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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-35610
D.C. No.
CV-00-01637-BJR
OPINION

KING COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Washington,
Plaintiff-counter-defendant-Appellee,
v.
JOHN RASMUSSEN; NANCY RASMUSSEN, husband and wife, and their marital community,
Defendants-counterclaimants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington
Barbara J. Rothstein, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted
June 13, 2002—Seattle, Washington

Filed August 9, 2002

Before: Betty Binns Fletcher and Ronald M. Gould,
Circuit Judges, and Mary H. Murguia, District Judge.(1)

Opinion by Judge B. Fletcher

COUNSEL

J. Jarrette Sandlin, Sandlin Law Firm, Zillah, Washington,
for the defendants-counter-plaintiffs-appellants.

Howard P. Schneiderman and Scott Johnson,
King County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, Seattle, Washington,
for the plaintiff-counter-defendant-appellee.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

    This "legal opinion" is a CRIMINAL ACT from the bench.

            This is not a legal opinion, but rather it is an intentional criminal act from the bench by Senior Ninth Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher. This dishonest opinion must be read in the context of the lower court opinion it protects, King County v. Rasmussen (2001). Federal District Judge Barbara Jacobs Rothstein is responsible for King County v. Rasmussen (2001). As fellow Seattle based federal judges, I assume that Fletcher and Rothstein are personal friends. As a Senior Ninth Circuit judge, I assume that Fletcher requested my appeal so she could protect her friend.
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

            There are two basic elements in the resolution of this lawsuit: the facts and the law. Our disagreement with material facts was briefed to Fletcher. Under the law, Fletcher's only option was to send the lawsuit back to lower court for a jury trial. Fletcher refused, and then illegally and dishonestly settled questions of fact herself. While an occasional mistake is inevitable in legal opinions, this "legal opinion" has critical mistakes in essentially every paragraph. The reason for Fletcher's "mistakes" is found in the effect of her mistakes. Fletcher's "mistakes" cover-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme, protecting Rothstein and the other active participants in the crime from criminal prosecution. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

            With respect to the facts, Fletcher illegally settles disputed material facts and denies my right to resolve these questions of fact before a jury. Just one example of Fletcher's manipulation of facts is her treatment of the Statutory Warranty deed from Bill and Louise Hilchkanum to Chris Nelson on March 15, 1904. That deed granted fee simple title of 96% of the land involved in this lawsuit to Chris Nelson. This establishes the material fact that Hilchkanum believed he and his wife owned that land when they sold it to Chris Nelson in 1904. Since a person can't sell the same parcel of land to two different parties, this 1904 deed strongly suggests that Hilchkanum believed he didn't previously sell the same piece of land to the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in 1887. Therefore, this 1904 deed strongly suggests that Hilchkanum believed he granted an easement over the same parcel with his right-of-way deed to the SLS&E in 1887. But, Fletcher ignores this logical consequence when she decides the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed granted fee simple title to the Railway. The outcome of this lawsuit hinges on whether Hilchkanum granted fee simple title or an easement to the SLS&E in 1887. Fletcher admitted that this 1904 deed to Nelson sold the land involved in this lawsuit, but then declared it didn't provide a "scintilla" of evidence to suggest Hilchkanum understood he had granted an easement with his right-of-way deed in 1887. Hilchkanum's intentions in his deeds are critical material facts in this lawsuit. His intentions in this 1904 deed to Chris Nelson becomes particularly important in this opinion because Fletcher admits the 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed would be an easement if it were not for the intentions Hilchkanum demonstrated in his later real estate deeds. In real courts of law, the disputed material fact of Hilchkanum's intentions in his deeds would be resolved by a jury. Here, the material facts are manipulated by this dishonest Ninth Circuit federal judge. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

            With respect to the law, Fletcher misapplies the law time-and-again in this opinion. Just one example is her refusal to acknowledge the common law precedent established in King County v. Squire (1990). The Squire court construed the 1887 Squire right-of-way deed to the SLS&E. The Court found that the Squire granting clause "...strongly suggests conveyance of an easement...". Based largely on that finding, the Squire court determined that the deed granted an easement. The Hilchkanum granting clause to the SLS&E is identical to Squire's, yet Fletcher irrationally finds the identical Hilchkanum granting clause conveys fee simple title. We carefully briefed the importance and effect of this most critical precedential opinion. Fletcher intentionally ignored our briefs on Squire and refused to acknowledge this legal precedent in this opinion. King County v. Squire is established property law in Washington State. Fletcher demonstrates that she believes she in not bound by the law.
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

            As stated above, Judge Fletcher's dishonest manipulation of the facts and the law covers-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and protects the active participants in the crime from criminal prosecution.
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    There are three versions of this opinion.

      First, the published version:

        View King County v. Rasmussen (2002) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      Second, a version containing only brief comments. The second version is built to maintain the continuity of Judge Fletcher's opinion, but make the reader aware of the violation of constitutional rights, the massive dishonesty, and the intentional misapplication of the law by Fletcher.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        View King County v. Rasmussen (2002), with brief comments and documentation. (Recommended)

      Third, the version, which you are viewing here, contains detailed analysis of this opinion. This version provides links to supporting argument, historical documents, and precedential opinions. But, this version breaks up the continuity of Judge Fletcher's opinion because of the lengthy explanations of her dishonest tactics and misapplication of the law.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

            My suggestion is to read the Second version (with brief comments) and, when interested in viewing expanded justification and documentation, use the hyperlink at the bottom of each note to open this detailed version's corresponding note in a separate window.

    Color Scheme:

            Fletcher's opinion is presented here in bold blue font color. I've broken her opinion into small sections for the purpose of analysis. Each portion of Fletcher's opinion is preceded with the notice: "The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2002) by Senior Ninth Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher."

            I have added my comments and analysis in black font color, indented, and bracketed by horizontal reference lines, as shown here. My comments are preceded with the words "Note from John Rasmussen:".

    Reference:

      View the briefs presented to Senior Circuit Judge Fletcher in this appeal of King County v. Rasmussen (2001).

      Read a description of the federal tax fraud scheme that Judge Rothstein covered-up with this decision.



    The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2002) by Senior Ninth Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher.

OPINION

B. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

This case arises from a dispute over a 100-foot-wide strip of land running along a portion of the eastern shore of Lake Sammamish in King County, Washington, that was formerly used as part of a railway corridor. King County filed suit against the Rasmussens to quiet title over this strip of land, which bisects the Rasmussens' property, and to obtain a declaratory judgment that it is entitled to quiet enjoyment of the strip.

King County claims it owns a fee simple estate in the strip. The Rasmussens, in turn, claim that their predecessors in interest granted only an easement over the strip and that the rights in the easement have reverted to the Rasmussens so that they now have fee simple title to the strip. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of King County and dismissed the Rasmussens' counterclaims. Because we conclude that no genuine issues of material fact exist for trial and that King County holds the strip in fee simple, we affirm.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

          Well, it didn't take long. Senior Federal Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher actually got out five sentences before her first big lie in this opinion. Fletcher states, above, "Because we conclude that no genuine issues of material fact exist for trial...". This "conclusion" is a ridiculous lie, and is one of the methods used by dishonest judges to take complete control of a case before them. There must be no genuine issues of material fact in order for a judge to control a case using the rules of summary judgment. Because it's almost impossible to hold a judge responsible for misconduct, illegal application of summary judgment has become a method dishonest judges use to predetermine and guarantee the outcome of cases before them. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Here are eight significant material facts which are not in agreement:

      It is a material fact who wrote the Hilchkanum deed

            Washington State common law holds that "[C]ontract language . . . is construed most strongly against the party who drafted it, or whose attorney prepared it." Authorship is a critical material fact in the construing of a deed. In this appeals decision, Fletcher should have responded to our briefing on the dishonesty of Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein's opinion that illiterate Native American, Bill Hilchkanum, authored his right-of-way deed. She didn't. Instead, Judge Fletcher and panel supported Rothstein's dishonest conclusion of fact that Hilchkanum wrote the words of his right-of-way deed to the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway (SLS&E) in 1887. Fletcher ignored our argument that the Railway lawyers wrote the deed, and here she dishonestly proclaims we agree with this and the other questions of material fact. That's a lie.
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

            In order to understand Fletcher's dishonesty, on needs to read my lawyer's brief to Fletcher. Here is a portion on that brief, which Fletcher refused to address in this opinion. (In this citation, I hyperlink the references so that the reader can easily view the information Fletcher ignores in this "legal opinion".)
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

               "Bill Hilchkanum was the original homesteader of the Rasmussens’ lands in this case. ER 446. On June 15, 1876 David T. Denny and Luke M. Redmond stated under oath that Bill Hilchkanum was an Indian who had abandoned his membership in the Snoqualmie tribe, and “adopted the habits and pursuits of civilized life”. ER, 494 The entire chronology of events explaining the homestead efforts of Bill Hilchkanum are found as exhibits to the expert witness Graddon declaration, at ER 446-522. On March 6, 1884 David T. Denny testified by sworn affidavit that “Bill Hilchkanum is an Indian and unable to read or write the English language***That said Indian Bill Hilchkanum relied on this affiant to take care of his said business…”. ER, 486. On March 24, 1884 Bill Hilchkanum “made his mark” upon an affidavit, which stated he “is an Indian and unable to read or write the English language and hence depends entirely upon the assistance of his white friends to aid him in transacting his business for him. That one D.T. Denny of Seattle W.T. had the care of his homestead papers for him…” ER, 483. David T. Denny was one of the witnesses to the original Hilchkanum deed in this case. ER, 502. On March 25, 1884 George W. Tibbetts swore by affidavit that he was “well acquainted with Bill Hilchkanum…” and that “…Bill Hilchkanum is an Indian and unable to read or write the English language and that he depended upon other parties to manage his business for him so that said Indian did not understand how to proceed in his homestead proof…”. ER, 485. In all documents of record, including the original Hilchkanum deed to SLS&E, Bill Hilchkanum signed his name by “making his mark”, which was an “X”, rather than a written or printed signature. ER, 476-522. The quitclaim deed from Bill Hilchkanum to SLS&E was signed (by his “mark”) and delivered to SLS&E on May 9, 1887. ER, 501-503. Bill Hilchkanum received the United States’ fee patent to his homestead lands on July 24, 1888. ER, 505-507.

               The above uncontroverted material facts describe the grantor whom the district court in this case found as being competent to limit a grant and to distinguish between an easement and a conveyance of fee simple absolute. ER, 592-597. The district court even found that Bill Hilchkanum was aware of 17 U.S. Stat. 602, and chose the phrase “right of way” out of necessity rather than to create an easement, because Bill Hilchkanum knew the then existing federal law allowed the conveyance of a railroad right of way before he had received his fee patent. ER, 595. The Rasmussens contest these factual findings of the district court, with the above evidence that was before the district court."

            [My lawyer's brief to Judge Fletcher and panel, "Defendants-Appellants’ John and Nancy Rasmussens’ Opening Appeal Brief", and view the above statement beginning on page 4, (PDF page 10).]

            The Hilchkanum deed was based on an unaltered Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway (SLS&E) "ELS form deed" written by the lawyers for the Railway. Two variations of this SLS&E right-of-way "ELS form deed" had been construed previously in Washington State courts and each found to grant an easement. In King County v. Squire (1990), the court construed a deed constructed on the same variation of the SLS&E "form deed" that was used for the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. The Squire court found the Squire deed granted an easement based on the identical granting words that are found in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. Further, King County admitted in its Lawson argument that the SLS&E right-of-way deeds involved in Lawson v. State (1986) granted only easements. There were about twelve SLS&E right-of-way deeds involved in that lawsuit. Acknowledging the precedent set in these prior decisions would not allow the federal judges who construed the Hilchkanum deed to find that Hilchkanum granted fee title with his right-of-way deed. It was necessary for Fletcher and Rothstein to find that the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed granted fee simple title to the Railway in order to hide the federal tax fraud scheme that silently dominates and controls this decision. So, Judges Fletcher and Rothstein ignored common law precedent and "found" that Bill Hilchkanum, an illiterate Native American, wrote his own right-of-way deed to the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway (SLS&E). Ridiculous!
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          Understand the SLS&E "ELS form deed" which was used by the SLS&E to obtain the right-of-way deeds along East Lake Sammamish.

            We were not allowed the constitutional right to establish the material fact that Hilchkanum took no part in the wording of his right-of-way deed, and that the Railway lawyers wrote the SLS&E "ELS form deed" that is exactly the words of the Hilchkanum deed. Most of the white settlers made small changes to the Railway's "form deed". None of the Native American homesteaders changed even one word. Hilchkanum was a Native. We brought the court's attention to King County v. Squire (1990) which supports the fact that the Railway was responsible for the words in the Hilchkanum deed, and which destroys Rothstein's and Fletcher's ridiculous manufactured fact that an illiterate Native American wrote his own right-of-way deed to the SLS&E in 1887. Fletcher's response to our briefing on Squire was to refuse to consider its implications and precedent. In fact, Fletcher was so afraid of drawing attention to Squire that she refused to even name the decision when she referred to our argument. Instead, she refers to Squire as "a Washington Court of Appeals case dealing with a railroad right of way". How's that for intellectual honesty?
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

            After Fletcher and Rothstein ignored or struck our argument on this material fact, they declared we agreed with their contrived material fact that Hilchkanum wrote his right-of-way deed to the Railway. Welcome to summary judgment, Ninth Circuit style!
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          Understand how the Squire opinion establishes the author of the SLS&E "form deed".

      The intention of the Hilchkanums in their right-of-way deed is a material fact.

            With absolutely no agreement on this material fact, Fletcher states there was no disagreement with the material facts, and decreed that the Hilchkanums intended to grant an unrestricted fee simple title to the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway. The way she twisted around the law to justify this fact is discussed later in this annotated opinion. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          Read a citation from Veach (1979) that establishes the intentions of a party as a material fact.

          Open the section of this opinion in which Fletcher misconstrues Hilchkanum's intentions in his ROW deed.

      The intention of the Hilchkanums in their subsequent real estate deeds is a material fact.

            It is a material fact to determine whether the Hilchkanums intended to except "land" or "right-of-way" in their subsequent deeds. Also, it is a material fact that the most relevant subsequent deeds did not except the right-of-way or the land under the right-of-way. Judge Fletcher and her sister judge, Rothstein, "cherry picked" the extrinsic evidence, misstating words in the subsequent deeds, and misapplying legal precedent in order to falsely explain the Hilchkanum's intentions with their subsequent deeds. They intentionally biased their examination by considering only the supporting facts that could be misconstrued to prop-up their predetermined outcome. It was not their right under the law to "cherry pick" the facts. It was my right to establish the Hilchkanum's intentions in their subsequent deeds before a jury. That right was intentionally denied by Fletcher and Rothstein.
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          Open the section of this opinion in which Fletcher misconstrues Hilchkanum's intentions in his subsequent real estate deeds.

      The purpose of the deed is a material fact.

            The purpose of a deed is a corollary to the intentions of the parties to a deed. The intentions and purpose are essentially the same thing. Later in this decision, Judge Fletcher states that she can find no purpose to convey a right-of-way in the words of Hilchkanum's deed. Since the grant a right-of-way to the Railway is found clearly stated in the granting clause of the Hilchkanum deed, apparently Fletcher is establishing a new precedent that holds the only way a purpose can be found in a deed is if there is a statement explicitly stating a purpose and containing the word "purpose". The purpose of a deed is a material fact that must be resolved before a jury when there is disagreement. It is not the privilege of a dishonest federal judge to irrationally decide this fact.
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

      The ability of the Hilchkanums to participate in their railroad right-of-way deed is a material fact.

            The Hilchkanums were illiterate Native Americans who gave up their tribal affiliation in order to homestead on off-reservation land. Fletcher ignored the history of the settlement of the American west, and the history of the settlement in Washington Territory. She ignored the laws that protected Natives in those days. She ignored the documents that we provided as exhibits which showed the Hilchkanums were at great disadvantage in legal proceedings. She refused to condemn District Judge Rothstein's opinion that the Hilchkanums were essentially skilled lawyers, capable of dealing with complex legal issues. Instead, Fletcher supported Rothstein's dishonest conclusion by "finding" that the Hilchkanums knowledgeably participated in their right-of-way deed. Her "finding" is so dishonest that she hid it in her footnote 13. Crooked lawyers like to hide their dishonesty in footnotes because they are less likely to be read. It is a sham that Fletcher decided this issue of fact in violation of the rules of summary judgment. Fletcher was required by law to send this disputed material fact back to district court for resolution before a jury. She refused.
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          Open the section of this opinion where Fletcher illegally resolves the Hilchkanum's participation in their right-of-way deed.

          Understand that the ability of the Hilchkanums to participate in their right-of-way deed is a material fact.

      It is a material fact to determine what was conveyed in the deed.

            In Federal District Court, Judge Rothstein stated in her decision that a "strip of land" was conveyed to the SLS&E. This was also the position of the King County prosecutor. We pointed out that one needs to simply read the Hilchkanum deed to see that a "right-of-way" was conveyed. In this decision, Fletcher irrationally agrees with Rothstein that a "strip of land" was conveyed. This disputed material fact should have been resolved before a jury, not by the dishonest proclamations of two dishonest judges.
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

             This substitution, and blending, of these contradictory terms is an essential element of Norm Maleng's "legal theory". Maleng's "legal theory" is a strategy devised by the King County Prosecutor's office after the Prosecutor and leadership of King County committed to participate in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. Norm Maleng's "legal theory" was first made public by King County Deputy Prosecutor Bill Blakney in 1997. What is written in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed is a material fact, not an optional fact that may be changed to support the various legal arguments that the King County Prosecutor and judges make in their dishonest attempt to hide their participation in a crime.
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          Simply read the granting clause of the Hilchkanum deed to understand what was granted:

          "In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right-of-way one hundred (100) feet in width through our land in said County described as follows to wit..." (Granting Clause of Hilchkanum Right-of-Way Deed)

            So, why is it so important that the Federal judges stated that a "strip of land" was granted rather than a "right-of-way"? The answer lies in over one hundred years of consistently applied common law in Washington State. The grant of a "right of way" to a railroad has always been held to grant an easement, without exception, until this decision and Rothstein's King County v. Rasmussen (2001).
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          Read more on this issue, including 44 citations contradicting the federal judge's misapplication of common law.

      It is a material fact to determine if King County's actions against me constituted a violation of my civil rights.

            In order for King County to be found in violation of my civil rights, the law requires that the County must exhibit a "policy, practice or custom" to violate my rights. It is a material fact whether the actions the county took against me fit the description of a "policy, practice or custom" to violate my rights. A jury must decide if the specific facts we described added up to a "policy, practice or custom". If the material fact of a "policy, practice or custom" is establish by a jury, then the law is applied to that material fact to find a violation of my rights. In Federal District Court, Judge Rothstein refused to let this happen by deciding this disputed material fact for herself. Judge Fletcher supports this violation of my rights in this opinion.
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

      It is a material fact that King County participated in a federal tax fraud scheme.

            The establishment of that material fact would have explained the dishonest actions of the County against my neighbors and me. The establishment of that fact would have explained the false identity manufactured by the King County Prosecutor to threaten and discredit me. The establishment of that material fact would have forced the court to see the dishonesty in the prosecutor's briefs as a criminal act. In Federal District Court, Judge Rothstein dishonestly struck my description of the tax fraud scheme and its evidence. When Rothstein struck the portion of my declaration which described the crime, she cited no authority for her removal. Judge Fletcher supports this violation of my rights in this opinion.
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Why was summary judgment illegally allowed?

          When this lawsuit was "resolved" in federal district court, Judge Barbara Rothstein abused the rules of summary judgment and covered up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme in order to protect the participants. Rothstein became a participant in the federal tax fraud scheme with her decision. In this decision, Senior Federal Circuit Fletcher protects her sister federal judge, and the other participants in the tax fraud, by agreeing that there were no genuine issues of material fact. Fletcher needed this lie in order to justify the use of summary judgment, and to deny my constitutional right to establish the truth before a jury. Even more disgusting is the willingness of very judge in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to agree to this violation of my constitutional rights in their denial of my request for en banc consideration.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          No legitimate jury would agree to the ridiculous material facts that Fletcher used to decide this lawsuit. In order to keep determination of the facts away from a jury, Fletcher simply declared we agreed with all the material facts she used to decide the case. This is a lie. Fletcher intentionally denied my constitutional right of due process, my right to establish the facts in "her" court. Apparently, suspending the United States Constitution is business-as-usual in Ninth Circuit courts. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Reference:

      Understand the concept and rules of Summary judgment.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2002) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2002), with brief comments. (More readable!)



    The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2002) by Senior Ninth Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher.

I.

Factual and Procedural Background

In 1876, homesteaders Bill Hilchkanum and Mary Hilchkanum claimed property along the eastern shore of Lake Sammamish in King County, Washington. They received their final ownership certificate in 1884 and their fee patent in 1888. On May 9, 1887, the Hilchkanums conveyed an interest in the strip to the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company ("the Railway"). The text of the "Right of Way Deed" is as follows:

      In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the County of King in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way one hundred (100) feet in width through our lands in said County described as follows to wit

      Lots one (1) two (2) and three (3) in section six (6) township 24 North of Range six (6) East.

      Such right of way strip to be fifty (50) feet in width on each side of the center line of the railway track as located across our said lands by the Engineer of said railway company which location is described as follows to wit [legal description in metes and bounds].

      And the said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company shall have the right to go upon the land adjacent to said line for a distance of two hundred (200) feet on each side thereof and cut down all trees dangerous to the operation of said road.

      To have and to hold the said premises with the appurtenances unto the said party of the second part and to its successors and assigns forever.

The deed was handwritten by a notary public.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

    The words of a deed are the most powerful indication of what the parties intended to accomplish with the deed's execution.

          Each word in a deed must be evaluated using its legal meaning, but the instrument must also be looked at as a whole in order to determine the intention of the parties. What the parties intended to grant is generally determined by looking at the granting clause and the habendum. (At times, words used in the description of the property have contributed to the understanding of what was granted, but that is not the purpose of the description section of a deed.) In Washington Territory and Washington State the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad has always been found to grant an easement, without exception. In this opinion, Judge Fletcher joins her sister federal judge, Barbara Rothstein, to dishonestly destroy that consistently held precedent. This issue will be carefully explained in a note following section C.[2], below. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Open the discussion at section C.[2] of this opinion, in a separate window, to understand this issue.

    It is important to understand that there is more to this deed than Judge Fletcher publishes in this opinion.

