XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
Website Navigation
The Issues
and
Proposed Solutions
( Website Homepage )
Understand the ELS Federal Tax Fraud Scheme
Legal Opinions and
Documents related to the
ELS Tax Fraud Scheme
Chronological List of
Website Documents
Washington State
Precedential
Railroad Right-of-Way
Opinions Thru Brown

Prior to the ELS federal tax fraud scheme, ALL SLS&E deeds considered in King County courts were determined to be easements.

by John Rasmussen

Please read a disclaimer for the statements I make on this website accusing judges, politicians and activists of criminal actions.



Introduction:

        Tax fraud: King County Prosecutor Norm Maleng, the leadership of King County, The Land Conservancy of Seattle and King County (TLC), Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad (BNSF), and the disgraced accounting firm Arthur Andersen LLC conspired to commit the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. From this blatant crime, BNSF got an illegal federal tax write-off of about $40 million, King County got the East Lake Sammamish railroad corridor to convert to a trail, along with the claim of ownership of the underlying land, and TLC did "good" and bagged a bunch of cash for its future "do gooder" projects. Perfect...almost. These very dishonest people screwed the American taxpayers out of about $15 million in stolen tax revenue and stole millions of dollars from the folks who had reversionary ownership of the land under the East Lake Sammamish right-of-way. The success of the crime was based on the false claim that all the 1887 Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway (SLS&E) deeds along East Lake Sammamish granted fee simple title of the land under the right-of-way to the Railway. The facts and the law do not support the arguments the participants used to claim the ELS deeds granted fee simple title. Almost all of the ELS right-of-way deeds granted easements.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Before King County's participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme, about fourteen Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway (SLS&E) deeds went before King County courts with the issue of whether they conveyed an easement or fee simple title of the land under the right-of-way. ALL the deeds were determined to convey EASEMENTS. The SLS&E was the railroad which obtained the original right-of-way deeds along East Lake Sammamish in the late 1880's. These original right-of-way deeds are the basis of King County's present claim of ownership of the land under the East Lake Sammamish right-of-way. In 1996, Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) owned the right-of-way along Lake Sammamish, as successor in interest to the SLS&E, and donated the underlying land to King County in order to take a fraudulent federal tax write-off. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        After King County's participated in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme by accepting the phony tax donation of the land under the ELS right-of-way, King County Prosecutor Norm Maleng claimed ALL the deeds along East Lake Sammamish conveyed FEE SIMPLE TITLE of the land under the right-of-way to the SLS&E. This was a false claim because almost all of the ELS deeds were materially identical to SLS&E deeds which had previously been determined to be easements. In the late 1880's, the SLS&E lawyers composed a "form deed" which they took to the settlers in the path of their proposed track. Therefore, most of the deeds along East Lake Sammamish are materially identical to the fourteen deeds which had previously been determined to be easements. This was a big problem for Maleng. It appears the only reason he claimed the East Lake Sammamish deeds granted fee simple title was to protect himself, the leadership of King County, and the other participants in the tax fraud scheme from going to prison for tax fraud.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      View a study of the SLS&E "form deed" used along East Lake Sammamish, and variations based on location and time.

        This page presents the Hilchkanum deed which the judges in King County v. Rasmussen and Ray v. King County illegally construed in violation of rules of summary judgment. These Hilchkanum judges denied the ELS right-of-way landowner's Constitutional right to resolve disputed facts before a jury. This page compares the Hilchkanum deed with the SLS&E deeds which were previously determined to be easements, and which are materially identical. It provides evidence such as photocopies of the deeds, court declarations, briefs, and legal opinions. This page then discusses the dishonest legal argument Maleng contrived to hide King County's participation in the crime.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

Outline and Menu:  (Each topic is presented as a hyperlink. Use this menu to jump to that subject.)

    * The Hilchkanum Judges committed criminal acts from the bench.

    * BEFORE the federal tax fraud scheme, ALL King County SLS&E deeds were determined to be EASEMENTS.

      * King County v. Squire (1990): The court found the Squire deed to the SLS&E granted an EASEMENT.

      * Lawson v. State (1986): King County admitted ALL the SLS&E deeds granted EASEMENTS.

      * Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber (1910): The court found the SLS&E deed granted an EASEMENT.

      * King County was notified the ELS deeds were EASEMENTS by an expert in railroad right-of-way law.

      * King County Prosecutor Norm Maleng knew the ELS deeds granted EASEMENTS.

    * AFTER the tax fraud scheme, Maleng claimed that ALL the ELS SLS&E deeds granted FEE SIMPLE TITLE.

      * King County Prosecutor Norm Maleng lied to the public through the local newspapers.

      * The King County Prosecutor's most ridiculous claim:

      * Norm Maleng's "legal theory": Maleng's dishonest legal argument.

      * The "I'm just stupid" defense.

    * Summary: King County Prosecutor Norm Maleng knew he was participating in the ELS federal tax fraud scheme.

The Hilchkanum Judges committed criminal acts from the bench.

        My name is John Rasmussen. I owned land bisected by the East Lake Sammamish right-of-way in King County Washington. In late 1999 and early 2000 I discovered the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme which was being used to steal my land and establish the East Lake Sammamish Trail. Since King County Prosecutor Norm Maleng appeared to be the principal participant in the crime, on January 31, 2000, I wrote an email to Norm Maleng accusing him of participating in the ELS federal tax fraud scheme. After Maleng refused to respond, I described the crime to the leadership of King County, a federal prosecutor, the IRS, federal and State politicians, the newspapers, judges, and others. It is now more than ten years later and I have had no answers to my accusations and questions despite the fact that I took my lawsuit as far as the United States Supreme Court. My submission to Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein is typical of my experience. In my declaration to Judge Rothstein (highlighted portions were struck by Rothstein), I explained how I discovered the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and provided evidence that King County had participated in the crime. On a motion by the King County Prosecutor, Judge Rothstein struck the portion of my declaration which described the tax fraud scheme, and struck the evidence of the crime which I had presented. It's "lucky" for a criminal who can get the description and evidence of his crime struck by the judge. The crime was further covered-up in federal and State courts by judges who illegally and irrationally found that the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway (SLS&E) conveyed fee simple interest to the land under the right-of-way on my property. I call them the "Hilchkanum Judges" and describe their common dishonest tactics as racketeering. My property along East Lake Sammamish was a portion of the 1883 Hilchkanum homestead and was subject to the terms of the 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E. The Hilchkanum deed is materially identical to other right-of-way deeds along East Lake Sammamish, and materially identical to SLS&E deeds which had previously been determined to convey easements. The Rasmussen and Ray Hilchkanum decisions legitimize King County's acceptance of BNSF's phony tax donation of all the land under the right-of-way, and cover-up King County's participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. A study of their opinions show that the Hilchkanum judges covered-up the ELS tax fraud scheme by suspending the Constitutional right of due process, misstating and misapplying common law, and manipulating the facts. It takes an effort to study these opinions. The Hilchkanum judges are counting on the public not making that effort. If you live in King County and believe that it is impossible for the leaders of King County to commit crimes and then convince judges to cover-up for them, you have every right to live in a state of denial and ignorance. But, when your kids or grandchildren ask you why you did nothing about the corruption in King County government, at least be honest with them and tell them you refused to even look at the evidence.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Who are the "Hilchkanum Judges"?

      View evidence of the ELS federal tax fraud scheme.

      King County v. Rasmussen (2001) is a criminal act from the bench.

      King County v. Rasmussen (2002) is a criminal act from the bench.

      Ray v. King County (2004) is a criminal act from the bench.

      View my 2004 Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, and denial by Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Schroeder.

      View my March 31, 2009 public letter to the Judges of the Washington State Supreme Court.

Before the tax fraud scheme, all King County SLS&E deeds were found to be easements.

        The East Lake Sammamish BNSF right-of-way was founded by the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway (SLS&E) in the late 1800s. Before the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme, the issue of easement-or-fee arose in about fourteen SLS&E right-of-way deeds which had been brought before King County courts. All of the deeds were determined to be easements. The Squire right-of-way deed was construed an easement in King County v. Squire (1990). The Burke right-of-way deed was construed an easement in Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber (1910). Further, in Lawson v. State (1986) the King County Prosecutor admitted that all the SLS&E deeds involved in that lawsuit were easements. There were about twelve SLS&E deeds associated with Lawson. So, prior to King County Prosecutor Maleng's participation in the ELS federal tax fraud scheme, about fourteen SLS&E deeds had been determined to grant easements in King County courts. In that determination, the King County Prosecutor (King County) was a party in thirteen of those fourteen deeds. The King County Prosecutor lost the issue of easement-or-fee in all the previous SLS&E lawsuits. With that knowledge, Norm Maleng illegally accepted a donation of the land under the East Lake Sammamish right-of-way based on the assumption that all the SLS&E right-of-way deeds along East Lake Sammamish granted fee simple title and the underlying land was owned by BNSF. There is no significant difference between the SLS&E deeds along Lake Sammamish and the other SLS&E deeds in King County which had previously been determined to be easements. This is because almost all of the SLS&E deeds were built on a "form deed" which was written by the Railway's lawyers. The granting clause, habendum, and secondary grant are identical in SLS&E deed, after SLS&E deed, after SLS&E deed. While there were small changes made to accommodate some of the grantors, these elements are materially identical in SLS&E deed, after SLS&E deed, after SLS&E deed. (A more detailed and in-depth study of the SLS&E "form deed" is provided by the link below. It explains that the "form deed" varied by location and time.) (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      View a study of the SLS&E "form deed" used along East Lake Sammamish, and variations based on location and time.

