Hilchkanum deed to be an easement. But, you didn't.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

           Judge Alexander, why did you not overturn Ray v. King County (2004) and find the Hilchkanum deed granted an easement? You are betrayed by your dissenting opinion in Brown. Or did you find some other reason in the Ray opinion compelling? Did you agree with the Appeals Court that they had the right to simply make up the material facts? Ridiculous, undocumented facts? Did you agree with the Appeals Court that Hilchkanum wrote his deed in spite of the correct interpretation in the Ray v. King County (2004) (Dissenting Opinion)? Did you agree with the Appeals Court that the exception of the right-of-way in some of subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deeds excepted the land under the right-of-way? I discuss this misapplication of common law in a section above. If you do believe the exception of a right-of-way means an exception of the land under the right-of-way, please tell me how many times you allow a party to sell the same piece of land? I discussed this conflict in the section above, too.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

           Judge Alexander, there appears to be only one reason for you to refuse to overturn and correct Ray v. King County (2004). Your refusal to overturn Ray covers-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and protects the active participants from prosecution. It seems that it would need to be something that "important" to get the Chief Justice of the Washington State Supreme Court to intentionally deny constitutional rights to a party and destroy property rights of the people of the State. It would need to be something that "important" to get the Chief Justice of the Washington State Supreme Court to accept the criminal act from the bench that is Ray v. King County (2004).
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    Justice Charles Johnson and Justice Barbara Madsen, why did you fail to uphold your majority findings in Brown?

           Justice Charles Johnson and Justice Barbara Madsen, why did you fail to uphold your majority findings in Brown? Both of you joined in the majority opinion in Brown. In Ray v. King County (2004), the majority adopted Norm Maleng's "legal theory" which grossly mischaracterizes your decision in Brown. It was your responsibility to reestablish your ruling in Brown by overturning and correcting Ray. As I have shown above, Norm Maleng's "legal theory" was first made public in a 1997 memorandum by King County Senior Deputy Prosecutor Bill Blakney. Blakney claimed that in your Brown opinion, you decided that the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad is the same as the grant of a "strip of land" to a railroad. You agree with that ridiculous claim by your refusal to overturn and correct Ray v. King County (2004). Deputy Prosecutor Blakney claimed in the opening paragraph of his 1997 memorandum that: (with my emphasis) (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        "Brown clearly establishes the rule that a deed to a railroad, even though it may convey a right of way, will convey fee simple title unless the deed contains language expressly and clearly limiting the estate conveyed."
        King County Senior Deputy Prosecutor Bill Blakney memorandum, September, 17 1997

           This statement by Blakney is the first public expression of Norm Maleng's "legal theory", the dishonest legal argument that Norm Maleng manufactured to hide his participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. Norm Maleng's "legal theory" has spread like a cancer, first into all of the Prosecutor's briefs, and then into the Ray v. King County and King County v. Rasmussen opinions. With your denial of the Ray appeal, the cancer has now metastasized to the Washington State Supreme Court. This cancer destroys the legitimacy of "your" court. Links to the dishonest arguments and legal opinions supporting Norm Maleng's "legal theory" were provided above. I'll repeat them here. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        In King County's "Brief in Support of King County's Motion for Summary Judgment" (February 15, 2001), Deputy Prosecutor Johnson repeatedly describes the grant of a "right-of-way" as a "strip of land".

        View a discussion of Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein's dishonest substitution of the term "right-of-way" with the term "strip of land" in King County v. Rasmussen (2001).

        View a discussion of Federal Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher's dishonest substitution of the term "right-of-way" with the term "strip of land" in King County v. Rasmussen (2002).

        View a discussion of Washington State Appeals Court Judge Ronald Cox' dishonest substitution of the term "right-of-way" with the term "strip of land" in Ray v. King County (2004).

