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The "House of Cards":
The Common Dishonest Tactics used by Federal and State Judges to Cover-Up the East Lake Sammamish Federal Tax Fraud Scheme

by John Rasmussen

Please read a disclaimer for the statements I make on this website accusing judges, politicians and activists of criminal actions.



The "House of Cards":

         The Federal Ninth Circuit and Washington State judges who construed the 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway (SLS&E) built a "house of cards" to justify their dishonest opinions. This "house of cards" was built with violation of constitutional rights, outright lies, and the intentional misapplication of the law. They built this "house of cards" in order to cover-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and protect the active participants, who were powerful people in King County and, in some cases, personal friends. These judges became participants in the ELS tax fraud scheme with their criminal acts from the bench.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

         This webpage identifies the common dishonest tactics used by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein, Senior Ninth Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher, and Washington State Division I Chief Appeals Judge Ronald Cox in their King County v. Rasmussen and Ray v. King County decisions. For the sake of brevity on this page, I'll refer to these opinions as the "Hilchkanum opinions" or the "Hilchkanum decisions". Here are links to annotated versions of these three dishonest opinions:
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      View an annotated version of King County v. Rasmussen (2001), containing brief comments.

      View an annotated version of King County v. Rasmussen (2002), containing brief comments.

      View an annotated version of Ray v. King County (2004), containing brief comments.

         The common dishonest tactics used in the Hilchkanum decisions are criminal acts from the bench. The coordination of tactics by the judges is simply racketeering.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)


Menu of the Common Dishonest Tactics used by Federal and State Judges to
Cover-Up the East Lake Sammamish Federal Tax Fraud Scheme:

     The tactics and issues discussed on this webpage are presented here as a "jump menu". Selecting an item will take the reader to that portion of the discussion.

    * Tactic: Illegally allow summary judgment.

    * Tactic: Ignore one hundred years of consistently held precedent which finds that the grant of a "right-of-way" to
                  a railroad is an easement.

    * Tactic: Misrepresent the findings in Brown v. State of Washington (1996) by adopting Norm Maleng's
                  "legal theory".

    * Tactic: Refuse to acknowledge the common law precedent set in King County v. Squire (1990), where the judges
                  construed identical SLS&E deed language.

    * Tactic: Change the words in the Hilchkanum deed and then construe the substituted language.

    * Tactic: Find that an illiterate Native American wrote his right-of-way deed to the SLS&E, ignoring the fact that
                  the Railway lawyers wrote the deed.

    * Tactic: Illegally assign false intentions to the Hilchkanums in their right-of-way deed by cherry-picking and
                  misrepresenting the extrinsic evidence.

    * How the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed should have been construed under common law.

    * Summary: Federal and State judges adopted identical dishonest tactics in order to cover-up the East Lake
                        Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.


Tactic: Illegally allow summary judgment.

         All of the Hilchkanum judges illegally used summary judgment to control the outcome of their decisions. Illegal use of summary appears to be an epidemic in our courts.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

         There are two elements in a common law decision: the facts and the law. In court, the facts are the responsibility of the jury. The law is the responsibility of the judge. When there is disagreement with the material facts, our Constitution and the law require those facts be resolved by a jury. This is a critical safeguard in our judicial system. When there is no disagreement with the material facts, there is no need for a jury and the decision may be made by the judge by applying the law to the undisputed facts. This process is called summary judgment. The decision whether there is disagreement with the material facts is made by the judge. This works when we have honest judges. But, this fails when dishonest judges decide to control the outcome of a lawsuit. These judges dishonestly declare there are no questions of material fact, then they sort through the facts they want to use, or even make up facts, and use these bogus facts to justify their decisions. This is exactly what happened with the Hilchkanum decisions. I list here disputed material facts which were illegally "resolved" by the Hilchkanum judges. Then, I provide links to the places in their annotated opinions which show that these judges illegally allowed summary judgment. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

         Here are several disputed material facts in the Hilchkanum decisions:

      * It is a material fact who wrote the Hilchkanum deed.

      * The intention of the parties in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed is a material fact.

      * The intention of the Hilchkanums in their subsequent real estate deeds is a disputed material fact.

      * The ability of the Hilchkanums to participate in their railroad right-of-way deed is a material fact.

      * What was granted in the 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed is a material fact.

         Each of these disputed material facts was illegally and dishonestly resolved by the judges. Any one of these disputed material facts was sufficient to require resolution by a jury. A jury was not allowed by these judges because no legitimate jury would come to the same conclusions made by the judges. The effect of the judge's illegal use of summary judgment and their dishonest resolution of facts is discussed throughout this page.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

         The following links take the reader to the position in each Hilchkanum opinion where the judges illegally granted themselves the right to use summary judgment.

    Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein:

      In King County v. Rasmussen (2001), Federal District Judge Rothstein illegally allowed summary judgment.

    Senior Federal Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher:

      In King County v. Rasmussen (2002), Federal Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher illegally allowed summary judgment.

    Washington State Appeals Court Division 1 Chief Judge Ronald Cox:

      In Ray v. King County (2004), Washington State Chief Appeals Judge Cox illegally allowed summary judgment.

         The dishonest and illegal resolution of facts is a violation of the constitutional right of due process. It is a direct violation of the rules of summary judgment. It is the sacred right of a party in a lawsuit to "have his day in court". At the links above, the judges intentionally denied that constitutional right. In the following sections of this page the effect of the judge's illegal resolution of facts will be discussed.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)


Tactic: Ignore one hundred years of consistently held precedent which finds that the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad is an easement.

         In order to understand the profound dishonesty in the Hilchkanum opinions, one must understand the common law which is used to construe railroad right-of-way deeds. From before Washington became a state until the criminal opinions discussed on this page, the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad has always been legally construed to be an easement. Common law is precedential, so here are links to Washington State common law opinions which establish and confirm this rule of law.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      View fourteen citations holding the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad conveys an easement.

      View forty-four citations which explain the meaning of the words "right-of-way" in railroad deeds.

         The Hilchkanum judges needed to ignore and change this long held precedent in order to cover-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and protect the active participants. They attacked this precedent with the tactics which are described on this page. Here they are listed as links.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Misrepresent the findings in Brown v. State of Washington (1996) by adopting Norm Maleng's "legal theory".

      Refuse to acknowledge the common law precedent set in King County v. Squire (1990).

      Change the words in the Hilchkanum deed and then construe the substituted language.

      Find that illiterate Native American Bill Hilchkanum wrote his right-of-way deed to the SLS&E, and then
      construe the words of the deed against only Hilchkanum.

      Assign false intentions to the Hilchkanums in their deeds based on "cherry-picked" extrinsic evidence, then
      construe the deeds based on misrepresenting that evidence.

         The five common dishonest tactics, linked directly above, are not all the tricks the judges and lawyers used to cover up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme, but they are the most important, and are easily seen as dishonest. Each will be discussed, with links to the respective opinions, in the following sections of this page.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)


Tactic: Misrepresent the findings in Brown v. State of Washington (1996) by adopting Norm Maleng's "legal theory".

The Short Answer:

         Like many of the topics on this website, the reader needs to look at facts and read detailed analysis in order to fully understand this issue. Many folks who read this page are unwilling to spend that time. So, here's the short answer.

         Norm Maleng, the King County Prosecutor, participated in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and needed to cover-up his crime. In 1986, Maleng had agreed that all of the twelve SLS&E deeds involved in Lawson v. State (1986) were easements. But, in the late 1990's, Maleng irrationally claimed that all the East Lake Sammamish SLS&E deeds granted fee simple title. His problem with this gigantic inconsistency was that these SLS&E deeds used identical wording, which was obviously composed by the Railway lawyers. His tactic was to hide this contradiction by manufacturing a phony legal argument which claimed the Washington State Supreme Court had altered one hundred years of consistently held common law in its Brown v. State of Washington (1996) opinion. Brown was decided after Lawson, so Maleng's tactic was to declare a "sea change" in the interpretation of railroad deeds had occurred in Brown. Based on this ridiculous and convoluted lie, which I call Norm Maleng's "legal theory", Maleng argued that deeds from the SLS&E, which had formerly been found to be easements, were now to be found to convey fee simple title, despite identical wording used in their material elements. This dishonest legal argument was adopted by all of the federal and State judges in their Hilchkanum opinions. The saddest aspect is that Norm Maleng's "legal theory was adopted by the judges of the Washington State Supreme Court with their denial of appeal. These judges chose to protect the active participants in the tax fraud scheme rather than uphold the Constitution and the law, defend and reestablish their findings in Brown v. State of Washington, and protect the property rights of the people of the State. Instead, these Supreme Court judges subverted Washington property law with their cowardly denial of the Ray's appeal. I believe this intentional violation of constitutional rights and subversion of common law is an act of treason by these judges because it substitutes the rule of law with abuse of judicial power. That's anarchy. How do we-the-people know how to make decisions in our lives when our laws are contingent on the whim of judges.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      View my March 31, 2009 public letter to the Judges of the Washington State Supreme Court, accusing them of participating in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.

The Long Answer:

         King County Prosecutor Norm Maleng had a problem. As head of the County's civil division, he accepted a donation of the land under the East Lake Sammamish (ELS) right-of-way from BNSF which he knew the railroad did not own. The right-of-way was established by the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway (SLS&E) in the late 1880's. The deeds from the settlers to the Railway were based on a "form deed" which was written by the Railway lawyers. Two deeds had been construed in Washington courts and were found to grant easements. Further, in the resolution of Lawson v. State (1986), Maleng agreed that all the SLS&E deeds involved in that lawsuit granted easements. My understanding is that there were about twelve SLS&E deeds in Lawson. So, fourteen SLS&E deeds had previously been before Washington courts and all were determined to be easements. Now, Norm Maleng accepts a phony donation of right-of-way land from BNSF which requires he assume all the East Lake Sammamish SLS&E deeds granted fee simple title. Essentially, all of these deeds were based on the same "form deed" which was written by the SLS&E lawyers. Norm Maleng needed a legal theory to justify this radical change in construing the SLS&E deeds. His solution was to misrepresent the findings in Brown v. State of Washington (1996), a Washington State Supreme Court opinion which was decided later than Lawson and the other opinions which found the SLS&E deeds to be easements. Maleng's argument would be hilarious if it weren't so dishonest and harmful. I call this dishonest legal argument "Norm Maleng's 'legal theory'".
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Read a detailed explanation of Norm Maleng's "legal theory".