        Norm Maleng knew he was participating in a tax fraud scheme by accepting the phony tax donation from BNSF, so he took steps to protect himself, his staff and the leadership of King County from being held accountable for their crime. These steps will be briefly discussed later on this page, and are explained, in detail, at the link directly below. But, the first step in understanding the criminal acts committed by Norm Maleng and the King County leadership is to understand the fact that, prior to the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme, all the SLS&E right-of-way deeds considered in King County courts were determined to be easements. These deeds are discussed next.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Understand how the King County Prosecutor hid his participation in the ELS federal tax fraud scheme.

    King County v. Squire (1990)

    Both Norm Maleng and the Hilchkanum judges ignored the precedent established in Squire.

        The most troublesome opinion for Norm Maleng and the Hilchkanum Judges was King County v. Squire (1990). In Squire, the Washington State Appeals Court construed Watson Squire's 1887 right-of-way deed to the SLS&E, and determined that the granting clause "strongly suggests conveyance of an easement". With respect to the issue of easement-or-fee, the granting clause of the Squire right-of-way deed is materially identical to the granting clause of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, and materially identical to many other SLS&E granting clauses. Here are the Squire and Hilchkanum granting clauses: (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      The Squire Granting Clause (with the changes made by Watson Squire shown in bold font):

        "In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location, construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway a right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands in said County, described as follows, to-wit:"
        [King County v. Squire (1990)]

      The Hilchkanum Granting Clause:

        "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of
        the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the County of King in Washington Territory we do hereby
        donate grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way one hundred (100) feet in width through our lands in said County described as follows to wit."
        [View a photocopy and the full transcription of the May 9, 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E.]

        The fact that the Squire and Hilchkanum granting words are identical, and the Squire granting words were found to convey an easement, was not good for Maleng because he accepted a donation of the land under the Hilchkanum right-of-way from BNSF based on the assumption that all the SLS&E deeds along East Lake Sammamish granted fee simple title. The Hilchkanum right-of-way is on located on East Lake Sammamish and, like most of the other right-of-way deeds along East Lake Sammamish, is based on a SLS&E "form deed" which was prepared by the Railway lawyers. If the precedent set in King County v. Squire were applied, the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed would be found to grant an easement. This would mean that BNSF had no land to donate, and Norm Maleng would be committing federal tax fraud by accepting a donation of that land. So, Maleng argued that the words in the Hilchkanum granting clause did not have the same meaning as the identical words in the Squire granting clause. Since the granting clauses are materially identical, this pushed Maleng into his most dishonest mode. In real courts of law, Maleng would have been exposed as a fraud. But, we don't have real courts of law in King County, Washington. They no longer exist in King County, Washington. The precedent set in Squire, finding the identical granting words conveyed an easement, was briefed to every Hilchkanum judge. Every judge ignored that precedent and refused to discuss it in their opinions.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    By default, the Squire court determined that the granting clause was written by the Railway.

        Since the words of a deed are construed against its author, the Squire court identified which words were added or changed by Watson Squire and gave great consideration to these changes in order to understand Squire's intentions. It's important to understand that "when construing a deed, the intent of the parties is of paramount importance and the court's duty to ascertain and enforce." Without explicitly stating the fact, the Squire court assumed the words of the Squire right-of-way deed which were not added or changed by Watson Squire were provided by the Railway lawyers. I make this statement because there were only two parties to the Squire deed; the Squires and the SLS&E Railway. By default, it must be assumed that the words not added or changed by Watson Squire were composed and provided by the Railway. In construing the deed, the court concluded that the Squire right-of-way deed was an easement based on the wording of the granting clause. Since Watson Squire made no changes to the granting words, the authorship of these words are attributed to the Railway. This becomes even more apparent when one observes that other SLS&E deeds used the identical granting words. Before we examine the Railway's "form deed", consider this condensed citation from Squire which shows the court found the Squire deed conveyed an easement based on the words in the granting clause. Please use the link to read the full citation in the context of the full opinion. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      "The Squire deed granted a 'right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands'. This suggests an easement was conveyed...the language in the granting clause strongly suggests conveyance of an easement...The authorities and cases discussed above clearly support construing the Squire deed as an easement."
      [King County v. Squire (1990)]

        It was very correct for the Squire court to determine that the Squire deed conveyed an easement. The Squire deed conveyed a "right of way" to the Railway in its granting clause. It is well established precedent in Washington State that the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad, expressed in the granting clause or habendum, conveys an easement.

      View fourteen citations explaining the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad conveys an easement.

        So, here again are the granting clause from the Squire deed (which was determined by the Squire court to convey an easement) and the Hilchkanum deed (which was determined by the Hilchkanum judges to convey fee simple title). The Hilchkanum Judges refused to explain this gigantic inconsistency in common law, despite the fact that the conclusions of the Squire court were briefed to them.

      The Squire Granting Clause (with the changes made by Watson Squire shown in bold font):

        "In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location, construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway a right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands in said County, described as follows, to-wit:"
        [King County v. Squire (1990)]

      The Hilchkanum Granting Clause:

        "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of
        the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the County of King in Washington Territory we do hereby
        donate grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way one hundred (100) feet in width through our lands in said County described as follows to wit."
        [View a photocopy and the full transcription of the May 9, 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E.]

        The Squire court found the Squire granting clause "strongly" indicated the intention to convey an easement. As shown further below, many other SLS&E deeds had this identical granting language. The Hilchkanum judges decided that illiterate Bill Hilchkanum, a Duwamish Indian, was responsible for the identical granting clause and intended to convey fee simple title to the Railway. These dishonest judges refused to explain why these identical granting words have different authors and conveyed different interests to the SLS&E Railway. Of course, the issue of authorship is a question of fact which is required to be resolved by a jury in real courts of law. It's a shame that we don't have real courts of law in Washington State.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Additionally, the Squire court found that the language inserted by Watson Squire in the habendum simply reiterated the intent of Watson Squire and his wife to convey an easement. (citation with my emphasis)

      "The instant case is much more compelling since Squire specifically included language in the habendum clause reiterating the limitation of the conveyance to use as a right of way. We hold that an easement was conveyed."
      [King County v. Squire (1990)]

        The precedent set in King County v. Squire, finding the granting clause to strongly indicate the intention to convey an easement, absolutely destroyed the King County Prosecutor's claim that the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed conveyed fee simple title to the Railway. So, the crooked lawyers at the Prosecutor's office misrepresented the findings of the Squire court by claiming the only reason that the Squire court found the Squire deed to be an easement was the words Watson Squire added to the habendum. The Prosecutor was correct in stating the words added by Squire to the habendum indicated his intention to covey an easement, but it was an intentional lie by the prosecutor to claim that was the only reason for the Squire deed to be found an easement. Here are habendum clauses from the Squire and Hilchkanum deeds. It is important to note that the words in bold in the Squire habendum are the words added by Watson Squire.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Squire right-of-way deed habendum (Words in bold added by Watson Squire)

        "To Have and to Hold the said premises, with the appurtenances, unto the said party of the second part, and to its successors and assigns forever or so long as said land is used as a right-of-way by said railway Company. Expressly reserving to said grantors their heirs and assigns all their riparian rights and water front rights on the shores of Lake Washington. And this grant is upon the condition that said railway shall be completed over said lands on or before January 1st, 1888."
        [March 29, 1887 Squire right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

      Hilchkanum right-of-way deed habendum

        "To have and to hold the said premises with the appurtenances unto the said party of the second part and to its successors and assigns forever"
        [May 9, 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

        As I wrote above, the Prosecutor claimed that the only reason the Squire court found the Squire deed to be an easement was the words Watson Squire added to the habendum. As shown in the analysis of the Squire granting clause above, this was an intentional lie by the King County Prosecutor. The above citations show that the restrictive language in the habendum reiterates the restrictive language in the granting clause. One can verify the Prosecutor's dishonest misrepresentation of Squire in Deputy King County Prosecutor Scott Johnson's reply brief to Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein. Use the following link to open that brief and go to page 8 to read Johnson's misrepresentation of King County v. Squire (1990).
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      "Brief in Reply to Defendants' Opposition to King County's Motion for Summary Judgment" (April 19, 2001)

    The Squire deed was based on the SLS&E "form deed".