          Fletcher omits the signature portion of the deed. This is important because Bill Hilchkanum and his wife, Mary, signed this right-of-way deed with an "X". They were illiterate Natives and unable to even sign their own names in the English language. It was important for Fletcher to omit this fact because she and her sister judge (Federal District Judge Barbara Jacobs Rothstein) irrationally establish Hilchkanum as the author of the words in this deed. Illiterate Native Americans didn't write the deeds for the railroads in Washington Territory in the late 1880s, but that's what District Judge Rothstein decided and Fletcher confirms in this decision. Of course, she has no legal right to make that conclusion because the authorship of the deed and the Hilchkanum's ability to participate in the deed are not legal conclusions. The authorship, and Hilchkanum's ability to participate in the deed, are material facts. When there is disagreement with the material facts, the judge is required by law to allow the material facts to be established before a jury. We strongly disagreed with the ability of the Hilchkanums to participate in the deed, but Fletcher simply ignored and misrepresented our brief so that she could illegally substitute her ridiculous unsupported facts. When a judge makes up the facts in a case, as Rothstein and Fletcher have done, there is no legitimate decision, only the illegitimate power of a federal judge to commit crimes from the bench with no consequences. Welcome to the courts of the Ninth Circuit of the United States of America. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        View the Hilchkanum deed in order to confirm the Hilchkanums signed with an "X".

          Fletcher omits the portion of the deed that shows that D.T. Denny was a witness. This is significant because David Denny was Hilchkanum's "white man" advocate in those days. But, at the same time, David Denny was one of the thirteen owners of the railway. This was a significant conflict of interest that Fletcher and the other Ninth Circuit judges hide in their decisions. Fletcher and Rothstein irrationally and illegally establish Hilchkanum as author of his deed. They claim Hilchkanum was assisted with the writing by his white friends. But then they refuse to admit that help would have come from one of the owners of the Railway, D.T. Denny. These dishonest judges manufacture some facts and cherry pick other facts in order to justify their predetermined outcome to the lawsuit. Facts are resolved before a jury in a legitimate court of law. Fletcher and Rothstein would now allow my right to a jury in their private courts.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        View the full transcribed Hilchkanum deed with a photocopy of the filed original.

          Fletcher changes the words of the deed and then analyzes her substituted words. Later in this decision, Judge Fletcher states that the Hilchkanums conveyed a "'strip' of land" to the Railway. This would be a good chance to look at the Hilchkanum granting clause, above, and see what was actually conveyed. One can see that the Hilchkanums conveyed a "right of way". So, why would Fletcher state that a "strip of land" was conveyed? The answer to that question is held in over one hundred years of consistently applied common law. In Washington State/Territory the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad had always been held to be the grant of an easement. Federal Judge Fletcher didn't want the grant to be an easement, so she changed the words of this 1887 deed when she analyzed its language.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          This substitution, and blending, of these contradictory terms is an essential element of Norm Maleng's "legal theory". Maleng's "legal theory" is a strategy devised by the King County Prosecutor's office after the Prosecutor and leadership of King County committed to participate in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. The "legal theory" was first made public by King County Deputy Prosecutor Bill Blakney in 1997. The elements of this theory were briefed to Judge Fletcher by King County Deputy Prosecutor Scott Johnson in this lawsuit. Judge Fletcher's adoption of this dishonest legal argument signals her cooperation with the King County Prosecutor in his attempt to hide his crime. Fletcher's adoption of Norm Maleng's "legal theory" is a criminal act from the bench.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          Fletcher could not find the clearly stated purpose of the deed. Judge Fletcher not only determined that a "'strip' of land" was conveyed, but she stated that there was no railroad or right-of-way purpose in the deed. Ridiculous! The Hilchkanum granting clause conveyed a "right of way" to a railroad, yet Fletcher could find no purpose in the deed to convey a right-of-way to a railroad. The property interest conveyed in this deed was based on the centerline of the proposed railroad track, and the SLS&E promptly built the tracks, yet Fletcher could find no railroad or right-of-way purpose in the deed. So, why would Fletcher state that she could find no railroad or right-of-way purpose in the Hilchkanum deed? Again, the answer to that question is held in over one hundred years of consistently applied common law. In Washington State/Territory if land is conveyed for railroad right-of-way purposes, it had always been held to be the grant of an easement. Federal Judge Fletcher didn't want the grant to be an easement, so she irrationally stated that there was no railroad or right-of-way purpose in the Hilchkanum grant.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          The fact that Judge Fletcher could find no railroad or right-of-way purpose becomes even more ridiculous when one reads the next paragraph in her opinion. There she cites a subsequent Hilchkanum deed: "Bill Hilchkanum then conveyed the property to a third party 'less three (3) acres heretofore conveyed to the Seattle International Railway for right of way purposes.'" In that subsequent deed, Hilchkanum referred to the right-of-way deed that is being construed in this decision and states that he understood the deed was granted for "right of way purposes". Since Fletcher bases this opinion on cherry-picked extrinsic evidence, how completely dishonest for her to cite this subsequent deed language and then state later in this decision that she could find no evidence of Hilchkanum's intention to grant the deed for railroad right-of-way purposes. Fletcher contradicts herself with her own written words. Does Fletcher even read her own citations? My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Conclusion:

          Judge Fletcher leaves out important parts of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E because those facts contradict her dishonest, predetermined, conclusions. By law and the Constitution, Fletcher was required to send this lawsuit back to federal district court to have the disputed facts resolved before a jury. Fletcher refused to do this because it would have exposed the criminal actions of her sister judge, Barbara Rothstein, and the other participants in the ELS federal tax fraud scheme. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Reference:

      View the full Hilchkanum right-of-way deed.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2002) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2002), with brief comments. (More readable!)



    The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2002) by Senior Ninth Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher.

Mary Hilchkanum later conveyed lots 1 and 3 of the homestead property to her husband by quitclaim deed. The conveyance is "less (3) acres right of way of Rail Road." Bill Hilchkanum then conveyed lot 1 to Chris Nelson "less three (3) acres heretofore conveyed to the Seattle and International Railway for right of way purposes." The deed by which the Hilchkanums conveyed lot 2 of their homestead property did not contain an exception for the railroad right of way. The Rasmussens claim that the right of way bisects portions of lots 2, 3, and 5.(2)



    Note from John Rasmussen:

    These are "cherry-picked" subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deeds!

          None of the land that is the subject of this lawsuit is on Government Lot 1. One percent (1%) of the land that is the subject of this lawsuit is on Government Lot 3. So, why does Fletcher concentrate of the subsequent transfer of land that is not the subject of this lawsuit? Well, the answer will come later in this decision where Fletcher analyzes the effect of this exception language and misstates the common law precedent. Further, Judge Fletcher later implies the exception language associated with the subsequent transfer of Government Lot 1 was the rule, and the deeds lacking that exception language provide not "a scintilla of evidence" to counter her rule. Ridiculous!
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    The relevant deeds:

          The truth is that a number of more relevant subsequent Hilchkanum deeds were presented to Judge Fletcher as exhibits. Only some of those deeds exempted the right of way. The most relevant subsequent deeds did not exempted the right of way. The Hilchkanum's intentions in their subsequent deeds is a material fact that must be resolved before a jury. Judge Fletcher does not have the right to hide some facts and miss-emphasize other facts in order to color the intentions of the Hilchkanums. Instead of allowing a jury to decide the relevant facts, Fletcher "went shopping" through less relevant extrinsic evidence for a subsequent Hilchkanum deed that she then wrongly construed to support her ridiculous contrived fact that an illiterate Duwamish Indian wrote his own deed to the railroad in 1887, and intended to convey unrestricted fee simple title. She ignores the deeds that lack this exception language because they destroy her argument. She then misapplies the law in the interpretation of exemption language, using her "cherry-picked" extrinsic evidence. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Open the section of this opinion which discusses this manipulation of the extrinsic evidence, in detail.

          There were three deeds that conveyed the land construed in this lawsuit to outside parties. These are the deeds most relevant to this lawsuit. Select the hyperlinks, directly below, to confirm that none of these deeds excepted the right-of-way or the land under the right-of-way.

        Hilchkanum warranty deed to Chris Nelson, March 15, 1904, conveying 96% of the disputed property.

        Hilchkanum warranty deed to Edward Sanders, September 3, 1904, conveying 3% of the disputed property.

        Hilchkanum warranty deed to John Herder, June 30, 1905, conveying 1% of the disputed property.

    Fletcher violates the rules of summary judgment:

          The questions that Fletcher would not allow to go to a jury: What did these words excepting a right-of-way mean to the parties in those early days? Why is Hilchkanum inconsistent with this exception language in his subsequent deeds, including it in some, and not in others? Did Hilchkanum have adequate legal experience, or advice, to protect his interests in the execution of these deeds, considering the fact that he was an illiterate American Indian? The answer to these questions strongly color the material fact that is Hilchkanum's intentions with these deeds. Fletcher, Rothstein, and the other Ninth Circuit judges denied my constitutional right to establish the material facts that control the outcome this case. Honestly answering those important questions would not support Rothstein's and Fletcher's dishonestly contrived material facts and "legal" conclusions.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          This manipulation of the material facts and the law was made possible because of the illegal application of summary judgment. The misapplication of summary judgment is a critical element in this dishonest decision and was discussed in more detail at the beginning of this annotated opinion.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Open the section of this opinion which discusses Fletcher's illegal use of summary judgment, in detail.

    Reference:

      View a study of the common law understanding of the exception of a right-of-way in a deed.

      Understand the concept and rules of Summary judgment.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2002) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2002), with brief comments. (More readable!)



    The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2002) by Senior Ninth Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher.

The Railway, and its successor Burlington Northern, built a track on the strip of land and used the track regularly for rail service until approximately 1996. In 1997, Burlington Northern sold its railway corridor, including the Hilchkanum strip, to The Land Conservancy of Seattle and King County ("TLC").

On June 11, 1997, TLC petitioned the United States Surface Transportation Board ("STB") to abandon use of the corridor for rail service under the National Trail System Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) ("Rails to Trails Act"). The STB approved interim trail use of the corridor — called railbanking — by King County and issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use. The County then purchased the corridor from the TLC and obtained title to the right of way carved from the Hilchkanum property.(3)

The Rasmussens oppose King County's efforts to railbank the right of way and claim that King County has no right to use the right of way as a trail because the Railway and its successors held only an easement for railroad purposes. As a result, King County brought this action in state court to quiet title and to obtain a declaration of its rights in the strip. The Rasmussens removed the action to federal court and counterclaimed with allegations that King County violated their First, Second, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights and violated 16 U.S.C. § 1267(d), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 1358, and Article 1, Section 16 of the Washington state constitution.

King County moved for summary judgment on its claim to the property and moved to dismiss the Rasmussens' counterclaims for failure to state a claim and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In response to these motions, the Rasmussens filed two over-length briefs and a declaration from Mr. Rasmussen containing several additional pages of legal argument. King County filed its reply and moved to strike the overlength portions of the Rasmussens' briefs and the legal arguments in Mr. Rasmussen's declaration. They also moved to strike inadmissible evidence from the briefs and the declaration. The Rasmussens filed a brief in response to King County's motion to strike as well as a separate surrebuttal brief. King County moved to strike the surrebuttal brief.

In a published opinion, the district court struck the overlength portions of the Rasmussens' response brief as well as the legal arguments in Mr. Rasmussen's declaration. See King County v. Rasmussen, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1227 (W.D. Wash. 2001). It also struck a paragraph in the response brief that indicated that Bill Hilchkanum was a Native American and was illiterate; the Rasmussens cited no evidence in support of this assertion in their brief to the district court. Id. at 1227-28. The district court also agreed to strike the surrebuttal brief. Id. at 1228. Finally, it granted King County's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the counterclaims. Id. at 1231. The Rasmussens appeal.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

    Topics Discussed in this Note:  (Each topic is presented as a hyperlink. Use this menu to jump to that subject.)

      * The striking of our argument and exhibits is one of several steps Judges Fletcher and Rothstein took to deny my right to present my case in "their" federal court.

      * Judges Fletcher and Rothstein struck our correct statements about Hilchkanum's participation in his deed, and then contrived ridiculous facts about Hilchkanum in order to justify their dishonest opinions.

      * Fletcher and Rothstein struck our statement of Hilchkanum's ethnic background and then ignored the well documented disadvantages American Indians had at that time in our history.

      * Fletcher and Rothstein struck our statement of Hilchkanum's illiteracy and later "found" that Hilchkanum actually wrote his deed.

      * Fletcher and Rothstein struck our statement that the Railway lawyers wrote the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed.

      * Judge Fletcher went searching through court documents to correct an error by King County, but refused to search through documents we provided when she struck our argument.

      * After holding me to an unreasonable standard, Fletcher is incredible sloppy and inaccurate with her statements.

      * The rules of procedure are not to be used by a judge to manipulate the facts of a case.

      * Despite the judge's extensive striking of briefing, declaration and exhibits, we still presented a legitimate legal argument.

    The striking of our argument and exhibits is one of several steps Judges Fletcher and Rothstein took to deny my right to present my case in "their" federal court. (in my opinion)

      Here are steps the judges took to limit our argument.

        First, District Judge Rothstein reneged on her clerks agreement for extend briefs and struck all briefing beyond the 24 page limit. This striking of our briefing, after her clerk agreed to an informal procedure on her behalf, is a denial of my right of due process. In this appeal, the panel supports Rothstein's striking of this argument.
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Second, in federal district court, Rothstein refused our many requests for oral arguments. While there were oral arguments associated with this appeal, they were very brief and there was no discussion of the issues critical to the lawsuit. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Third, in her ruling, District Judge Rothstein struck twelve of my fourteen exhibits, and about seven pages of my twenty page declaration. Approximately three hundred pages of my exhibits were reduced to eight pages by her various rulings to strike. The validity of the information in any of those struck pages was never questioned. That information is correct. The appeals panel supports Rothstein in this opinion. This striking of exhibits and briefs fits into this pattern of violating my constitutional rights by limiting and eliminating my argument.
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Forth, District Judge Rothstein illegally decided this lawsuit by using summary judgment. The appeals panel supports Rothstein's dishonesty, here. Summary judgment gives complete control of the decision to the judge. It appears that abuse of summary judgment is rampant in our courts. By illegally allowing summary judgment, the federal judges denied my constitutional right to correct the disputed material facts and challenge the flawed legal arguments used to decide this lawsuit.
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Judges Fletcher and Rothstein struck our correct statements about Hilchkanum's participation in his deed, and then contrived ridiculous facts about Hilchkanum in order to justify their dishonest opinions.

          In her above paragraph, Judge Fletcher upholds Rothstein's striking of a critical statement made by my lawyer in his brief. His statement was critical because it described Hilchkanum's disadvantage as a participant in his right-of-way deed and it identified the Railway lawyers as author of the deed. After striking this statement by my lawyer, the judges identified Hilchkanum as the author of his deed. They then construed all the words in the deed against Hilchkanum. This is an unsupported, undocumented, ridiculous lie by these judges.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          In order to understand the judge's reasons for striking this significant portion of my lawyer's brief, we need to first look at the sentences they struck. Here are those sentences.

            "Bill Hilchkanum was an Indian. At the very best he was functionally illiterate, and "made his mark" when he signed legal documents. Thus, all drafting of any ambiguous documents was completed by the railroad’s representative. In this case Bill Hilchkanum and his wife signed a document that did not comport with the necessary elements for conveyance of a fee simple interest, because of the qualifying and limiting language of the document."
        [Read my lawyer's brief opposing King County's Summary Judgment motion and view this statement on page 2. The portions highlighted in yellow were struck by Rothstein.]

          Judge Fletcher states my lawyer's statement was struck because he didn't cite "support" for his statement. Judge Rothstein claimed that we provided no "foundation" for our statements of Hilchkanum's ethnicity and ability to participate in his deed. This is not true. We provided a number of documents to Judge Rothstein which supported our statement. It is true that we did not draw Rothstein's attention to those documents at the place that my lawyer made the statement. But, it is also true that King County did not brief that Hilchkanum was the author of his deed and an expert in legal proceedings. If the county had briefed those ridiculous lies, we would have responded with a more detailed and documented argument. We didn't make that more detailed argument because it was Judge Rothstein who manufactured the fact that Hilchkanum had the skills of a lawyer and that he wrote the words in his right-of-way deed. This ridiculous conclusion didn't appear until the opinion was published. How do we respond to a legal argument that was never made by King County? This can be understood by reading King County's motion for summary judgment, hyperlinked below. One will realize that the county's argument relied on misrepresenting Washington State common law, not on a claim that an illiterate Native American wrote the deed. The second hyperlink below is a "companion document" which aids the reader in understanding the dishonesty of King County's argument.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        King County Brief "Brief in Support of King County's Motion for Summary Judgment" (February 15, 2001)

        Companion Document "Brief in Support of King County's Motion for Summary Judgment" (Comments and Analysis by John Rasmussen - This is not a court record.)

          My lawyer's statement, displayed above, contains three significant material facts. First, his statement identifies Hilchkanum as an "Indian", a Native American. Second, his statement identifies the fact that Hilchkanum was illiterate. Third, his statement identifies the Railway lawyers as author of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. These three material facts were struck by Fletcher and Rothstein. It was critical for these judges to strike our statement of these material facts because they completely contradict the undocumented, ridiculous material facts on which they base their opinions. When there is disagreement with the material facts the disputed facts are required to be resolved by a jury. No legitimate jury would agree to the ridiculous facts that Fletcher and Rothstein substituted for the material facts my lawyer described here. So, Rothstein manufactured a reason to strike this portion of my lawyers brief, then declared we agreed with her substituted material facts. Last, she granted herself complete control of his decision through the illegal application of summary judgment. Judge Fletcher agreed with Rothstein's dishonest tactic in this appeals opinion. Next, I'll discuss the legitimacy of these three material facts.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Fletcher and Rothstein struck our statement of Hilchkanum's ethnic background and then ignored the well documented disadvantages American Indians had at that time in our history.

          My lawyer's first sentence identified Bill Hilchkanum as an "Indian". While my lawyer did not link that statement to any of the exhibits we provided which established that fact, it did give notice to Judge Rothstein that Hilchkanum was a Native American. "Indian" is the term that was consistently used to describe Hilchkanum in the historical documents we provided as exhibits. Here is just one of many exhibits that we provided to the court which justify my lawyer's statement.

        Read Hilchkanum's 1876 homestead application affidavit in which he states "I am an indian formerly of the Duwamish Tribe".

          We identified Hilchkanum as an "Indian" in my lawyer's brief. Does the fact that Fletcher and Rothstein struck our correct statement of fact somehow make Hilchkanum a white settler? This notification of Hilchkanum's ethnic background gives notice to the judges that they must look at that issue whether they strikes my lawyer's sentence or not. The judges have no legal right to strike this fact, and then assume Hilchkanum was a white settler or a member of some other ethnic group, with no document of fact to justify their assumption. But, that is what they did.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          The judges struck our statement of Hilchkanum's ethnicity, implying that our statement exhibits a racial bias. They ignored the historical fact that Native Americans were at great disadvantage in Washington Territory in the late 1880's. Natives had been forced onto reservations by Governor Stevens in the middle of that century. When they realized that their lives were forever changed by the white man's settlement, they rebelled. The Indian wars which followed in the 1850's and early 1860's ended with ugly and humiliating defeat for the Natives. This is basic American history which is taught to children in school. It is not our responsibility to brief basic American history to judges who limit our legal argument to a precious twenty-four pages.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          In striking my lawyers statement, Fletcher and Rothstein claimed that "the Rasmussens speculate on the intent of Bill Hilchkanum based on his Native American ethnicity." Our statement is not speculation. It is an historical fact. There were laws at the time which recognized and protected Native American Indians from being taken advantage of by white settlers. Here is just one example to support this statement. (with my emphasis)

        R.C.W. 64.20.020, Enacted Laws 1890, p. 500, §2.

          "Manner of conveyance. All deeds, conveyances, encumbrances or transfers of any nature and kind executed by any Indian, or in any manner disposing of any land, or interest therein, shall be by deed executed in the same manner as prescribed for the execution of deeds conveying real estate, or any interest therein, except that the same shall in all cases be acknowledged before a judge of a court of record. In taking said acknowledgment, the said judge shall explain to the grantor the contents of said deed or instrument, and the effect of the signing or execution thereof, and so certify the same in the acknowledgment, and before the same shall be admitted to record shall duly examine and approve the said deed or other instrument."

          The judges struck our statement of Hilchkanum's ethnicity and ignored his ethnic background later in their opinions when they attributed to Hilchkanum the legal expertise of a lawyer. The judges "found" Hilchkanum to be the author of his deed without any supporting documentation that would explain why a Native American Indian would have this unusual ability in 1887. Our statement was the truth and was supported by documents we submitted to the court. The fact that Hilchkanum was an Indian is a material fact. If Fletcher or Rothstein had doubt of this fact they were required to allow us to resolve and prove the fact to a jury. At the very least, the judges should have resolved this question at oral arguments. It is obvious from the complete dishonesty of this opinion, in almost every paragraph, that the judges struck our statement of Hilchkanum's ethnicity in order to hide the historical disadvantage American Indians suffered in that period. They then manufactured legal abilities for Hilchkanum which have no justification whatsoever.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Fletcher and Rothstein struck our statement of Hilchkanum's illiteracy and later "found" that Hilchkanum actually wrote his deed.

          The judges struck our statement of Hilchkanum's illiteracy, based on their opinion that there was no foundation for my lawyer's statement. The dishonesty of their striking this statement is seen by reading the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. The deed is the principal subject of this lawsuit. One needs to simply read the deed to see that Hilchkanum signed with an "X". This establishes a foundation to question his literacy. Read the following full transcription of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, with a photocopy of the original, to verify Hilchkanum and his wife signed with an "X".
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        View the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E in order to confirm that it was signed with an "X".

          By refusing to admit that the Hilchkanums signed the deed with an "X", are the judges claiming that they didn't read the deed which they construed? Or, are they claiming that people who sign deeds with an "X" are assumed iterate by law? It appears that the judges were simply looking for a reason to strike our correct statement of Hilchkanum's illiteracy, because later they establish Hilchkanum as author of all the words in his right-of-way deed. They could not make Hilchkanum the author and at the same time admit that he could not read or write the English language, so they dishonestly strike my lawyer's statement. Conflict resolved!
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          Hilchkanum's illiteracy is a material fact. We correctly state that he was illiterate. It is obscene for the judge to decide the opposite and deny our constitutional right to resolve this disagreement before a jury. At the very least they could have resolved this issue at oral argument. The truth is that the judges didn't want to establish the truth. They wanted to illegally establish Hilchkanum as author of his right-of-way deed, so they dishonestly struck our briefing which contradicted their contrived fact, then they decided the lawsuit by illegally allowing summary judgment.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          There were a number of documents submitted to the court which established Hilchkanum's illiteracy. The judges refused to acknowledge them. Here is but one.