         To briefly explain Norm Maleng's "legal theory", the Prosecutor used the analysis in Brown v. State of Washington (1996), in which the Supreme Court construed railroad deeds written in statutory warranty form without language restricting the grant to right-of-way use, to analyze the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, which was not in statutory warranty form and explicitly granted a "right-of-way" to the Railway. With respect to construing the deeds, the Brown deeds and the Hilchkanum deed are completely different in form and content. In the simple terms, the King County Prosecutor compared "apples" to "oranges", and claimed they were all "apples".
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

         In order to understand the ridiculous and flimsy legal argument which was used to justify Norm Maleng's "legal theory", one should read a brief submitted by King County in my lawsuit, King County v. Rasmussen. In his brief to Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein, King County Deputy Prosecutor Scott Johnson claimed that in Brown v. State of Washington the Washington State Supreme Court signaled a "sea change" in the way railroad deeds were construed. To explain this "sea change", Johnson cited a statement from Brown which he attributed to the majority opinion, but the citation is actually found in the dissenting opinion. Perhaps some legal expert will explain to me how often the Washington State Supreme Court has signaled a dramatic change in common law in a dissenting opinion. Federal District Judge Rothstein agreed with the Prosecutor's briefs and adopted Norm Maleng's "legal theory" in her opinion. I invite the reader to view my analysis of this "sea change". (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Open my analysis of King County's "Brief in Reply to Defendants' Opposition to King County's Motion for Summary Judgment" (April 19, 2001) at the location I discuss King County's ridiculous "sea change" theory.

         Norm Maleng's "legal theory" was adopted by all of the Hilchkanum judges. The following links take the reader to the multiple locations in which the judges used this dishonest legal argument in their opinions.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein:

          Federal District Judge Barbara Jacobs Rothstein adopted Element 2 of Norm Maleng's "legal theory" with the following statement. (citation with my emphasis)
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        "The intent of the parties is "of paramount importance" when interpreting deeds. Brown v. State, 130 Wn.2nd 430, 924 P.2d 908, 911 (1996). The deed must "clearly indicate" an intent to make the conveyance conditional. King County v. Hanson Inv. Co., 34 Wn2d 112, 208 P.2d 113, 117 (1949); see also Brown, 924 P.2d at 912."
            [View this citation from King County v. Rasmussen (2001) with my added detailed comments.]

          Judge Rothstein states that the Hilchkanum deed is an "unconditional grant" of land which does not "restrict the conveyance by designating a specific purpose". This is a statement of Element 2 of Norm Maleng's "legal theory". (citation with my emphasis)
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        "The Hilchkanum deed's overall language does not restrict the conveyance by designating a specific purpose, by limiting use of the land, or by adding a reversion clause. The omissions result in an unconditional grant and distinguish the deed from those in which courts have found easements."
            [View this citation from King County v. Rasmussen (2001) with my added detailed comments.]

          In this citation, Rothstein claims that the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed needs a separate "specific restriction on use" in order to be found an easement. This does not represent common law, but rather is a statement of Element 2 of Norm Maleng's "legal theory". (citation with my emphasis)
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        "The Rasmussens ignore the "entire instrument's" unconditional language and instead urge the court to focus on isolated words. [...] However, an acknowledgement of the probable use cannot limit the conveyance unless accompanied by a specific restriction on use - something the Hilchkanum deed lacks. [...] Similarly, the Rasmussens claim the deed limits the conveyance by using the term "right of way" in the text and caption, but courts have rejected this narrow view as well."
            [View this citation from King County v. Rasmussen (2001) with my added detailed comments.]

          In this last citation, Rothstein intentionally misstates the language in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed by stating the deed grants a "'strip' of land". This substitution of the granting words is Element 1 of Norm Maleng's "legal theory". She then concludes the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed grants fee simple interest because it "contains no restriction" on the grant of the "'strip' of land". This lack of a restriction statement is an adoption of Element 2 of Norm Maleng's "legal theory". (citation with my emphasis)
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        "Moreover, other aspects of the language favor a fee simple. The deed grants a "strip" of land described in metes and bounds rather than merely a right "over" the land (as it does with the tree-cutting grant). The deed uses the word "convey" when granting the strip, which is associated with fee transfers (notably, "convey" is absent in the tree-cutting grant). See Hanson, 208 P.2d at 119. Finding that the overall language contains no restriction, the court concludes that the Hilchkanums intended to convey a fee interest to the Railway."
            [View this citation from King County v. Rasmussen (2001) with my added detailed comments.]

    Senior Federal Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher:

          Judge Fletcher cites King County v. Hanson Inv. Co. with the following sentence from the citation below: "However, the parties must 'clearly indicate' an intent to make a conveyance conditional." Element 2 of Norm Maleng's "legal theory" relies on the misapplication of Hanson as a basis of its dishonest argument. (citation with my emphasis)
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        "A conveyance of a right of way to a railroad may be in fee simple, or it may be an easement. [...] To ascertain the intent of the parties, one must look to the language of the deed as well as the circumstances surrounding the deed's execution and the subsequent conduct of the parties.(6)Id. However, the parties must "clearly indicate" an intent to make a conveyance conditional."
            [View this citation from King County v. Rasmussen (2002) with my added detailed comments.]

          In this citation, Fletcher adopts Norm Maleng's "legal theory" by requiring "language clearly limiting the use of the land to a specific purpose" in order to find the Hilchkanum deed an easement. This dishonest analysis abandons common law and is a statement of Element 2 of Norm Maleng's "legal theory". (citation with my emphasis)
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        "[2] Here the term "right of way" appears in the granting clause as well as in the legal description.(11) In this sense, the Hilchkanum deed suggests a possible intent to create only an easement in a way the deeds at issue in Brown did not. However, neither the granting nor the habendum clauses contains language clearly limiting the use of the land to a specific purpose. In virtually all cases where Washington courts have found only an easement, the granting or the habendum clauses contained such language."
            [View the full citation from King County v. Rasmussen (2002) with my added detailed comments.]

          In this next citation, Judge Fletcher claims that the Hilchkanum deed grants a "strip of land" in spite of the fact that the words of the Hilchkanum deed plainly state that a "right of way" is granted. This misstatement of what Hilchkanum granted is Element 1 of Norm Maleng's "legal theory". (citation with my emphasis)
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        "[4] First, the district court compared the Hilchkanum deed's language granting an interest in the strip of land with its language granting the Railway the right to enter the adjacent land to cut trees:

          The deed grants a "strip" of land described in metes and bounds rather than merely a right "over" the land (as it does with the tree-cutting grant). The deed uses the word "convey" when granting the strip, which is associated with fee transfers (notably, "convey" is absent in the tree-cutting grant). See Hanson, 208 P.2d at 119.

        Id. We agree with the district court that these factors indicate that Hilchkanum intended to convey a fee simple interest in the strip of land described."
            [View this citation from King County v. Rasmussen (2002) with my added detailed comments.]

          With this last citation, Judge Fletcher claims that the Hilchkanum deed needs "additional language explicitly restricting the grant to railroad purposes and providing that the interest would revert to the grantor if the railroad ceased to operate" in order to be found an easement. These statements are and adoption of Element 2 of Norm Maleng's "legal theory". (citation with my emphasis)
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        "Deeds to the Railway from other landowners executed in the same year as the Hilchkanum deed used the same form but contained additional language explicitly restricting the grant to railroad purposes and providing that the interest would revert to the grantor if the railroad ceased to operate. [...] The differences in these deeds reflected the common practice of the railroads of using fee simple form deeds and adding language to include limitations requested by landowners. [...] The deed in question here suggests that the Hilchkanums requested no such limitations."
            [View this citation from King County v. Rasmussen (2002) with my added detailed comments.]

    Washington State Appeals Court Division 1 Chief Judge Ronald Cox:

          Early in his opinion, Judge Cox introduces Element 1 of Norm Maleng's "legal theory" with this citation implying the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad may be fee simple. (citation with my emphasis)
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        "Where a deed conveys a right of way to a railroad, the conveyance may be in fee simple or may be an easement only.11 The interpretation of such a deed is a mixed question of fact and law.12 It is a factual question to determine the intent of the parties.13 Courts must then apply the rules of law to determine the legal consequences of that intent.14 Whether a conveyance is one of fee title or an easement is a conclusion of law as to the effect of a deed."
            [View this citation from Ray v. King County (2004) with my added detailed comments.]

          This next citation takes the reader to the position in Cox' opinion where he morphs and changes the words in the Hilchkanum granting clause from a "right of way" to a "right of way strip" to a "strip of land". The substitution of these contradictory terms is Element 1 of Norm Maleng's "legal theory". (citation with my emphasis)
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        "The granting provisions of the Hilchkanums' deed characterize the conveyed property first as a 'right of way one hundred (100) feet in width through' {the Hilchkanums'} lands,' and the property conveyed as a 'right of way strip.'31 The substance of this language is that the subject of the conveyance is a strip of land, not just the grant of some interest 'over' the land, as the Rays state. Language conveying a strip of land suggests a fee, not a mere easement."
            [View this citation from Ray v. King County (2004) with my added detailed comments.]

          The following citation shows that Cox substitutes the term "strip of land" for the term "right of way". His technique is to blur and confuse the meaning of the term "right-of-way" by ignoring the legal precedent which defines the meaning of "right-of-way" by where-and-how it is used in a deed. He then substitutes "strip of land" for "right of way" as if the terms have the same legal meaning. This is Element 1 of Norm Maleng's "legal theory". Then, after destroying its precedential understanding, Cox finds that the grant of a "right-of-way" is the same as the grant of a "strip of land" unless there is additional limiting language added in the deed. This requirement for additional limiting language is Element 2 of Norm Maleng's "legal theory". (citation with my emphasis)
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        "The Rays' argument that the use of the term 'right of way' invariably means that only an easement is conveyed is overly simplistic. In Washington, as the Brown court observed, the use of that term as a limitation or to specify the purpose of the grant generally creates only an easement.33 Conversely, where there is no language relating to the purpose of the grant or limiting the estate conveyed, and the deed conveys a strip of land, courts will construe the deed to convey fee simple title."
            [View this citation from Ray v. King County (2004) with my added detailed comments.]

          In this citation, Judge Cox makes a statement which contains both Element 1 and Element 2 of Norm Maleng's "legal theory". (citation with my emphasis)

        "The first few factors stated in Brown require consideration of whether the deed conveyed a strip of land and whether additional language limited the use of the land or the estate conveyed.40 As we have already observed, the Hilchkanum deed conveyed a strip of land. Whether language in the deed limited the use of the land is the question. The language of the deed grants a right of way to the Railway without expressly restricting how that right of way was to be used."
            [View this citation from Ray v. King County (2004) with my added detailed comments.]

          Here is a citation, in which Judge Cox states Element 2 of Norm Maleng's "legal theory", by claiming that the Hilchkanum deed contains no limiting language. (citation with my emphasis)

        "Turning to the fourth factor, we note that nothing in the language of the Hilchkanum deed limits the grant to the 'privilege of constructing, operating, or maintaining a railroad over the land.'41 Rather, the granting clause expressly conveys 'a right of way one hundred (100) feet in width through our lands,' without any limitations of the type expressed in the fourth factor. This language is most consistent with the grant of fee title, not an easement."
            [View this citation from Ray v. King County (2004) with my added detailed comments.]