           The "buck" is supposed to stop at the Washington State Supreme Court. You had the responsibility to reverse Ray and reestablish the ruling you made in Brown. To help you remember, and because this is a public letter, I'll cite two statements in your Brown majority opinion that were reversed with your refusal to correct Ray.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        "Weighing the factors outlined in Swan, we conclude construing the deeds to convey fees simple more accurately reflects the intent of the parties, given the form of the deeds and the fact they convey "fee simple title" to definite strips of land given without any limitation or qualification. While the manifest purpose of the deeds is to convey land for railroad lines, railroads have never been prohibited from holding rights of way in fee simple. Morsbach, 152 Wash. at 575. In the absence of language in the deeds expressly and clearly limiting the estate conveyed, the deeds fall squarely within the rule that where there is no language in a deed relating to the purpose of the grant or limiting the estate conveyed, and it conveys a definite strip of land, it will be construed to convey fee simple title. See Swan, 37 Wn.2d at 536.
        [Brown v. State of Washington (1996)]

        "The words "right of way" can have two purposes: (1) to qualify or limit the interest granted in a deed to the right to pass over a tract of land (an easement), or (2) to describe the strip of land being conveyed to a railroad for the purpose of constructing a railway. Morsbach, 152 Wash. at 568; Harris 120 Wn.2d at 737. Unlike Swan, Veach, and Roeder, where "right of way" was used in the granting or habendum clauses to qualify or limit the interest granted, "right of way" in the deeds at issue here appears in either the legal description of the property conveyed or in the portion of the deeds describing Milwaukee's obligations with respect to the property."
        [Brown v. State of Washington (1996)]

           In the first citation above, you specified that the Brown court was considering deeds which conveyed only a "strip of land", most in statutory warranty form and specifically conveying "fee simple title". In the second citation above, you specified that the Brown court recognized that the use of the term "right of way", in the granting or habendum clauses, qualifies or limits the conveyance to an easement. In Ray v. King County (2004), the court adopted Norm Maleng's "legal theory" and found that the grant of a "right-of-way" is the same as the grant of a "strip of land". The "legal theory" mis-cites your first citation above for authority. The Ray court further found that the use of the term "right-of-way" in the Hilchkanum granting clause does not limit or restrict the grant. This finding in Ray reverses your finding in the second citation above. These findings in Ray have changed the property rights of the people of the State of Washington. Your refusal to overturn Ray signaled your agreement and approval of the appeals court's dishonest analysis.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

           I ask again, Justice Charles Johnson and Justice Barbara Madsen, why did you fail to uphold your majority findings in Brown? Your refusal to overturn Ray v. King County (2004) has harmed the property rights of the people of the State of Washington. But, it has done much more damage than that. Ray v. King County (2004) is based on the illegal use of summary judgment. Judge Ronald Cox and Judge Ann Schindler made up the facts that controlled the outcome of the lawsuit. They made up unsupported material facts, such as their conclusion that an illiterate Native American wrote his right-of-way deed to the SLS&E Railway in 1887. Since the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed is word-for-word the same as many of the other right-of-way deeds, it must follow that Hilchkanum authored those deeds, too. Ridiculous! A study of Ray v. King County (2004) shows not only the violation of the Ray's constitutional right of due process, but the opinion contains intentional error after intentional error. Ray v. King County (2004) is a criminal act from the bench. Your refusal to overturn and correct is a more serious criminal act. Your refusal is a statement that you will not recognize the constitutional rights of the citizens of the State in "your" court. Your refusal is a statement of your willingness to misapply the law and destroy common law precedent in order to cover-up the criminal activity of federal and State judges and the powerful folks in King County who committed the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

           Justice Charles Johnson and Justice Barbara Madsen, you must be impeached and removed before you do any more harm to the people of Washington State.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    Justice Tom Chambers, Justice Susan Owens, and Justice Mary Fairhurst, you destroyed rights and misapplied the law in your denial of Ray.

           Prior to the Ray v. King County and King County v. Rasmussen decisions, all contested SLS&E right-of-way deeds were determined to be easements. Two of those SLS&E deeds were found to be easements in judicial opinions. About twenty, associated with Lawson v. State (1986), were admitted to be easements by King County in the settlement of that lawsuit. After King County agreed to accept a phony tax donation of all the land under the East Lake Sammamish right-of-way, it needed to manufacture a reason that all of the ELS deeds granted fee simple title to the SLS&E. Since the ELS deeds and the earlier construed deeds were based on a common SLS&E "form deed", the King County Prosecutor contrived Norm Maleng's "legal theory" to explain the radical change in the rules to construe railroad right-of-way deeds. The Prosecutor claimed that, in Brown v. State of Washington (1996), the Washington State Supreme Court effected a "sea change" or "bright line rule" altering one hundred years of Washington common law. In the paragraphs above, I have criticized the WSCC judges who participated in Brown, and then failed up uphold their Brown opinion in the face of its misrepresentation by King County and the judges who misconstrued the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