        View an Exhibit presented to Judge Rothstein which specifically identifies Hilchkanum's illiteracy.

    Fletcher and Rothstein struck our statement that the Railway lawyers wrote the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed.

          Judge Rothstein struck my lawyer's statement that the Railway lawyers wrote the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. In this opinion, Judge Fletcher upheld her action. My lawyer's statement was tied to the fact that Hilchkanum was illiterate and, as an Indian, in no position to write or participate in the deed. If we had been allowed our constitutional right to establish Hilchkanum's illiteracy and disadvantage as a Native American in the late 1800's, this statement should have been allowed, too. But, we were not allowed to resolve these disputed material facts. It is apparent to me that these federal judges do not believe in the constitutional right of due process.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          There is a precedential Washington State opinion which establishes the SLS&E Railway lawyers as authors of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. That decision is King County v. Squire (1990). In Squire, the court construed the right-of-way deed from Watson Squire and his wife to the SLS&E. The court published the relevant portions of the Squire deed and indicated which words were written by the Railway lawyers and which words were changed or added by Watson Squire. The court found that the granting language in the Squire deed strongly indicated the intention to grant an easement. That granting language is identical to the granting language in the Hilchkanum deed, and establishes the "ELS form deed" which the Railway lawyers prepared and presented to the landowners along East Lake Sammamish. Later in this opinion, when Judge Fletcher refers to our briefing on King County v. Squire, she describes it as "...the facts of a Washington Court of Appeals case dealing with a railroad right of way.", and refuses to identify the case as King County v. Squire. Both Fletcher and Rothstein misrepresent the findings in Squire.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        View a study which compares the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds to the SLS&E.

        Understand the SLS&E "ELS form deed" used to obtain the right-of-way deeds along East Lake Sammamish.

          Judges Fletcher and Rothstein refused to honestly compare the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the Squire right-of-way deed. They refused to explain how their determination that Hilchkanum wrote all the words in his deed, is consistent with the finding by the Squire court that the identical SLS&E deed language was written by the Railway. The Squire findings are legal precedent. They are the law. The authorship of the Hilchkanum deed is a material fact. The judges decided that Hilchkanum wrote his deed, without any fact, or document, or basis in law to support their conclusion. The judges struck our statement that the deed was written by the Railway lawyers. They denied our constitutional right to establish this material fact before a jury. They refused to resolve this issue at oral arguments.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Judge Fletcher went searching through court documents to correct an error by King County, but refused to search through documents we provided when she struck our argument.

          The rules are not to be used to manipulated and violate the constitutional rights of the parties to the lawsuits. If a judge is irrationally strict in enforcing the rules with one party, then she (he) must be equally strict with the other party. Considering the willingness of Judge Fletcher to be a stickler for the rules when they harm my case, and her willingness to forgive King County when the County was not technically correct, I have to conclude that Senior Federal Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher is manipulating the rules of the court in order to deprive me of my constitutional right of due process. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          Federal District Judge Rothstein threw out our statement, that Bill Hilchkanum was an illiterate American Indian, because we had not drawn her attention to any fact or document that would support our statement. She then irrationally found Hilchkanum had the ability of a skilled lawyer and actually wrote his own deed to the SLS&E. She came to this ridiculous conclusion without any fact or document in support. She did this by ignoring the many documents we provided that supported our statements, the federal and state laws protecting Native Americans in Hilchkanum's time, and the history of the settlement of the American West. In this opinion, Judge Fletcher agreed with Rothstein's striking of our statements because we failed to cited supporting documentation with those statements.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        View the information, ignored by Fletcher, that explained Hilchkanum's ability to participate in his deed.

          But, when we pointed out that King County's title officer had identified the wrong lot in his "expert declaration", and we therefore called into question the validity of the County's claim to my land, Judge Fletcher went searching through the documents available to the court in order to reestablish the County's claim, and to correct King County's error. Footnote 3 of this opinion describes Fletcher's action.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

            "Footnote 3. The Rasmussens contend that King County has not provided evidence that it has an interest in a significant portion of the strip of land bisecting the Rasmussens' property. They claim that the only evidence provided by the County is a title insurance document that refers solely to the portion of the strip on Government Lot 3; only 3% of the subject strip is on Government Lot 3. However, King County has also provided the quitclaim deed by which TLC transferred its interest to King County. This deed indicates that the portion of the strip on Government Lot 2 was also conveyed; the Rasmussens assert that 96% of the strip lies on Government Lot 2. Thus, King County has submitted undisputed evidence that it has an interest in the subject property.
            [Footnote 3 of this opinion]

          Fletcher's Footnote 3 is in response to this portion of my lawyer's brief to Judge Fletcher:

        "7. King County has Failed to Provide Material Facts to Prove it has an Interest in the Subject Property.

            King County claims it is successor in interest to the subject property, based on the expert opinion of its title officer, Neil DeGoojer. ER 614-617. Mr. DeGoojer provides, as proof, a title report from Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company, and encloses that report as exhibit 2. ER 623-634. This Commitment for Title Insurance is for Government Lot 3, Sec 6, Twp 24 North, Range 6 East, W.M. Less than 1% of the subject property is in Government Lot 3. The property that is the subject of this lawsuit is located approximately 96% on adjacent Government Lot 2, and approximately 3% is on adjacent Government Lot 5. The map Mr. DeGoojer provides to locate the property, (ER 631), points out a parcel about one hundred yards southwest of the Rasmussens' property. The Rasmussens' property is the northeastern most parcel depicted on that map. ER 517 provides a map of the Rasmussens' property in better scale. The subject property is numbered "76" on both maps.

            King County has provided no material fact to prove it is successor in interest to any significant portion of the Rasmussens' property by failing to direct its argument to the correct parcel. With no material fact to support the County's claim of an interest to the property, the court should reverse summary judgment, and grant summary judgment in favor of the Rasmussens, quieting title in their favor and against the County."
            ["Defendants-Appellants’ John and Nancy Rasmussens’ Reply Brief" Go to Page 17 (PDF page 23).]

          Judge Fletcher went searching through court documents to correct the County's error when it failed to justify its claim of ownership, but she supported Rothstein's striking of our claims when Rothstein refused to research the documents we provided in support. This isn't equal justice. If Judge Fletcher found it was correct to strike a great percentage of our briefings, argument, and exhibits because we did not draw attention to supporting documentation at the precise points required, then she had the obligation to be equally strict with King County and disqualify its claim of ownership because it identified the wrong parcel of land. "What's for the goose is good for the gander"...except in Ninth Circuit courts.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    After holding me to an unreasonable standard, Fletcher is incredible sloppy and inaccurate with her statements.

          Judge Fletcher got the above facts almost right. TLC did not railbank the ELS right-of-way as Fletcher states above. The ownership of the ELS right-of-way was re-conveyed to BNSF for railbanking. You would think that a Federal Judge, who insists that everything I do in the lawsuit be technically perfect, would explain the railbanking of the right-of-way in the way it was technically accomplished. Perhaps she finds the rules of the court, and the technical description of the railbanking transaction, important only when she can use those rules to enforce her personal agenda.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          Next, Fletcher misrepresents our argument. She writes that we claim "...King County has no right to use the right of way as a trail because the Railway and its successors held only an easement for railroad purposes." Again, almost right. We correctly stated the common law precedent that the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad has always been the grant of an easement in Washington State, without exception. Further, we argued that the STB had no authority to railbank the ELS right-of-way because it was a spur line. Spur lines, which are entirely within a state, are not subject to federal authority. The STB had no jurisdiction over the East Lake Sammamish BNSF spur line. So, Fletcher grossly misstates our argument. But, she almost got it right. It's noteworthy that Fletcher is so strict with her application of the rules in the admissibility of our briefs and exhibits, yet so sloppy and inaccurate with her statement of the facts of the lawsuit. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    The rules of procedure are not to be used by a judge to manipulate the facts of a case.

          The rules of procedure are designed for the efficient and fair operation of the court, not for judges to use to deny a party the right to establish the facts. As one reads this annotated version of Judge Fletcher's decision, one will realize that Fletcher and Rothstein used excessively strict application of the rules in order to deny my right to establish the facts before the court. This strict application of the rules of procedure, and subsequent striking of our briefs and exhibits, goes hand-in-hand with their illegal application of summary judgment. They eliminate the facts we present and then manufacture undocumented, contested, material facts to use in the dishonest application of summary judgment. They completely take over the case, becoming both judge and jury (and executioner of my constitutional rights). Welcome to the Ninth Circuit. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Despite the judge's extensive striking of briefing, declaration and exhibits, we still presented a legitimate legal argument.

          I'm not claiming we lost this lawsuit because of the briefing, declaration and exhibits the judges struck. The information they struck weakened our case, but the judges still resorted to manufacturing material facts without foundation, cherry-picking other facts, misapplied the law, and illegally using summary judgment. We still had a valid legal argument despite the judges cutting our briefs, declarations and exhibits to shreds. This will be apparent as one reads this annotated opinion.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Reference:

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2002) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2002), with brief comments. (More readable!)



    The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2002) by Senior Ninth Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher.

II.

Jurisdiction

The district court had jurisdiction over this removal action if King County could have brought the case in federal court in the first place. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). King County could have brought this action in federal court initially because the district court would have had federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. King County's complaint included an allegation that it had a legal right to the strip of land in question even if the original deed conveyed only an easement. King County relied on 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) as the source of this right. Thus, there was a federal question on the face of the well-pleaded complaint. See Patenaude v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of United States, 290 F.3d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir. 2002) ("The presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction is governed by the well-pleaded complaint rule . . . ." (quoting Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

This court has appellate jurisdiction over the district court's summary judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

III.

Motions to Strike

The Rasmussens argue that we should consider materials struck by the court below. The district court struck the overlength portions of the Rasmussens' briefs in response to King County's motions for summary judgment and to dismiss the counterclaims. It also struck legal arguments contained in John Rasmussen's declaration as well as the Rasmussens' surrebuttal brief.

The district court struck these materials on the basis of Western District of Washington Local Civil Rule 7, which limits the length of summary judgment briefs to twenty-four pages, limits the length of briefs relating to other motions to eight pages, and makes no allowance for surrebuttal briefs. Parties may file over-length briefs if they obtain prior permission from the court. The Rasmussens violated this rule by filing two thirty-four-page briefs without obtaining prior permission.(4) Mr. Rasmussen's declaration added further briefing well beyond the twenty-four-page limit. Declarations, which are supposed to "set forth facts as would be admissible in evidence," should not be used to make an end-run around the page limitations of Rule 7 by including legal arguments outside of the briefs. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). As for the surrebuttal brief, the Rasmussens claim that it merely contained a response to the motion to strike. This is not so. It contains legal arguments on the motion to dismiss the counterclaims. The Rasmussens filed a separate response to the County's motion to strike, which the district court considered. Thus, the district court acted properly in granting King County's motions to strike.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

    Topics Discussed in this Note:  (Each topic is presented as a hyperlink. Use this menu to jump to that subject.)

      * What did Rothstein strike?

      * Fletcher and Rothstein struck evidence of the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.

      * Did Fletcher and Rothstein have the right to strike my legal arguments?

      * FRCP, FRAP, and Local Rules:

      * Fletcher hides important facts in her footnotes.

      * This striking of briefing and exhibits must be seen as criminal behavior by the judges.

    What did Rothstein strike?

          Each of the items struck by Rothstein and Fletcher is identified and explained in my analysis of Rothstein's opinion, King County v. Rasmussen (2001). In that analysis, I question the legitimacy of Rothstein's rulings, and I question her motivation. Judge Fletcher and panel upheld every item that Rothstein struck. Use the hyperlink, directly below, to view what Judge Rothstein struck.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Open the annotated version of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) at the position District Judge Rothstein strikes significant portions of our briefs, declaration, and exhibits.

    Fletcher and Rothstein struck evidence of the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.

          The most important information that Rothstein and Fletcher struck is my description and evidence of the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. King County actively participated in the federal tax fraud scheme. On a motion from the King County Prosecutor, all evidence of the tax fraud was struck by Judge Rothstein in Federal District Court. It's a fortunate criminal who can get a judge to strike all evidence of his crime. Here, Judge Fletcher upholds Rothstein's decision to strike evidence of King County's crime. These judges covered-up the federal tax fraud scheme by striking this un-refuted evidence. Despite their oaths to uphold the Constitution and the law, both of these dishonest judges then failed to turn the evidence over to federal prosecutors. Fletcher, Rothstein, and other Ninth Circuit judges became active participants in the ELS tax fraud scheme with these actions. The following is the section from my annotated version of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) in which I identify the information of the tax fraud scheme which these judges struck. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Rothstein struck my description and evidence of the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.

             Regarding " (c) Page 7, line 26 - page 10, line 3 and "Exhibits 4-7" above: This struck portion of my declaration and exhibits describes the federal tax fraud scheme used to establish the East Lake Sammamish Trail. Rothstein strikes my description of the crime, strikes all the evidence, and then refuses to turn this uncontested information over to federal prosecutors. When these actions are combined with her illegal use of summary judgment, her dishonest analysis, and her misapplication of the law, this striking of evidence appears to be a tactic by Judge Rothstein to cover-up of the federal tax fraud scheme.
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Did Judge Rothstein have the right to strike this declaration and exhibits?

             I "blew the whistle" on the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme in a February 7, 2000 letter to the King County leadership. By late summer of that year, it was obvious to me that every member of the county leadership had either participated in the tax fraud scheme or didn't care if the county acted illegally. I made the decision to stand up to the corruption in the county and declared that intention in an August 9, 2000 letter to David Irons, my King County Councilman. My description of the crime the county was committing, the evidence that I had discovered, and my understanding of the law are material facts, of which I had personal knowledge, that should have been allowed in my declaration. Judge Rothstein mischaracterized this information as "legal argument". I don't believe that is correct. I believe that Rothstein struck this information in order to cover up the tax fraud scheme, not to strike what she characterized as "legal argument".
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Was Judge Rothstein correct in striking my "legal argument"?

             I've read through the FRCP and the local rules of civil procedure for the Federal District Court of Western Washington. It is apparent to me that declarations or affidavits are for the purpose of providing facts, of which a party has personal knowledge, to use in support of a brief. But as I read the rules, I cannot find a prohibition against legal argument in a declaration. Judge Rothstein cites no rule to justify her striking my "legal argument". I believe there is no rule that allows a judge to go through a declaration and clean out anything she/he feels is "legal argument". So, I question Rothstein's motives, and right, to strike my description of the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and the evidence which led to my commitment to defend my property with a gun against the corruption of the county. The civil rules are available in the links directly below.
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          Go to Pages 7-10 of my declaration to view my description of federal tax fraud which Rothstein struck here. (Portions struck by Rothstein are highlighted in yellow)

          View my Exhibit 4, struck by Judge Rothstein. (BNSF instructed the disgraced accounting firm Arthur Andersen to appraise the land under the right-of-way as if BNSF owned it all. See page 8.) Note: 3.8 mb file size.

          View my Exhibit 5, struck by Judge Rothstein. (Draft sale agreement between BNSF and TLC showing TLC was aware of the dishonest appraisal. This draft agreement appears to have been altered in order to hide TLC's knowledge of the fraud.)

          View my Exhibit 6, struck by Judge Rothstein. (Final sale agreement between BNSF and TLC, with evidence that TLC hid its participation in the tax fraud scheme.)

          View my Exhibit 7, struck by Judge Rothstein. (Final sale agreement between TLC and King County, showing that King County agreed to accept the phony donation of land which the County knew BNSF did not own. See page 4.)

          Read a description of the federal tax fraud scheme used to railbank the ELS right-of-way.

          View the evidence of the tax fraud scheme with a discussion of its importance.

          Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the Federal District Court of Western Washington.

          Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP)

        [Open King County v. Rasmussen (2001) at the position I make these comments.]

    Did Fletcher and Rothstein have the right to strike my legal arguments?

          Above, Fletcher writes:

        "Mr. Rasmussen's declaration added further briefing well beyond the twenty-four-page limit. Declarations, which are supposed to 'set forth facts as would be admissible in evidence,' should not be used to make an end-run around the page limitations of Rule 7 by including legal arguments outside of the briefs. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)."

          This is the section of the opinion where we "split hairs". The judges want to "split hairs" in order to strike facts that contradict their conclusions, so "splitting hairs" is the game I must play in response. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) makes no comment with respect to legal argument and does not restrict affidavits only to "facts as would be admissible in evidence". What is allowed in an affidavit? I contend that anything is allowed that is not specifically disallowed. Instead, the judges apply a "rule" that doesn't exist as described in the FRCP. A rule denying a party the right to make legal argument would be in violation of the United States Constitution, and Fletcher should understand that. Read Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) and use the hyperlink to view the full FRCP. Fletcher has the habit of citing rules and legal findings, but when one goes to the citation they find she is wrong or dishonest in her analysis. So, read Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) and try to find a restriction on legal argument.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e):

        (e) FORM OF AFFIDAVITS; FURTHER TESTIMONY; DEFENSE REQUIRED. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.
        [View the complete Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.]

          District Judge Rothstein struck significant portions of my declaration because they contained legal briefing. Rothstein cited no rule for that authority to strike. In this opinion, Circuit Judge Fletcher takes a different tactic. Fletcher claims that we were trying to add additional briefing by including it in my declaration. She claims we were trying "...to make an end-run around the page limitations of Rule 7 by including legal arguments outside of the briefs." Fletcher cites Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) for authority. But, that rule states no restriction on legal briefing in declarations. While it is obvious to me that declarations or affidavits are for the purpose of providing facts of which the party has personal knowledge, I can find no rule restricting legal argument in a declaration. In my situation, my right to express my understanding of the law becomes an important part of my declaration because I expressed my willingness to use a gun to defend my property rights against the criminal acts by King County. The inclusion of my understanding of the law in my declaration were my work and were not intended to be some "end-run" around the rules, or to replace my lawyer's briefs. Whether the judges struck my studies of the law, or not, the judges still had the responsibility to apply that law. Sadly, the judges abandoned the law and the Constitution in my lawsuit. This abandonment of the law is identified and explained in almost every paragraph of this annotated opinion.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        View struck Exhibit 1, Rasmussen Study of Easement-Fee Issues.

        View struck Exhibit 9, Rasmussen Study of Spur Issue.

        View struck Exhibit 10, Rasmussen Study of Takings Issues.

          While it may have been correct for the judges to strike my exhibits 1, 9, and 10, it was not right that these judges struck my description of the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme, and the evidence I uncovered which led me to understand that King County was participating in that crime. My declaration and description of the evidence I discovered are material to this opinion. Later in this opinion Fletcher states that "...Mr. Rasmussen threatened county employees who entered the railroad right of way bisecting his land." Fletcher convicts me of a crime without any hearing or trial. It is an absolute lie that I threatened any county employee. If I had illegally threatened county employees, King County would have criminally prosecuted me. The county didn't prosecute because there was no basis for prosecution. In my declaration, I describe the county's attempt to lure a protesting resident into a confrontation and arrest. The county was looking to arrest someone as an example. All the facts and events leading to my confrontation with King County over its criminal activity were struck by these judges and no mention of the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme is made in either of these federal opinions which "settled" my lawsuit. Instead of allowing my statement of facts and the evidence of the tax fraud scheme, these judges struck this information, never mentioned the tax fraud scheme in their opinions, and issued decisions which covered-up the tax fraud scheme. The judges became active participants in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme by these actions.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    FRCP, FRAP, and Local Rules:

          The rules governing the function of the court are very important. The civil rules are codified as the "Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" (FRCP), prescribed by the U.S. Supreme Court and approved by Congress. The "Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure" (FRAP) are a separate, but related, set of rules. Courts also have "Local Rules". These rules establish everything from the type and form of pleadings, to the deadlines for filings, to the number of pages of briefing allowed, and even to the color of the outside cover of a briefing. These rules are designed to standardize and facilitate the functions of the courts.

        Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP)

        Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (FRCP)

        Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the Federal District Court of Western Washington.

    Fletcher hides important facts in her footnotes.

          In Fletcher's paragraph above there is a small number "4". What is written at footnote 4? Dishonest lawyers hide their lies in the footnotes because folks don't bother to read them. Crooked judges apparently use that technique, too.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Footnote 4. The Rasmussens claim that their failure to obtain prior approval to file over-length briefs was due to a miscommunication with the district court's law clerk. However, Rule 7 unambiguously requires prior approval to file briefs exceeding the page limitations set forth in the rule.

          Shortly before our initial briefing was due to the district court, my lawyer called Judge Rothstein's clerk, Christian Halliburton, to request overlength briefs. After a short conversation, the two agreed that it would be acceptable to request overlength briefs in the first paragraph of each submitted brief. I was in my lawyer's office at the time of the conversation, but heard only my lawyer's half of the conversation. I recall my lawyer hanging up and immediately explaining the agreed upon process to me.

        Read the letter of apology from my lawyer to Judge Rothstein explaining this situation.

          Judge Rothstein's clerk should not have agreed to this procedure, on her behalf, if this were not a method acceptable to the judge. If Christian Halliburton acted on Rothstein's behalf, without her consent, Judge Rothstein, and now Judge Fletcher, should not have punished us for the clerk's mistake. Considering the complete dishonesty throughout her decision, it seems obvious that Rothstein reneged on her clerk's commitment in order to make my lawyer appear a fool, and to throw out as much of our briefs and exhibits as possible, leaving us no remedy. Here Judge Fletcher supports the dishonesty of her fellow federal judge and hides this dishonest process in the footnotes.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    This striking of briefing and exhibits must be seen as criminal behavior by the judges.

          Federal District Judge Rothstein struck all evidence of the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme, and then refused to turn it over to federal prosecutors. Judge Fletcher does the same in this opinion. So, did these judges strike our briefing and exhibits for legitimate reasons? Or, did they strike this evidence of federal crimes in order to protect the participants in the crime? Considering the complete dishonesty of this opinion and the violation of my constitutional rights, I'm forced to conclude the latter.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          As I explain above, there is much more than evidence of the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme that these judges struck. They struck material facts that we presented, and then used contradictory material facts to decide this lawsuit. (Summary judgment is not allowed when there is disagreement with material facts.) I've shown that the judges struck our statement that Bill Hilchkanum was an illiterate Native American and then decided that Hilchkanum had adequate expertise to handle the legal matters related to his homesteading application and his right-of-way conveyance. The judges provided no documents to justify Hilchkanum's legal expertise, and they ignored the many documents that we submitted which supported our statements. The judges refused to send these disputed material facts to a jury for resolution. Does the fact that the judges struck our statement that Hilchkanum was an "Indian" somehow make Bill Hilchkanum a "white man"? Does the fact that the judges struck our statement that Hilchkanum was illiterate somehow make Bill Hilchkanum literate? There is no assumption under the law that every party to a deed is a white man who is an expert in the law. But, that is exactly what Rothstein assumed in federal district court, and the appeals judges allowed in this opinion. It was important to strike our briefs, declarations, and exhibits because they contradicted the facts and conclusions the judges made in this lawsuit.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           The striking of much of our argument and exhibits, combined with the illegal application of summary judgment and misapplication of the law, establishes a criminal pattern which District Judge Rothstein used to force her predetermined outcome. Here, Judge Fletcher dishonestly supports Rothstein. Summary judgment requires agreement with the material facts. It was critical for Fletcher and Rothstein to eliminate material facts that we presented so that they could substitute their own unsubstantiated "facts". After eliminating our argument and exhibits, these dishonest federal judges then claim we provide no argument to counter their dishonest contrivance of facts. The illegal application of summary judgment was discussed in greater detail above. I provide a link to that portion of this annotated opinion here:
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Open this opinion at the position which Judge Fletcher "justifies" summary judgment.