          In this last citation, Judge Cox again repeats his claim "that the grant of the strip of land was in fee" because of a "lack of any limitation in the use of the strip". These statements express both Element 1 and Element 2 of Norm Maleng's "legal theory". (citation with my emphasis)

        "...The grant of the interest in the strip was to the land itself, not an interest over the land. The lack of any limitation in the use of the strip starkly contrasts with the more limited right to cut trees only on the property adjacent to the strip. The clear distinction in the extent of rights conveyed supports the conclusion that the grant of the strip of land was in fee, not an easement similar to the more limited right to cut trees on land adjacent to the strip."
            [View the full citation from Ray v. King County (2004) with my added detailed comments.]

Summary:

        All of the Hilchkanum judges adopted Norm Maleng's "legal theory", as shown in the above discussion. Further, it was adopted by the judges of the Washington State Supreme Court in their denial of the Ray's appeal. Since Norm Maleng's "legal theory" relies on misrepresenting the findings in Brown v. State of Washington (1996), a Washington State Supreme Court opinion, the judges of Washington State Supreme Court had a responsibility to correct the errors in Ray v. King County and reestablish their findings in Brown. Instead of correcting the errors, the judges of Washington State Supreme Court became participants in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme with their denial of appeal. In response to their cowardly denial of the Ray's appeal, I wrote a public letter to the judges of Washington State Supreme Court accusing them of a criminal act from the bench. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      View my March 31, 2009 public letter to the Judges of the Washington State Supreme Court.


Tactic: Refuse to acknowledge the common law precedent set in King County v. Squire (1990), where the judges construed identical SLS&E deed language.

The Short Answer:

         There was a precedential opinion which the Hilchkanum judges refused to acknowledge. In King County v. Squire (1990), the court construed the Squire right-of-way deed to the SLS&E. The Squire court found that the granting clause "strongly" indicted the intention of the parties to convey an easement. The granting clause of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E contained the identical wording. The Hilchkanum judges refused to acknowledge the analysis of the Squire granting clause by the Squire court. Further, the Hilchkanum judges refused to use the precedential citations which the Squire court used in its analysis. The Hilchkanum judges refused to acknowledge the well established precedent that the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad is an easement in Washington State common law.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Read a detailed comparison of the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds to the SLS&E.

      View fourteen precedential citations holding the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad conveys an easement.

The Long Answer:

         Common law is precedential. This means that if a common law decision has already been made on an issue, that decision holds precedent and must be analyzed and, if required, incorporated into a later opinion. While there is a difference between binding precedent and persuasive precedent, the Hilchkanum judges refused to acknowledge any common law precedent in the analysis of the Squire granting clause in King County v. Squire (1990).
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

         The Squire deed to the SLS&E and the Hilchkanum deed to the SLS&E used identical granting language. In King County v. Squire, the court found that this granting language "strongly" indicated the intention to convey an easement. The Hilchkanum judges found that this identical granting language indicated the intention to convey fee simple title. The Squire opinion was briefed to every Hilchkanum judge, but in every case the precedent set in Squire was ignored or misstated by the judges. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

         In the Hilchkanum opinions, the judges determined that Hilchkanum, an illiterate Native American, wrote the granting words of his right-of-way deed to the SLS&E. In the Squire opinion, the court identified the Railway as author of those identical granting words. The Hilchkanum judges refused to explain this inconsistency and refused the Rays and me our constitutional right to resolve this material fact before a jury. This issue of authorship is addressed, in detail, in another section of this page. Use the following link to open that discussion.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Open the discussion on authorship of the Hilchkanum deed.

         We'll now will look at the granting clause of the Squire and Hilchkanum deeds. Then, we will examine the precedent established in Squire and the refusal to acknowledge that precedent in the Hilchkanum opinions.

    Squire right-of-way deed to the SLS&E, March 29, 1887, Granting Clause:

      "In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location, construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway a right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands in said County, described as follows, to-wit:"
           [March 29, 1887 Squire right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

    Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E, May 9, 1887, Granting Clause:

      "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the County of King in Washington Territory we do hereby donate grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way one hundred (100) feet in width through our lands in said County described as follows to wit."
           [May 9, 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

         One can see that the wording of these granting clauses is identical. The Squire court found that this granting language "strongly" indicated the intention to convey an easement. Here is a citation which explains this fact. (The emphasis is mine.)

      "The Squire deed granted a "right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands". This suggests an easement was conveyed. Both King County and Squire note, however, that the habendum clause contains the handwritten language, "or so long as said land is used as a right-of-way by said railway Company," which arguably suggests conveyance of a fee simple determinable. If the granting clause merely conveyed the land to the railroad without reference to a right of way, the "so long as" language would create such a fee. Since the language in the granting clause strongly suggests conveyance of an easement, however, we find it more plausible that the "so long as" language was inserted by Squire to preclude the claim that he conveyed a fee simple to the railroad, particularly since the habendum clause granted the interest to the railroad and "to its successors and assigns forever". The authorities and cases discussed above clearly support construing the Squire deed as an easement.
           [King County v. Squire (1990)]

         If one reads King County v. Squire (1990), one will find that the Squire court relied on Washington State precedential railroad right-of-way opinions to come to its conclusion that the granting clause conveyed an easement. Squire relied on Reichenbach v. Washington Short Line Ry. Co. (1894), Swan v. O'Leary (1950), Morsbach v. Thurston Co. (1929), Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber (1910), and Veach v. Culp (1979) for precedent. These precedential opinions hold that the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad is an easement. The meaning of the term "right-of-way" in railroad deeds has well documented precedent in Washington common law.

      View fourteen precedential citations holding the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad conveys an easement.

      View forty-four citations explaining the meaning of the words "right-of-way" in railroad deeds.

         In spite of the precedent set in King County v. Squire and the many earlier precedential opinions, the Hilchkanum judges found the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to convey fee simple title. The Hilchkanum judges provided no precedent in support. Instead, the Hilchkanum judges determined that the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed was written by the Hilchkanums (in spite of the fact that they were illiterate) and their intentions in their right-of-way deed was not expressed by the language in their right-of-way deed, but rather in the language of their subsequent real estate deeds. I'm not kidding. This is what these dishonest Hilchkanum judges decided. The basis of their analysis was to "cherry pick" the Hilchkanum subsequent real estate deeds, ignoring the deeds which would contradict their bizarre analysis, and then to misrepresenting the exception language in the subsequent deeds they "cherry picked". This dishonest analysis of the Hilchkanum's subsequent deeds is discussed in another section of this page, which is linked here.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Open the discussion on the "cherry picked" extrinsic evidence used to construe the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed.

         The following links will take the reader to the place in each Hilchkanum opinion where the judges refused to honestly apply the precedent set in King County v. Squire. The judges do this by either ignoring or misrepresenting the findings of the Squire court. After the elimination of Squire, the reader will find that the only opinion the judges find comparable is Veach v. Culp (1979). After finding similarities with Veach, each judge then abandons that comparison in order to find the Hilchkanum's intentions in their "cherry picked" subsequent real estate deeds. Ignoring the language of a deed in favor of "cherry picked" extrinsic evidence is the legal equivalent of "throwing out the baby with the bath". Please use the following links to view the location in each Hilchkanum opinion where the judge adopts this dishonest tactic.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein:

      In King County v. Rasmussen (2001), Federal District Judge Rothstein recognized only Veach v. Culp (1979) as precedential, and then abandoned that precedent in favor of "cherry picked" extrinsic evidence.

    Senior Federal Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher:

      In King County v. Rasmussen (2002), Senior Federal Circuit Judge B. Fletcher recognized only Veach v. Culp (1979) as precedential, and then abandoned that precedent in favor of "cherry picked" extrinsic evidence.

    Washington State Appeals Court Division 1 Chief Judge Ronald Cox:

      In Ray v. King County (2004), Washington State Chief Appeals Judge Cox eliminated Veach v. Culp (1979) as precedent by misstating the findings in Veach.

      In Ray v. King County (2004), Washington State Chief Appeals Judge Cox completely misrepresents the findings of in King County v. Squire (1990).

Summary:

         The Squire and Hilchkanum right-of-way deeds used identical granting language. The Squire court analyzed those granting words and found that Squire granting clause "strongly" indicated the intention to convey an easement. The basis for the Squire court's opinion was a number of precedential railroad right-of-way decisions.

         The Hilchkanum judges intentionally ignored the precedent found in King County v. Squire. Additionally, the Hilchkanum judges ignored the many precedential opinions which the Squire court used to support its analysis. Instead of using well established precedent to analyze the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, the Hilchkanum judges relied only on "cherry picked" extrinsic evidence in order to determine the intentions of the parties to the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. This tactic is beyond bizarre, and supports the fact that the Hilchkanum judges intentionally subverted the Constitution and the law in order to cover-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Read a detailed comparison of the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds to the SLS&E.


Tactic: Change the words in the Hilchkanum deed and then construe the substituted language.

         All of the Hilchkanum judges changed the granting words in the Hilchkanum deed and then construed their substituted words rather than the actual words in the deed. So first, let's look at the granting clause of the Hilchkanum deed to determine what is granted. In addition, a link is provided to view the complete Hilchkanum deed with a photocopy of the original. (my emphasis in this citation) (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    May 9, 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E, Granting Clause:

      "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the County of King in Washington Territory we do hereby donate grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way one hundred (100) feet in width through our lands in said County described as follows to wit."
           [May 9, 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

         For more that one hundred years, the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad has been found to be an easement in Washington State/Territory common law. The Hilchkanum opinions dishonestly changed that consistently held precedent. Here are fourteen citations from Washington precedential opinions which explain this precedent.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      View fourteen precedential citations holding the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad conveys an easement.

         It is obvious that a "right of way" is granted to the SLS&E by Bill Hilchkanum. But, the dishonest Hilchkanum judges conclude that a "strip of land" is granted. "Right-of-way" and "strip of land" are contradictory terms when construing railroad right-of-way deeds. Changing the words of a deed by substituting contradictory terms is profoundly dishonest. The judge's dishonesty is shown in their opinions. In this case, I'll let the judges prove their dishonesty with citations from each Hilchkanum opinion, accompanied by my analysis. Please use the following links to verify that the judges changed the words of the Hilchkanum deed when they analyzed the meaning of the deed's language. (citations with my emphasis)
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein:

      "Moreover, other aspects of the language favor a fee simple. The deed grants a "strip" of land described in metes and bounds rather than merely a right "over" the land (as it does with the tree-cutting grant). The deed uses the word "convey" when granting the strip, which is associated with fee transfers (notably, "convey" is absent in the tree-cutting grant). See Hanson, 208 P.2d at 119. Finding that the overall language contains no restriction, the court concludes that the Hilchkanums intended to convey a fee interest to the Railway."
        [Open an annotated version of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) at the location Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein makes this dishonest substitution of granting words.]

    Senior Federal Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher:

      "[4] First, the district court compared the Hilchkanum deed's language granting an interest in the strip of land with its language granting the Railway the right to enter the adjacent land to cut trees:

        The deed grants a "strip" of land described in metes and bounds rather than merely a right "over" the land (as it does with the tree-cutting grant). The deed uses the word "convey" when granting the strip, which is associated with fee transfers (notably, "convey" is absent in the tree-cutting grant). See Hanson, 208 P.2d at 119.