        As I explained above, the Squire court identified which deed words were written by the Railway lawyers, and which words were added or changed by Watson Squire. When compared to other SLS&E right-of-way deeds of the same period, it's obvious that the words of the Squire deed which were not attributed to Watson Squire were taken from the SLS&E "form deed". This "form deed" was also used to obtain the 1887 right-of-way deed from Bill Hilchkanum. Based on the common law precedent set in King County v. Squire, an honest comparison of the Squire and Hilchkanum deeds shows the Hilchkanum deed to be an easement. Norm Maleng and the Hilchkanum judges could not allow an honest comparison. They needed the Hilchkanum deed to be found a fee simple grant in order to hide the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. In real courts of law this issue of authorship would have been resolved by a jury. All of the Hilchkanum judges denied the right to a jury and dishonestly "resolved" the authorship issue themselves by illegally allowing summary judgment.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Understand the rules of summary judgment.

      Understand the basic rules to construe a deed.

      View a study which establishes the SLS&E "form deed" and identifies the Railway as author.

      View a study comparing the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds to the SLS&E.

        I assume that the reader has skipped the four links above and has moved directly to this paragraph. Analyzing the above four links takes lots of time and energy. If the reader skipped the links, I assume the reader has refused to look at the twenty-six SLS&E deeds which I've photocopied and transcribed in order to understand that there is very little difference between the SLS&E deeds along East Lake Sammamish, which King County claimed to convey fee simple title, and the other deeds which were all determined to be easements. So, I will make it even easier for the reader to understand that the Squire and Hilchkanum deeds have identical granting clauses which are identical to many other SLS&E deeds of the same period. Since the Squire court found the granting clause of the Squire deed to "strongly suggest[] conveyance of an easement", I present a number of SLS&E deeds which use the identical granting clause. If the reader ignores the conclusion of the Squire court that the Squire granting clause "strongly suggests conveyance of an easement", and believes that the habendum is the most important factor in construing the ESL right-of-way deeds, then go to the following link to understand that the habendum clause was also common to many SLS&E deeds and written by the Railway lawyers.

      View a study of the SLS&E "form deed" which identifies the common language in the habendum.

    The Squire and Hilchkanum granting clauses are identical to many other SLS&E deeds.

        In order to understand the massive corruption in King County's leadership and in the federal and State judges in Washington State, one needs to look at the deeds which these dishonest judges ignored or misconstrued in order to cover-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. While every word and phrase is considered when construing whether an easement or fee simple interest is conveyed in a deed, the granting clause of the SLS&E "form deed" provides that function. So, here are a number of SLS&E granting clauses. Observe that they are materially identical, but weren't found to have identical meaning when construed in federal and State courts. What the parties intend to convey in a deed is an issue of fact. If the dishonest judges decided the Hilchkanum's intentions are an issue of law rather than fact, then they were required to apply the legal precedent set in King County v. Squire, which found the identical granting words indicated the intention to convey an easement. But, the issues of authorship and intention are material facts which would be resolved by a jury in legitimate courts of law. The Hilchkanum judges didn't believe in the right to a jury to resolve disputed facts. Instead, they illegally and irrationally granted themselves complete control of the facts by allowing summary judgment. Seven different times summary judgment was illegally used by judges in the cover-up of the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. Since the Hilchkanum judges denied the right to a jury, the viewer of this page becomes a member on a jury which was never allowed. In addition to the issue of easement-or-fee, what is on trial here is the honesty of the judiciary in Washington State, and the legitimacy of our federal and State courts.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Squire granting clause. This deed was found to grant an easement in King County v. Squire (1990).

        "In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location, construction and operation
        of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby
        donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way
        Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands in said County, described as follows, to-wit:"
        [March 29, 1887 Squire right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

      Hilchkanum granting clause. The Hilchkanum judges declared this deed conveyed fee simple title to the SLS&E and that illiterate Bill Hilchkanum was its author in King County v. Rasmussen (2001), King County v. Rasmussen (2002), and Ray v. King County (2004). Both Bill and Mary Hilchkanum signed their right-of-way deed with an illiterate "X".

        "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation
        of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the County of King in Washington Territory we do hereby
        donate grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way
        one hundred (100) feet in width through our lands in said County described as follows to wit."
        [May 9, 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

      Bargquist granting clause. The King County Prosecutor admitted this deed conveyed an easement in Lawson v. State (1986). The Bargquist right-of-way was located at the north end of Lake Washington.

        "In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to me from the location construction and operation
        of the Seattle, Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, I do hereby
        donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle, Lake Shore and Eastern railway Company a right of way
        one hundred (100) feet in width through my lands in said county, described as follows, to wit:"
        [May 10, 1887 Bargquist right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

      Sbedzuse granting clause. Bill and Lucinda Sbedzuse lived north of the Hilchkanums on Lake Sammamish. The granting clause, secondary grant and habendum of this deed are materially identical to the Hilchkanum's, and are based on an unaltered SLS&E "form deed". Both Bill and Lucinda Sbedzuse signed their right-of-way deed with an
      illiterate "X".

        "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation
        of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the County of King in Washington Territory we do hereby
        donate grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way
        one hundred (100) feet in width through our lands in said County described as follows to wit"
        [May 6, 1887 Sbedzuse right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

      Davis granting clause. George and Elizabeth Davis lived north of the Hilchkanums on Lake Sammamish. The granting clause, secondary grant and habendum of this deed are materially identical to the Hilchkanum's, and are based on an unaltered SLS&E "form deed". Both George and Elizabeth Davis signed their right-of-way deed with an
      illiterate "X".

        "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation
        of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the County of King in Washington Territory. We do hereby
        donate grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way
        one hundred (100) feet in width through our lands in said County described as follows to wit"
        [May 6, 1887 Davis right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

      Yonderpump granting clause. Jim and Alice Yonderpump lived north of the Hilchkanums on Lake Sammamish. The granting clause, secondary grant and habendum of this deed are materially identical to the Hilchkanum's, and are based on an unaltered SLS&E "form deed". Both Jim and Alice Yonderpump signed their right-of-way deed with an
      illiterate "X".

        "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation
        of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the County of King in Washington Territory we do hereby
        donate grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way
        one hundred (100) feet in width through our lands in said County described as follows to wit:"
        [April 6, 1887 Yonderpump right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

      Tahalthkut granting clause. Louis and Mary Tahalthkut lived north of the Hilchkanums on Lake Sammamish. The granting clause, secondary grant and habendum of this deed are materially identical to the Hilchkanum's, and are based on an unaltered SLS&E "form deed". Both Louis and Mary Tahalthkut signed their right-of-way deed with an
      illiterate "X".

        "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation
        of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the County of King in Washington Territory we do hereby
        donate grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way
        one hundred (100) feet in width through our lands in said County described as follows to wit:"
        [April 6, 1887 Tahalthkut right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

      Palmberg granting clause. Alfred Palmberg lived north of the Hilchkanums on Lake Sammamish. The granting clause, and secondary grant of this deed are materially identical to the Hilchkanum's, and are based on an unaltered SLS&E "form deed". The habendum is identical to the Hilchkanum's, but adds "All riparian and water front rights on Lake Sammamish are hereby expressly reserved.".

        "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to me from the location construction and operation
        of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the County of King in Washington Territory I do hereby
        donate grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way
        one hundred (100) feet in width through my lands in said County described as follows to wit:"
        [June 13, 1887 Palmberg right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

      Lee granting clause. The Lee property was not along East Lake Sammamish. It was located west of Lake Sammamish.

        "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation
        of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the County of King in Washington Territory we do hereby
        donate grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way
        fifty (50) feet in width through our lands in said County described as follows to wit:"
        [March 23, 1887 Lee right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

      Lurber granting clause. The Lurber property was not along East Lake Sammamish. It was located west of Lake Sammamish.

        "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to me from the location construction and operation
        of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the County of King in Washington Territory I do hereby
        donate grant and and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way
        one hundred (100) feet in width through my lands in said County described as follows to wit:"
        [March 24, 1887 Lurber right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

      McGraw granting clause. The McGraw property was not along East Lake Sammamish. It was located west of Lake Sammamish.