    Summary:

          The civil rules that support the function of the court are not for the purpose of manipulating the evidence and denying the constitutional rights of a party. The rules must be applied equally to each party. In this opinion, Judge Fletcher strikes our briefing and exhibits in order to support her predetermined outcome to the lawsuit. Fletcher strikes my declaration and exhibits in order to cover-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and protect the participants. One of the participants is Fletcher's sister judge, Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Reference:

      Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP)

      Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (FRCP)

      Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the Federal District Court of Western Washington.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2002) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2002), with brief comments. (More readable!)



    The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2002) by Senior Ninth Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher.

For the most part, however, the fact that this material has been struck will not affect our review. The final pages of the summary judgment response brief do not contain separate legal arguments that are waived because they were not raised in the first twenty-four pages of the brief. Instead, they contain comparisons between the facts of this case and the facts of a Washington Court of Appeals case dealing with a railroad right of way. We must consider the effect of any case relevant to the arguments raised, regardless of whether the Rasmussens briefed the particular case.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

          Why did Judge Fletcher refer to "...the facts of a Washington Court of Appeals case dealing with a railroad right of way.", and not simply identify King County v. Squire (1990)? Doesn't that seem odd? Is she afraid of something? The reason is obvious when one reads her discussion comparing the Squire and Hilchkanum deeds at the hyperlink below. A comparison of the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds to the SLS&E, combined with the Squire court's analysis of the Squire deed, absolutely destroys Fletcher's and Rothstein's analysis of the easement-or-fee issue and their assignment of Hilchkanum as author of his deed. Fletcher was so concerned about drawing attention to Squire that she refused to even name the decision when she referred to it in her statement directly above. That is intellectually dishonest, and hides Fletcher's participation in the ELS federal tax fraud scheme.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          Further, Fletcher writes above: "We must consider the effect of any case relevant to the arguments raised, regardless of whether the Rasmussens briefed the particular case." Fletcher admits that she must consider the effects of Squire, but she refuses to consider Squire in the section of this opinion that analyzes the common law issue of "Easement or Fee Simple". So, Judge Fletcher lied. She had a good reason to be dishonest about this. An honest analysis of the Squire decision exposes the dishonesty of her opinion.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Open the portion of this opinion where the precedent in King County v. Squire (1990) should have been analyzed, and was ignored instead.

        Compare the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds to the SLS&E in order to understand Fletcher's dishonesty in hiding King County v. Squire (1990).

    Reference:

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2002) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2002), with brief comments. (More readable!)



    The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2002) by Senior Ninth Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher.

As for the counterclaims, the only claims not addressed in the first twenty-four pages of the brief opposing Rule 12(b) dismissal are the Rasmussens' takings claims. However, the district court did not consider these claims waived and instead dismissed them for failure to state a claim. Rasmussen, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1231 (disposing of Fifth Amendment and state constitutional takings claims). Thus, we will address all of the Rasmussens' counterclaims.

IV.

Summary Judgment

A. Standard of Review

A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). This court must determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law. Id. All reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Orin v. Barclay, 272 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2001).



    Note from John Rasmussen:

    This statement by Senior Federal Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher takes us to the heart of the issue of corruption in the Ninth Circuit.

          Summary Judgment is the vehicle that Ninth Circuit judges use to dishonestly force their preordained outcomes to the cases before them. Summary judgment is allowed under a limited number of circumstances. The critical issue is that the facts which control a case are in agreement. These are called material facts. If the material facts are in agreement, a judge can apply the law to the material facts to resolve the case, saving the cost and time of a jury trail. The federal judges of the Ninth Circuit have figured out that they simply have to declare that there is agreement between the parties on the material facts in order for the judge to take complete control of the case. I believe that this case is typical of the corruption that goes on in the Ninth Circuit. There is absolutely no agreement with the material facts in this opinion, but Fletcher lies and declares that there is agreement, granting King County's motion for summary judgment and granting herself complete control of the lawsuit. (The remainder of this note repeats the discussion on this subject at the beginning of this annotated opinion.)
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Here are eight significant material facts that are not in agreement:

      It is a material fact who wrote the Hilchkanum deed

            Washington State common law holds that "[C]ontract language . . . is construed most strongly against the party who drafted it, or whose attorney prepared it." Judge Fletcher, and panel, found that Hilchkanum, an illiterate American Indian, wrote the words of his right-of-way deed to the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway (SLS&E) in 1887. Fletcher ignored, or struck, our argument that the Railway lawyers wrote the deed, and here she dishonestly proclaims we agree with her.
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

            The Hilchkanum deed was based on an unaltered Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway (SLS&E) "form deed" written by the lawyers for the Railway. Two variations of this SLS&E right-of-way "form deed" had been construed previously in Washington State courts and each found to grant an easement. In King County v. Squire (1990), the court construed a deed constructed on the same variation of the SLS&E "form deed" that was used for the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. The Squire court found the Squire deed granted an easement based on the identical granting words that are found in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. Further, King County admitted in its Lawson argument that the SLS&E right-of-way deeds involved in Here are eight significant material facts which are not in agreement:

          It is a material fact who wrote the Hilchkanum deed

                Washington State common law holds that "[C]ontract language . . . is construed most strongly against the party who drafted it, or whose attorney prepared it." Authorship is a critical material fact in the construing of a deed. In this appeals decision, Fletcher should have responded to our briefing on the dishonesty of Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein's opinion that illiterate Native American, Bill Hilchkanum, authored his right-of-way deed. She didn't. Instead, Judge Fletcher and panel supported Rothstein's dishonest conclusion of fact that Hilchkanum wrote the words of his right-of-way deed to the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway (SLS&E) in 1887. Fletcher ignored our argument that the Railway lawyers wrote the deed, and here she dishonestly proclaims we agree with this and the other questions of material fact. That's a lie.
                My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

                In order to understand Fletcher's dishonesty, on needs to read my lawyer's brief to Fletcher. Here is a portion on that brief, which Fletcher refused to address in this opinion. (In this citation, I hyperlink the references so that the reader can easily view the information Fletcher ignores in this "legal opinion".)
                My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

                   "Bill Hilchkanum was the original homesteader of the Rasmussens’ lands in this case. ER 446. On June 15, 1876 David T. Denny and Luke M. Redmond stated under oath that Bill Hilchkanum was an Indian who had abandoned his membership in the Snoqualmie tribe, and “adopted the habits and pursuits of civilized life”. ER, 494 The entire chronology of events explaining the homestead efforts of Bill Hilchkanum are found as exhibits to the expert witness Graddon declaration, at ER 446-522. On March 6, 1884 David T. Denny testified by sworn affidavit that “Bill Hilchkanum is an Indian and unable to read or write the English language***That said Indian Bill Hilchkanum relied on this affiant to take care of his said business…”. ER, 486. On March 24, 1884 Bill Hilchkanum “made his mark” upon an affidavit, which stated he “is an Indian and unable to read or write the English language and hence depends entirely upon the assistance of his white friends to aid him in transacting his business for him. That one D.T. Denny of Seattle W.T. had the care of his homestead papers for him…” ER, 483. David T. Denny was one of the witnesses to the original Hilchkanum deed in this case. ER, 502. On March 25, 1884 George W. Tibbetts swore by affidavit that he was “well acquainted with Bill Hilchkanum…” and that “…Bill Hilchkanum is an Indian and unable to read or write the English language and that he depended upon other parties to manage his business for him so that said Indian did not understand how to proceed in his homestead proof…”. ER, 485. In all documents of record, including the original Hilchkanum deed to SLS&E, Bill Hilchkanum signed his name by “making his mark”, which was an “X”, rather than a written or printed signature. ER, 476-522. The quitclaim deed from Bill Hilchkanum to SLS&E was signed (by his “mark”) and delivered to SLS&E on May 9, 1887. ER, 501-503. Bill Hilchkanum received the United States’ fee patent to his homestead lands on July 24, 1888. ER, 505-507.

                   The above uncontroverted material facts describe the grantor whom the district court in this case found as being competent to limit a grant and to distinguish between an easement and a conveyance of fee simple absolute. ER, 592-597. The district court even found that Bill Hilchkanum was aware of 17 U.S. Stat. 602, and chose the phrase “right of way” out of necessity rather than to create an easement, because Bill Hilchkanum knew the then existing federal law allowed the conveyance of a railroad right of way before he had received his fee patent. ER, 595. The Rasmussens contest these factual findings of the district court, with the above evidence that was before the district court."

                [My lawyer's brief to Judge Fletcher and panel, "Defendants-Appellants’ John and Nancy Rasmussens’ Opening Appeal Brief", and view the above statement beginning on page 4, (PDF page 10).]

                The Hilchkanum deed was based on an unaltered Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway (SLS&E) "ELS form deed" written by the lawyers for the Railway. Two variations of this SLS&E right-of-way "ELS form deed" had been construed previously in Washington State courts and each found to grant an easement. In King County v. Squire (1990), the court construed a deed constructed on the same variation of the SLS&E "form deed" that was used for the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. The Squire court found the Squire deed granted an easement based on the identical granting words that are found in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. Further, King County admitted in its Lawson argument that the SLS&E right-of-way deeds involved in Lawson v. State (1986) granted only easements. There were about twelve SLS&E right-of-way deeds involved in that lawsuit. Acknowledging the precedent set in these prior decisions would not allow the federal judges who construed the Hilchkanum deed to find that Hilchkanum granted fee title with his right-of-way deed. It was necessary for Fletcher and Rothstein to find that the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed granted fee simple title to the Railway in order to hide the federal tax fraud scheme that silently dominates and controls this decision. So, Judges Fletcher and Rothstein ignored common law precedent and "found" that Bill Hilchkanum, an illiterate Native American, wrote his own right-of-way deed to the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway (SLS&E). Ridiculous!
                My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

              Understand the SLS&E "ELS form deed" which was used by the SLS&E to obtain the right-of-way deeds along East Lake Sammamish.

                We were not allowed the constitutional right to establish the material fact that Hilchkanum took no part in the wording of his right-of-way deed, and that the Railway lawyers wrote the SLS&E "ELS form deed" that is exactly the words of the Hilchkanum deed. Most of the white settlers made small changes to the Railway's "form deed". None of the Native American homesteaders changed even one word. Hilchkanum was a Native. We brought the court's attention to King County v. Squire (1990) which supports the fact that the Railway was responsible for the words in the Hilchkanum deed, and which destroys Rothstein's and Fletcher's ridiculous manufactured fact that an illiterate Native American wrote his own right-of-way deed to the SLS&E in 1887. Fletcher's response to our briefing on Squire was to refuse to consider its implications and precedent. In fact, Fletcher was so afraid of drawing attention to Squire that she refused to even name the decision when she referred to our argument. Instead, she refers to Squire as "a Washington Court of Appeals case dealing with a railroad right of way". How's that for intellectual honesty?
                My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

                After Fletcher and Rothstein ignored or struck our argument on this material fact, they declared we agreed with their contrived material fact that Hilchkanum wrote his right-of-way deed to the Railway. Welcome to summary judgment, Ninth Circuit style!
                My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

              Understand how the Squire opinion establishes the author of the SLS&E "form deed".

          The intention of the Hilchkanums in their right-of-way deed is a material fact.

                With absolutely no agreement on this material fact, Fletcher states there was no disagreement with the material facts, and decreed that the Hilchkanums intended to grant an unrestricted fee simple title to the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway. The way she twisted around the law to justify this fact is discussed later in this annotated opinion. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

              Read a citation from Veach (1979) that establishes the intentions of a party as a material fact.

              Open the section of this opinion in which Fletcher misconstrues Hilchkanum's intentions in his ROW deed.

          The intention of the Hilchkanums in their subsequent real estate deeds is a material fact.

                It is a material fact to determine whether the Hilchkanums intended to except "land" or "right-of-way" in their subsequent deeds. Also, it is a material fact that the most relevant subsequent deeds did not except the right-of-way or the land under the right-of-way. Judge Fletcher and her sister judge, Rothstein, "cherry picked" the extrinsic evidence, misstating words in the subsequent deeds, and misapplying legal precedent in order to falsely explain the Hilchkanum's intentions with their subsequent deeds. They intentionally biased their examination by considering only the supporting facts that could be misconstrued to prop-up their predetermined outcome. It was not their right under the law to "cherry pick" the facts. It was my right to establish the Hilchkanum's intentions in their subsequent deeds before a jury. That right was intentionally denied by Fletcher and Rothstein.
                My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

              Open the section of this opinion in which Fletcher misconstrues Hilchkanum's intentions in his subsequent real estate deeds.

          The purpose of the deed is a material fact.

                The purpose of a deed is a corollary to the intentions of the parties to a deed. The intentions and purpose are essentially the same thing. Later in this decision, Judge Fletcher states that she can find no purpose to convey a right-of-way in the words of Hilchkanum's deed. Since the grant a right-of-way to the Railway is found clearly stated in the granting clause of the Hilchkanum deed, apparently Fletcher is establishing a new precedent that holds the only way a purpose can be found in a deed is if there is a statement explicitly stating a purpose and containing the word "purpose". The purpose of a deed is a material fact that must be resolved before a jury when there is disagreement. It is not the privilege of a dishonest federal judge to irrationally decide this fact.
                My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          The ability of the Hilchkanums to participate in their railroad right-of-way deed is a material fact.

                The Hilchkanums were illiterate Native Americans who gave up their tribal affiliation in order to homestead on off-reservation land. Fletcher ignored the history of the settlement of the American west, and the history of the settlement in Washington Territory. She ignored the laws that protected Natives in those days. She ignored the documents that we provided as exhibits which showed the Hilchkanums were at great disadvantage in legal proceedings. She refused to condemn District Judge Rothstein's opinion that the Hilchkanums were essentially skilled lawyers, capable of dealing with complex legal issues. Instead, Fletcher supported Rothstein's dishonest conclusion by "finding" that the Hilchkanums knowledgeably participated in their right-of-way deed. Her "finding" is so dishonest that she hid it in her footnote 13. Crooked lawyers like to hide their dishonesty in footnotes because they are less likely to be read. It is a sham that Fletcher decided this issue of fact in violation of the rules of summary judgment. Fletcher was required by law to send this disputed material fact back to district court for resolution before a jury. She refused.
                My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

              Open the section of this opinion where Fletcher illegally resolves the Hilchkanum's participation in their right-of-way deed.

              Understand that the ability of the Hilchkanums to participate in their right-of-way deed is a material fact.

          It is a material fact to determine what was conveyed in the deed.

                In Federal District Court, Judge Rothstein stated in her decision that a "strip of land" was conveyed to the SLS&E. This was also the position of the King County prosecutor. We pointed out that one needs to simply read the Hilchkanum deed to see that a "right-of-way" was conveyed. In this decision, Fletcher irrationally agrees with Rothstein that a "strip of land" was conveyed. This disputed material fact should have been resolved before a jury, not by the dishonest proclamations of two dishonest judges.
                My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

                 This substitution, and blending, of these contradictory terms is an essential element of Norm Maleng's "legal theory". Maleng's "legal theory" is a strategy devised by the King County Prosecutor's office after the Prosecutor and leadership of King County committed to participate in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. Norm Maleng's "legal theory" was first made public by King County Deputy Prosecutor Bill Blakney in 1997. What is written in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed is a material fact, not an optional fact that may be changed to support the various legal arguments that the King County Prosecutor and judges make in their dishonest attempt to hide their participation in a crime.
                My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

              Simply read the granting clause of the Hilchkanum deed to understand what was granted:

              "In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right-of-way one hundred (100) feet in width through our land in said County described as follows to wit..." (Granting Clause of Hilchkanum Right-of-Way Deed)

                So, why is it so important that the Federal judges stated that a "strip of land" was granted rather than a "right-of-way"? The answer lies in over one hundred years of consistently applied common law in Washington State. The grant of a "right of way" to a railroad has always been held to grant an easement, without exception, until this decision and Rothstein's King County v. Rasmussen (2001).
                My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

              Read more on this issue, including 44 citations contradicting the federal judge's misapplication of common law.

          It is a material fact to determine if King County's actions against me constituted a violation of my civil rights.

                In order for King County to be found in violation of my civil rights, the law requires that the County must exhibit a "policy, practice or custom" to violate my rights. It is a material fact whether the actions the county took against me fit the description of a "policy, practice or custom" to violate my rights. A jury must decide if the specific facts we described added up to a "policy, practice or custom". If the material fact of a "policy, practice or custom" is establish by a jury, then the law is applied to that material fact to find a violation of my rights. In Federal District Court, Judge Rothstein refused to let this happen by deciding this disputed material fact for herself. Judge Fletcher supports this violation of my rights in this opinion.
                My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          It is a material fact that King County participated in a federal tax fraud scheme.

                The establishment of that material fact would have explained the dishonest actions of the County against my neighbors and me. The establishment of that fact would have explained the false identity manufactured by the King County Prosecutor to threaten and discredit me. The establishment of that material fact would have forced the court to see the dishonesty in the prosecutor's briefs as a criminal act. In Federal District Court, Judge Rothstein dishonestly struck my description of the tax fraud scheme and its evidence. When Rothstein struck the portion of my declaration which described the crime, she cited no authority for her removal. Judge Fletcher supports this violation of my rights in this opinion.
                My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Why was summary judgment illegally allowed?

              When this lawsuit was "resolved" in federal district court, Judge Barbara Rothstein abused the rules of summary judgment and covered up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme in order to protect the participants. Rothstein became a participant in the federal tax fraud scheme with her decision. In this decision, Senior Federal Circuit Fletcher protects her sister federal judge, and the other participants in the tax fraud, by agreeing that there were no genuine issues of material fact. Fletcher needed this lie in order to justify the use of summary judgment, and to deny my constitutional right to establish the truth before a jury. Even more disgusting is the willingness of very judge in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to agree to this violation of my constitutional rights in their denial of my request for en banc consideration.
              My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

              No legitimate jury would agree to the ridiculous material facts that Fletcher used to decide this lawsuit. In order to keep determination of the facts away from a jury, Fletcher simply declared we agreed with all the material facts she used to decide the case. This is a lie. Fletcher intentionally denied my constitutional right of due process, my right to establish the facts in "her" court. Apparently, suspending the United States Constitution is business-as-usual in Ninth Circuit courts. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Reference:

          Understand the concept and rules of Summary judgment.

          View King County v. Rasmussen (2002) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

          View King County v. Rasmussen (2002), with brief comments. (More readable!)



    The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2002) by Senior Ninth Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher.

B. Validity of Conveyance Prior to Obtaining Fee Patent

The Rasmussens claim that Bill Hilchkanum did not have the power to convey anything more than an easement to the Railway because he had not perfected his title to the homestead when he made the conveyance in 1887. Under the Act of March 3, 1873, ch. 266, 17 Stat. 602 (1873),(5) a homesteader could convey a right of way to a railroad before perfecting his title. The use of the term "right of way" in the statute may have limited a homesteader to conveying only an easement, not a fee simple, to a railroad.

However, we need not answer this question to decide this case because Bill Hilchkanum perfected his title to the homestead property in 1884, three years before he conveyed the interest in the strip of land to the Railway in 1887. He entered the subject property in 1876 and took up residence there. The Homestead Act of 1862 provided that he could receive a certificate or patent at the expiration of five years from the date of entry if he provided proof that he had resided or cultivated the land for these five years, that he had not alienated any of the land, and that he had borne true allegiance to the United States. See Homestead Act, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (1862). Bill Hilchkanum submitted the necessary proof and obtained his certificate of ownership in 1884. Since he had fulfilled all the necessary conditions of ownership, his title was perfected in 1884. As a result, he did not need to act within the restrictions of the Act of March 3, 1873 to alienate his property nor did he need to include an after-acquired property clause in his conveyances; he had title free and clear and could convey to the Railway whatever he wished.

Although Hilchkanum did not obtain his patent deed until 1888, the Rasmussens cite no authority suggesting that the certificate of ownership did not perfect his title, and their own expert opined that Hilchkanum obtained "unqualified and perfect fee simple ownership" in 1884. Graddon Decl. Ex. 1, §1 at 2. We affirm the district court's conclusion that there are no genuine issues of fact as to whether Hilchkanum had the power to convey a fee simple interest to the Railway in 1887.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

    Fletcher is wrong that Hilchkanum held "perfect title" in 1884:

          Fletcher states, above, that Hilchkanum "had fulfilled all the necessary conditions of ownership, his title was perfected in 1884." It would be nice if she had cited some law or ruling to support her opinion. She points to the Homestead Act, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (1862) for authority, but the Homestead Act of 1862 provides no support for Fletcher's contention that Hilchkanum attained "perfect title" by merely meeting the homestead qualifications.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Read the Homestead Act of 1862 to verify this issue.

          Since the Homestead Act does not support Fletcher's statement that Hilchkanum's title was "perfected" in 1884, I did a little research and found that the United States Supreme Court does not agree with Fletcher, either. The United States Supreme Court defined legal title as the issuance of patent. The United States Supreme court defined Hilchkanum's property interest in 1884 as an "inceptive title". An "inceptive title" is far inferior to a "perfect title" and would not allow Hilchkanum the property right that Fletcher describes above. Apparently, Judge Fletcher does not feel bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Here is a citation from U. S. v. Buchanan, 232 U.S. 72 (1914):
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        "The entry by Scott withdrew the land from entry or settlement by any other, [232 U.S. 72, 77] and segregated the quarter section from the public domain. The legal title remained in the government until patent issued; but, as against all except the United States, he was the lawful possessor, clothed with an inceptive title..."
        [U. S. v. Buchanan (1914)] with this citation in red font.