      Id. We agree with the district court that these factors indicate that Hilchkanum intended to convey a fee simple interest in the strip of land described."
        [Open an annotated version of King County v. Rasmussen (2002)) at the location Federal Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher makes this dishonest substitution of granting words.]

    Washington State Appeals Court Division 1 Chief Judge Ronald Cox:

      "The granting provisions of the Hilchkanums' deed characterize the conveyed property first as a 'right of way one hundred (100) feet in width through' {the Hilchkanums'} lands,' and the property conveyed as a 'right of way strip.'31 The substance of this language is that the subject of the conveyance is a strip of land, not just the grant of some interest 'over' the land, as the Rays state. Language conveying a strip of land suggests a fee, not a mere easement."
        [Open an annotated version of Ray v. King County (2004), at the location State Appeals Judge Ronald Cox makes this dishonest substitution of granting words.]


Tactic: Find that an illiterate Native American wrote his right-of-way deed to the SLS&E, ignoring the fact that the Railway lawyers wrote the deed.

The Short Answer:

         All of the Hilchkanum judges irrationally found that Bill Hilchkanum wrote his right-of-way deed to the SLS&E. Since the words of a deed are construed against its author, the Hilchkanum judges then construed all the words of the 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed against only Bill Hilchkanum, an illiterate Duwamish Indian. In order the come to their dishonest conclusion that Hilchkanum wrote his right-of-way deed, the Hilchkanum judges ignored the many documents and legal briefs which were presented to them and show the Railway lawyers wrote every word of the Hilchkanum deed.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

         Authorship is a material fact. Under the rules of summary judgment, disputed material facts are required to be resolved by a jury. The Hilchkanum judges ignored the rules of summary judgment, and the due process amendment of the Bill of Rights, and illegally established Hilchkanum as author of his deed. This was an important tactic for the Hilchkanum judges in their cover-up of the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. Since all of the SLS&E deeds which had previously been before the courts had been determined to be easements, the Hilchkanum judges needed to make the Hilchkanum deed unique and different from the others so they could declare it conveyed fee simple title. This tactic of illegally naming Hilchkanum the author of his deed achieved this goal. The problem is that the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed had identical language to other SLS&E deeds which had previously been found to be easements. This was no problem for the dishonest Hilchkanum judges. They simply ignored legal precedent and the disputed material fact of authorship and refused the Rays and me our constitutional right to resolve this disputed material fact before a jury of our peers. We don't have a legitimate legal system in Washington State.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Understand Hilchkanum's participation and intentions with his right-of-way deed.

      View a study of the SLS&E "form deed" which identifies the Railway lawyers as author of both the "form deed" and the Hilchkanum deed.

The Long Answer:

         All of the Hilchkanum judges illegally identified Hilchkanum as author of his 1887 right-of-way deed to the SLS&E. Their identification of Hilchkanum as author was illegal because that material fact was challenged in each of the court cases. Under the rules of summary judgment, questions of material fact must be resolved by a jury, not by dishonest judges who are committing criminal acts with their opinions.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

         After denying the right to a jury, the judge's illegal establishment of Hilchkanum as author of his deed involved two tactics. First, the Hilchkanum judges simply named Hilchkanum as author without any document or fact to support their conclusions. Second, the judges ignored and hid the fact that the Hilchkanum deed was an unaltered version of the SLS&E "form deed" which had been prepared by the Railway lawyers. This fact was available from an analysis of King County v. Squire (1990), where the Squire granting clause is identical to the Hilchkanum granting clause and the Squire judges found that the Railway was responsible for those words. Further, many other SLS&E deeds contained identical language to the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. Since the deeds used identical language, and Bill Hilchkanum was an illiterate Native American, it was ridiculous for the Hilchkanum judges to conclude that Hilchkanum wrote his deed. The Hilchkanum judges made up the material fact of authorship and denied the Rays and me our constitutional right to resolve that question of material fact before a jury. It just doesn't get much more dishonest that that in a court of law.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      View a detailed comparison of the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds to the SLS&E.

      View a study of the SLS&E "form deed" which identifies the Railway as author of both the "form deed" and the Hilchkanum deed.

         Identifying the author of a deed is important because the words of a deed are construed against the party who drafted it. Here is a citation supporting this common law precedent:

      "Initially, it should be noted that contract language subject to interpretation is construed most strongly against the party who drafted it, or whose attorney prepared it. Underwood v. Sterner, supra: Wise v. Farden, 53 Wn.2d 162, 332 P.2d 454 (1958): Restatement, Contracts SS 236 (d) (1932)."
        [Stickney v. Underwood (1966) - Citation is highlighted on page 3.]

         Prior to the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed being construed in court, about fourteen SLS&E deeds had been before the courts in Washington State. All fourteen deeds were determined to be easements, either by the judicial opinions or by agreement of the parties. The deeds contained common language which was written by the Railway lawyers. The Hilchkanum judges ignored these facts and established Hilchkanum as author of his deed because they had predetermined that the Hilchkanum deed would convey fee simple title of the right-of-way land to the Railway. The Hilchkanum judges did this in order to differentiate the Hilchkanum deed from the previous deeds which were determined to be easements.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      View a study of the SLS&E "form deed" which identifies the Railway as author of both the "form deed" and the Hilchkanum deed.

         The dishonesty of each Hilchkanum judge in establishing Hilchkanum as author of his right-of-way deed is discussed next.

    Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein, King County v. Rasmussen (2001):

           Federal district Judge Rothstein was the most clever in her establishment of Hilchkanum as author. She never made the statement that Hilchkanum wrote his deed, she just made conclusions based on that unstated and undocumented assumption. Further, she struck our statement that the Railway lawyer's wrote the Hilchkanum deed by dishonestly claiming our statement was racially biased.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

           Rothstein struck my lawyers briefing which contradicted her illegal and dishonest conclusions of fact about Hilchkanum. My lawyer made the following statement in his "Brief Opposing King County Motion for Summary Judgment": (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

             "Bill Hilchkanum was an Indian. At the very best he was functionally illiterate, and "made his mark" when he signed legal documents. Thus, all drafting of any ambiguous documents was completed by the railroad’s representative. In this case Bill Hilchkanum and his wife signed a document that did not comport with the necessary elements for conveyance of a fee simple interest, because of the qualifying and limiting language of the document."
          [Read my lawyer's brief opposing King County's Summary Judgment motion and view this statement on page 2. The portions highlighted in yellow were struck by Rothstein.]

           Judge Rothstein struck my lawyer's statement with this comment: (with my emphasis)

            "In paragraph 1 of the response to the motion for summary judgment, the Rasmussens speculate on the intent of Bill Hilchkanum based on his Native American ethnicity. The Rasmussens provide no evidence to support the allegations. Therefore, all but the last two sentences of the paragraph will be stricken."
          [View this statement in an annotated version of King County v. Rasmussen (2001)]

           Of course this was a self-serving lie by Judge Rothstein. My lawyer was not ..."speculat[ing] on the intent of Bill Hilchkanum based on his Native American ethnicity." Instead, he made two distinctly separate observations and a legitimate conclusion, all of which were correct. First, my lawyer stated the material fact that Bill Hilchkanum was an "Indian". This fact is obvious from the documents we provided Judge Rothstein. Second, my lawyer stated the material fact that Bill Hilchkanum was illiterate. The Hilchkanum right-of-way deed was the principal exhibit in the lawsuit. Rothstein was required to read that deed in order to construe its meaning. If she read the deed, she was aware that both Hilchkanums signed their right-of-way deed with an "X". While there were many other documents we presented to Rothstein which proved the Hilchkanums were illiterate, the fact that they couldn't sign their names on the deed was adequate evidence to establish their illiteracy. Questions of material facts are required to be resolved by a jury in a legitimate court of law. The illiteracy of a party is a material question of fact. Last, my lawyer concluded that the Railway lawyers must have written the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed because of these two contributing material facts. Rothstein struck my lawyers' statements by stating they were racially motivated. The judge lied. There were federal and state laws which protected Native Americans in real estate transactions in the late 1800's and early 1900's. These laws recognized the disadvantage Natives had in legal transactions. There is no racial bias in recognizing this historical fact. It was not my lawyer's responsibility to teach basic American history to Judge Rothstein. Instead of recognizing the history of the times, the laws enacted to protect vulnerable Natives, and the many Hilchkanum documents we presented to Rothstein which supported my lawyer's statements, Rothstein struck my lawyer's legitimate argument and then irrationally and illegally determined the material fact that Hilchkanum was responsible for every word in his right-of-way deed. She ignored facts and the law, and made up ridiculous facts, in order to justify her conclusions. The following link explains the history, laws and specific Hilchkanum documents which Rothstein refused to allow us to present to a jury in an honest resolution of these questions of material fact.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Read a study which explains the Hilchkanum's ability to participate in their right-of-way deed.

           Instead of allowing my constitutional right to establish the fact that the Railway lawyers wrote the Hilchkanum deed, and to brief the precedent set in King County v. Squire (1990) (which found the Railway responsible for the Squire/Hilchkanum granting clause), Rothstein "took the law into her own hands" and made up the fact that Hilchkanum was responsible for the words of his deed. Here is her first statement finding the Hilchkanums knowledgeable about deed construction. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        "Thus it is clear that the parties knew how to limit a grant, and that they chose not to limit the right of way."
             [View this citation in an annotated version of King County v. Rasmussen (2001)]

           The fact that the deed had limiting language does not prove that Hilchkanum knew how to limit a deed. It does not prove that Hilchkanum had any part in that limiting language or in any other part of his deed. This becomes even more dishonest by Judge Rothstein because my lawyer notified Rothstein in his brief that Hilchkanum was illiterate and a Native American. Whether Rothstein was correct in striking my lawyer's statement or not, she was required to consider whether Hilchkanum was capable of participating in his right-of-way deed.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

           Rothstein didn't stop there. After falsely stating that Hilchkanum "...knew how to limit a grant...", she construed all the words in the Hilchkanum deed against only Hilchkanum. Rothstein justified this by manufacturing ridiculous material facts about Hilchkanum. Here is a citation in which Rothstein manufactured facts to justify her construing the words of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed against only Hilchkanum: (with my emphasis)
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        "Furthermore, because the Hilchkanums were homesteaders without a final patent, federal law limited them to certain types of conveyances, such as grants to schools, cemeteries, and rights of way to railways. See 17 U.S. Stat. 602. The Act provides more context for the choice of the term "right of way" in the deed, indicating that the Hilchkanums chose the phrase out of necessity rather than a desire to create an easement."
             [View this citation in an annotated version of King County v. Rasmussen (2001)]