        "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to me from the location construction and operation
        of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the county of King in Washington Territory. I do hereby
        donate grant and convey unto the said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way
        Fifty (50) feet in width through my lands in said County described as follows to wit"
        [March 25, 1887 McGraw right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

      Stone granting clause. The Stone property was not along East Lake Sammamish. It was located west of Lake Sammamish.

        "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation
        of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the county of King in Washington Territory. We do hereby donate grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way
        Fifty (50) feet in width through our lands in said County described as follows to wit"
        [April 5, 1887 Stone right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

      Lewellyn granting clause. The Lewellyn property was not along East Lake Sammamish. It was located in the present City of Seattle

        "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to me from the location construction and operation
        of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the County of King in Washington Territory I do hereby
        donate grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way
        Fifty (50) feet in width through my lands in said County described as follows to wit"
        [April 11, 1887 Lewellyn right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

      Burnett granting clause. The Burnett property was not along East Lake Sammamish. It was located west of Lake Sammamish.

        "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation
        of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the county of King in Washington Territory. We do hereby
        donate grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Rail way Company a right of way
        Fifty (50) feet in width through our lands in said County described as follows to wit"
        [April 13, 1887 Burnett right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

      Pearson granting clause. The Pearson property was not along East Lake Sammamish. It was located northwest of Lake Sammamish.

        "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construc- tion and operation
        of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Rail- way in the County of King in Washington Territory. We do hereby
        donate grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way
        one hundred (100) feet in width through our lands in said County described as follows to wit:"
        [May 6, 1887 Pearson right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

      Anderson granting clause. The Anderson property was not along East Lake Sammamish. It was located northwest of Lake Sammamish.

        "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to me from the location construction and operation
        of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the County of King in Washington Territory I do hereby
        donate grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way
        one hundred (100) feet in width through my lands in said County described as follows to wit:"
        [May 6, 1887 Anderson right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

      Ashworth granting clause. The Ashworth property was not along East Lake Sammamish. It was located west of Lake Sammamish.

        "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location, construction and operation
        of the Seattle, Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, I do hereby
        donate, grant, and convey unto the said Seattle, Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way
        fifty (50) feet in width through our lands in said County described as follows, to wit:"
        [May 10, 1887 Ashworth right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

      Peterson granting clause. The Peterson property was not along East Lake Sammamish. It was located west of Lake Sammamish.

        "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to me from the location construction and operation
        of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the county of King in Washington Territory I do hereby
        donate grant and convey unto the said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way
        one hundred (100) feet in width through my lands in said County described as follows to wit"
        [May 16, 1887 Peterson right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

        The profound dishonesty of the Hilchkanum judges can be understood by comparing the granting clauses displayed above. The Hilchkanum judges decided that Bill Hilchkanum, an illiterate Duwamish Indian, wrote his granting clause and intended to convey unrestricted fee simple title. Authorship of the Hilchkanum deed was a disputed material fact which these judges had no legal right to resolve. When there is an issue of material fact, it must be resolved by a jury in our legal system. All of the Hilchkanum opinions were settled by summary judgment with the Hilchkanum judges decreeing that Hilchkanum wrote his right-of-way deed and intended to convey fee simple title of his land. Further, the judges found that there was no purpose to convey a right-of-way expressed in the deed despite the fact the deed conveyed a "right of way" in its granting clause. The judge's illegal use of summary judgment and their illegal resolution of material facts are profoundly dishonest and demonstrate that we have lost our legal system to the arrogance and corruption of our judiciary. Understand that the Hilchkanum judges' use of common dishonest tactics suggests racketeering.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    Does a copy machine become the author of the documents it copies?

        The authorship of the Hilchkanum deed took a bizarre twist in Ray v. King County (2004). In that opinion, the judges decided that the Railway couldn't possibly be the author of the Hilchkanum deed because the deed was copied into the King County Book of Records in the handwriting of the notary public who filed the deed. Since the filed deed was in the notary's handwriting, the court implied that he was the author, or at least that the Railway lawyers were not the author. This ridiculous finding by the Ray judges manufactured the "fact" that authorship was ambiguous, so therefore the Hilchkanums should be considered the author of their right-of-way deed, as the grantors. This implication, that the notary who copies a deed into the Book of Records should be considered its author, is the equivalent of deciding a copy machine becomes the author of the documents it copies. This ridiculous conclusion by the Ray judges would also support the legal theory that a fax is actually authored by the fax machine which receives and prints it. We have juries in real courts of law to keep dishonest judges like Cox and Schindler from making dishonest conclusions of fact, as they did in Ray v. King County (2004). Use the following link to open Ray v. King County (2004) at the position this injustice is discussed.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Open Ray v. King County (2004) at the position the judges imply B.J. Tallman is author.

        The conclusion or implication by the Ray judges that notary public B.J. Tallman authored the Hilchkanum deed becomes even more ridiculous when one understands that other SLS&E deeds, with identical wording, were copied by other individuals into the Book of Record in their different handwriting. For comparison, below are links to photocopies of the Hilchkanum deed, the Lurber deed, and the Perry deed. These three right-of-way deeds to the SLS&E are identical in granting language, secondary grant, and habendum, yet are in the handwriting of three different individuals, two notaries public and a Justice of the Peace. Also, I've included the Squire deed which used Edwin Briscoe and Jos. Gregory as notaries, and was apparently filed in Jos. Gregory's handwriting. As discussed above, the Squire deed is materially identical to the Hilchkanum, Lurber, and Perry deeds, if the changes made by Governor Squire are removed. If Tallman is author of the Hilchkanum deed because it is filed in Tallman's handwriting, then how did the identical language get authored by the other individuals who filed SLS&E deeds in their different and unique handwriting? Ridiculous! Also, note that each deed shown below is filed at the request of Burke and Haller who were the lawyers for the SLS&E. That statement is the common factor in the four deeds, and suggests that Burke and Haller were responsible for the "form deed" used for Hilchkanum, Lurber, and Perry deeds, and for the words of the Squire deed which were not changed or added by Governor Squire. In real courts of law, a jury would have decided this issue. A jury was denied because the Hilchkanum judges illegally allowed summary judgment and actually made up facts, such as Tallman was author, in order to control the outcome of their opinions. We no longer have real courts of law in Washington State. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E - filed by B.J. Tallman, notary public.

      Lurber right-of-way deed to the SLS&E - filed by Edwin Briscoe, notary public.

      Perry right-of-way deed to the SLS&E - filed by Jo J. Beard, Justice of the Peace.

      Squire right-of-way deed to the SLS&E - filed by Jos. Gregory, notary public.

        In spite of the fact that the Hilchkanum deed granted a "right of way" to the SLS&E, the Hilchkanum judges decided that Hilchkanum granted a "strip of land" with no intention that it be used as a railroad right-of-way. I'm not kidding. Essentially, these dishonest judges changed the words in the Hilchkanum granting clause and then construed their substituted wording. Verify this fact in the three links directly below. The links will take the reader to the place in each published Hilchkanum opinion where the judge changes the words in the Hilchkanum granting clause, substituting "strip of land" for "right of way" and then makes conclusions based on his/her substituted words. These are annotated opinions. The judges words are in bold blue font. My comments are indented and in black font. At the top of the document there is an option to read the judge's opinion without my comments. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Federal Judge Barbara Rothstein changed the words of the Hilchkanum deed in King County v. Rasmussen (2001).

      Federal Judge Betty Fletcher changed the words of the Hilchkanum deed in King County v. Rasmussen (2002)

      State Appeals Judge Ronald Cox changed the words of the Hilchkanum deed in Ray v. King County (2004)

        It's important to reemphasize the fact that ALL of the Hilchkanum judges were briefed King County v. Squire (1990). The Squire court found the Squire granting clause, which is identical to the Hilchkanum granting clause, "strongly suggests conveyance of an easement". Further, by default the Squire court found the Squire granting clause was authored by the Railway. King County v. Squire was the most important precedential opinion in determining whether the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed conveyed an easement. ALL the Hilchkanum judges ignored or misrepresented the conclusions of the Squire court. Squire was binding precedent in the Washington State Division One opinion, Ray v. King County (2004). It's obvious that judges in Washington State have no belief in binding precedent. Had the Hilchkanum judges obeyed the requirement that a jury resolve the issues of fact, the comparison of the Hilchkanum, Squire, and the many other identical granting clauses displayed above, would have caused the jury to find Hilchkanum's deed an easement. That finding would have exposed the ELS federal tax fraud scheme. There was no jury allowed in any of the Hilchkanum decisions because the judges had predetermined that the Hilchkanum deed would grant fee simple title. No legitimate jury would come to that conclusion.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    Lawson v. State (1986)

    The King County Prosecutor admitted all the Lawson deeds were easements.