          Judge Fletcher had predetermined that Hilchkanum passed fee simple title of his homestead land to the Railway with his right-of-way deed. She needed to do this in order to cover-up the dishonest actions by her sister judge, Barbara Rothstein, in King County v. Rasmussen (2001). So, we get her unsupported legal conclusion that Hilchkanum attained perfect title at the time of meeting his homestead requirements. An "inceptive title" is not a "perfect title". But there is more to understand about Hilchkanum's ability to sell his homestead land prior to receiving patent. Read on!
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Fletcher failed to realize that Hilchkanum, an "Indian", could not sell his land until five years after receiving patent:

          Hilchkanum did not file for homestead entry under Section 2289, Revised Statutes of the United States, which is the Homestead Act of 1862, codified. Hilchkanum was not qualified for homestead entry under Section 2289 because he was a Native American "Indian". The right of Native Americans to homestead was not authorized until Congress passed the Act of March 3, 1875. This can be seen in Hilchkanum's homestead application where the words "Section 2289, Revised Statutes of the United States" are crossed out and replaced by "the provisions of the Act of Congress of March 3, 1875".

        Read Hilchkanum's Homestead Application to verify that he filed under the provisions of the Act of March 3, 1875.

        Read Hilchkanum's affidavit which states his qualification to homestead as an "Indian" under the provisions of the Act of March 3, 1875.

          The "Act of March 3, 1875" allowed Native Americans to homestead, but restricted "Indians" from selling their homestead land for five years from the date of patent. This federal law prohibited Hilchkanum from transferring fee simple title to the SLS&E until 1893. So, he was not allowed to convey fee simple title of his right-of-way land to the SLS&E in 1887, as Fletcher claims. (My emphasis in the citation below):
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        "Mar. 3, 1875. | 18 Stat., 402

        Chapter 131
        SEC. 15

          That any Indian born in the United States, who is the head of a family, or who has arrived at the age of twenty-one years, and who has abandoned, or may hereafter abandon, his tribal relations, shall, on making satisfactory proof of such abandonment, under rules to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior, be entitled to the benefits of the act entitled "An act to secure homesteads to actual settlers on the public domain," approved May twentieth, eighteen hundred and sixty-two, and the acts amendatory thereof, except that the provisions of the eighth section of the said act shall not be held to apply to entries made under this act:

          Provided, however, That the title to lands acquired by any Indian by virtue hereof shall not be subject to alienation or incumbrance, either by voluntary conveyance or the judgment, decree, or order of any court, and shall be and remain inalienable for a period of five years from the date of the patent issued therefor:"

            Read a study that explains Hilchkanum's situation as a homesteading "Indian" in the late 1800's, including the history of the times, laws that protected "Indians", and specific Hilchkanum documents.

    Fletcher failed to understand that Congress intended the grant of a "right of way" to be the grant of an easement, not fee title to the land:

          In the "Act of March 3, 1873", Congress intended an un-patented homesteader's grant of a right-of-way to convey only an easement, not fee simple title. Fletcher refused to resolve this important fact in her discussion above. This fact is supported by the United States Supreme Court opinion in Great Northern v. USA (1942). In Great Northern, the United States Supreme Court studies the intent of Congress in its post 1850 railroad rights-of-way legislation, making these observations (with my emphasis):
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          "The Act of March 3, 1875, from which petitioner's rights stem, clearly grants only an easement, and not a fee. Section 1 indicates that the right is one of passage since it grants 'the', not a, 'right of way through the public lands of the United States'. Section 2 adds to the conclusion that the right granted is one of use and occupancy only, rather than the land itself, for it declares that any railroad whose right of way passes through a canyon, pass or defile 'shall not prevent any other railroad company from the use and occupancy of said canyon, pass, or defile, for the purposes of its road, in common with the road first located'.1

          Section 4 is especially persuasive. It requires the location of each right of way to be noted on the plats in the local land office, and 'thereafter all such lands over which such right of way shall pass shall be disposed of subject to such right of way'.2 This reserved right to dispose of the lands subject to the right of way is wholly inconsistent with the grant of a fee. As the court below pointed out, 'Apter words to indicate the intent to convey an easement would be difficult to find' (119 F.2d 825). That this was the precise intent of Section 4 is clear from its legislative history. 3 While Section 4 pro- [315 U.S. 262, 272]   vides a method for securing the benefits of the Act in advance of construction,4 no adequate reason is advanced for believing that it does not illumine the nature of the right granted. The Act is to be interpreted as a harmonious whole.

          The Act is to be liberally construed to carry out its purposes. United States v. Denver, etc., Railway Co., 150 U.S. 1, 14 , 14 S.Ct. 11, 15; Nadeau v. Union Pacific R. Co., 253 U.S. 442 , 40 S.Ct. 570; Great Northern R. Co. v. Steinke, 261 U.S. 119 , 43 S. Ct. 316. But the Act is also subject to the general rule of construction that any ambiguity in a grant is to be resolved favorably to a sovereign grantor-' nothing passes but what is conveyed in clear and explicit language'-Caldwell v. United States, 250 U.S. 14, 20 , 21 S., 39 S.Ct. 397, 398, and cases cited. Cf. Great Northern R. Co. v. Steinke, supra. Plainly there is nothing in the Act which may be characterized as a 'clear and explicit' conveyance of the underlying oil and minerals. The Act was designed to permit the construction of railroads through the public lands and thus enhance their value and hasten their settlement. The achievement of that purpose does not compel a construction of the right of way grant as conveying a fee title to the land and the underlying minerals; a railroad may be operated though its right of way be but an easement. 5   [315 U.S. 262, 273]   But we are not limited to the lifeless words of the statute and formalistic canons of construction in our search for the intent of Congress. The Act was the product of a period, and, 'courts, in construing a statute, may with propriety recur to the history of the times when it was passed'. United States v. Union Pacific R. Co., 91 U.S. 72 , 79. And see Winona & St. Peter R. Co. v. Barney, 113 U.S. 618, 625 , 5 S.Ct. 606, 609; Smith v. Townsend, 148 U.S. 490, 494 , 13 S. Ct. 634, 635; United States v. Denver, etc., Railway Co., 150 U.S. 1, 14 , 14 S.Ct. 11, 15.

          Beginning in 1850 Congress embarked on a policy of subsidizing railroad construction by lavish grants from the public domain. 6 This policy incurred great public disfavor7 which was crystallized in the following resolution adopted by the House of Representatives on March 11, 1872:

            'Resolved, that in the judgment of this House the policy of granting subsidies in public lands to railroads and [315 U.S. 262, 274]   other corporations ought to be discontinued, and that every consideration of public policy and equal justice to the whole people requires that the public lands should be held for the purpose of securing homesteads to actual settlers, and for educational purposes, as may be provided by law.' Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess., 1585 (1872).

          After 1871 outright grants of public lands to private railroad companies seem to have been discontinued. 8 But, to encourage development of the Western vastnesses, Congress had to grant rights to lay track across the public domain, rights which could not be secured against the sovereign by eminent domain proceedings or adverse user. For a time special acts were passed granting to designated railroads simply 'the right of way' through the public lands of the United States. 9 That those acts were not intended to convey and land is inferable from remarks in Congress by those sponsoring the measures. For example, in reporting a bill granting a right of way to the Dakota Grand Trunk Railway (17 Stat. 202), the committee chairman said: 'This is merely a grant of the right of way'.10 Likewise, in reporting a right of way bill for the New Mexico and Gulf Railway Company (17 Stat. 343), Mr. Townsend of Pennsylvania, the same Congressman who sponsored the Act of 1875, observed: 'It is nothing but a grant of the right of way.' 11   [315 U.S. 262, 275]   The burden of this special legislation moved Congress to adopt the general right of way statute now before this Court. Since it was a product of the sharp change in Congressional policy with respect to railroad grants after 1871, it is improbable that Congress intended by it to grant more than a right of passage, let alone mineral riches. The presence in the Act of Section 4, which, as has been pointed out above, is so inconsistent with the grant of a fee, strongly indicates that Congress was carrying into effect its changed policy regarding railroad grants. 12  

          Also pertinent to the construction of the Act is the contemporaneous administrative interpretation placed on it by those charged with its execution. Cf. United States v. Johnston, 124 U.S. 236, 253 , 8 S.Ct. 446, 454; United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760 , 763; Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 , 53 S. Ct. 350, 358. The first such interpretation, the general right of way circular of January 13, 1888, was that the Act granted an easement, not a fee. 13 The same position was taken in the regulations of March 21, 1892, 14 L.D. 338, and those of November 4, 1898, 27 L.D. 663. While the first of these circulars followed the Act by 13 years, the weight to be accorded them is not dependent on strict contemporaneity. Cf. Swendig v. Washington Water Power Co., 265 U.S. 322 , 44 S.Ct. 496. This early administrative gloss received indirect Congressional approval when Congress repeated the language of the Act in granting canal and reservoir companies rights of way by the Act of March 3, 1891, c. 561, 26 Stat. [315 U.S. 262, 276]   1101, 43 U.S.C.A. 946, and when Congress made the Act of 1875 partially applicable to the Colville Indian Reservation by Act of March 6, 1896, c. 42, 29 Stat. 44. Cf. National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 140, 146 , 40 S.Ct. 237, 239.

          The circular of February 11, 1904, 32 L.D. 481, described the right as a 'base or qualified fee'. This shift in interpretation was probably due to the description in Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Townsend, 190 U.S. 267 , 23 S.Ct. 671, 672, of a right of way conveyed in a land-grant act (13 Stat. 365) as a 'limited fee, made on an implied condition of reverter'.14 But the earlier view was reasserted in the departmental regulations of May 21, 1909, 37 L.D. 787.15 After 1915 administrative construction bowed to the case of Rio Grande Western R. Co. v. Stringham, 239 U.S. 44 , 36 S.Ct. 5, which applied the language of the Townsend case to a right of way acquired under the Act of 1875. We do not regard this subsequent interpretation as binding on the Department of the Interior since it was impelled by what we regard as inaccurate statements in the Stringham case. Cf. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 121 , 60 S.Ct. 444, 452, 125 A.L.R. 1368

          Congress itself in later legislation has interpreted the Act of 1875 as conveying but an easement. The Act of June 26, 1906, c. 3550, 34 Stat. 482, 43 U.S.C.A. 940 declaring a forfeiture of unused rights of way, provides in part that: 'the United States hereby resumes the full title to the lands covered thereby (by the right of way) freed and discharged from such easement'. This language is repeated in the forfeiture act of February 25, 1909, c. 191, 35 Stat. 647, 43 U.S.C.A. 940. Also on June 26, 1906, an act16 was passed confirming the rights of way which certain railroads had acquired under [315 U.S. 262, 277]   the 1875 Act in the Territories of Oklahoma and Arizona. The House committee report on this bill said: 'The right as originally conferred and as proposed to be protected by this bill simply grants an easement or use for railroad purposes. Under the present law whenever the railroad passes through a tract of public land the entire tract is patented to the settler or entryman, subject only to this easement'.17 It is settled that 'subsequent legislation may be considered to assist in the interpretation of prior legislation upon the same subject.' Tiger v. Western Investment Co., 221 U.S. 286, 309 , 31 S.Ct. 578, 583, 584. See also Cope v. Cope, 137 U.S. 682 , 11 S.Ct. 222; United States v. Freeman, 3 How. 556. These statutes were approximately contemporaneous with petitioner's acquisition of the rights of way of the St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Railway.

          That petitioner has only an easement in its rights of way acquired under the Act of 1875 is therefore clear from the language of the Act, its legislative history, its early administrative interpretation and the construction placed upon it by Congress in subsequent enactments."
          [Great Northern R. Co. v. U. S., 315 U.S. 262 (1942)]

          This U.S. Supreme Court decision differentiated between the earlier land grant law, which granted land to the railroads, and the later right-of-way laws which granted only easements. The Court found that the term "right-of-way" was understood to mean an easement.

          Great Northern dealt with The Act of March 3, 1875. But, as one can see from the discussion, the Supreme Court looked at the intent of Congress, in its use of the term "right-of-way", from 1850 onward. After 1871, Congress recognized and responded to the public disfavor with the grant of land to the railroads. The resolution adopted by the House of Representatives on March 11, 1872 and subsequent legislation reveals the intent of congress with its use of the words "right-of-way" in The Act of March 3, 1873. The U.S. Supreme Court found the intent of Congress in "17 Stat. 202" and "17 Stat. 343", above, was to use the term "right-of-way" as an easement. Both of those Statutes were passed in 1872, prior to The Act of March 3, 1873.

          Judge Fletcher had no right to assume that the grant of a right-of-way under 17 U S Statute 602 as the grant of fee simple title when the United Supreme Court had found the intent of Congress, with those words, was to grant an easement. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Summary:

      Fletcher is wrong that Hilchkanum held perfect title in 1884. Perfect title was not passed to Hilchkanum until his patent was issued in 1888.

      Hilchkanum was restricted by law from conveying any part of his homestead land until 1893, five years after receiving his 1888 patent, because he qualified to homestead as an "Indian" under the Act of March 3, 1875.

      When Congress allowed a homesteader to grant a railroad right-of-way after entry and before patent, Congress intended the grant to be an easement, not fee title. This intent of Congress was explained by the United States Supreme Court in its decision Great Northern R. Co. v. U. S. (1942).

      Senior Federal Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher got essentially everything wrong in her paragraph, above.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Reference:

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2002) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2002), with brief comments. (More readable!)



    The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2002) by Senior Ninth Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher.

C. Easement or Fee Simple

King County claims that under Washington state law the Hilchkanum deed conveyed a fee simple estate in the strip of land to the Railway. The Rasmussens argue that, even if Hilchkanum had the power to convey a fee simple estate to the Railway, he intended to convey only an easement. The district court agreed with King County, as do we.

[1] A conveyance of a right of way to a railroad may be in fee simple, or it may be an easement. Veach v. Culp, 599 P.2d 526, 527 (Wash. 1979). The intent of the parties is of paramount importance in determining what interest the deed conveyed. Brown v. State, 924 P.2d 908, 911 (Wash. 1996). It has been said that it is a factual question to determine the intent of the parties. Veach, 599 P.2d at 527. But the intent of parties to a deed as well as the legal consequences of that intent are in reality mixed questions of law and fact: legal rules of deed interpretation determine how the underlying facts reflect the intent of the parties. See Brown, 924 P.2d at 912 (determining intent from undisputed underlying facts on summary judgment). To ascertain the intent of the parties, one must look to the language of the deed as well as the circumstances surrounding the deed's execution and the subsequent conduct of the parties.(6)Id. However, the parties must "clearly indicate" an intent to make a conveyance conditional. King County v. Hanson Inv. Co., 208 P.2d 113, 119 (1949) (cited in Brown, 924 P.2d at 912).



    Note from John Rasmussen:

    The Intention of the Parties is a Material Fact.

          In her paragraph above, Fletcher admits that the intention of the parties is the most important material fact in construing a deed. Summary judgment is allowed only when there is agreement with the material facts. Judge Fletcher knew that we disagreed with her about the intentions of the Hilchkanums in their right-of-way deed to the SLS&E, yet she dishonestly declared we were in agreement. If she had admitted the truth that there was no agreement on the Hilchkanum intentions, she would have had to send the lawsuit back to district court for a jury trial. She couldn't allow that because the federal tax fraud scheme, covered up in Federal District Court, would then be exposed to the jury.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          Fletcher is correct when she states that the intentions of the parties are derived from the words of the deed, the circumstances surrounding the deed's execution, and the subsequent conduct of the parties. But, Fletcher is very wrong when she manipulates the facts of the case by misstating what is plainly printed in the Hilchkanum deed and instead substitutes her own words. She is very wrong when she manipulates the facts of the case by "cherry picking" extrinsic evidence to color the intentions of the Hilchkanums in their subsequent real estate deeds. She is very wrong when she manipulates the facts of the case by refusing to address the ability of the Hilchkanums to participate in their deed. Fletcher is very wrong when she manipulates the facts of the case by ignoring the authorship of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. These contributing material facts interact and combine to establish the material fact that is the intention of the Hilchkanums in their right-of-way deed. When there is disagreement with the material facts, the issue goes to a jury, under the law. It's obvious that we aren't dealing with the law here.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          Fletcher correctly states Washington State common law with her statement that "...it is a factual question to determine the intent of the parties.", yet she bases her opinion on undocumented, ridiculous, disputed facts in violation of the rules of summary judgment. She does this as an arrogant senior circuit judge who intentionally destroys my constitutional right of due process in order to protect the criminal activity of her fellow federal district judge, Barbara Rothstein, and the other participants in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Norm Maleng's "legal theory"

          In her last statement, above, Judge Fletcher takes us to King County v. Hanson Inv. Co. Norm Maleng's "legal theory" relies on the misapplication of Hanson as a basic element of its dishonest argument. Here, Fletcher first gives us correct analysis of Hanson by stating that "the parties must 'clearly indicate' an intent to make a conveyance conditional". Then, Fletcher incorrectly adopts Norm Maleng's dishonest "legal theory" by claiming that only a separate statement "'clearly indicat[ing]' an intent to make a conveyance conditional" will make a conveyance conditional. The King County Prosecutor, this judge, and several other dishonest judges have relied on this misrepresenting Hanson in order to falsely justify this separate statement "rule" in Norm Maleng's "legal theory". There is more on this subject in the next Note. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Open the portion of the next Note which discusses Judge Fletcher dishonestly adoption of Norm Maleng's "legal theory".

    Reference:

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2002) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2002), with brief comments. (More readable!)



    The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2002) by Senior Ninth Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher.

The Washington Supreme Court provided its most recent guidance on this issue in Brown.(7) The Brown court identified various factors to consider in determining whether a deed conveyed a fee simple or an easement:

    [W]e have relied on the following factors: (1) whether the deed conveyed a strip of land and did not contain additional language relating to the use or purpose to which the land was to be put, or in other ways limiting the estate conveyed; (2) whether the deed conveyed a strip of land and limited its use to a specific purpose; (3) whether the deed conveyed a right of way over a tract of land, rather than a strip thereof; (4) whether the deed granted only the privilege of constructing, operating, or maintaining a railroad over the land; (5) whether the deed contained a clause providing that if the railroad ceased to operate, the land conveyed would revert to the grantor; (6) whether the consideration expressed was substantial or nominal;(8) (7) whether the conveyance did or did not contain a habendum clause, and many other considerations.

Brown, 924 P.2d at 912.

The Brown court further explained that whether the parties to a railroad right of way deed used a statutory form deed is a significant factor in determining their intent. Brown, 924 P.2d at 912; see Roeder Co. v. K&E Moving & Storage Co., 4 P.3d 839, 841 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000). The court ruled that "where the original parties utilized the statutory warranty form deed and the granting clauses convey definite strips of land, we must find that the grantors intended to convey fee simple title unless additional language in the deeds clearly and expressly limits or qualifies the interest conveyed."(9) Brown, 924 P.2d at 912.

In this case, however, the Hilchkanum deed did not follow the statutory warranty form. The statutory form is as follows:

    The grantor (here insert the name or names and place of residence) for and in consideration of (here insert consideration), in hand paid, convey and warrant to (here insert the grantee's name) the following described real estate (here insert description), situated in the county of _____, state of Washington.

Laws of 1886, §3, pp. 177-78. The Hilchkanum deed used a slightly different form:

    In consideration of (here insert consideration), grantor (here insert name of grantor) does hereby donate grant and convey unto grantee (here insert name of grantee) the following described right of way (here insert description).

As a result, the Hilchkanum deed does not give rise to the presumption that the deed conveyed a fee simple. See Roeder, 4 P.3d at 843; Veach, 599 P.2d at 527 (no presumption that quitclaim deed conveyed fee simple). A failure to use the statutory warranty deed form, however, does not necessarily mean that the parties did not intend to convey a fee simple. The court must consider whether other factors indicate that the parties intended a fee simple.

Another factor on which the Brown court focused was if and how the deed uses the term "right of way." The court noted that use of the term in the granting clause as a limitation or to specify the purpose of the grant generally creates only an easement. Brown, 924 P.2d at 913. The term "right of way," however, can have two purposes: "(1) to qualify or limit the interest granted in a deed to the right to pass over a tract of land (an easement), or (2) to describe the strip of land being conveyed to a railroad for the purpose of constructing a railway." Id. at 914.

In Brown, the term "right of way" appeared only in each deed's legal description or in the description of the railroad's obligations, instead of in the granting or habendum clauses. The court concluded that "used in this manner, 'right of way' merely describes a strip of land acquired for rail lines." Brown, 924 P.2d at 914. Since the term did not qualify or limit the interest expressly conveyed in the granting and habendum clauses of the deeds at issue, the court concluded it did not indicate an intent to grant an easement only.(10)

[2] Here the term "right of way" appears in the granting clause as well as in the legal description.(11) In this sense, the Hilchkanum deed suggests a possible intent to create only an easement in a way the deeds at issue in Brown did not. However, neither the granting nor the habendum clauses contains language clearly limiting the use of the land to a specific purpose. In virtually all cases where Washington courts have found only an easement, the granting or the habendum clauses contained such language. See Swan v. O'Leary, 225 P.2d 199, 199 (Wash. 1950) (granting premises "for the purpose of a Railroad right-of-way"); Morsbach v. Thurston County, 278 P. 686, 687 (Wash. 1929) (conveying a "right of way for the construction of said company's railroad"); Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber & Shingle Mill Co., 111 P. 578 (Wash. 1910) (holding that deed providing "to have and to hold the said premises . . . for railway purposes, but if it should cease to be used for a railway the said premises shall revert to said grantors" granted easement); Reichenbach v. Washington Short Line Ry. Co., 38 P. 1126 (Wash. 1894) (construing deed which provided "so long as the same shall be used for the operation of a railroad" as an easement); King County v. Squire Inv. Co., 801 P.2d 1022, 1022 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (granting premises to railroad "so long as said land is used as a right-of-way by said railway Company, Expressly reserving to said grantors their heirs and assigns all their riparian rights. . . ."). Without such additional language, the use of the term "right of way" merely "begs the question" since a railroad could own a right of way either as an easement or in fee. Brown, 924 P.2d at 914.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

    Three significant topics are discussed in this Note:  (Each topic is presented as a hyperlink. Use this menu to jump to that subject.)

      * Judge Fletcher ignores one hundred years of consistently upheld common law which holds the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad conveys only an easement.

      * Judge Fletcher dishonestly adopts Norm Maleng's "legal theory", which contends the Washington State Supreme Court reversed one hundred years of common law in Brown v. State of Washington. Maleng's "legal theory" incorrectly contends that "additional language" limiting the grant is always required in order to find an easement.

      * Judge Fletcher misrepresents King County v. Squire. An honest evaluation of Squire absolutely destroys Fletcher's argument.

    Fletcher ignores one hundred years of consistently upheld common law which holds the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad conveys only an easement.