           In the above citation, Judge Rothstein states that Hilchkanum, an illiterate Native American in 1887, understood the complexities of 17 U.S. Stat. 602 and wrote his deed using the term "right of way" in the granting clause only to comply with the words in the federal statute. This is ridiculous. This is not legal analysis, but rather this is the illegal establishment of a material fact. It is a question of fact that the Hilchkanums chose the term "right of way" as Rothstein claims. Questions of fact are resolved by juries in legitimate courts of law. Judge Rothstein knew she was making up a material fact here, but had no fear of being held responsible for that dishonest act. The Ninth Circuit Courts of the United States of America are completely out of control, with judges, such as Rothstein, freely committing criminal acts from the bench. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    Senior Federal Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher, King County v. Rasmussen (2002):

           Senior Federal Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher was clever like her district judge friend, Rothstein. Apparently, clever is a prerequisite of becoming a federal judge. My lawyer "rubbed" Fletcher's nose in the truth of Hilchkanum's inability to author his deed, but Fletcher simply refused to acknowledge and respond to my lawyer's brief. Here is a quote from my lawyer's brief which would require an honest judge to respond. Fletcher simply ignored my lawyer's argument and allowed Rothstein's dishonest establishment of Hilchkanum as author of his deed, to stand.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

             "Bill Hilchkanum was the original homesteader of the Rasmussens’ lands in this case. ER, 446. On June 15, 1876 David T. Denny and Luke M. Redmond stated under oath that Bill Hilchkanum was an Indian who had abandoned his membership in the Snoqualmie tribe, and “adopted the habits and pursuits of civilized life”. ER, 494. The entire chronology of events explaining the homestead efforts of Bill Hilchkanum are found as exhibits to the expert witness Graddon declaration, at ER 446-522. On March 6, 1884 David T. Denny testified by sworn affidavit that “Bill Hilchkanum is an Indian and unable to read or write the English language***That said Indian Bill Hilchkanum relied on this affiant to take care of his said business…”. ER, 486. On March 24, 1884 Bill Hilchkanum “made his mark” upon an affidavit, which stated he “is an Indian and unable to read or write the English language and hence depends entirely upon the assistance of his white friends to aid him in transacting his business for him. That one D.T. Denny of Seattle W.T. had the care of his homestead papers for him…” ER, 483. David T. Denny was one of the witnesses to the original Hilchkanum deed in this case. ER, 502. On March 25, 1884 George W. Tibbetts swore by affidavit that he was “well acquainted with Bill Hilchkanum…” and that “…Bill Hilchkanum is an Indian and unable to read or write the English language and that he depended upon other parties to manage his business for him so that said Indian did not understand how to proceed in his homestead proof…”. ER, 485. In all documents of record, including the original Hilchkanum deed to SLS&E, Bill Hilchkanum signed his name by “making his mark”, which was an “X”, rather than a written or printed signature. ER, 476-522. The quitclaim deed from Bill Hilchkanum to SLS&E was signed (by his “mark”) and delivered to SLS&E on May 9, 1887. ER, 501-503. Bill Hilchkanum received the United States’ fee patent to his homestead lands on July 24, 1888. ER, 505-507.

             The above uncontroverted material facts describe the grantor whom the district court in this case found as being competent to limit a grant and to distinguish between an easement and a conveyance of fee simple absolute. ER, 592-597. The district court even found that Bill Hilchkanum was aware of 17 U.S. Stat. 602, and chose the phrase “right of way” out of necessity rather than to create an easement, because Bill Hilchkanum knew the then existing federal law allowed the conveyance of a railroad right of way before he had received his fee patent. ER, 595. The Rasmussens contest these factual findings of the district court, with the above evidence that was before the district court."

          [Read my lawyer's brief to Judge Fletcher and panel, "Defendants-Appellants’ John and Nancy Rasmussens’ Opening Appeal Brief", and view the above statement beginning on page 4,
          (PDF page 10).]

           Despite my lawyer "rubbing Fletcher's nose" in document after document which established questions of material fact about Hilchkanum's ability to participate in his deed, and Hilchkanum's authorship of his deed, Fletcher simply refused to respond to my lawyer's brief. Her refusal supported the criminal actions by her fellow federal judge, Barbara Rothstein. It would be nice if federal judges had any commitment to the truth and the rights of the citizens of the United States, rather than the irrational support of criminal activity by their fellow federal judges.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    Washington State Appeals Court Division 1 Chief Judge Ronald Cox, Ray v. King County (2004):

           Appeals Court Division 1 Chief Judge Ronald Cox wasn't as clever as the federal judges who subtly established Hilchkanum as author of his right-of-way deed. Perhaps, Cox is not as skilled at lying as Judges Rothstein and Fletcher, or perhaps he simply had the confidence that, on appeal, his irrational and illegal assumptions would be supported by the Washington State Supreme Court. If that were the case, he was right.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

           While Rothstein and Fletcher made conclusions on Hilchkanum's authorship without ever stating that Hilchkanum wrote his deed, Cox made statements which found Hilchkanum to be the author of his deed and responsible for the words in his right-of-way deed. Here is Cox' statement in Ray v. King County (2004). Please use the link to read this statement in the context of the full opinion, with my added analysis. (citation with my emphasis)
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

             "The Rays also speculate that the Railway prepared the May 1887 deed.64 Thus, they argue that we should construe ambiguities in that deed language against the Railway. We decline to do so because nothing in the record supports this argument.

             First, the face of the deed shows that the Hilchkanums executed the deed by making their marks, not by signing the instrument. Of course, neither party disputes that the Hilchkanums could neither read nor write.65 While we are mindful of the undisputed evidence that the Hilchkanums could neither read nor write, we are unaware of any rule that says that one who cannot do so lacks the capacity to understand the nature and extent of his or her property or the nature of a conveyance of such property. Nothing in the record before us indicates that the Hilchkanums failed to understand what they were doing in this particular transaction, a point counsel for the Rays appeared to concede at oral argument of this case. Second, and more importantly, examination of the deed shows that it is entirely handwritten, apparently by the same person. Both the language of the main part of the deed, as well as the acknowledgment, is in the handwriting of the notary who acknowledged the signatures of the Hilchkanums, B.J. Tallman.66 Nothing in the record before us indicates that he was the agent of the Railway. Absent such proof, we fail to see why we should construe ambiguities in the May 1887 deed against the Railway. Rather, to the extent we were to engage in applying a rule of construction to any perceived ambiguities in the language of the Hilchkanum deed, we would construe the deed against the Hilchkanums, the grantors.67 Third, the Rays also rely on the opinions of expert witnesses to support their position. Because courts decide the legal questions before us, not experts, we decline to give credence to these opinions.68"
             [View this citation from Ray v. King County (2004), with my detailed comments and documentation.[

           Apparently, Judge Cox is unable to understand the difference between as a "legal question" and a question of material fact. I believe that distinction is taught about the first day of law school. Authorship is a question of material fact, not a question of law. Under the rules of summary judgment, questions of material fact are required to be resolved by a jury. Here, Cox discusses questions of material fact and mischaracterizes them as questions of law. Cox dishonestly resolved the fact of authorship. His dishonesty is revealed in the dissenting opinion. Here is a citation from the Ray v. King County (2004) dissenting opinion. (citation with my emphasis)
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

             "The majority states that because Hilchkanum must have understood the nature and extent of his conveyance, the fact that the deed was handwritten by someone else is of no consequence. And the majority holds that because there is nothing in the record indicating that the drafter was an agent of the railway, Hilchkanum must have been the drafter. This conclusion wrongly focuses on the identity of the grantor instead of the identity of the drafter of the deed. It is undisputed that the deed's language was taken from the railroad's standard deed. And the affidavit by the Rays' expert creates a material question of fact concerning who actually drafted the document. Taking this affidavit in a light most favorable to the Rays as the nonmoving party, any ambiguities in the deed must be construed against the railroad."
             [Ray v. King County (2004) (Dissenting)]

           In the above dissenting statement by Judge Baker, he specifically identifies a "material question of fact" which, in a legitimate court of law, is required to be resolved by a jury. Baker states that "It is undisputed that the deed's language was taken from the railroad's standard deed." This is a contributing material fact which establishes the material fact of authorship of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. I don't have the presentation of the Ray's expert witness, but the slightest amount of research verifies the fact that the Hilchkanum deed was based on the Railway's "form deed". Please use the following link to verify this material fact.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        View a study of the SLS&E "form deed" which identifies the Railway as author of both the "form deed" and the Hilchkanum deed.

           Besides the question of authorship, there were other questions of material fact which were kept from a jury in Ray v. King County (2004).

        View a discussion of the disputed material facts in Ray v. King County (2004), which were kept from a jury and illegally resolved by the judges.

           While Judge Baker identifies authorship of the Hilchkanum deed to be a question of material fact, he fails to demand that question of fact, and the others, be resolved by a jury. All of the Ray v. King County (2004) judges know this requirement. Here is the law and the Washington State Constitution.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

           The Revised Code of Washington (RCW) requires disputed facts to be resolved by a jury:

        RCW 4.44.090 - Questions of fact for jury.

        All questions of fact other than those mentioned in RCW 4.44.080, shall be decided by the jury, and all evidence thereon addressed to them.

           The Washington State Constitution forbids the judge from interfering with the jury's determination of facts:

        Washington State Constitution, Article IV - The Judiciary, Section 16 - Charging Juries.

        Judges shall not charge juries with respect to matters of fact, nor comment thereon, but shall declare the law.

           Judges Cox, Schindler, and Baker, know the Constitution and the law. They simply chose to not abide by it in Ray v. King County (2004). Their denial of a jury was necessary to cover-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and protect the active participants in the crime. I'd suspect that a number of the active participants are personal friends or former legal colleagues of these dishonest judges.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

Summary:

         Since all of the SLS&E deeds which had previously been before the courts had been determined to be easements, the Hilchkanum judges needed to make the Hilchkanum deed unique and different from the others so they could declare it conveyed fee simple title. Their tactic to illegally name Hilchkanum the author of his deed achieved this goal. The problems with this dishonest tactic were that Hilchkanum was an illiterate Native American, and the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed had identical language to other SLS&E deeds which had previously been found to be easements. This was no problem for the Hilchkanum judges. They simply ignored legal precedent and the disputed material fact of authorship and refused the Rays and me our constitutional right to resolve this disputed material fact before a jury of our peers.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)


Tactic: Illegally assign false intentions to the Hilchkanums in their right-of-way deed by cherry-picking and misrepresenting the extrinsic evidence.

The Short Answer:

         In construing a deed, it's the duty of the court to carry out the intentions of parties. The words of the deed are the primary source for determining the intentions, with the circumstances at the time of the deed's execution and the subsequent conduct of the parties being a secondary consideration. The Hilchkanum right-of-way deed should have been simple for the judges to construe. The Hilchkanum deed was based on an unaltered "form deed" which had been written by the Railway lawyers. The Hilchkanum deed granted a "right of way" to the SLS&E. This wording has always been found to grant an easement in Washington common law. Further, the granting words of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed were identical to the granting words of the Squire right-of-way deed. The Squire granting words had been found to "strongly" indicate the intention to convey an easement in King County v. Squire (1990).