        Approximately twelve SLS&E right-of-way deeds were involved in Lawson v. State (1986). (This number is provided on page 5 of the Lawson lawyer's reply brief to the Washington State Supreme Court, filed January 23, 1986. This document is available at the Washington State Archives, 1129 Washington Street SE, Olympia, WA 985041129 Washington Street SE, Olympia, WA 98504.) However, only two of these deeds were presented as exhibits to the court: the Bargquist deed and the Puget Mill deed. These two deeds were presented in the Affidavit of Richard Welsh to King County Superior Court, July 8, 1985. This affidavit was then presented as an exhibit to the Washington State Supreme Court, and was certainly a dominant factor in the Supreme Court's opinion that "There is a strong argument to be made that Burlington Northern had no interest to convey to the County", cited below. Of the two SLS&E deeds presented to the Washington State Supreme Court in Lawson, the the Bargquist deed is the most damaging to King County's claim that all the SLS&E deeds along East Lake Sammamish conveyed fee simple title of the land under the right-of-way. Before analyzing the Bargquist deed, the reader should be aware of the statements made by the Supreme Court in Lawson and the admission by King County that all the SLS&E deeds in involved in that lawsuit granted easements.

        In Lawson v. State (1986), the Washington State Supreme court did not construe the issue of easement or fee simple, but it did make this statement: (with my emphasis)

      "We note that, insofar as the present record reveals, the County has only acquired, through a quitclaim deed, whatever interest Burlington Northern held. There is a strong argument to be made that Burlington Northern had no interest to convey to the County: upon abandonment of the right of way the land automatically reverted to the reversionary interest holders."
      [Lawson v. State (1986)]

        In the King County Prosecutor's brief to the Supreme Court, the following admission was made: (with my emphasis)

      "Solely for the purposes of its CR 12(b)(6) motion, King County accepted as true plaintiffs' allegations in their complaint that the original conveyance to the railroad had only been an easement, and that any reverter interest would go to them."
      ["Brief of Respondent King County" in Lawson, filed December 3, 1985 - Available at the Washington State Archives]

        The Lawson judges noted that the King County Prosecutor admitted the Lawson deeds were easements with this statement in its opinion. King County is one of the "Defendants" in this citation. (citation with my emphasis)

      "Defendants argue that under Washington law a railroad is a perpetual public easement. They contend that a railroad right of way easement does not terminate upon a change from one transportation use to another transportation or recreation use, or any other consistent public use. We disagree."
      [Lawson v. State (1986)]

    The Bargquist deed is materially identical to the Hilchkanum deed.

        As I stated above, of the two SLS&E deeds presented to the Washington State Supreme Court in Lawson, the Bargquist deed is the most damaging to King County's claim that all the SLS&E deeds along East Lake Sammamish conveyed fee simple title of the land under the right-of-way. This is because the Bargquist deed is materially identical to right-of-way deeds along East Lake Sammamish, such as the Hilchkanum, Davis and Sbedzuse deeds. Bargquist was predecessor in interest to the Lawsons. The Hilchkanum judges found three elements of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to be material to the issue of easement-or-fee. The judges determined these material elements are the granting clause, the habendum and the secondary grant. I can find no previous court which found the secondary grant to be material to the question of easement-or-fee, but I'll still provide this element of the deeds to show there was no difference between the Bargquist, Hilchkanum, Davis, and Sbedzuse deeds. So, here are those three material elements for the reader to compare.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    Identical Granting Clauses:

        While every word in a deed is considered when construing the party's intent, the granting clause and habendum usually describe what is granted. In the Bargquist, Hilchkanum, Davis, and Sbedzuse deeds, the granting clause determines this issue. As shown in the above citations, the King County Prosecutor admitted the Bargquist conveyed an easement. After accepting the phony tax donation of all the land under the East Lake Sammamish right-of-way, the King County Prosecutor claimed the Hilchkanum, Davis, and Sbedzuse deeds conveyed fee simple title despite the fact they are materially identical to the Bargquist deed. It appears the only difference between the Bargquist deed and the ELS deeds is the Prosecutor's phony legal brief designed to keep him and his co-conspirators out of federal prison for their participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Bargquist Granting Clause. The King County Prosecutor admitted this deed conveyed an easement in Lawson v. State (1986). The granting clause is materially identical to the Hilchkanum, Davis and Sbedzuse deeds, and is based on an unaltered SLS&E "form deed".

        "In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to me from the location construction and operation
        of the Seattle, Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, I do hereby
        donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle, Lake Shore and Eastern railway Company a right of way
        one hundred (100) feet in width through my lands in said county, described as follows, to wit:"
        [May 10, 1887 Bargquist right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

      Hilchkanum Granting Clause. The Hilchkanum judges declared this deed conveyed fee simple title to the SLS&E and that illiterate Bill Hilchkanum was its author in King County v. Rasmussen (2001), King County v. Rasmussen (2002), and Ray v. King County (2004). The granting clause is materially identical to the Bargquist, Davis, and Sbedzuse deeds, and is based on an unaltered SLS&E "form deed". Both Bill and Mary Hilchkanum signed their right-of-way deed with an illiterate "X".

        "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation
        of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the County of King in Washington Territory we do hereby
        donate grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way
        one hundred (100) feet in width through our lands in said County described as follows to wit."
        [May 9, 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

      Sbedzuse Granting Clause. Bill and Lucinda Sbedzuse lived just north of the Hilchkanums on Lake Sammamish. The granting clause is materially identical to the Bargquist, Hilchkanum, and Davis deeds, and is based on an unaltered SLS&E "form deed". Both Bill and Lucinda Sbedzuse signed their right-of-way deed with an
      illiterate "X".

        "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation
        of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the County of King in Washington Territory we do hereby
        donate grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way
        one hundred (100) feet in width through our lands in said County described as follows to wit"
        [May 6, 1887 Sbedzuse right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

      Davis Granting Clause. George and Elizabeth Davis lived just north of the Hilchkanums on Lake Sammamish. The granting clause is materially identical to the Bargquist, Hilchkanum, and Sbedzuse deeds, and is based on an unaltered SLS&E "form deed". Both George and Elizabeth Davis signed their right-of-way deed with an
      illiterate "X".

        "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation
        of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the County of King in Washington Territory. We do hereby
        donate grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way
        one hundred (100) feet in width through our lands in said County described as follows to wit"
        [May 6, 1887 Davis right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

    Identical Habendum Clauses:

        As shown in the above citations, the King County Prosecutor admitted the Bargquist right-of-way deed conveyed an easement. The habendum clause is an important factor in determining the issue of easement-or-fee. After accepting the phony tax donation of all the land under the East Lake Sammamish right-of-way, the King County Prosecutor claimed the Hilchkanum, Davis, and Sbedzuse deeds conveyed fee simple title despite the fact they are materially identical to the Bargquist deed. For comparison, here are the habendum clauses from each of these deeds.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Bargquist Habendum Clause. The King County Prosecutor admitted this deed conveyed an easement in Lawson v. State (1986). As explained above, the habendum clause is materially identical to the Hilchkanum, Davis and Sbedzuse deeds, and is based on the SLS&E "form deed".

        "To Have and to Hold the said premises, with the appurtenances, unto the said party of the second part, and to its successors and assigns forever. Said Railway company agrees to furnish said grantor good and sufficient crossings on said above described premises, not to exceed three in number."
        [May 10, 1887 Bargquist right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

      Hilchkanum Habendum Clause. The Hilchkanum judges declared this deed conveyed fee simple title to the SLS&E and that illiterate Bill Hilchkanum was its author in King County v. Rasmussen (2001), King County v. Rasmussen (2002), and Ray v. King County (2004). The habendum clause is materially identical to the Bargquist, Davis, and Sbedzuse deeds, and is based on an unaltered SLS&E "form deed". Both Bill and Mary Hilchkanum signed their right-of-way deed with an illiterate "X".

        "To have and to hold the said premises with the appurtenances unto the said party of the second part and to its successors and assigns forever"
        [May 9, 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

      Sbedzuse Habendum Clause. Bill and Lucinda Sbedzuse lived just north of the Hilchkanums on Lake Sammamish. The habendum clause is materially identical to the Bargquist, Hilchkanum, and Davis deeds, and is based on an unaltered SLS&E "form deed". Both Bill and Lucinda Sbedzuse signed their right-of-way deed with an
      illiterate "X".

        "To have and to hold the said premises with the appurtenances unto the said party of the second part and to its successors and assigns forever"
        [May 6, 1887 Sbedzuse right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

      Davis Habendum Clause. George and Elizabeth Davis lived just north of the Hilchkanums on Lake Sammamish. The habendum clause is materially identical to the Bargquist, Hilchkanum, and Sbedzuse deeds, and is based on an unaltered SLS&E "form deed". Both George and Elizabeth Davis signed their right-of-way deed with an
      illiterate "X".