          Judge Fletcher writes, above, "However, neither the granting nor the habendum clauses contains language clearly limiting the use of the land to a specific purpose." This is an intentional lie by this very dishonest judge. The Hilchkanum deed grants a right-of-way in its granting clause. The grant of a right-of-way to a railroad has always been held to be the grant of an easement in Washington State/Territory, without exception, until this decision and its dishonest District Court sister, King County v. Rasmussen (2001). The reason is simple. The grant of a right-of-way has historically and precedentially always been considered to be the grant of a right-of-passage, which is an easement. It is the grant of a right to use the land, not a grant of the land itself. Rothstein, in her Federal District Court decision, and Fletcher in this Ninth Circuit Appeals Panel decision threw out one hundred years of consistently held common law precedent in order to protect the participants in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          Let's look at that precedent. Below, are forty-four abbreviated citations which explain the meaning of the words "right-of-way" in railroad deeds. The opinions, from which the citations are derived, span over one hundred years and are consistent in their interpretation that the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad is the grant of an easement. Fletcher uses abbreviated citations and then intentionally misinterprets their meaning. Each abbreviated citation is a hyperlink which will take the reader to its location in its respective opinion. Read the complete opinion for a better understanding. The truth is my friend.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

      Citations Explaining the Meaning of the Words "Right-of-way" in Railroad Deeds:

      (Citations are in reverse chronological order, with my emphasis on the terms "right-of-way" and "easement".)

        2000: Roeder v. K&E Storage (2000)
          "Because the words "right of way" appeared only in each deed's legal description or in the description of the railroad's obligations, instead of in the granting or habendum clauses, the court concluded that '[u]sed in this manner, 'right of way' merely describes a strip of land acquired for rail lines; it does not qualify or limit the interest expressly conveyed in the granting and habendum clauses.'"

        1996: Brown v. State of Washington (1996)
          "We have given special significance to the words "right of way" in railroad deeds."

          "...we held the deed granted an easement based on the specifically declared purpose that the grant was a right of way for railroad purposes..."

          "...the term "right of way" as a limitation or to specify the purpose of the grant generally creates only an easement."

          "The words "right of way" can have two purposes: (1) to qualify or limit the interest granted in a deed to the right to pass over a tract of land (an easement), or (2) to describe the strip of land being conveyed to a railroad for the purpose of constructing a railway." ... "Unlike Swan, Veach, and Roeder, where "right of way" was used in the granting or habendum clauses to qualify or limit the interest granted, "right of way" in the deeds at issue here appears in either the legal description of the property conveyed or in the portion of the deeds describing Milwaukee's obligations..." "Used in this manner, "right of way" merely describes a strip of land acquired for rail lines; it does not qualify or limit the interest expressly conveyed in the granting and habendum clauses."

          Dissenting Opinion: "...where the granting clause...declares the purpose...to be a right of way for a railroad, the deed passes an easement only..."

          Dissenting Opinion: "...an easement is not created unless the magic words "right of way" are contained in the 'granting clause.'"

          Dissenting Opinion: "...Morsbach does not narrowly define "granting clause" nor does it require the right of way purpose be expressed in any particular words."

          Dissenting Opinion: "Where the purpose is right of way...it was the intent of the parties to grant...an easement."

          Dissenting Opinion: "...majority...giving "special significance to the words 'right of way' in railroad deeds,"...finding the absence...overpowering in significance."

          Dissenting Opinion: "A grant of a right of way to a railroad company is the grant of an easement merely..."

        1993: Harris v. Ski Park Farms (1993)
          "...when the granting clause...declares the purpose...to be a right of way for a railroad the deed passes an easement only..."

        1990: King County v. Squire (1990)
          "...rights of way granted to a railroad are frequently held to create easements."

          "[W]hen the granting clause of a deed declares the purpose...to be a right of way...the deed passes an easement only..."

          "...construing the deed as a whole, held...instrument conveyed a right of way easement..."

          "...The Squire deed granted a "right-of-way...This suggests an easement was conveyed."

          "...right-of-way...language in the granting clause strongly suggests conveyance of an easement..."

          "...language of the deed which described the conveyance of a right of way indicated an easement had been conveyed."

        1986: Lawson v. State (1986)
          "...where a deed is construed to convey a right of way for railroad purposes only, upon abandonment...the land...reverts...free of the easement...."

        1986: Roeder v. BNSF (1986)
          "Since the granting clause...declares the purpose of the grant to be a right of way for a railroad, the deed passes an easement..."

          "...land being conveyed as "a right-of-way"...has been found to create an easement..."

        1979: Veach v. Culp (1979)
          "The parties...describe what was being conveyed: a right-of-way...Language like this has been found to create an easement..."

          "...language of the deed...describing the conveyance of a right-of-way...we conclude the deed conveyed an easement..."

        1977: Zobrist v. Culp (1977)
          "...when the granting clause...declares the purpose...to be a right of way for a railroad the deed passes an easement only..."

        1956: Scott v. Wallitner (1956)
          "...in none of these transactions was there a grant of a right of way for the purpose of building a railroad..."

        1950: Swan v. O'Leary (1950)
          "...when the granting clause of a deed declares the purpose of the grant to be a right of way for a railroad the deed passes an easement only..."

        1929: Morsbach v. Thurston Co. (1929)
          "...we held that the reservation was of a right of way creating nothing more than an easement..."

          "...an instrument reserving and excepting a strip of land...conveyed...for a right of way...only an easement was granted..."

          "...construed as a whole...in the light of the purpose...it was made, was a grant of a right of way or easement..."

          "...grant of the right of way...was intended to convey simply the right of way and easement..."

          "...a conveyance...granting a right of way...will be held to have taken an easement merely..."

          "...granting clause...conveys only a right of way, which is a mere easement..."

          "...Where the granting clause of a deed declares the purpose...to be a right of way for a railroad, the deed passes an easement only, and not a fee..."

          "...Where the granting clause declares the purpose of the grant to be a right of way for a railroad, the deed passes an easement..."

          "...the granting clause"..."described as follows, to wit: The right of way for a railroad"..."conveyed an easement only, and not a fee."

          "...grant involved was of a right of way...across a tract of land"..."held...that...an easement...was granted."

          "In the Uhl case...what meaning...given 'right of way' used in the granting clause of the deed...its effect...to vest...an easement..."

          "...grant of a right of way to a railroad company is the grant of an easement merely..."

        1910: Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber (1910)
          "The grant of a right of way to a railroad company is the grant of an easement..."

        1905: Abercrombie v. Simmons et al (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1905)
          "...in regard to the right of way...the grant...vests...an easement..."

          "...a deed releasing and quitclaiming to a railroad company a right of way...did not acquire the fee of the land."

          "...the words "right of way" in a grant to a railroad company means an easement..."

        1894: Reichenbach v. Washington Short Line Ry. Co.(1894)
          "The conveyance is one of a mere right of way habendum to the grantee...and show the grant of an easement only..."

        1893: Biles v. Tacoma, Olympia & Gray's Harbor R.R. Co.(1893)
          The term "right-of-way" means "easement".

          From reading the above citations and studying them in the context of their full decisions, one can understand that the term "right-of-way" can have two different meanings when used in a railroad right-of-way deed. "Right-of-way" can be used in the granting clause or the habendum to grant, or restrict the grant, to be an easement for railroad use, or it can be used in the portion of the deed describing the property to merely refer to the strip of land the railroad uses to operate its trains. To understand which meaning is intended, a person must examine how and where the words "right-of-way" are used in the deed. The decisions, above, establish the rules that are used to understand which meaning is intended. One rule stands out and controls this opinion. The grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad has always been held to grant an easement in Washington State/Territory.

          The Hilchkanum deed to the SLS&E grants a right-of-way to the Railway in the granting clause of its premises. Therefore, the Hilchkanum deed grants an easement under Washington State common law. But the federal and state judges who construed the Hilchkanum deed ignored the law and denied my constitutional right to establish this truth in "their" courts. These judges had something more important to do than uphold the Constitution and the law. They needed to cover-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme in order to protect some powerful folks in King County and some very dishonest judges from taking responsibility for their crimes. They decided to ignore the law and sacrifice the rights of innocent citizens in order to make this happen.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Judge Fletcher dishonestly adopts Norm Maleng's "legal theory", which contends the Washington State Supreme Court reversed one hundred years of common law in Brown v. State of Washington. Maleng's "legal theory" incorrectly contends that "additional language" limiting the grant is always required in order to find an easement.

          In her paragraph above, Judge Fletcher incorporates Norm Maleng's "legal theory" with this statement:
             My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        "Here the term "right of way" appears in the granting clause as well as in the legal description.(11) In this sense, the Hilchkanum deed suggests a possible intent to create only an easement in a way the deeds at issue in Brown did not. However, neither the granting nor the habendum clauses contains language clearly limiting the use of the land to a specific purpose."

          In that paragraph, Fletcher is claiming that the grant of a "right of way" to a railroad only "suggests" an easement. As seen in the forty-four citations above, that is not the law and it is not the conclusion of the Brown court. Instead, this is Norm Maleng's "legal theory", which is discussed below.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          It is useful to first look at this citation from Brown which shows the Brown court was not requiring Fletcher's additional language in the granting or habendum clause "clearly limiting the use of the land to a specific purpose" when a right-of-way was granted in these clauses.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        "The words "right of way" can have two purposes: (1) to qualify or limit the interest granted in a deed to the right to pass over a tract of land (an easement), or (2) to describe the strip of land being conveyed to a railroad for the purpose of constructing a railway. Morsbach, 152 Wash. at 568; Harris 120 Wn.2d at 737. Unlike Swan, Veach, and Roeder, where "right of way" was used in the granting or habendum clauses to qualify or limit the interest granted, "right of way" in the deeds at issue here appears in either the legal description of the property conveyed or in the portion of the deeds describing Milwaukee's obligations with respect to the property."
        [Brown v. State of Washington (1996)]

    Norm Maleng's "legal theory":

          Instead of admitting that the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad conveys an easement under Washington State common law, Judge Fletcher adopts Norm Maleng's "legal theory" in this opinion. Norm Maleng's "legal theory" was concocted by the King County Prosecutor in order to hide the County's participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          Fletcher claims that the Hilchkanum deed grants fee simple title because "neither the granting nor the habendum clauses contains language clearly limiting the use of the land to a specific purpose". Later in her paragraph, Fletcher states that a deed cannot be an easement "[w]ithout such additional language". So, Fletcher now requires "additional language", a separate statement limiting the grant, in order to find an easement. This is a misapplication of King County v. Hanson Investment Company (1949), and not supported in common law.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        View an expanded description of Norm Maleng's "legal theory".

          Here is Norm Maleng's "legal theory" from the above hyperlink:

        Norm Maleng's "legal theory":

              In Brown v. State of Washington, the Washington State Supreme Court threw out one hundred years of legal precedent which held the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad is an easement, and now finds that the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad is a fee simple conveyance of the underlying land unless the deed contains a separate statement expressly and clearly limiting the estate conveyed.

          There are two basic elements to Norm Maleng's "legal theory":

        Element 1: Equate the grant of a "right-of-way" with the grant of a "strip of land". The King County Prosecutor did this by ignoring the legal precedent which has always held the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad conveys an easement. Instead, the Prosecutor worked to blur and confuse the meaning of the term "right-of-way" by using abbreviated citations and then misrepresenting the meaning of those selected words. The judges joined Maleng with their dishonest analysis. In their opinions, each judge published the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, which shows that Hilchkanum granted a "right of way" to the Railway. Then, each judge declared that Hilchkanum granted a "strip of land". Fletcher does that in this opinion.
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Element 2: Require a separate statement "expressly and clearly limiting the estate conveyed" in order to find the conveyance of an easement. The King County Prosecutor did this by applying the "Railroad Land Granting Rule" to deeds that should have been construed using the "Railroad Right-of Way Granting Rule". In their opinions, after each judge dishonestly claimed that the Hilchkanum deed granted a "strip of land". Each judge then found that Hilchkanum conveyed fee simple title of the land underlying the right-of-way to the Railway because it did not contain a separate statement expressly and clearly limiting the estate conveyed. In order to justify this argument, the judges misrepresented the discussion in King County v. Hanson Investment Company (1949). This misrepresentation of Hanson was first promoted in Senior Deputy Prosecutor Bill Blakney's 1997 memorandum, and was repeated in each of King County's legal briefs.
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          Understand the "Railroad Land Granting Rule", with supporting precedent.

          Understand the "Railroad Right-of-Way Granting Rule", with supporting precedent.

          View Senior Deputy Prosecutor Bill Blakney's 1997 memorandum.

          View a more detailed explanation of Norm Maleng's "legal theory".

    Judge Fletcher misrepresents King County v. Squire. An honest evaluation of Squire absolutely destroys Fletcher's argument.

          In order to understand the profound dishonesty in Fletcher's paragraphs above, I'll first present a condensed version of her last paragraph. Then, I'll explain how this dishonest judge worked to misrepresent the law.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

      "In virtually all cases where Washington courts have found only an easement, the granting or the habendum clauses contained ['language clearly limiting the use of the land to a specific purpose']." [. . .] "King County v. Squire Inv. Co., 801 P.2d 1022, 1022 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (granting premises to railroad 'so long as said land is used as a right-of-way by said railway Company, Expressly reserving to said grantors their heirs and assigns all their riparian rights....'). Without such additional language, the use of the term 'right of way' merely 'begs the question' since a railroad could own a right of way either as an easement or in fee. Brown, 924 P.2d at 914."

          Judge Fletcher's statement claims that it is required to have "language clearly limiting the use of the land to a specific purpose" in order for a deed to be found to be an easement. She cites Brown for authority. This is, of course, an intentional lie by this dishonest judge. Above, I provided a citation from Brown which showed that the use of the term "right-of-way" in the granting clause or habendum limits the deed to an easement. Here is that citation again.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        "The words "right of way" can have two purposes: (1) to qualify or limit the interest granted in a deed to the right to pass over a tract of land (an easement), or (2) to describe the strip of land being conveyed to a railroad for the purpose of constructing a railway. Morsbach, 152 Wash. at 568; Harris 120 Wn.2d at 737. Unlike Swan, Veach, and Roeder, where "right of way" was used in the granting or habendum clauses to qualify or limit the interest granted, "right of way" in the deeds at issue here appears in either the legal description of the property conveyed or in the portion of the deeds describing Milwaukee's obligations with respect to the property."
        [Brown v. State of Washington (1996)]

          So, we know that Fletcher lied when she stated that "language clearly limiting the use of the land to a specific purpose" is required in order to find a deed to be an easement. We know that is a lie because Fletcher cites Brown, and just the opposite conclusion was made in Brown. The Brown court wasn't looking at deeds which granted a "right-of-way" in the granting clause. The Brown court was looking at deeds which granted "strips of land" in their granting clause. Fletcher is trying to apply the logic used in Brown, which construed deeds granting land, to the Hilchkanum deed, which directly grants a "right of way". Fletcher wasn't confused. Instead, Fletcher was trying to confuse the reader. If the reader studies the forty-four citations I presented above, the reader will understand how completely dishonest Senior Federal Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher is with her statement. Fletcher is counting on the reader not making the effort to read those citations. Next, we will look at Fletcher's misrepresentation of King County v. Hanson Investment Company (1949). My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          In Fletcher's statement, above, she claims/implies that the only language which caused King County v. Squire to be found to convey an easement was the statement that Governor Watson Squire added to his habendum. When one reads King County v. Squire (1990), he will find that Senior Circuit Judge Fletcher has lied again. The Squire court found that the language in the granting clause "strongly" indicated the intention to convey an easement. The Squire court stated that the language Governor Squire added to his habendum merely "reiterated" that intention expressed in the granting clause. Fletcher lied about this fact because the Hilchkanum and Squire deeds to the SLS&E are essentially the same. While this issue is described briefly here, it is discussed in greater detail later in this opinion and in a separate study. Links are provided at the bottom of this Note.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          The granting clause of the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds are identical, with the exception of the width of the right-of-way. The words used to grant the right-of-way are perfectly identical. Here are the Squire and Hilchkanum granting clauses with the granting words emphasized:

        Squire Granting Clause:

            In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location, construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway a right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands in said County, described as follows, to-wit:

        Hilchkanum Granting Clause:

            In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right-of-way one hundred (100) feet in width through our land in said County described as follows to wit

          The Squire court published the Squire deed in its opinion. It identified which words were part of the Railway's "ELS form deed" and which words were altered or added by Governor Squire. The words in red in the Squire granting clause, above, were altered by Governor Squire. Since the Hilchkanum granting words are identical to the Squire granting words, and the Squire court identified those words as coming from the Railway, Judge Fletcher was required to find that those identical words in the Hilchkanum deed were also written by the Railway lawyers. Further, Judge Fletcher was required by law to find that those words "strongly" indicated the intention of the parties in the Hilchkanum deed to grant an easement, just as the Squire court had found in its analysis. If Judge Fletcher wanted to overturn the precedent set in Squire, she was obligated to make an argument to justify that action. Recognizing the legal precedent set by the Squire court would not allow Fletcher her predetermined outcome. So, Fletcher ignored our brief on the issue and hid this comparison of the granting clauses in this opinion. This is not a legal opinion, this is a criminal act by an arrogant federal judge. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Open a more detailed comparison of the Squire and Hilchkanum deeds.

        Read the Squire deed as published in King County v. Squire (1990).

        View a photocopy and transcription of the full Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E.

    Summary:

          The grant of a right-of-way to a railroad has always been held to grant an easement in Washington State. This precedent is spelled out, time and again, in the citations posted above. Judge Fletcher refuses to acknowledge this precedent. Instead, in Fletcher's analysis above, she adopts Norm Maleng's "legal theory", requiring separate limiting language in a deed which grants a "right of way" in its granting clause. This requirement does not exist in Washington common law. Further, she misrepresents the analysis in King County v. Squire by concentrating only on the language in the habendum and ignoring the Squire court's statement that the language in the granting clause "strongly" indicates an easement was intended. The granting words in the Squire and Hilchkanum right-of-way deeds are identical.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Reference:

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2002) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2002), with brief comments. (More readable!)



    The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2002) by Senior Ninth Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher.

[3] The Hilchkanum deed contained precatory language indicating that the parties expected that the right of way would be used to construct and operate a railroad, but it did not actually condition the conveyance on such use.(12) Brown, 924 P.2d at 912-13. Also, in Brown, the court noted that identifying the general purpose of a conveyance, i.e., for railroad purposes, is not helpful in discerning intent because it does not clarify whether the right of way is an easement or a fee. Id. at 913.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

    Fletcher's illogical analysis continues...

          Judge Fletcher states above, that "The Hilchkanum deed contained precatory language indicating that the parties expected that the right of way would be used to construct and operate a railroad, but it did not actually condition the conveyance on such use." Fletcher cites Brown, 924 P.2d at 912-13 as authority. But if one goes to Brown, they will find no discussion relating to whether the wording used in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed is precatory or not. Fletcher provides no quotation with her "citation". It's a citation to nowhere. Judge Fletcher is just making up law to serve her predetermined outcome of my lawsuit.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          Of course, Fletcher could have provided a legitimate citation that would clarify the issue. She could have cited King County v. Hanson Investment Company (1949) for precedent. It's likely she didn't cite Hanson because it does not support her "precatory language" analysis. Here is the citation that Fletcher should have used to construe these Hilchkanum words of "consideration": (Citation with my emphasis)
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        "The deed of January 5, 1932, expresses, as the primary consideration for the conveyance of the land therein described, the benefit accruing to the grantor, Hanson, through the construction and maintenance of a road by the county. It would appear that, in return for such contemplated benefit, more land than would reasonably be required for road purposes was included in the terms of the grant. It is not disputed that this consideration for the grant has been executed by the county by its construction and maintenance of the county road."
        [King County v. Hanson Inv. Co. (1949)]

          As I stated earlier, Hanson in not a railroad right-of-way opinion. That stated, it is Washington State precedent applying to the construing of deeds. This language from the Hanson granting clause, describing the compensation for the land granted, is almost identical to the language in the Hilchkanum granting clause, describing the compensation for the right-of-way granted. (Citation with my emphasis)

        "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the County of King in Washington Territory..."
        [Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

          Fletcher finds this language in the Hilchkanum deed to be "precatory", and provides no legitimate citation to justify her conclusion. The Hanson court considers very similar words to be an expression of real compensation, and a condition of the grant. Hanson is legal precedent in Washington State and, if Judge Fletcher chooses to overturn that precedent, she has an obligation to provide some justification, other than her "citation to nowhere".
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Fletcher misapplies the discussion in Brown. The Brown Court construed deeds which were not written in the same form as the Hilchkanum deed.

          In Brown v. State of Washington (1996), the Washington State Supreme Court construed deeds which were written in statutory warranty form, conveying land, and having no language in the habendum that restricted the deed to railroad right-of-way use. The Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E is completely different. It does not convey land, but rather directly conveys a right-of-way. Fletcher tries to use the discussion in Brown to analyze the Hilchkanum deed. That is intellectually dishonest because the deeds are completely different in form and content. This misuse of Brown is the dishonest analysis presented in Norm Maleng's "legal theory". Fletcher concentrates on misusing citations from Brown, and ignores King County v. Squire (1990), a SLS&E deed that is identical to the Hilchkanum deed in critical respects. Fletcher ignores a comparison of the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds to the SLS&E because it destroys her predetermined outcome to this lawsuit.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Reference:

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2002) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2002), with brief comments. (More readable!)



    The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2002) by Senior Ninth Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher.

One Washington case, Veach, supports the Rasmussens' contention that the mere use of the term "right of way" in the granting clause of the Hilchkanum deed, without additional language conditioning the use of the interest, creates an easement. 599 P.2d at 527. In Veach, the 1901 deed stated:

    The said party of the first part, for and in consideration of the sum of Two Hundred and Twenty-five Dollars, . . . do by these presents remise, release, and forever quit claim unto said party of the second part, and to its assigns, all that certain lot, piece or parcel of land situated in Whatcom County . . . to-wit: "A right of way one hundred feet wide, being fifty feet on each side of the center line of the B.B. & Easter R.R. . . . . To have and to hold, all and singular, said premises, together with the appurtenances unto the said party of the second part, and to its assigns forever."

Id. Like the Hilchkanum deed, the language in the Veach deed did not expressly limit the use to a particular purpose. However, the district court distinguished Veach on the basis of other language in the Hilchkanum deed and extrinsic evidence indicating an intent to convey a fee simple estate, neither of which was present in Veach. Rasmussen, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1230 n.4.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

    Topics Discussed in this Note:  (Each topic is presented as a hyperlink. Use this menu to jump to that subject.)

      * Judge Fletcher admits her previous analysis is wrong.

      * Judge Fletcher implies Veach is the only opinion which supports construing the Hilchkanum deed as an easement. That's a lie.

      * King County v. Squire (1990): An honest examination of King County v. Squire absolutely destroys Judge Fletcher's analysis in this opinion.