         The Hilchkanum judges needed to find the Hilchkanum deed granted fee simple title in order to cover-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and protect the active participants in the crime. So, the Hilchkanum judges considered the intentions of only the Hilchkanums in their right-of-way deed. They justified this by illogically and illegally naming the Hilchkanums as author of their deed. This issue was discussed in the previously section. Then, the Hilchkanum judges ignored the words of the Hilchkanum deed, and instead concentrated on "cherry-picked" subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deeds in order to determine the Hilchkanum's intentions in their right-of-way deed to the SLS&E. In construing the Hilchkanum's subsequent real estate deeds, the Hilchkanum judges considered only the deeds which excepted the SLS&E right-of-way. They then misinterpreted those subsequent deeds by misstated their words and misrepresented their legal meaning. Contrary to common law, the Hilchkanum judges found that the exception of a right-of-way means the exception of the land under that right-of-way. Further, the Hilchkanum judges ignored the subsequent deeds which contradicted their dishonest analysis. Of course, these considerations should have been presented to a jury because of the number of disputed material facts the Hilchkanum judges concocted in their analysis. It just doesn't get much more dishonest than that. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

The Long Answer:

         In a previous section on this page, I explained that the Hilchkanum judges decided that the Hilchkanums authored their 1887 right-of-way deed to the SLS&E. Based on that obvious lie, the judges then considered only the intentions of the Hilchkanums in the construing of the deed. When disputed, the authorship and the intentions of the parties in a deed are material facts which must be resolved by a jury. All of the Hilchkanum judges illegally and dishonestly resolved these material facts in violation of the Constitution of Washington State, the Constitution of the United States, and the rules of summary judgment. This section discusses the illegal establishment of the Hilchkanum's intentions by the judges.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    The intentions of the parties in a deed should primarily be determined by construing the words of that deed.

           The intentions of the parties in a deed is the most critical question of fact in construing the effect of the deed. Here are two citations which explains this. (with my emphasis)

             "In general, when construing a deed, the intent of the parties is of paramount importance and the court's duty to ascertain and enforce."
             [Brown v. State of Washington (1996)]

             "[1] A conveyance of a right-of-way to a railroad may be in fee simple or may be an easement only. Morsbach v. Thurston County, 152 Wash. 562, 568, 278 P. 686 (1929). The interpretation of such a deed to determine its effect is a mixed question of fact and law. It is a factual question to determine the intent of the parties. Then we must apply the rules of law to determine the legal consequences of that intent. Vavrek v. Parks, 6 Wn. App. 684, 690, 495 P.2d 1051 (1972); Warren v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 19 Cal. App. 3d 24, 35, 96 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1971)."
             [Veach v. Culp (1979)]

           So, the intent of the parties is the most critical material fact in construing the deed. Common law has established that the intentions should be determined primarily from the deed itself. Here is a citation which supports this tenant. (with my emphasis)

             "[1, 2] The instruments of conveyance should reflect the intention of the parties. Gold Bar v. Gold Bar Lumber Co., 109 Wash. 391, 393-94, 186 P. 896 (1920), held:

          [T]he intent of the parties must primarily be gathered from a fair consideration of the deed, and the language employed therein should be consistent with the terms of the deed, including its scope and subject-matter; that the object, in construing the deed, is to ascertain the intention of the parties, especially that of the grantor; that some meaning should be given to every word, clause and expression, if it can reasonably be done and if it is not inconsistent with the general intent of the whole instrument, so that the deed may operate according to the intention of the parties; . . ."
             [Zobrist v. Culp (1977)]

           While the words of a deed are the most important factor in construing its intent, there are two other factors which are considered: the circumstances at the time of the deed's execution and the subsequent conduct of the parties. These factors are called extrinsic evidence. Here is a citation which supports this point. (with my emphasis)

             "The intention of the grantor may be determined from the language contained in the granting clause of the deed, the circumstances surrounding its execution, and the subsequent conduct of the parties with relation thereto."
             [Scott v. Wallitner (1956)]

    The Hilchkanum judges relied only on Veach v. Culp in construing the words of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed.

           As shown in the above citation, it is established common law that the words of the deed have the strongest effect to explain the intentions of the parties, with the extrinsic evidence of secondary importance. In violation of this rule, the Hilchkanum judges ignored the effect of the words of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed and instead concentrated on "cherry picked" extrinsic evidence. Their technique was to ignore the opinion in King County v. Squire (1990) and instead consider Veach v. Culp (1979) as the only opinion with comparable circumstances. As I explained in an earlier section, all of the judges were briefed Squire, and all ignored or misrepresented the opinion of the Squire court. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Open the earlier discussion on the importance of King County v. Squire (1990).

           After finding Veach v. Culp (1979) the most applicable precedent, the Hilchkanum judges eliminated Veach by claiming it lacked the extrinsic evidence which was available to explain the Hilchkanum's intentions. Of course, the Hilchkanum judges "cherry-picked" the Hilchkanum's subsequent real estate deeds (extrinsic evidence) and then misstated the words in those deeds and misconstrued their legal meaning. This misrepresentation of "cherry-picked" extrinsic evidence is discussed later in this section. First we verify that each Hilchkanum judge found Veach as the only opinion which was remotely comparable to the circumstances with the Hilchkanums. Here, I present the portion of each Hilchkanum opinion in which the judges dishonestly consider only Veach as a comparable opinion and then dismiss Veach in favor of "cherry-picked" extrinsic evidence. (with my emphasis)
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein abandoned Veach in favor of extrinsic evidence:

        "(* One Washington case did find that a deed containing the term "right of way" without additional limiting language granted an easement rather than a fee. Veach v. Culp, 92 Wn.2d 570, 599 P.2d 526 (1979). Veach, however did not analyze the circumstances surrounding the transfer or the subsequent behavior of the parties. Evidence on both factors exists here and provides context that was lacking in Veach.)"
          Open an annotated version of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) at the position where Federal District Judge Rothstein provides that dishonest analysis.

      Senior Federal Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher abandoned Veach in favor of extrinsic evidence:

        "One Washington case, Veach, supports the Rasmussens' contention that the mere use of the term "right of way" in the granting clause of the Hilchkanum deed, without additional language conditioning the use of the interest, creates an easement. 599 P.2d at 527. In Veach, the 1901 deed stated:

          The said party of the first part, for and in consideration of the sum of Two Hundred and Twenty-five Dollars, . . . do by these presents remise, release, and forever quit claim unto said party of the second part, and to its assigns, all that certain lot, piece or parcel of land situated in Whatcom County . . . to-wit: "A right of way one hundred feet wide, being fifty feet on each side of the center line of the B.B. & Easter R.R. . . . . To have and to hold, all and singular, said premises, together with the appurtenances unto the said party of the second part, and to its assigns forever."

        Id. Like the Hilchkanum deed, the language in the Veach deed did not expressly limit the use to a particular purpose. However, the district court distinguished Veach on the basis of other language in the Hilchkanum deed and extrinsic evidence indicating an intent to convey a fee simple estate, neither of which was present in Veach. Rasmussen, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1230 n.4."
          Open an annotated version of King County v. Rasmussen (2002) at the position where Federal Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher provides that dishonest analysis.

      Washington State Appeals Judge Ronald Cox abandoned Veach in favor of extrinsic evidence:

             "In Veach v. Culp,38 the court construed language in the relevant portion of the deed, but did not consider the full range of factors that the supreme court in Brown later articulated for characterizing the nature of the interest conveyed. Thus, we do not read Veach as broadly as do the Rays. In short, as the Brown court states, a narrow focus on the term 'right of way simply begs the question of what interest {the railroad} acquired, because a railroad can own rights of way in fee simple if that is what the deed conveyed.'39 Recognizing that the use of the term does not end the analysis, we therefore examine further the factors guiding determination of intent so that we may properly characterize the nature of the interest conveyed."
          Open an annotated version of Ray v. King County (2004) at the position where Washington State Chief Appeals Judge Cox eliminated Veach v. Culp (1979) as precedent.

    The Hilchkanum judges dishonestly "cherry-picked" the extrinsic evidence by considering only the subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deeds which excepted the SLS&E right-of-way.

           After refusing to apply legal precedent to construe the words of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, the Hilchkanum judges determined the intentions of the Hilchkanums in their right-of-way deed by misconstruing "cherry-picked" subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deeds. Their tactic was to misstate the words of the "cherry-picked" subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deeds and then to misconstrue the legal meaning of those subsequent deeds. Some of the Hilchkanum subsequent real estate deeds excepted the right-of-way and some did not. The Hilchkanum judges considered only the subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deeds which excepted the SLS&E right-of-way, and declared the deeds which failed to except the right-of-way to be of no importance. The judges then claimed that the Hilchkanums understood that 1887 right-of-way deed to the SLS&E had conveyed fee simple title to the Railway because they excepted the land under their right-of-way in these subsequent deeds. There are two problems with the judges reasoning. First, the exception of a railroad right-of-way in a subsequent deed does not necessarily except the land under the right-of-way, but rather may simply recognize an easement for the grantee of that subsequent deed. Second, if the Hilchkanums meant to except the land under the right-of-way with that language in their subsequent deeds, then they intentionally conveyed their land a second time in the subsequent deeds which did not contain that exception. It is fundamental that a person cannot convey fee simple title of land which has previously been conveyed fee simple to another party. But, this is what the Hilchkanum judges avoided by declaring the subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deeds, which did not contain the exception of the right-of-way, to be of no significance or worthy of consideration. I'll discuss each of these problems with the judges reasoning in the next portion of this section. To understand that the Hilchkanum judges "cherry-picked" the subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deeds, please use the following links to the portion of their opinions where they made that dishonest selection.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein:

        In King County v. Rasmussen (2001), Federal District Judge Rothstein "cherry-picked" the subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deeds.

        In this second citation from King County v. Rasmussen (2001), Federal District Judge Rothstein analyzed
        her "cherry-picked" subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deeds and declared any interpretation other than hers would be "superfluous".

      Senior Federal Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher:

        In King County v. Rasmussen (2002), Senior Federal Circuit Judge B. Fletcher "cherry-picked" the subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deeds, and declared the deeds which did not except the right-of-way
        to be "not significantly probative".

      Washington State Appeals Court Division 1 Chief Judge Ronald Cox:

        In Ray v. King County (2004), Washington State Chief Appeals Judge Cox "cherry-picked" an 1898 subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deed in this citation.

        In Ray v. King County (2004), Washington State Chief Appeals Judge Cox "cherry-picked" a 1905 subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deed in this citation.

        In Ray v. King County (2004), Washington State Chief Appeals Judge Cox "cherry-picked" a 1904 subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deed in this citation.

        In Ray v. King County (2004), Washington State Chief Appeals Judge Cox admitted an 1890 subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deed lacked the exception, but declared it "not probative".

    The exception of a railroad right-of-way in a subsequent deed does not necessarily except the land under the right-of-way, but rather may simply recognize an easement for the grantee of that subsequent deed.