        "To have and to hold the said premises with the appurtenances unto the said party of the second part and to its successors and assigns forever"
        [May 6, 1887 Davis right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

        The habendum clauses do differ in that Bargquist added the requirement that the Railway provide crossings. I can find no decision where the addition of crossings was material in the determination of easement-or-fee. Of course, King County would claim that this immaterial addition was the only reason that the County agreed the Bargquist deed was an easement. The King County Prosecutor has a history of dishonest legal argument, as I explain throughout this website. So, to clarify the significance this crossing addition to the Bargquist habendum, I present this citation from Brown v. State of Washington (1996). The King County Prosecutor has dishonestly claimed that Brown established a "sea change" in the way railroad right-of-way deeds are construed, changing one hundred years of consistently applied precedent. So, since the King County Prosecutor has declared Brown the only authority on the issue of easement-or-fee, here is a citation from Brown, where the court looked as very similar crossing language in the Eidal deed. (citation condensed, use link to view full citation)
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      "Said Railway Company . . . will permit a telephone wire and an electric light wire to cross its said right-of-way. . . . Before grading is begun Right of way fences shall be built. . . . Said Railway Company is to furnish such facilities for conducting water for irrigation and other purposes under its track and across its Right-of-Way as are reasonable and practicable. . . ."
      [Brown v. State of Washington (1996)]

        The Washington State Supreme court found this language to not be a factor in determining the easement-or-fee issue in Brown. Since the King County Prosecutor claims Brown redefines how railroad deeds are construed, the Prosecutor would be forced to agree with the Supreme Court that additional restrictions like those above to not determine the easement-or-fee issue. The crossing restrictions in the Bargquist habendum fall into the same category and are not material to the issue of easement-or-fee. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    Identical Secondary Grants:

        As shown at the beginning of this section, the King County Prosecutor admitted the Bargquist deed conveyed an easement. The Hilchkanum judges found three elements of the Hilchkanum deed to be material to the question of easement-or-fee. These elements are the granting clause, the habendum and the secondary grant. Common law precedent finds the granting clause, the habendum to be material, but no earlier precedential opinion found the secondary grant to be material to the issue of easement-or-fee. This is brand new precedent manufactured by the Hilchkanum judges. Their unfounded reliance on the secondary grant is discussed in my analysis of the dishonest Hilchkanum opinions. So, the secondary grants of the Bargquist, Hilchkanum, Davis, and Sbedzuse deeds are presented here. As one will observe, they are identical. I also include here the Squire secondary grant. While the Squire secondary grant was not published in the Squire opinion, it is found embedded in the recorded Squire right-of-way deed to the SLS&E. Since the Squire secondary grant was not published in the Squire opinion, and not mentioned in the Court's analysis of the deed, it must be assumed that the Squire court did not find the secondary grant material to the question of easement-or-fee. So, here are five materially identical SLS&E secondary grants.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Bargquist Secondary Grant. The King County Prosecutor admitted this deed conveyed an easement in Lawson v. State (1986). The secondary grant is materially identical to the Hilchkanum, Davis, Sbedzuse, and Squire deeds, and is based on an unaltered SLS&E "form deed".

        "And the said Seattle, Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company shall have the right to go upon the land adjacent to said line for a distance of two hundred (200) feet on each side thereof and cut down all trees dangerous to the operation of said road."
        [May 10, 1887 Bargquist right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

      Hilchkanum Secondary Grant. The Hilchkanum judges declared this deed conveyed fee simple title to the SLS&E and that illiterate Bill Hilchkanum was its author in King County v. Rasmussen (2001), King County v. Rasmussen (2002), and Ray v. King County (2004). The secondary grant is materially identical to the Bargquist, Davis, Sbedzuse, and Squire deeds, and is based on an unaltered SLS&E "form deed". Both Bill and Mary Hilchkanum signed their right-of-way deed with an illiterate "X".

        "And the said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company shall have the right to go upon the land adjacent to said line for a distance of two hundred (200) feet on each side thereof and cut down all trees dangerous to the operation of said road"
        [May 9, 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

      Sbedzuse Secondary Grant. Bill and Lucinda Sbedzuse lived just north of the Hilchkanums on Lake Sammamish. The secondary grant is materially identical to the Bargquist, Hilchkanum, Davis, and Squire deeds, and is based on an unaltered SLS&E "form deed". Both Bill and Lucinda Sbedzuse signed their right-of-way deed with an
      illiterate "X".

        "And the said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company shall have the right to go upon the land adjacent to said line for a distance of two hundred (200) feet on each side thereof and cut down all trees dangerous to the operation of said road."
        [May 6, 1887 Sbedzuse right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

      Davis Secondary Grant. George and Elizabeth Davis lived just north of the Hilchkanums on Lake Sammamish. The secondary grant is materially identical to the Bargquist, Hilchkanum, Sbedzuse, and Squire deeds, and is based on an unaltered SLS&E "form deed". Both George and Elizabeth Davis signed their right-of-way deed with an
      illiterate "X".

        "And the said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company shall have the right to go upon the land adjacent to said line for a distance of two hundred (200) feet on each side thereof and cut down all trees dangerous to the operation of the said road."
        [May 6, 1887 Davis right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

      Squire Secondary Grant. The Squire deed was found to convey an easement in King County v. Squire (1990). The Squire opinion is discussed, in detail, earlier this page. While the Squire secondary grant was not published in King County v. Squire (1990), it is found in the recorded Squire right-of-way deed to the SLS&E. Since the Squire secondary grant was not published in the Squire opinion, it must be assumed that the Squire court did not find the secondary grant material to the question of easement-or-fee. This secondary grant is materially identical to the Bargquist, Hilchkanum, Davis, and Sbedzuse deeds, and is based on the SLS&E "form deed".

        "And the said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company shall have the right to go upon the land adjacent to said line for a distance of two hundred (200) feet on each side thereof and cut down all trees dangerous to the operation of said road. Provided that all trees when cut down shall belong to said first party, the donors, W.C. Squire & wife."
        [March 29, 1887 Squire right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

    Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber (1910)

        The Burke right-of-way deed to the SLS&E was construed as an easement in Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber (1910). In construing the issue of easement-or-fee, the court concluded: (with my emphasis)

      "...when the instrument is construed as a whole and in the light of the purpose for which the grant was made, it is a grant of a right of way or easement and nothing more.

             'The grant of a right of way to a railroad company is the grant of an easement merely and the fee of the soil remains in the grantor. Although the language used in the granting part of the deed and in the habendum is appropriate, and that commonly used to convey the fee, yet the clause descriptive of the use to be made of the land may so limit or qualify the grant as to change it from a fee to an easement." Cyc. 1162; Robinson v. Missisquoi R. Co., 59 Vt. 426, 10 Atl. 522.'"
      [Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber (1910)]

        The Burke deed was not published in Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber (1910), but was published in Northlake Marine Works v. Seattle (1993). Thomas Burke was one of the founders of the SLS&E and was its lead attorney. His right-of-way deed was construed in 1910, while he was still alive, influential in the community, and would have been available as a witness or declarant to the court. Burke was considered an expert in property law and was Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Washington Territory in 1888 and 1889. We do not have the records of that lawsuit, but it seems unlikely that Burke's deed would have been found an easement if Thomas Burk did not intend that his deed convey that interest in the property. While his right-of-way deed is based loosely on the same "form deed" which was used for the Squire and Hilchkanum deeds, it is different in that it is a quitclaim deed and it includes a reverter statement in the habendum.

      Open Northlake Marine Works v. Seattle (1993) to view material portions of the Burke deed.

    The King County leadership was notified the ELS deeds were easements by an expert in railroad right-of-way law.

        In the sections above, I discuss three legal opinions in which about fourteen SLS&E right-of-way deeds were construed, or determined, to be easements. No SLS&E deed was found to convey fee simple title prior to King County's participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. Because the decision was in 1910, the lawyers for Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber were no longer available to advise the King County leadership about the SLS&E deeds along East Lake Sammamish. But, the lawyer whose legal argument prevailed in Lawson v. State (1986) and King County v. Squire (1990) was available. His name is Daryl A. Deutsch. Confirm his participation in these significant lawsuits by viewing the attorneys listed in these published opinions, linked here.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Lawson v. State (1986)

      King County v. Squire (1990)

        In 1997, when it was first disclosed that King County was claiming the East Lake Sammamish SLS&E right-of-way deeds were fee simple grants of the underlying land, Daryl Deutsch expressed his expert opinion that the County's claim failed in its legal analysis. This issue is discussed in greater detail below, where I describe Norm Maleng's "legal theory". Maleng's "legal theory" is the dishonest legal argument the King County Prosecutor devised to hide his participated in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. Here, I simply note that King County was notified of its dishonest claim in October 1997 by an expert in railroad right-of-way law. To confirm, read Daryl Deutsch's letter to King County Councilwoman Louise Miller (copy to the other Council members) on October 24, 1997.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Daryl Deutsch letter to the King County Council, October 24, 1997.