        * How does Squire expose the complete dishonesty of this opinion?

        * Why is identifying the author of the Hilchkanum deed so important?

        * The Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds compared:

        * The granting clauses are essentially identical:

        * Other SLS&E deeds used identical granting words. This establishes the SLS&E "form deed".

        * The habendum clauses of the Squire and Hilchkanum deeds compared:

        * The Hilchkanum secondary grant:

    Judge Fletcher admits her previous analysis is wrong.

          Several paragraphs above, Fletcher claimed that railroad deeds need "language clearly limiting the use of the land to a specific purpose" in order to find the grant of an easement. In the discussion, directly above, Fletcher now admits that the deed in Veach v. Culp (1979) did not have this limiting language and was still found to be an easement. Further, Fletcher admits that the Veach deed compares with the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. So, what happened to the requirement to have "language clearly limiting the use of the land to a specific purpose"? The answer is that this requirement to have a separate statement "clearly limiting the use of the land to a specific purpose" is completely bogus. That requirement is associated with deeds which grant land to a railroad and does not apply to deeds which directly grant rights-of-way. The "language clearly limiting the use of the land to a specific purpose" requirement was dreamed up by Norm Maleng and his staff to hide their participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          After Fletcher finally admits that the Veach deed has similar granting language to the Hilchkanum deed, she abandons the comparison because of the secondary grant in the Hilchkanum deed and because of the extrinsic evidence available to determine the Hilchkanum's intentions. Both of these reasons to ignore the Veach-Hilchkanum comparison are completely dishonest, and are discussed in this annotated opinion at the following hyperlinks.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Open the discussion on the Hilchkanum secondary grant.

        Open the discussion on the Hilchkanum extrinsic evidence.

        View a study of the tactics the King County Prosecutor used to hide his ELS crime.

    Judge Fletcher implies Veach is the only opinion which supports construing the Hilchkanum deed as an easement. That's a lie.

          Judge Fletcher is very misleading when she states/implies that Veach v. Culp (1979) is the only Washington decision which supports construing the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed as an easement. There are a number of opinions that support the grant of a right-of-way being an easement, not just one. Fletcher ignores these opinions and instead misrepresents Brown v. State of Washington (1996) in order to confuse the argument and hide legal precedent. This is the dishonest tactic the King County Prosecutor concocted, and is described as Norm Maleng's "legal theory". The next Note in this annotated opinion provides fourteen citations which hold the grant of a right-of-way is an easement. These citations show that Veach v. Culp is not an exception, as Fletcher implies, but rather one of a number of opinions which establish that precedent. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        View fourteen citations explaining the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad conveys an easement.

          Of those opinions which hold that the grant of a right-of-way is an easement, the one opinion which absolute destroys Judge Fletcher's argument is King County v. Squire (1990). The remainder of this Note is dedicated to a thorough examination of Squire, and a comparison of the Squire and Hilchkanum right-of-way deeds.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    King County v. Squire (1990):

    An honest examination of King County v. Squire absolutely destroys Judge Fletcher's analysis in this opinion.

          There is a very important comparison that Judge Fletcher needed to make at this point in her opinion, and she dishonestly refused. Earlier in this opinion, Fletcher makes this statement (with my emphasis):
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        "The final pages of the summary judgment response brief do not contain separate legal arguments that are waived because they were not raised in the first twenty-four pages of the brief. Instead, they contain comparisons between the facts of this case and the facts of a Washington Court of Appeals case dealing with a railroad right of way. We must consider the effect of any case relevant to the arguments raised, regardless of whether the Rasmussens briefed the particular case."

          Open this opinion at that location to confirm the above citation.

          So, Judge Fletcher, what is the name of that mysterious "Washington Court of Appeals case dealing with a railroad right of way"? Why didn't you simply name the case rather than refer to it using obscure language? Are you trying to hide something? It takes character to be intellectually honest. Also, did you actually "consider the effect of any case relevant to the arguments raised" when you got to the appropriate portion of this opinion? This is the portion of the opinion where you are required to address your "Washington Court of Appeals case dealing with a railroad right of way". My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          Fletcher was referring to King County v. Squire (1990) when she referred to "Washington Court of Appeals case dealing with a railroad right of way". The place to consider King County v. Squire was in Fletcher's paragraph above. Fletcher reneged on her promise to consider this "case relevant to the arguments raised". She had a good reason to not consider Squire, because a comparison of the 1887 Squire and Hilchkanum right-of-way deeds to the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway (SLS&E), combined with the analysis of the Squire deed in King County v. Squire (1990), absolutely destroys the legitimacy of the analysis of the Hilchkanum deed in King County v. Rasmussen (2001), this dishonest opinion, and the subsequent Washington State decision, Ray v. King County (2004).
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    How does Squire exposes the complete dishonesty of this opinion?

          The Squire right-of-way deed was granted to the Seattle, Lake Shore and Eastern Railway (SLS&E) less that six weeks before the Hilchkanum deed to the SLS&E. The Squire deed was construed to be an easement in King County v. Squire (1990). As shown in the discussion below, the Squire granting clause was construed to "strongly" indicate the intention to convey an easement. The words of conveyance in the Hilchkanum granting clause are identical to the words in the Squire granting clause. It is obscene that Judge Fletcher found these same words to indicate the intention to grant fee simple title without explaining this inconsistency.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          Another important finding in the Squire opinion is the authorship of the words in the deed. The Squire court found, by default, that the Railway lawyers were responsible for the words of conveyance in the granting clause. This is completely contrary to the finding in this opinion, King County v. Rasmussen (2001), and Ray v. King County (2004). Authorship is important because the words of a deed are construed against its author. Federal Judges Fletcher and Rothstein, and Washington State Appeals Judge Ronald Cox, "found" that Hilchkanum was responsible for the words in his right-of-way deed. This is a ridiculous conclusion by these three judges, but more important, these judges had no legal right to make that finding. Authorship of the Hilchkanum deed was a contested material fact. Contested material facts are resolved by juries, not by crooked judges who are participating in a federal tax fraud scheme. The authorship issue is discussed in more detail, next.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Why is identifying the author of the Hilchkanum deed so important?

          In common law, when there are no facts to establish the author of a deed, the grantor is presumed to be the author. I have no legal education, but I'll explain how I understand this precedent, anyway. In most real estate transactions, the grantor has the most power and influence over the terms. Because the grantor owns and controls the property interest he has the power to reject or accept the transaction. Since the grantor is in a more powerful position, he is in the position to dictate the terms of the deed. So, in common law, the words of a deed are construed against the grantor when there are no other factors to consider. But, that is not the situation with the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed and most other railroad right-of-way deeds.

          Construing the words of a railroad right-of-way deed against the grantor makes no sense. Railroads are in the position of power with most right-of-way deeds. This was the case with the Hilchkanum deed. Railroads are chartered under federal or state authority. The charters give the railroads the right to survey and lay down their tracks without the permission of the landowner. Railroad charters grant the right of eminent domain to these private companies. Most, if not all, railroads try to obtain right-of-way deeds at the time they establish their tracks. To do this, the railroad lawyers make up a generic "form deed" which they then take to the landowners for signature. Sometimes the landowners make additions or changes to these "form deeds". When the landowners make changes, their words represent their intentions in the deed and should be construed against them. The words in the "form deed", composed by the railroad lawyers, should be construed against the railroad. Judge Fletcher, and the other judges who construed the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, relied greatly on Brown v. State of Washington (1996) for authority. While this issue was not directly addressed in the majority opinion, this situation was discussed in the dissenting opinion. Please read the following citation to understand.

        "The railroad was a sophisticated, well financed, and organized party, undoubtedly represented by counsel. Landowners stood at a disadvantage to railroads in the early 1900s. It approached the landowners to purchase their land after it had already laid out or even built its rail line over the land...The railroad and the landowners knew that the railroad possessed the power of eminent domain and would end up in possession of the right of way, if it were not already. These were not arm's-length transactions between parties of equal bargaining power. For these reasons, the deeds, at least the preprinted portions of them, must be construed against the railroad. '[C]ontract language . . . is construed most strongly against the party who drafted it, or whose attorney prepared it.' Guy Stickney, Inc. v. Underwood, 67 Wn.2d 824, 827, 410 P.2d 7 (1966)"
        [Washington State Supreme Court Judge Richard B. Sanders dissenting in Brown (1996)]

          The granting words in the Squire deed to the SLS&E are identical to the granting words in the Hilchkanum deed to the SLS&E. By default, the Squire court found that the lawyers for the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway (SLS&E) wrote those identical granting words. The Squire decision (King County v. Squire (1990) destroys the dishonest conclusions by federal judges Rothstein and Fletcher, in King County v. Rasmussen (2001), and King County v. Rasmussen (2002), that Bill Hilchkanum, an illiterate Duwamish Indian, wrote the words of the Hilchkanum deed. Under the law and the Constitution this issue of fact would be resolved by a jury. But, of course, federal judges Rothstein and Fletcher don't believe in the Constitution and the law. These two very dishonest judges denied my constitutional right to establish the authorship before a jury. Instead, these two judges granted themselves complete control of the decision by illegally allowing summary judgment. With complete control over the case, these judges refused to acknowledge the precedent established in Squire, which found that the granting clause was written by the Railway and conveyed only an easement. Instead, these very dishonest judges construed the words of the Hilchkanum deed against only Hilchkanum, as their contrived author. It was necessary for them to ignore the Squire decision in order to come to their predetermined opinion that Hilchkanum conveyed unrestricted fee simple ownership to the Railway.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        View a study of the SLS&E "form deed" which identifies the Railway lawyers as author of the "form deed", the Hilchkanum deed, and significant portions of the Squire deed.

          Who were the lawyers for the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway (SLS&E)? Judge Thomas Burke was lead attorney and co-founder of the Railway. Judge Burke became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Washington Territory the year after obtaining these right-of-way deeds from Hilchkanum and Squire. The statutory warranty deed form, established to convey fee simple title, was established by the Territorial legislature in 1886, the year before the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds. Burke's SLS&E right-of-way "form deed" did not conform to the requirements of the statutory warranty deed law. Judge Burke was considered a highly competent lawyer and judge, and an expert in property law. With that understanding, the words in the SLS&E "form deed" must be construed in a different light than as if an illiterate Native American wrote the deed, as our "esteemed" federal judges have conjured. Considering Judge Burke's competence as a lawyer, his refusal to use the statutory warranty deed form, and the long held precedent that the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad grants an easement, the judges in Rasmussen and Ray were required to find that the Railway prepared "form deed" conveyed an easement. This is the precedent that was set in King County v. Squire (1990) when the court found that the words in the Squire granting language "strongly suggests conveyance of an easement". The Squire decision is so contrary to the dishonest manipulation of the facts and the law in the King County v. Rasmussen opinions, that the federal and state judges did everything they could to hide its precedent in their analysis of the Hilchkanum deed.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          By dishonestly establishing Hilchkanum as author of his right-of-way deed, Federal Judges Rothstein and Fletcher were able to ignore a comparison of the Squire and Hilchkanum deeds. Once they irrationally established Hilchkanum as author, the judges then concentrated on cherry picked extrinsic evidence to manufacture false intentions for Hilchkanum with his deed. This dishonest manipulation of the facts, and the denial of my constitutional right to establish the truth before a jury, hid the federal tax fraud scheme used railbank the BNSF East Lake Sammamish spur line.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    The Hilchkanum and Squire Right-of-Way Deeds Compared:

          The significant portions of the Squire right-of-way deed to the SLS&E were published in King County v. Squire (1990). Significant portions of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E were published in King County v. Rasmussen (2001), King County v. Rasmussen (2002), and Ray v. King County (2004). Additionally, this website provides a more complete photocopy and transcription of the full Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E.

        The Squire Right-of-Way Deed to the SLS&E:

            The words in BOLD Red Font where handwritten changes made by Squire. By default, the remainder of the words, in black font, were written by the Railway lawyers. If one removes the changes made to his deed by Watson Squire, the Squire and Hilchkanum granting and habendum language are identical. This common wording is the SLS&E "form deed" written by the lawyers for the Railway. (Historical Note: Watson Squire was Governor of Washington Territory at the time of the formation of the Railway. He served as one of Washington State's first United States Senators. He was a lawyer.)

            "In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location, construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway a right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands in said County, described as follows, to-wit:

            [legal description].

            Such right-of-way strip to be twenty-five (25) feet in width on each side of the center line of the railway track as located across the said lands by the Engineer of said Railway Company, which location is described as follows, to-wit [description.] ....

            To Have and to Hold the said premises, with the appurtenances, unto the said party of the second part, and to its successors and assigns forever or so long as said land is used as a right-of-way by said railway Company, Expressly reserving to said grantors their heirs and assigns all their riparian rights and water front rights on the shores of Lake Washington. And this grant is upon the condition that said railway shall be completed over said lands on or before January 1st, 1888."

        The Hilchkanum Right-of-Way Deed to the SLS&E:

            "In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right-of-way one hundred (100) feet in width through our land in said County described as follows to wit

            Lots one (1) two (2) and three (3) in section six (6) township 24 North of Range six (6) East.

            Such right of way strip to be fifty (50) feet in width on each side of the center line of the railway track as located across our said lands by the Engineer of said railway Company which location is described as follows to wit (legal description)

            And the said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company shall have the right to go upon the land adjacent to said line for a distance of two hundred (200) feet on each side thereof and cut down all trees dangerous to the operation of said road.

            To have and to hold the said premises with the appurtenances unto the said party of the second part and to its successors and assigns forever."

    The Granting Clauses are Essentially Identical:

          The granting clause of the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds are identical, with the exception of the width of the right-of-way. The words used to grant the right-of-way are perfectly identical. Here, again, are the Squire and Hilchkanum granting clauses with the granting words emphasized:

        Squire Granting Clause:

            In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location, construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway a right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands in said County, described as follows, to-wit:

        Hilchkanum Granting Clause:

            In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right-of-way one hundred (100) feet in width through our land in said County described as follows to wit

          Since the granting words in the Hilchkanum and Squire deeds are identical, and by default the Squire court identified the Railway as author of those granting words, Federal Judges Rothstein and Fletcher should have found that the granting clause of the Hilchkanum deed was written by the Railway lawyers, and not written by Hilchkanum. More important the Squire court found that the words in the Squire granting language "strongly suggests conveyance of an easement". In this opinion, Senior Federal Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher found that the exact same words conveyed fee simple title, not an easement. Of course, Fletcher refused to explain the inconsistency with Squire. In fact, she refused to even name Squire when she referred to our briefing which so damages the legitimacy of her opinion.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Other SLS&E deeds used identical granting words. This establishes the SLS&E "form deed".

           While I understood that the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed was based on the unaltered SLS&E "form deed", I didn't have the proof that I needed for this webpage. So, I asked my son to go down to the King County Records Office and obtain copies of SLS&E right-of-way deeds which were recorded near the time of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed in May 1887. Since the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed is recorded in the King County Book of Deeds, Volume 42, Page 250, my son copied all the SLS&E right-of-way deeds he could find in the first 500 pages of Volume 42. There were nineteen SLS&E right-of-way deeds in those 500 pages which were executed between February 4, 1887 and May 27, 1887. So, the below discussion is based on twenty SLS&E right-of-way deeds which consist of the nineteen deeds my son found in the Book of Deeds and the Squire deed which is displayed in King County v. Squire (1990). While this is not an examination of all the SLS&E right-of-way deeds, I believe the reader will understand from observing these deeds that this is an adequate number to establish the SLS&E "form deed" which was used at the time of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E.

        View a study of the SLS&E "form deed" which identifies the Railway lawyers as author of the "form deed", the Hilchkanum deed, and significant portions of the Squire deed.

           The SLS&E "form deed" granting clause is determined from the common language found in a number of SLS&E deeds which were executed near the time of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. Here are the Hilchkanum granting clause, the Squire granting clause, and the SLS&E "form deed" granting clause followed by links to a number of other SLS&E deeds containing the identical granting words.

        May 9, 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E - Granting Clause:

        "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the County of King in Washington Territory we do hereby donate grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way one hundred (100) feet in width through our lands in said County described as follows to wit."

          [View a photocopy and the full transcription of the May 9, 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E.]

        March 29, 1887 Squire right-of-way deed to the SLS&E - Granting Clause:

        In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location, construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway a right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands in said County, described as follows, to-wit:

          [View a photocopy and the full transcription of the March 29, 1887 Squire right-of-way deed to the SLS&E.]

        SLS&E "Form Deed" Granting Clause:

        "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to ("me" or "us") from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the County of King in Washington Territory ("I" or "we") do hereby donate grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way ("one hundred (100)" or "fifty (50)") feet in width through ("my", "our" or "said") lands in said County described as follows to wit."

          [View the SLS&E "form deed" which was composed by the SLS&E Railway lawyers]


        View the Lee granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "form deed" granting clause.

        View the Lurber granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "form deed" granting clause.

        View the McGraw granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "form deed" granting clause.

        View the Stone granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "form deed" granting clause.

        View the Lewellyn granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "form deed" granting clause.

        View the Burnett granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "form deed" granting clause.

        View the Pearson granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "form deed" granting clause.

        View the Davis granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "form deed" granting clause.

        View the Anderson granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "form deed" granting clause.

        View the Sbedzuse granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "form deed" granting clause.

        View the Ashworth granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "form deed" granting clause.

        View the Peterson granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "form deed" granting clause.

          In King County v. Rasmussen (2001) and this opinion, Judges Rothstein and Fletcher dishonestly established Hilchkanum as author of all the words in his right-of-way deed. They were unwilling to explain the common factors in the Squire and Hilchkanum right-of-way deeds in their opinions, so they ignored a comparison of the two deeds. They were unwilling to explain the common factors found in other SLS&E right-of-way deeds recorded at the time of the Hilchkanum deed, so they denied my constitutional right to establish this comparison. The authorship of a deed is a material fact. Authorship is important because the words of a deed are construed against the party who prepared, or wrote, the deed. Disagreement with material facts are resolved before a jury. It is not the privilege of a judge to resolve that issue. Fletcher and Rothstein knew that they were illegally manufacturing the material facts, and denying my right to establish the truth before a jury, when they "found" Hilchkanum to be author of his right-of-way deed.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          In my declaration to Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein (The yellow highlighted portions were struck by Rothstein.), I wrote:

          "The Squire deed was granted to SLS&E a few months before the Hilchkanum deed. The established factors used to construe these deeds compare well because these two deeds use almost identical language. 1 The Squire deed was found to be an easement. 2".

          Judge Rothstein struck these words in my declaration, citing no authority to do so. In this decision Fletcher supports Rothstein's right to strike my words, stating we exceeded our allowed number of pages of briefing. Footnote 1 in that statement took Rothstein and Fletcher to a study I had written and provided as Exhibit 1 with my declaration. In that study, I made this statement:
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          King County ignores Squire because it destroys its claim to ownership of my property. Here are the similarities between Hilchkanum and Squire:

            Both deeds granted a right of way to SLS&E for railroad purposes using the same wording. This very strongly suggests an easement.

            Both deeds granted strips of land and limit its use to a specific purpose, using the same words.

            Both deeds granted only the privilege of constructing, operating, or maintaining a railroad over the land, using exactly the same words.

            Both deeds were granted with nominal consideration. Neither Hilchkanum nor Squire was paid any monetary compensation for their easements. They both granted a right of way for the "benefits and advantages to accrue", rather than a cash amount. Again, exactly the same words were used.

            Both deeds were established with the same circumstances surrounding the deed's execution and the subsequent conduct of the parties because they were established just five weeks apart, on the same railroad line.

              One minor difference between the deeds is that Squire had a clause providing that if the railroad ceased to operate, the land conveyed would revert to the grantor. Hilchkanum did not have such a clause. In Squire that statement is in the habendum. Since the granting clause of the deed already specified a right of way for railroad purposes, the habendum in this case only serves the purpose of explaining or qualifying that grant. That clause simply reinforces the reversionary language already in the granting clause, and is not necessary to prove the deed an easement. This fact is supported in Squire :

                "The Squire deed granted a 'right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands'. This suggests an easement was conveyed. Both King County and Squire note, however, that the habendum clause contains the handwritten language, 'or so long as said land is used as a right-of-way by said railway Company,' which arguably suggests conveyance of a fee simple determinable. If the granting clause merely conveyed the land to the railroad without reference to a right of way, the 'so long as' language would create such a fee. Since the language in the granting clause strongly suggests conveyance of an easement, however, we find it more plausible that the 'so long as' language was inserted by Squire to preclude the claim that he conveyed a fee simple to the railroad, particularly since the habendum clause granted the interest to the railroad and 'to its successors and assigns forever'. The authorities and cases discussed above clearly support construing the Squire deed as an easement.

                In Veach v. Culp, /5 the court construed a deed which granted a right of way and used the standard habendum clause language, but without the additional language conditioning use of the property on its continued use as a railroad right of way. The successor railroad argued that the absence of such limiting language showed a fee was conveyed. The Veach court disagreed, holding that the language of the deed which described the conveyance of a right of way indicated an easement had been conveyed."
                    King County v. Squire Investment Co., 59 Wn. App. 888, 894, 801 P.2d 1022 (1990).

            Read the above quote in the context of Exhibit 1.

          Of course, Judge Rothstein struck all of my above briefing. Fletcher agreed in this opinion. God forbid that we be allowed to legitimately present our argument. In fact, she struck all of my Exhibit 1, a study of the Easement-Fee Issue. Judges Rothstein and Fletcher needed to strike that information because it correctly analyzed Washington State common law and precedent, and the judges needed to destroy some of that legal precedent in order to come to their preordained opinions. Fletcher and Rothstein had predetermined to find that Hilchkanum granted fee simple title of the land with his right-of-way deed to the SLS&E. This protected the participants in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme from federal prosecution. Rothstein couldn't allow briefing to be presented that destroyed her opinion, so she struck major parts of our argument. Judge Rothstein struck twelve of my fourteen exhibits. She reduced my exhibits from several hundred pages to eight pages. More important, she denied my constitutional right to establish the facts before a jury. If she had allowed a jury trial all the exhibits and briefing that she struck would have been reintroduced. Rothstein could not let the truth be told in her court. She could not allow us to have a jury trial because no legitimate jury would agree with her that Hilchkanum wrote his deed and granted fee simple title to the Railway. Rothstein committed this crime with the confidence that, on appeal, the judges of the Ninth Circuit would support her dishonesty and protect her. Rothstein was correct. In this appeals panel opinion, Senior Federal Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher covers for the criminal actions of her district court sister judge.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    The Habendum Clauses of the Squire and Hilchkanum deeds Compared:

          The habendum clauses start out with identical words. The Hilchkanum habendum uses only the words used in the "form deed" prepared by the Railway lawyers. The Squire habendum continues with words added by Governor Squire. His additional words reiterate the requirement for the right-of-way to revert on abandonment, and require the railway to be completed by January 1, 1888. Here are the Squire and Hilchkanum habendum clauses with the Railway "form deed" words in black font and the addition by Governor Squire in BOLD Red Font:

        Squire Habendum:

            "To Have and to Hold the said premises, with the appurtenances, unto the said party of the second part, and to its successors and assigns forever or so long as said land is used as a right-of-way by said railway Company, Expressly reserving to said grantors their heirs and assigns all their riparian rights and water front rights on the shores of Lake Washington. And this grant is upon the condition that said railway shall be completed over said lands on or before January 1st, 1888.