           All of the Hilchkanum judges decided that the exception of a right-of-way in the subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deeds excepted the land under the right-of-way. None of the subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deeds excepted the right-of-way land. Instead, they excepted only the right-of-way. The exception of a railroad right-of-way in a subsequent real estate deed does not necessarily except the land under the right-of-way, but rather may simply recognize an easement for the grantee of that subsequent deed. Here are a series of citations which explains this legal understanding.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

           First, the definition of an exception in a deed. Zobrist v. Culp (1977) provides this definition:

        "An exception is the withholding from the operation of the deed of something existent which otherwise the deed would pass to the grantee."
             [Zobrist v. Culp (1977)]

           If Hilchkanum granted an easement to the SLS&E with his right-of-way deed, then the exception of that "right-of-way" in a subsequent deed would simply except an easement.

        "The conveyance of a fee simple interest with a clause excepting an easement...conveys to the grantee all the grantor's rights and interests...yet compels the grantee...from acting...inconsistent with the rights of the third party...described in the exception."
             [Zobrist v. Culp (1977)]

           So, if Hilchkanum granted an easement to the SLS&E with his right-of-way deed, the exception of that "right-of-way" in a subsequent real estate identifies the easement, and nothing more.

        "The grantor here excepted a right-of-way amounting to an easement from the grant. No reference was made in the conveyance to Custer of an exception of the fee to the 100 feet." "...Custer...received a fee interest in the land...restricted only...that he could not use...in a manner inconsistent with the existing rights of the railroad..."
             [Zobrist v. Culp (1977)]

           It was completely dishonest for the Hilchkanum judges to find that the exception of the right-of-way in the subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deeds indicates that the Hilchkanums understood that they conveyed free simple interest of the land under the right-of-way in their 1887 right-of way deed. That isn't common law, and the correct understanding of the law was briefed to most of these dishonest judges. Whether it was briefed, or not, the judges had the responsibility to research and apply the common law shown in the above citations.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

           The exception of a "right-of-way" in a subsequent deed withholds the conveyance of only the "right-of-way". It is necessary to go to the Hilchkanum's 1887 right-of-way deed to the SLS&E to determine whether that "right-of-way" represents an easement or fee simple title to the underlying land. The Hilchkanum judges illegally worked the logic backwards. The Hilchkanum judges misstated the words of the Hilchkanum's subsequent real estate deeds by claiming that the deeds excepted the land under the right-of-way rather than simply the "right-of-way". Based on that misstatement, the judges then dishonestly speculated on the Hilchkanum's intentions in their right-of-way deed. One needs to read the subsequent deeds to understand that the land under the right-of-way was never excepted. Here are several of the subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deeds for the reader to view and verify that the exception was always "right-of-way". (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        December 16, 1898 Warranty Deed from Bill Hilchkanum to Annie Hilchkanum excepted "acres right of way of railroad" not "land".

        August 25, 1899 Quit Claim Deed from Annie Hilchkanum to Bill Hilchkanum excepted "acres right of way of Rail Road" not "land".

        February 27, 1904 Warranty Deed from Bill Hilchkanum to Chris Nelson excepted "acres heretofore conveyed to the Seattle & International Railway for right of way purposes" not "acres of land".

           In each subsequent deed, the exception is a portion of the 1887 right-of-way granted by the Hilchkanums. In no case was land excepted. The use of the term "acres" does not assume "acres of land" because easements may also be expressed in terms of "acres" and in metes and bounds. All of the Hilchkanum judges misstated the words of exception in their "cherry-picked" subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deeds. They misstated the exception to be the land under the right-of-way and then used that misstatement to conclude that the Hilchkanums intended to convey the land under the right-of-way in their 1887 right-of-way deed. This legal analysis by the Hilchkanum judges is completely dishonest and, as shown by the citations above, is not based on the common law. To determine the nature of what was excepted in the subsequent real estate deeds, the Hilchkanum judges were required to construe the effect the 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E. Instead of applying this common law, the Hilchkanum judges worked the legal analysis backward, determining the Hilchkanums intentions in their right-of-way deed by misstating and misconstruing the words of their subsequent deeds. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    If the Hilchkanums meant to except the land under the right-of-way with their exception of the right-of-way in their subsequent deeds, then they intentionally conveyed their land a second time in the subsequent deeds which did not contain that exception.

           I've stated repeatedly on this page, and on this website, that the Hilchkanum judges "cherry-picked" the subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deeds, then misstated the words of those "cherry-picked" deeds and misconstrued their legal meaning. In this section, we'll look at some of the deeds which the judges ignored, and understand that these ignored deeds contradicted their dishonest legal analysis.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

           All of the Hilchkanum judges dishonestly and irrationally decided that the Hilchkanums understood that they conveyed fee simple title of the land under the right-of-way in their 1887 deed because they later excepted that right-of-way in their subsequent real estate deeds. Applying that dishonest analysis, if the Hilchkanums understood that they granted fee simple title of the right-of-way land to the SLS&E, then they should have excepted the right-of-way land in all of their subsequent real estate deeds. If they didn't except the right-of-way in a subsequent real estate deed, then they would be selling that land under the right-of-way a second time. That's Real Estate 101! But, the Hilchkanums didn't except the right-of-way in all of their subsequent real estate deeds. The Hilchkanum judges knew this fact contradicted their conclusion, so they declared that the deeds which did not except the right-of-way to be "not probative". They couldn't explain their inconsistency, so they simply declared the deeds which did not except the right-of-way to be immaterial and insignificant. What liars! To understand their dishonesty, we'll look at the two very different deeds conveyed from Hilchkanum to Chris Nelson in 1904. One deed excepted the right-of-way and the other did not.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Hilchkanum conveyed two very different deeds to Chris Nelson in 1904.

           First, here are two deeds conveyed by Bill Hilchkanum to Chris Nelson in 1904. Each deed conveyed land which contained a portion of the original Hilchkanum 1887 right-of-way.

        February 27, 1904 Warranty Deed for Government Lot 1 from Bill Hilchkanum to Chris Nelson excepted "acres heretofore conveyed to the Seattle & International Railway for right of way purposes" not "acres of land". This deed conveyed about one third of the original 1887 right-of-way.

        March 15, 1904 Warranty Deed for Government Lot 2 from Bill Hilchkanum to Chris Nelson contained no exception of the right-of-way. This deed conveyed about one third of the original 1887 right-of-way.

           The following link will open a series of orientation maps to aid the reader in understanding the location of the Hilchkanum homestead and to display the location of Government Lots 1 and 2.

        View a series of maps which explain the location of the March 15, 1904 conveyance of Government Lot 2 to Chris Nelson.

           If Hilchkanum understood that he granted fee simple title of the right-of-way land to the SLS&E, and then excepted that right-of-way in his sale of Government Lot 1 to Chris Nelson, he should have also excepted the SLS&E right-of-way in his sale of Government Lot 2. Right? Well, as shown in the above deed, Hilchkanum didn't except the SLS&E right-of-way in his sale of Government Lot 2 to Chris Nelson. So, what is the logical explanation that one 1904 deed to Chris Nelson excepts the SLS&E right-of-way, and another 1904 deed to Chris Nelson does not except the right-of-way? The only explanation which would allow Hilchkanum to legally grant Government Lot 3 with an exception for the SLS&E "right-of-way", and grant Government Lot 2 without an exception, is that Hilchkanum understood his 1887 right-of-way deed to have granted an easement. This fact is even more obvious because both Government Lots 2 and 3 were deeded by Bill Hilchkanum to Chris Nelson in the same year. The Hilchkanum judges eliminated this glaring inconsistency in their legal reasoning by dishonestly declaring the subsequent Hilchkanum deeds which failed to except the right-of-way to be "not probative". What incredible dishonesty!
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    Summary:

           As I showed in the above citations, the exception of an easement in a deed simply identifies the easement to the grantee and does not convey the land, or anything else. If Hilchkanum understood that his 1887 right-of-way grant to the SLS&E was an easement, then he would not be required to except that right-of-way in his subsequent deeds. On the other hand, if Hilchkanum understood that his 1887 right-of-way grant to the SLS&E was a conveyance in fee simple, then he would be required to except that right-of-way in all of his subsequent deeds, or else he would be selling the land under the right-of-way a second time with the deeds which failed to include the exception. The fact that Hilchkanum granted two deeds to Chris Nelson in 1904, with one excepting the right-of-way and the other lacking an exception, suggests that Hilchkanum understood his right-of-way to be an easement. The Hilchkanum judges refused to acknowledge and apply this common law in their analysis. They needed to find that Hilchkanum granted fee simple title of the right-of-way land in his 1887 right-of-way deed in order to cover-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and protect the active participants in the crime, so they dishonestly claimed that the subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deeds excepted the land under the right-of-way and ignored the deeds which contradicted their dishonest analysis. The saddest aspect of these crimes-from-the-bench is that the blatant dishonest of the Hilchkanum judges was accepted in the courts of appeal. This includes the Washington State Supreme Court.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        View my March 31, 2009 public letter to the Judges of the Washington State Supreme Court, accusing them of committing a crime from the highest bench.


How the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed should have been construed under common law.

         It has always been legal precedent in Washington State/Territory common law that the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad is an easement. The grant of a "right-of-way" has always been treated as the grant of a "right", not as the grant of land. The Hilchkanum judges are the only judges to refuse to acknowledge and apply this rule. The following link will take the reader to fourteen citations from Washington State opinions which support this precedent. There is no precedential citation which supports the Hilchkanum judge's opinion that the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed conveys fee simple title of the land under the right-of-way.

      View fourteen citations holding the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad conveys an easement.

         Construing the 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed should have been simple and brief. It's the courts duty to determine and enforce the intentions of the original parties in a deed. The intentions of the parties should primarily be determined from the words of the deed. The parties to the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed were the Hilchkanums (who were illiterate Native Americans), and the Railway. Numerous documents showed the inability of the Hilchkanums to participate in their right-of-way deed. This fact was further explained by the laws which protected Natives in real estate transactions at the time, and the history of Native Americans in Washington territory in the late 1800's.

         In construing a deed, the words should be construed most strongly against the party who authored the deed. The material portions of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed (the granting clause, habendum, and secondary grant) are identical to many of the other SLS&E right-of-way deeds, and establish the material fact that the Hilchkanum deed was based on an unaltered "form deed" authored by the Railway's attorneys. Judge Thomas Burke was co-founder of the Railway, lead attorney, and was an acknowledged expert in property law. Therefore, the words of the Hilchkanum deed should be construed against the Railway, and considered in the light of Burke's expertise in property law. Further, there was persuasive precedent to consider. The 1887 Squire deed to the SLS&E and the Hilchkanum deed used identical granting words. The Squire court found these granting words to "strongly" indicate the intention to convey an easement. Therefore, King County v. Squire established precedent which "strongly" suggest the intent to convey an easement in the Hilchkanum deed.