    Norm Maleng knew that he was participating in the ELS federal tax fraud scheme.

        As shown in the discussion above, prior to King County accepting a phony tax donation of the land under the East Lake Sammamish BNSF right-of-way in 1997, all the SLS&E deeds before King County courts with the issue of easement-or-fee were determined to grant easements. In 1986, Norm Maleng admitted the Bargquist deed granted an easement in the resolution of Lawson. Then, in 1990, the Squire court determined that the Squire deed granted an easement. Norm Maleng, representing King County, lost that lawsuit too. So how, from 1997 onward, could Maleng claim that Hilchkanum and his East Lake Sammamish neighbors conveyed fee simple interest of the land under their rights-of-way, using the identical granting language found in the Bargquist and Squire deeds? The only logical answer is that King County Prosecutor Norm Maleng knew the East Lake Sammamish SLS&E right-of-way deeds granted easements and that he was participating in a federal tax fraud scheme by accepting a donation of the underlying land from BNSF. To hide his crime, Maleng needed to manufacture a phony legal brief to justify his acceptance of the phony tax donation from BNSF. I call that phony legal briefing Norm Maleng's "legal theory" and discuss it below. The profound dishonesty of Norm Maleng's "legal theory" serves as further proof of the criminal intent of Maleng, his staff, and the leadership of King County.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

After the tax fraud scheme, Maleng claimed that all the SLS&E deeds granted fee simple.

        As shown above, before King County's participation in the federal tax fraud scheme which was used to establish the East Lake Sammamish Trail, about fourteen Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway (SLS&E) deeds were before King County courts with the issue of whether they conveyed an easement or fee simple title of the land under the right-of-way. ALL of the deeds were determined to convey easements. King County was a party in the lawsuits in which easements were determined in thirteen of the fourteen deeds. So, the King County Prosecutor was very well aware of the similarity between the SLS&E deeds along East Lake Sammamish and the SLS&E deeds which previously had been determined to be easements. In spite of this fact, the King County Prosecutor accepted a phony tax donation of all the land under the ELS right-of-way based on the assumption that none of the ELS right-of-way deeds granted easements. Maleng intentionally participated in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme by acknowledging that donation in the sale agreement with The Land Conservancy (TLC). TLC acted as a middleman between BNSF and King County in the Railbanking transaction. Confirm this with the following links.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      View the final sale agreement between BNSF and TLC, with the phony tax donation explained on page six of the document. (PDF page 9)

      View the final sale agreement between TLC and King County, with the phony tax donation explained on page four of the document. (PDF page 5)

        In order to hide his criminal act, Norm Maleng resorted to a number of dishonest tactics. Use the following link to view a study of these tactics. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Understand how Norm Maleng covered-up King County's participation in the East Lake Sammamish tax fraud scheme.

    King County Prosecutor Norm Maleng lied to the public through the local newspapers.

        After accepting the phony tax donation of the land under the ELS right-of-way, the King County Prosecutor repeatedly advised the public that the County owned all of the right-of-way land. In response to a suggestion that the County owned only easements, here is a September 1999 quote from a King County attorney in the Seattle Post-Intelligencer.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      "David Eldred, a county attorney, said he has no doubt the county owns the entire right of way."
      [Seattle Post-Intelligencer 9-28-1999]

        Of course, we "know" that the King County Prosecutor did "extensive research" before releasing his "expert opinion" that the County owned all the land under the East Lake Sammamish right-of-way, because he reported that fact to the newspapers. The newspapers then obediently passed along Maleng's "expert opinion". Here is an October 1999 quote from King County attorney David Eldred, assuring the Eastside Journal readers that the Prosecutor's Office had thoroughly reviewed the records and the law. Apparently, he "forgot" to admit that every SLS&E deed previously before the courts had been determined an easement. (with my emphasis)
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      "David Eldred, an attorney with the civil division of the King County Prosecutor's Office, says homeowners' hopes are ill-placed. 'I don't think there's any doubt the county owns the property," Eldred said. 'Our determination of ownership is based on a thorough review of the records and the law.'"
      [Eastside Journal 10-01-1999]

        Despite the fact that every SLS&E deed previously before the courts had been determined an easement, and the ELS deeds were built on the same SLS&E "form deed", the County continued to lie to the public. Here is another quote and link to a newspaper article. (with my emphasis)
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      "Elaine Kraft, spokeswoman for King County Executive Ron Sims, says the county's claim on the land is solid. 'Our attorneys have gone to great lengths to determine that the great extent of the trail is owned by King County,' Kraft said."
      [Eastside Journal 6-3-2000]

        I've repeatedly stated that King County participated in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme by accepting a phony tax donation of the land under the ELS right-of-way from BNSF. This explains the County's false claim of ownership of the land. So one might ask "Were the newspapers notified about the tax fraud scheme?" The answer is "yes". The Seattle Times and the Eastside Journal (later King County Journal) were notified a number of times. Neither newspaper would respond to the accusations, ask for proof, or report it to their readers. Here are links to my final letter to each of these newspapers, after years of trying to get them to publish the truth about the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      August 30, 2009: Final email to the owners, editors, and staff of The Seattle Times.

      January 11, 2007: Final email to the Eastside/King County Journal.

    The King County Prosecutor's most ridiculous claim:

        As I've shown above, the King County Prosecutor repeatedly lied to the press after he participated in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme by accepting a tax donation of land that he knew BNSF didn't own. But, when he went to court, the prosecutor needed to actually make a legal argument to justify his illegal acceptance of the phony tax donation. I call his dishonest legal argument Norm Maleng's "legal theory" and discuss it in the next section, below. But first, I present the Prosecutor's most ridiculous claim. In a reply brief to Federal District Judge Rothstein, the King County Prosecutor claimed that the Washington State Supreme Court signaled a "sea change" in the construing of railroad right-of-way deeds in a footnote of its Brown v. State of Washington (1996) dissenting opinion. I'm not kidding! The majority opinion is the only place one would find a "sea change" in railroad property law. While a dissenting opinion may have valid legal argument, a "sea change" in property law would never be published there. In Washington State, there is over one-hundred years of consistently upheld common law in the construing of the easement-or-fee issue in railroad deeds. Since a deed is construed to uphold the intentions of the original parties to the deed, a 1996 "sea change" in the intentions of the parties to an 1887 deed is far beyond remote. In the next paragraph, I present the details, links to the Prosecutor's dishonest brief, and links to his citation in the dissenting opinion. First, here are links to citations from precedential opinions which establish the common law which governs the construing of railroad right-of-way deeds.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      View forty-four citations explaining the meaning of the words "right-of-way" in railroad deeds.

      View fourteen citations holding the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad conveys an easement.

        On Page 6 of Scott Johnson's April 19, 2001 "Brief in Reply to Defendants' Opposition to King County's Motion for Summary Judgment." brief, the dishonesty, corruption, and desperation of the King County Prosecutor to hide his East Lake Sammamish crime is exposed. At the bottom of that page is Footnote 5 in which Johnson describes a "sea change" in the way the Washington State Supreme Court construes railroad right-of-way deeds. It seems that crooked lawyers like to hide their most dishonest statements in the footnotes. The "sea change" that Johnson describes is a statement of Norm Maleng's "legal theory". Here is Scott Johnson's footnote 5 from page 6 of his reply brief supporting summary judgment. I've emphasized the critical words in bold font.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Footnote 5 "The Brown court acknowledges that in every prior case where the Washington State Supreme had considered a deed conveying an interest in a narrow strip of land to a railroad it found only an easement was conveyed, Brown 130 Wn.2d 430 at note 4. The fact that the court goes on to find a variety of instruments - including a quitclaim deed, indentures and the Simpson deed - conveying strips of land to railroads granted fee simple title in those strips should be taken as an expression of the court's intent to effect a sea change in the way such instruments are interpreted."
      [Open Scott Johnson's reply brief and go to the bottom of Page 6 to find Footnote 5.]

        In this Footnote 5 of his brief Scott Johnson sends the reader to "note 4" (Footnote 4) of Brown v. State of Washington to verify his "sea change". But, when one goes to Brown and reads its footnote 4, there is no support for Scott Johnson's "sea change". Here is Footnote 4 of Brown v. State of Washington.

      "4. Since we are reviewing summary judgments, we apply the same standard as the trial court. Hartley v. State, 103 Wn.2d 768, 774, 698 P.2d 77 (1985). In this case, where both parties have agreed no material facts are in dispute, the only issue is a question of law. Department of Labor & Indus. v. Fankhauser, 121 Wn.2d 304, 308, 849 P.2d 1209 (1993)."
      [Brown v. State of Washington at Footnote 4.]