           Justice Tom Chambers, Justice Susan Owens, and Justice Mary Fairhurst, even though you did not participate in the Brown opinion, you are responsible for accepting the dishonest legal argument and violations of rights in Ray v. King County (2004). You are responsible for the effect of your denial of the Ray's appeal. Your denial covered-up of the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and stole land from innocent citizens. I'm one of them! There is no possibility that you made a mistake in your denial of the Ray's appeal. The profound dishonesty of Judges Cox and Schindler in their Ray opinion is proof of your participation in the crime. You destroy the Washington State Supreme Court, and all the lower courts in the state, by your actions. In my opinion, the only possibility for the Washington State Supreme Court to regain its legitimacy is for you to be impeached and removed from the court.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    Justice Debra Stephens, you must publicly demand impeachment of your fellow judges.

           Justice Stephens, it is up to you to reestablish the legitimacy of the Washington State Supreme Court by publicly calling for the impeachment of your fellow judges who participated in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme with their denial of Ray. You (and possibly James Johnson) are the only judge who sits on the Supreme Court and did not take part in that crime. Your choice is simple. Support the Constitution, the law, and the rights of the people of Washington State, or support your fellow judges who have committed criminal acts, suspended the Constitution and the law, and destroyed the legitimacy of the Washington State Supreme Court. Since I have not found one honest judge in my ten year fight for my rights, I have little expectation that you will be the exception to that rule. But, consider this. The criminal acts and violation of rights which judges are committing from the bench will one day be realized by and corrected by an angry public. If you fail to act now, don't deny knowledge of this crime or pretend to side with the we-the-people later. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    Justice James Johnson, where do you fit?

           Justice James Johnson, above I separately address the judges who participated in the Brown and Ray opinions, the judges who participated only in Ray, and the judge (Stephens) who clearly came to the Washington State Supreme Court after Ray. Your bio on the Supreme Court website shows that you were elected in 2004. Since I don't have the date of the denial of the Ray's appeal and the names of the judges who participated, you will have to add yourself to the appropriate category above. Either you participated in the denial of the Ray's appeal and should be impeached, or you should join Stephens in a call for impeachment of your fellow judges. I assume neither will happen, and the judicial system in the State of Washington will continue in its course toward rule by total anarchy.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

Recap of the ELS tax fraud scheme and failure of the judiciary.

    Your denial of appeal was a cowardly act.

           Judges of the Washington State Supreme Court, in this letter I've described your participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. On its surface, your denial of the Ray's appeal seems an innocuous act. If challenged, you will probably concentrate on your right to refuse review rather than honestly address the effect of your refusal. Your cowardly denial of the Ray's appeal is the last act in a perfect crime that I call "Theft-by-Community". This recap summarizes the chain of criminal acts ending with your denial of the Ray's appeal, and its effect.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    The chain of judicial betrayal:

           The judicial branch of our government has lost its way. It has lost its legitimacy. After I discovered the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme, then "blew the whistle" on the crime, and took evidence of the crime to court, I foolishly believed that my constitutional rights would be recognized and my property rights established. Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein denied my constitutional rights, stole my land, and covered up the tax fraud scheme with her opinion, King County v. Rasmussen (2001). On appeal, Rothstein's sister federal judge, Senior Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher, supported every dishonest element of the district court's opinion in her appeal opinion, King County v. Rasmussen (2002). I still foolishly believed in the integrity of our judicial system and assumed my rights and property would reestablished with my appeal to the Ninth Circuit, en banc. I was wrong. My en banc appeal was refused, as was my appeal to the United States Supreme Court. My 2004 Complaint of Judicial Misconduct was then dishonestly rejected by the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit. Irrationally optimistic, I still foolishly believed that the Ray's lawsuit in the Washington State courts would reestablish the integrity of Washington railroad right-of-way precedent, expose the criminal actions of the federal judges, and justify a second appeal of my lawsuit to the United States Supreme Court. Your cowardly acceptance of Ray v. King County (2004) was the last link in this chain of judicial dishonesty and betrayal. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    The effect of these judicial crimes:

           The Hilchkanum lawsuits have ramifications far beyond the property rights of a few families along Lake Sammamish. There may have been no Enron or WorldCom scandals if District Judge Rothstein had turned over the evidence of Arthur Andersen's fraudulent ELS appraisal to prosecutors in 2000. The chain of betrayal covers-up massive corruption in King County government. I count nine courts, state and federal, which were presented with the dishonest arguments of the King County Prosecutor, and a minimum of five federal and state judges who were presented specific evidence of the ELS tax fraud scheme. In each court, the judges refused to enforce Washington common law and ignored evidence of the County's crime. The federal judges struck evidence of the tax fraud scheme on a motion by Norm Maleng, who was a principle participant in the crime. The effect of the judge's actions and opinions was to cover-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and protect the powerful folks who participated in that crime. These criminal actions by federal and state judges destroy the legitimacy of our courts, and replace the rule of law with the unchecked power of a corrupt judiciary.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

Summary: The legitimacy of the Washington State Supreme Court must be reestablished.

         The criminal acts from the bench, which I document on this page, destroy the legitimacy and moral authority of the Washington State Supreme Court. They show that our judges have replaced the Constitution and the law with the anarchy of unchecked judicial power. When the public realizes that the Constitution and the laws are not being upheld in our courts, the anarchy will spread. It will destroy our State and Nation if not stopped where it started: in the courts. For the judges of the Washington State Supreme Court who participated in this crime, you must be impeached and removed before you do any more harm to the people of Washington. For the WSSC judge(s) who did not participate in Ray, if you want to reestablish the legitimacy of the Washington State Supreme Court, you must call for the impeachment and prosecution of the judges who participated in this crime from the bench. This includes the federal judges who covered-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and are protected by the Washington State Supreme Court's denial of the Ray's appeal.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        John Rasmussen




Reference: A timeline of the events described on this webpage:

     Here is a timeline of the events I describe on this page. The events are presented as a hyperlinks which will take the reader to justifying documentation. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    1997 The fraudulent ELS railbanking transaction was completed by BNSF, TLC (staffed with Rails-to-Trails Conservancy lawyers), and King County. The tax fraud scheme generated a $40 million illegal tax write-off for BNSF.

    1997 Norm Maleng, the King county Prosecutor knew that he could be prosecuted for his participation in the tax fraud scheme. To hide his crime, Maleng altered public documents and manufactured a dishonest legal argument.

    2000 After questioning the legality of King County's establishment of the ELS trail for months, I discovered the tax fraud scheme and "blew the whistle".

    2000 After enduring months of stonewalling by the County, I expressed my willingness to defend my property and rights with a gun, unless King County would explain its illegal actions on my land.

    2000 King County responded by filing suit. King County Superior Court Judge Haley then issued a preliminary injunction against me based on perjurious declarations. Haley ignored my description of the ELS tax fraud scheme.

    2001 To escape Judge Haley, we moved to Federal Court. There, District Judge Rothstein issued a completely dishonest opinion which covered-up the ELS tax fraud scheme. Her illegal use of summary judgment denied my constitutional rights.

    2002 On appeal, Circuit Judge Fletcher issued a dishonest opinion which backed up the District Court opinion. Her opinion mirrored every significant dishonest argument in King County v. Rasmussen (2001). It covered-up the ELS tax fraud scheme.

    2002 En banc appeal of King County v. Rasmussen (2002) was denied by the full Ninth Circuit Court.

    2003 Appeal of King County v. Rasmussen (2002) was denied by the United States Supreme Court.

    2004 I filed a Complaint of Judicial Misconduct with the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit. I described the criminal activity of Judges Rothstein and Fletcher. The appeal was denied.

    2004 In Ray v. King County (2004), Chief Judge Ronald Cox, Washington State Court of Appeals, Division 1, issued a completely dishonest opinion which mirrored the treasonous opinions by Federal Judges Rothstein and Fletcher.

    2004 In your denial of the Ray v. King County (2004) appeal, the Washington State Supreme Court hid the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and protected the participants in the crime.

    2008 This website is established in order to inform the public of the corruption and dishonesty in King County government, and in the Federal and State courts of Washington.

    My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.