         The Hilchkanum deed granted a "right of way" to the SLS&E in its granting clause. As shown in the above linked fourteen citations and the opinion of the Squire court, this language has always been construed to grant an easement. Considering the authorship by the Railway lawyers, the inability of the Hilchkanums to participate, and the common law precedent set in many prior railroad right-of-way opinions, the 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed granted an easement.

         That's it. Simple, straight forward, and consistent with long established common law. Lawsuit over."

         2013 Update: In early 2013 I found out that a number of parties along East Lake Sammamish were allowed compensation for the taking associated with the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. This process began with a decision in 2005 by U.S. Federal Court of Claims Judge Marion Horn, finding that the parties may proceed with taking claims. The issues were turned over for determination of how much compensation was due in Horn's most recent opinion in 2012. The four opinions associated with this Court are displayed below. For the residents of East Lake Sammamish, Washington, the issue of ownership of the land underlying their railroad rights-of-way likely will still be unresolved. The crooked politicians and bureaucrats who dominate King County politics will undoubtedly continue to rely on the prior Federal and State opinions which granted fee simple ownership to King County. It's hard to find any honesty in the politicians or lawyers for King County, Washington. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      View Beres v. United States (2005).

      View Beres v. United States (2010).

      View Beres v. United States (2011).

      View Beres v. United States (2012).


Summary of this Webpage:

            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions in this "Summary" are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

         On this page, I've discussed a number of common tactics which the Hilchkanum judges used to subvert the Constitution and common law in order to cover-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and protect the active participants in the crime from prosecution. I've suggested that this criminal behavior from the bench meets the definition of racketeering.

         Under common law, the Hilchkanum judges were required to find that the 1887 right-of-way grant to the SLS&E conveyed an easement. They refused to do this. A number of common tactics were used by the judges to justify their dishonest opinions. They are summarized here.

    Tactic: Illegally allow summary judgment.

           Summary judgment gives full control of the decision to the judge and is allowed only when there is agreement with the material facts. All of the Hilchkanum decisions were made in violation of the rules of summary judgment because of a number of disputed material facts in each lawsuit. All of the Hilchkanum judges denied the Constitutional right for these disputed material facts to be resolved by a jury.

        Open the full discussion on this tactic in a separate window.

    Tactic: Ignore one hundred years of consistently held precedent which finds that the grant of a "right-of-way"
                to a railroad is an easement.

           Common law is precedential. For over one hundred years, the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad has been construed to convey an easement. There is no precedential opinion which supports construing the grant of a "right-of-way" to convey the underlying land, until the dishonest Hilchkanum opinions.

        Open the full discussion on this tactic in a separate window.

    Tactic: Misrepresent the findings in Brown v. State of Washington (1996) by adopting Norm Maleng's
                "legal theory".

           King County Prosecutor Norm Maleng accepted a donation of the land under the East Lake Sammamish right-of-way from BNSF with the knowledge that BNSF did not own the land. In order to hide his crime, Maleng concocted a phony legal argument. I've named this phony argument "Norm Maleng's 'legal theory'" and expose its dishonesty on this website.

        Open the full discussion on this tactic in a separate window.

    Tactic: Refuse to acknowledge the common law precedent set in King County v. Squire (1990), where the judges
                construed identical SLS&E deed language.

           Common law is precedential. This means that a prior decision, based on similar facts and legal principles, should be adopted or considered in a later decision. The Squire deed to the SLS&E used identical granting words to the Hilchkanum deed to the SLS&E. In King County v. Squire (1990), the court found that the granting words were provided by the Railway and "strongly" indicated the intention to convey an easement. The Hilchkanum judges completely ignored the Squire court's analysis and found the identical granting words in the Hilchkanum deed were written by illiterate Native American Bill Hilchkanum and indicated Hilchkanum's intention to convey fee simple title. King County v. Squire (1990) established precedent which was intentionally ignored by the Hilchkanum judges. Authorship and the intentions of the parties were disputed material facts which should have been resolved by a jury.

        Open the full discussion on this tactic in a separate window.

    Tactic: Change the words in the Hilchkanum deed and then construe the substituted language.

           The 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E explicitly conveys a "right of way" to the Railway in its granting clause. All of the Hilchkanum judges changed the words on the deed when they construed the language. Each judge stated that the Hilchkanum deed conveyed a "strip of land". In construing what is granted in railroad deeds the terms "right-of-way" and "strip of land" are contradictory. The grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad has always been held to convey an easement. The unrestricted grant of a "strip of land" to a railroad has always been held to convey fee simple title. All of the Hilchkanum judges changed the words "right of way" to "strip of land" when they construed the deed's language. They used this dishonest tactic to find that Hilchkanum's grant of a "strip of land" conveyed fee simple title. What was explicitly written in the deed was a disputed material fact which should have been resolved by a jury.

        Open the full discussion on this tactic in a separate window.

    Tactic: Find that an illiterate Native American wrote his right-of-way deed to the SLS&E, ignoring the fact that
                the Railway lawyers wrote the deed.

           In construing a deed, it's the duty of the court to determine and carry out the intention of the parties. The words of a deed are the primary source to determine the intent. The words of the deed are construed most strongly against the party who authored the deed. All of the Hilchkanum judges irrationally construed the words of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed against only the Hilchkanums. The Hilchkanums were illiterate Native Americans who signed their deed with an "X". The Hilchkanum judges ignored the many documents which provided evidence that the Hilchkanums took no part in the authorship of their deed. The Hilchkanum judges also ignored evidence that the Hilchkanum deed was an unaltered version of the "form deed" which was written by the Railway lawyers. Authorship was a disputed material fact which should have been resolved by a jury.

        Open the full discussion on this tactic in a separate window.

    Tactic: Illegally assign false intentions to the Hilchkanums in their right-of-way deed by cherry-picking and
                misrepresenting the extrinsic evidence.

           In construing a deed, it's the duty of the court to determine and carry out the intention of the parties. While the words of the deed are the primary consideration, the judges may also consider extrinsic evidence such as the circumstances at the time of the deed and the subsequent conduct of the parties. As I have explained above, the Hilchkanum judges attacked the meaning of words in the Hilchkanum deed by ignoring precedent, applying Norm Maleng's "legal theory", changing the words in the granting clause, and falsely assigning Hilchkanum as author. After misconstruing the words of the deed, the judges decided that the Hilchkanum's intentions in their 1887 right-of-way deed should be determined by construing their subsequent real estate deeds. In construing the Hilchkanum's subsequent real estate deeds, the judges changed the words of those deeds and then analyzed their substituted language. Specifically, the Hilchkanum judges claimed that the subsequent Hilchkanum deeds excepted the "land" under the right-of-way. This was not the truth. The subsequent deeds excepted only the "right-of-way". The exception of "land" is treated completely differently than the exception of "right-of-way". What was excepted in the subsequent deeds is a disputed material fact which should have been resolved by a jury.

        Open the full discussion on this tactic in a separate window.

    Final thought:

         The adoption of these common dishonest tactics by the Hilchkanum judges suggests that the judges were illegally influenced in order to cover-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and protect the active participants in the crime from prosecution. It's too coincidental that all the Hilchkanum judges adopted these obviously dishonest tactics.

            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions in this "Summary" are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.



General Reference:

    Understand the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.

    View the Evidence of the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.

    View an analysis of Who Participated in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.

    View my Whistle Blower Letter to Ron Sims and Council in February 2000, outlining the ELS federal tax fraud scheme.

    "Lie, Stonewall and Slander", how King County deals with citizens who challenge its actions.

    "Theft-by-Community", how the community in King County stole the ELS land from its residents.

    Norm Maleng's "Legal Theory" the legal excuse by the Prosecutor to hide his part in the fraud.

    Understand how Norm Maleng Covered-up King County's Participation in the ELS federal tax fraud scheme.

    Understand how the Rails-to-Trails Conservancy works against the rights of Americans.

    View King County v. Rasmussen (2001) annotated with brief comments.

    View King County v. Rasmussen (2001) annotated with detailed comments.

    View King County v. Rasmussen (2002) annotated with brief comments.

    View King County v. Rasmussen (2002) annotated with detailed comments.

    View Ray v. King County (2004) annotated with brief comments.

    View Ray v. King County (2004) annotated with detailed comments.

    View Beres v. United States (2005).

    View Beres v. United States (2010).

    View Beres v. United States (2011).

    View Beres v. United States (2012).

    View my 2004 Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, and denial by Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Schroeder.

    Understand how Judges Protect their Fellow Judges at the expense of the Constitution and the laws.

    View my March 31, 2009 Public Letter to the Judges of the Washington State Supreme Court.































A Timeline of the East Lake Sammamish Federal Tax Fraud Scheme


My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.

     The East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme was probably conceived in the early or mid 1990's with quiet phone calls and private communications. The crime was committed in 1996-1997. The cover-up of the crime involved many powerful people, the most significant being Federal and State judges. In describing the tax fraud scheme, I'll present a timeline first. Each event is a hyperlink that will take the reader to documentation of that event.

1997 The fraudulent ELS railbanking transaction was completed by BNSF, TLC (staffed with Rails-to-Trails Conservancy lawyers), and King County. The tax fraud scheme generated a $40 million illegal tax write-off for BNSF.

1997 Norm Maleng, the King county Prosecutor knew that he could be prosecuted for his participation in the tax fraud scheme. To hide his crime, Maleng altered public documents and manufactured a dishonest legal argument.

2000 After questioning the legality of King County's establishment of the ELS trail for months, I discovered the tax fraud scheme and "blew the whistle".

2000 After enduring months of stonewalling by the County, I expressed my willingness to defend my property and rights with a gun, unless King County would explain its illegal actions on my land.

2000 King County responded by filing suit. King County Superior Court Judge Haley then issued a preliminary injunction against me based on perjurious declarations. Haley ignored my description of the ELS tax fraud scheme.

2001 To escape Judge Haley, we moved to Federal Court. There, District Judge Rothstein issued a completely dishonest opinion which covered-up the ELS tax fraud scheme. Her illegal use of summary judgment denied my constitutional rights.

2002 On appeal, Circuit Judge Fletcher issued a dishonest opinion which backed up the District Court opinion. Her opinion mirrored every significant dishonest argument in King County v. Rasmussen (2001). It covered-up the ELS tax fraud scheme.

2002 En banc appeal of King County v. Rasmussen (2002) was denied by the full Ninth Circuit Court.

2003 Appeal of King County v. Rasmussen (2002) was denied by the United States Supreme Court.

2004 I filed a Complaint of Judicial Misconduct with the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit. I described the criminal activity of Judges Rothstein and Fletcher. The appeal was denied.

2004 In Ray v. King County (2004), Chief Judge Ronald Cox, Washington State Court of Appeals, Division 1, issued a completely dishonest opinion which mirrored the dishonest opinions by Federal Judges Rothstein and Fletcher.

2004 In its denial of the Ray v. King County (2004) appeal, the Washington State Supreme Court hid the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and protected the participants in the crime.

2008 This website is established in order to inform the public of the corruption and dishonesty in King County government, and in the Federal and State courts of Washington.

    My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions these timeline events are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.