        So, where is this support for Scott Johnson's "sea change" statement? It would be important to verify this "sea change". It isn't often that the Washington State Supreme Court reverses one-hundred years of consistently held legal precedent. If one reads the full Brown opinion, the only footnote that has words similar to the words Scott Johnson uses in his footnote 5, is not footnote 4 in Brown, but rather footnote 14 in Brown. Here is Footnote 14 of Brown v. State of Washington. I've emphasized the critical words in bold font.

      "14. In every case where this court has considered a deed conveying an interest in a narrow strip of land to a railroad company we have found only easements. See Biles v. Tacoma O. & G.H. R.R., 5 Wash. 509, 32 P. 211 (1893); Reichenbach v. Washington Short Line Ry., 10 Wash. 357, 360, 38 P. 1126 (1894); Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber & Shingle Mill Co., 60 Wash. 502, 111 P. 578 (1910); Neitzel v. Spokane Int'l Ry., 65 Wash. 100, 117 P. 864 (1911); Morsbach v. Thurston County, 152 Wash. 562, 278 P. 686 (1929); Swan v. O'Leary, 37 Wn.2d 533, 225 P.2d 199 (1950); Veach v. Culp, 92 Wn.2d. 570, 599 P.2d 526 (1979); Zobrist v. Culp, 95 Wn.2d 556, 627 P.2d 1308 (1981); Roeder Co. v. Burlington N., Inc., 105 Wn.2d 567, 716 P.2d 855 (1986); Lawson v. State, 107 Wn.2d. 444, 730 P.2d 1308 (1986); see also King County v. Squire Inv. Co., 59 Wn. App. 888, 801 P.2d 1022 (1990), review denied, 116 Wn.2d 1021, 811 P.2d 219 (1991)."
      [Brown v. State of Washington at Footnote 14.]

        Comparing Scott Johnson's comment in his footnote 5 (above) to Brown footnote 14 (directly above), it is obvious that Johnson is citing Brown footnote 14 and not Brown footnote 4. Why was it important for Scott Johnson to write that his "sea change" was found in footnote 4 of Brown instead of footnote 14? The answer is that footnote 14 is in the dissenting opinion. Perhaps a legal expert who reads this page can tell me how many times the Washington State Supreme Court has used a footnote in the dissenting opinion to signal a "sea change" in the way it construes deeds. Scott Johnson and the King County Prosecutor actually make that argument. In the County's "defense", it is important to understand that the Prosecutor needed to make outrageous and dishonest claims like this in order to hide his participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. This is the state of our judicial system; crooked lawyers intentionally make false statements with the knowledge that there is no penalty or punishment for their lies. From my experience with the King County Prosecutor, I believe that there is not one honest lawyer in the civil division of that office.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        There was no "sea change" in Brown! Brown recognized the legal precedent which has been used for over one hundred years to construe railroad right-of-way deeds in Washington State. The "sea change" was just a lie by King County Deputy Prosecutor Scott Johnson. When this brief went to Federal district Judge Barbara Jacobs Rothstein, she incorporated many of Scott Johnson's lies into her opinion. Scott's "sea change" wasn't specifically mentioned in Rothstein's opinion, but Rothstein used elements of Johnson's misinterpretation of Brown to justify her dishonest decision. My discussion of Norm Maleng's "legal theory", below, describes the Prosecutor's misrepresentation of the Brown opinion.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Read King County v. Rasmussen (2001), Judge Rothstein's dishonest opinion.

    Norm Maleng's "legal theory" to justify his acceptance of the phony BNSF donation of its land under the East Lake Sammamish right-of-way:

        Norm Maleng and his civil staff needed to come up with a "legal theory" to explain why all the SLS&E deeds along the BNSF East Lake Sammamish right-of-way conveyed fee simple title to the SLS&E Railway in 1887. This theory would keep Maleng and his staff out of federal prison for their participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. As I explained above, Maleng's admission that the Bargquist deed in Lawson v. State granted an easement, and the finding of the court in King County v. Squire that Squire granted an easement, exposed Maleng's dishonesty in accepting the phony tax donation from BNSF. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Since the previous decisions finding the SLS&E "form deed" granted easements were based on Washington State common law, and common law is based on precedent, Maleng and his staff looked to the legal decisions published after King County v. Squire in order to find an opinion which they could mischaracterize in order to cover-up their crime. The decision they selected was the Washington State Supreme Court opinion Brown v. State of Washington (1996). Brown was a later opinion, issued by the highest court, and construed railroad right-of-way deeds. Maleng simply needed to manufacture a "legal theory" as to how Brown had changed one hundred years of legal precedent holding the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad is an easement. This was easy for someone as powerful and dishonest as Norm Maleng.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Maleng's "legal theory" proposed that Brown v. State of Washington had "clarified" one hundred years of consistently held legal precedent, and that now everything was changed. Instead of the long held precedent that the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad always conveys an easement, now Maleng's "legal theory" holds that this is true only if additional language in the deed "expressly and clearly" limits the conveyance to an easement. According to Maleng's "legal theory", without this additional language, a deed granting a right-of-way to a railroad will be presumed to grant the land in fee simple interest. Of course, Brown v. State of Washington does not support Maleng's "legal theory". In fact, Brown contradicts Norm Maleng's "legal theory". Maleng and his staff mischaracterized Brown by using short, selected citations and misrepresenting their meaning when read in the context of Brown and the context of long held legal precedent. Maleng intentionally ignores the portions of the Brown which refuted his dishonest argument. The study of Norm Maleng's "legal theory", hyperlinked below, explains this dishonest tactic, in detail. Norm Maleng realized that he might get lucky and be able to influence the judges construing the ELS right-of-way deeds to buy his "legal theory". But, if Maleng wasn't able to influence the judges, he could always fall back on his "I'm just stupid defense", described below.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Norm Maleng's "legal theory" was first made public on September 17, 1997 in a memorandum written by Senior King County Deputy Prosecutor Bill Blakney. Subsequently, the "legal theory" was used in all of the Prosecutor's briefs related to the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. It is very troubling that federal and State judges adopted Norm Maleng's "legal theory" when they construed the Hilchkanum deed. Since Norm Maleng's "legal theory" is so blatantly dishonest, the judge's adoption of the "legal theory" implicates them in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and identifies them as active participants in the crime. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      View a study of Norm Maleng's "legal theory".

      Read an analysis of Senior King County Deputy Prosecutor Bill Blakney's memorandum.

    The "I'm just stupid" defense.

        Norm Maleng accepted a donation of land from BNSF that he knew BNSF didn't own. To keep himself from going to federal prison for his participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme, he simply needed to claim BNSF owned that land. He wouldn't go to prison for accepting a donation of land that was legally owned by the grantor (BNSF). To claim ownership of all the land under the ELS right-of-way, Maleng and his civil staff needed to devise a "legal theory" to explain why BNSF owned all of the right-of-way land. Norm Maleng's "legal theory" was described above. As long as his "legal theory" appeared to be an honest attempt to obey the law, he could not be prosecuted for tax fraud in accepting the phony donation. If the courts ruled that his "legal theory" was wrong, his excuse for not getting the law right would be "I'm just stupid". You don't go to prison for being stupid.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

Summary:

        King County Prosecutor Norm Maleng accepted a phony donation of the land under the East Lake Sammamish right-of-way from BNSF with the knowledge BNSF did not own that land. This allowed BNSF to take an illegal federal tax write-off of about $40 million. This is the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        In the discussion above, I show that prior to the ELS federal tax fraud scheme about fourteen Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern (SLS&E) right-of-way deeds from King County had been before the Washington State courts with the issue of easement-or-fee. All of the SLS&E deeds were determined to be easements. None were determined to convey fee simple title of the underlying land. King County Prosecutor Norm Maleng represented King County in the determination of thirteen of these fourteen deeds. He and his staff were very knowledgeable in this area of the law. Above, I provide the deeds which were used in the courts to come to the determination of easement and show that several of these deeds are materially identical to the SLS&E deeds along East Lake Sammamish, which Maleng dishonestly claimed granted fee simple title.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        To hide his participation in the ELS tax fraud scheme, Maleng and his ethically challenged staff devised a legal argument to justify a "sea change" in construing railroad right-of-way deeds. They needed a "sea change" in order to justify their claim that the ELS deeds granted fee simple title. I name their bogus legal argument Norm Maleng's "legal theory". The Rasmussen and Ray Hilchkanum judges adopted Maleng's "legal theory" in violation of the truth and their oaths to support the Constitution and the law. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)