        Hilchkanum Habendum:

            To have and to hold the said premises with the appurtenances unto the said party of the second part and to its successors and assigns forever.

          When the Squire court looked at the additional words written by Governor Squire in his habendum, the court considered whether the words signaled the intention of Squire to grant a "fee simple determinable" or an "easement". The court came to the conclusion that "...Squire specifically included language in the habendum clause reiterating the limitation of the conveyance to use as a right of way. We hold that an easement was conveyed." It is important to understand that a "fee simple determinable" is not a "fee simple" grant. In this case, a fee simple determinable would have worked very much like an easement, in that the land would revert to the grantor upon abandonment of railroad use.

          Most of the other SLS&E right-of-way deeds, which were executed near the time of the Hilchkanum deed, contained the identical habendum words found in the Hilchkanum deed. Like the Squire habendum, some had additional restrictions added.

        View a study of the SLS&E "form deed" which identifies the Railway as author of the "form deed" habendum, the Hilchkanum habendum, and the basis of the habendum clauses in other SLS&E deeds.

    The Hilchkanum Secondary Grant:

          As stated above, the Hilchkanum deed contains a secondary grant allowing for the removal of trees that could fall across the track and inhibit the operation of the Railway. The secondary grant is in these words:

          "And the said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company shall have the right to go upon the land adjacent to said line for a distance of two hundred (200) feet on each side thereof and cut down all trees dangerous to the operation of said road."     [Hilchkanum Right-of-Way Deed]

          These secondary grants are common in railroad deeds and deal with issues specific to the individual right-of-way deed. Secondary grants are necessary for the construction or operation of the railroad. The Hilchkanum secondary grant resolved a minor problem with the operation of the railroad. That problem was that the right-of-way was only 100 feet wide, 50 feet on each side of the centerline, but there were tall trees outside of the easement that could fall on the tracks and affect the operation of the railroad. So, this secondary grant allowed the Railway the right to cut down those trees. These secondary grants have nothing to do with the intentions of the parties to convey an easement or fee simple interest in the land underlying the right-of-way. There is no precedent in Washington common law for these secondary grants to be considered in the analysis of easement or fee.

          Here are two other examples of secondary grants to railroads. One secondary grant is from a deed which was found to be an easement because a "right-of-way" was granted in its premises. The other secondary grant is from a deed which was found to be a fee simple grant because a "strip of land" was granted to the railroad. Please follow the hyperlinks to the actual opinions to understand that these secondary grants had no effect to signal whether their deed granted an easement of a fee. This illogical construing of a secondary grant by Federal District Judge Rothstein, Federal Circuit Judge Fletcher, and Washington State Court of Appeals Judge Ronald Cox, is a new precedent established by these dishonest judges and published first in King County v. Rasmussen (2001).
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        The Edward Kratz right-of-way deed to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company in 1872:
            After granting a right-of-way to the Railroad, the Kratz deed included a secondary grant that allowed the Railroad to deal with the interference of a nearby river on its rail operation. The secondary grant allowed for:

          "...the construction of certain canals, whereby the channel of Skookumchuck is changed and prevented from infringing upon said railroad including the land necessary for said roads and canals..."
          [Morsbach v. Thurston County (1929)]

            The Kratz deed was construed in Morsbach v. Thurston County (1929), which is hyperlinked above. The Kratz deed was found to grant the Northern Pacific Railroad an easement because a "right-of-way" was conveyed in the deed's premises. Further, there is no mention in Morsbach of the significance of the secondary grant with respect to the determination of easement or fee.

        The Brown right-of-way deed to the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Company:
            After granting a strip of land to the Railroad, the Brown deed included a secondary grant that allowed the Railroad to resolve problems with the railroad's construction. The secondary grant allowed for:

          "Also conveying the following extra widths for excavations, embankments, depositing waste earth, and borrowing pits, as follows: Two strip[s] of land each fifty (50) feet in width and bordering one on either side of the strip of land first above described..."
          [Brown v. State of Washington (1996)]

            The Brown deed was construed in Brown v. State of Washington (1996), which is hyperlinked above. The Brown deed was found to grant the Milwaukee Railroad fee simple title because a "strip of land" was conveyed in the granting clause of its premises. There is no mention in Brown of the significance of the secondary grant with respect to the determination of easement or fee.

          Most of the other SLS&E right-of-way deeds, which were executed near the time of the Hilchkanum deed, contain the identical secondary grant which is found in the Hilchkanum deed.

        View a study of the SLS&E "form deed" which identifies the Railway as author of the "form deed" and identifies the identical secondary grant in many of the deeds.

          Federal Judges Fletcher and Rothstein found great, unjustified, meaning in the Hilchkanum secondary grant. They supplied no citation to justify their rulings that the words in the secondary grant indicated the intentions of the Hilchkanums to grant fee simple title in the main granting clause of their deed. These judges simply made up a new precedent, a precedent that is illogical but supports their predetermined opinion that the Hilchkanum deed granted fee simple title. Fletcher and Rothstein used twisted logic to "prove" Hilchkanum's intention to grant fee simple title to the SLS&E, but the intentions of a party in a deed is a material fact. If there were some precedent to establish Fletcher's and Rothstein's meaning of the Hilchkanum secondary grant, they might have been justified in their interpretation. There is no precedent. It was my right, under the Constitution, to present facts to a jury that would resolve the intentions of the Hilchkanum's with their secondary grant. Rothstein Fletcher denied my constitutional rights in order to force their unsubstantiated set of facts and their predetermined outcome to my lawsuit.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          When the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed was construed in Washington State Court of Appeals Division I, Chief Judge Ronald E. Cox used Rothstein's analysis of the Hilchkanum secondary grant as precedent. In fact, Cox ignored over one hundred years of precedential railroad right-of-way opinions and used the dishonest federal decisions [King County v. Rasmussen (2001) and King County v. Rasmussen (2002)] as the only significant precedent throughout his opinion. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Summary:

          In her paragraph above, Judge Fletcher states that the Hilchkanum deed is similar only to the deed construed in Veach v. Culp (1979). But, she then distinguishes the two deeds because of the secondary grant in the Hilchkanum deed and the extrinsic evidence. This analysis is completely dishonest.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          Fletcher ignores one hundred years of legal precedent which holds the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad conveys only an easement. She ignores a number of Washington State opinions which establish this precedent. Of those precedential opinions, an honest examination of King County v. Squire (1990) absolutely destroys Fletcher's conclusions. An honest examination of Squire identifies the SLS&E "form deed" written by the Railway lawyers. This "form deed" is the basis of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed and was construed to convey an easement in Squire.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Reference:

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2002) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2002), with brief comments. (More readable!)



    The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2002) by Senior Ninth Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher.

[4] First, the district court compared the Hilchkanum deed's language granting an interest in the strip of land with its language granting the Railway the right to enter the adjacent land to cut trees:

    The deed grants a "strip" of land described in metes and bounds rather than merely a right "over" the land (as it does with the tree-cutting grant). The deed uses the word "convey" when granting the strip, which is associated with fee transfers (notably, "convey" is absent in the tree-cutting grant). See Hanson, 208 P.2d at 119.

Id. We agree with the district court that these factors indicate that Hilchkanum intended to convey a fee simple interest in the strip of land described. Furthermore, the fact that he explicitly limited the purpose of the Railway's right to enter the adjacent land demonstrates that he was aware of the distinction between an easement and a fee simple conveyance.(13)



    Note from John Rasmussen:

    Topics Discussed in this Note:  (Each topic is presented as a hyperlink. Use this menu to jump to that subject.)

      * Senior Federal Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher lies when she states that Hilchkanum right-of-way deed grants a "strip of land".

      * It is a lie that the word "convey" implies a fee simple conveyance.

      * It is completely dishonest for Judge Fletcher to claim the secondary grant in the Hilchkanum deed signals Hilchkanum's intentions in his primary grant.

      * In her Footnote 13, Judge Fletcher violates the rules of summary judgment and dishonestly establishes Hilchkanum's ability to participate in his deed.

      * Without any law or fact in support, Judge Fletcher dishonestly identifies Hilchkanum as author of the words in his deed.

      * How does the false assignment of authorship support Judge Fletcher's predetermined outcome to this opinion?

    Senior Federal Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher lies when she states that Hilchkanum right-of-way deed grants a "strip of land".

          In her paragraph above, Fletcher refers to the "'strip' of land" that was granted in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E. The term "strip of land" does not exist in the Hilchkanum deed! Fletcher simply substitutes the term "strip of land" for "right of way" in the Hilchkanum deed when she construes it. Rothstein used the same dishonest trick in federal district court. Again, I ask that the reader simply view the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to confirm that a "right of way" is granted and there is no grant of a "'strip' of land". Fletcher and Rothstein simply lie about this fact.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Read the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E to confirm that Judge Fletcher is substituting these critical words in the Hilchkanum deed.

        Open the portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) that shows Judge Rothstein used the same dishonest trick in federal district court.

          Once, the reader confirms that a "right of way" is granted in the Hilchkanum deed, the next step is to look at one hundred years of Washington State/Territory railroad right-of-way decisions to confirm that the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad is the grant of an easement under common law. For over one hundred years, it has been common law precedent in Washington State/Territory that the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad is an easement. There is no precedent that supports Fletcher's right to change the words in a deed which she is construing. This substitution of words is simply a criminal act from the bench by Federal Judge Fletcher which covers up the ELS federal tax fraud scheme and protects the active participants from prosecution. The most notable participant in this crime is Fletcher's sister judge, Federal District Judge Barbara Jacobs Rothstein. Rothstein used the same dishonest tactic of changing the granting words in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. The Rothstein decision is a criminal act, and its use as precedent would not apply for those who believe in the Constitution and the law. Above in this web page, I provided links to forty-four citations which provide the precedent that is used to construe the words "right-of-way" in railroad deeds. I provide a link here which will open those citations in a new window. From those forty-four citations, I've selected fourteen which show that the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad is an easement in Washington State common law. They are listed below. Each citation has a hyperlink attached which will take the reader to its location in its respective opinion.
         My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          View 44 citations defining the meaning of the words "right-of-way" in railroad deeds.


      Citations Explaining the Grant of a "Right-of-Way" to a Railroad is an Easement.

      (The citations are in chronological order, with my emphasis.)

        Abercrombie v. Simmons et al (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1905)

          "In Railway Co. v. Geisel, 119 Ind. 77, 21 N. E. 470, there was a deed releasing and quitclaiming to a railroad company a right of way 80 feet wide through a certain tract of land, and it was held that the company did not acquire the fee of the land."
          [Abercrombie v. Simmons et al (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1905)]

        Morsbach v. Thurston Co. (1929)

          "It is followed by a case note in 6 Ann. Cas., p. 239, supra, among others, citing many cases to the effect that, where a railroad has taken a conveyance expressly granting a right of way, it will be held to have taken an easement merely, and that a grant of a strip of land to a railroad company 'for right of way and for operating its railroad only,' conveyed merely an easement."
          [Morsbach v. Thurston Co. (1929)]

          "...The granting clause of this instrument conveys only a right of way, which is a mere easement, the owner of the soil retaining his exclusive right in all mines, timber and earth for every purpose not incompatible with the use for which it is granted;..."
          [Morsbach v. Thurston Co. (1929)]

          "The agreement in this case does not grant land in its granting clause, but only right of way . . . Where the granting clause declares the purpose of the grant to be a right of way for a railroad, the deed passes an easement only, though it be in the usual form of warranty deed."
          [Morsbach v. Thurston Co. (1929)]

          "In Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co. v. Wachter, 70 Ohio 113, 70 N. E. 974, the grant involved was of a right of way, one hundred feet in width, across a tract of land containing twenty acres or more, together with a waiver of all further damages that might arise by reason of the location or construction of the railroad or repairing thereof when finally established or completed. There was no reservation of any kind in the instrument. The right of way was adopted, the road completed in 1854, and used continuously for the operation of railroad passenger and freight trains. The court there said:

                 'The right of way of the company is an easement. Washb. on E. & S. 4. It is, using exact language, a servitude imposed as a burden on the land. The conveyance from Crane in terms specifies that it is a 'release of a right of way,' and no question is made, and we presume none can be, that the right thus granted is not different from, nor greater than, that which would result from an appropriation proceeding under the statute.'

               It was held in that case that an easement, and not a fee simple estate, was granted."
          [Morsbach v. Thurston Co. (1929)]

          "A noted text writer states the law as follows:

                 'A grant of a right of way to a railroad company is the grant of an easement merely, and the fee remains in the grantor. The mere fact that the railroad company's charter empowered it to acquire a greater estate than that which it contracted for has been held not to affect its rights in the land purchased. But statutes authorizing railroad companies to acquire the fee in land have been generally given effect. It is held that a deed conveying land to a railroad for a right of way gives the railroad no more rights than it would have acquired by condemnation. 'The easement is not that spoken of in the old law books, but is peculiar to the use of a railroad which is usually a permanent improvement, a perpetual highway of travel and commerce, and will rarely be abandoned by nonuser. The exclusive use of the surface is acquired, and damages are assessed, on the theory that the easement will be perpetual; so that, ordinarily, the fee is of little or no value unless the land is underlaid by quarry or mine.' Where the intention to convey a fee does not appear, as in case of the conveyance of a 'right of way' for the railroad through certain lands, the company takes an easement only. The fact that the right conveyed is designated as a fee, or that the deed contains covenants of warranty, does not necessarily pass the fee.
            1 Thompson on Real Property, SS 4:20.'"
          [Morsbach v. Thurston Co. (1929)]

        Veach v. Culp (1979)

          "The parties in fact describe what was being conveyed: a right-of-way 100 feet wide, being 50 feet on each side of the center line of the railroad. Language like this has been found to create an easement, not a fee simple estate."
          [Veach v. Culp (1979)]

          "Given the language of the deed explicitly describing the conveyance of a right-of-way and given the rule of Swan v. O'Leary, supra, and Morsbach v. Thurston County, supra, we conclude the deed conveyed an easement, not a fee title."
          [Veach v. Culp (1979)]

        King County v. Squire (1990)

          "Although the language of a particular deed defines the interest conveyed, rights of way granted to a railroad are frequently held to create easements."
          [King County v. Squire (1990)]

          "The Squire deed granted a "right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands". This suggests an easement was conveyed."
          [King County v. Squire (1990)]

          "Since the language in the granting clause strongly suggests conveyance of an easement,"....."The authorities and cases discussed above clearly support construing the Squire deed as an easement."
          [King County v. Squire (1990)]

          "The Veach court disagreed, holding that the language of the deed which described the conveyance of a right of way indicated an easement had been conveyed."
          [King County v. Squire (1990)]

        Harris v. Ski Park Farms (1993)

          "When the granting clause of a deed conveys a right of way to a railroad, this court has usually concluded that the deed passes an easement and not a fee with a restricted use:

            [I]t is clear that we adopted the rule that when the granting clause of a deed declares the purpose of the grant to be a right of way for a railroad the deed passes an easement only, and not a fee with a restricted use, even though the deed is in the usual form to convey a fee title. "
          [Harris v. Ski Park Farms (1993)]

        Brown v. State of Washington (1996)

          "The words "right of way" can have two purposes: (1) to qualify or limit the interest granted in a deed to the right to pass over a tract of land (an easement), or (2) to describe the strip of land being conveyed to a railroad for the purpose of constructing a railway. Morsbach, 152 Wash. at 568; Harris 120 Wn.2d at 737. Unlike Swan, Veach, and Roeder, where "right of way" was used in the granting or habendum clauses to qualify or limit the interest granted, "right of way" in the deeds at issue here appears in either the legal description of the property conveyed or in the portion of the deeds describing Milwaukee's obligations with respect to the property."
          [Brown v. State of Washington (1996)]

    It is a lie that the word "convey" implies a fee simple conveyance.

          Fletcher agrees with Rothstein's opinion that the "...deed uses the word "convey" when granting the strip, which is associated with fee transfers...". This statement is completely ridiculous. The word "convey" is also commonly used to grant easements. Since the issue here is whether the grant is fee or easement, to imply that the word "convey" in the Hilchkanum deed indicates that the grant is fee simple, is completely dishonest. Fletcher and Rothstein can provide no citation to support their analysis. Instead, they cite Hanson, which is not a decision dealing with railroad rights-of-way. More important, the statement in Hanson does not support Fletcher's and Rothstein's analysis that the word "convey" in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed indicates the deed grants fee simple title. Click on this hyperlinked citation from Hanson to take you to the citation in the context of the whole decision. Read King County v. Hanson (1949) to confirm that these judges are completely wrong in their analysis. Then, read the following four citations from Washington railroad decisions to understand that the word "convey" is commonly used in the granting of railroad easements.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        "It is also the settled rule in this state, as elsewhere, that a deed which by its terms conveys the land to a grantee operates as a grant of the fee, although it may also contain a recital designating, or even restricting, the use to which the land may be put."
        [King County v. Hanson Inv. Co. (1849)]

          Rothstein cites King County v. Hanson Inv. Co. and then misinterprets it meaning with respect to this opinion. Hanson Inv. Co. does not find that the word "convey" is associated only with fee simple grants. It's completely dishonest for Fletcher to agree with that statement by Rothstein. Further, Fletcher ignores the Washington State railroad right-of-way decisions that use the word "convey" and were found to be easements. Here are four examples: (with my emphasis) My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        "The granting clause gives to the grantee, his heirs or assigns, "the right and privilege of surveying and laying out, by his or their agents and engineers, through, over, across and along the land hereinbefore described the route and site of said railroad," and grants, bargains, sells and conveys unto the said party of the second part and to his heirs and assigns, a right of way for said railroad..."
        [Reichenbach v. Washington Short Line Ry. CO (1894)]

        Reichenbach was found to grant an easement.

        "...by these presents give, grant, bargain, sell and convey unto said Northern Pacific Company, or its assigns the following described premises, viz: the right-of-way for the construction of said company's railroad..."
        [Morsbach v. Thurston Co. (1929)]

        Morsbach was found to grant an easement.

        "...by these presents do sell, convey, remise, release and forever quit-claim unto said part*y* of the second part, and to *his* heirs and assigns, the following described premises, situate, lying and being in the County of Thurston, State of Washington, *for the purpose of a Railroad right-of-way..."
        [Swan v. O'Leary (1950)]

        Swan was found to grant an easement.

        "... we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway a right-of-way..."
        [ King County v. Squire (1990)]

        Squire was found to grant an easement.

    It is completely dishonest for Judge Fletcher to claim the secondary grant in the Hilchkanum deed signals Hilchkanum's intentions in his primary grant.

          District Judge Rothstein and Circuit Judge Fletcher have manufactured legal precedent in their analysis of the Hilchkanum secondary grant. They attempt to explain Hilchkanum's intentions in his primary grant by contrasting its language with the language in his secondary grant. There is no legal precedent for this analysis, and it makes no sense. There is no justification in determining the Hilchkanum's intentions from this scant information. These judges provide no citation or scholarly study to justify their bizarre conclusion. Common law holds that the intention of a party in a deed is a material fact. Without any precedent to justify their conclusion, these judges were required by law to have the Hilchkanum's intentions in their secondary grant decided by a jury.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          I discussed secondary grants in railroad deeds in my previous Note. Judge Fletcher had abandoned her comparison of the Hilchkanum and Veach deeds on the basis of this language in the secondary grant, and on the basis of the subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deeds. I'll repeat the above discussion, relating to secondary grants, here.

          The Hilchkanum deed contains a secondary grant allowing for the removal of trees that could fall across the track and inhibit the operation of the Railway. The secondary grant is in these words:

          "And the said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company shall have the right to go upon the land adjacent to said line for a distance of two hundred (200) feet on each side thereof and cut down all trees dangerous to the operation of said road."     [Hilchkanum Right-of-Way Deed]

          These secondary grants are common in railroad deeds and deal with issues specific to the individual right-of-way deed. Secondary grants are necessary for the construction or operation of the railroad. The Hilchkanum secondary grant resolved a minor problem with the operation of the railroad. That problem was that the right-of-way was only 100 feet wide, 50 feet on each side of the centerline, but there were tall trees outside of the easement that could fall on the tracks and affect the operation of the railroad. So, this secondary grant allowed the Railway the right to cut down those trees. These secondary grants have nothing to do with the intentions of the parties to convey an easement or fee simple interest in the land underlying the right-of-way. There is no precedent in Washington common law for these secondary grants to be considered in the analysis of easement or fee.

          Here are two other examples of secondary grants to railroads. One secondary grant is from a deed which was found to be an easement because a "right-of-way" was granted in its premises. The other secondary grant is from a deed which was found to be a fee simple grant because a "strip of land" was granted to the railroad. Please follow the hyperlinks to the actual opinions to understand that these secondary grants had no effect to signal whether their deed granted an easement of a fee. This illogical construing of a secondary grant by Federal District Judge Rothstein, Federal Circuit Judge Fletcher, and Washington State Court of Appeals Judge Ronald Cox, is a new precedent established by these dishonest judges and published first in King County v. Rasmussen (2001).
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        The Edward Kratz right-of-way deed to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company in 1872:
            After granting a right-of-way to the Railroad, the Kratz deed included a secondary grant that allowed the Railroad to deal with the interference of a nearby river on its rail operation. The secondary grant allowed for:

          "...the construction of certain canals, whereby the channel of Skookumchuck is changed and prevented from infringing upon said railroad including the land necessary for said roads and canals..."
          [Morsbach v. Thurston County (1929)]

            The Kratz deed was construed in Morsbach v. Thurston County (1929), which is hyperlinked above. The Kratz deed was found to grant the Northern Pacific Railroad an easement because a "right-of-way" was conveyed in the deed's premises. Further, there is no mention in Morsbach of the significance of the secondary grant with respect to the determination of easement or fee.

        The Brown right-of-way deed to the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Company:
            After granting a strip of land to the Railroad, the Brown deed included a secondary grant that allowed the Railroad to resolve problems with the railroad's construction. The secondary grant allowed for:

          "Also conveying the following extra widths for excavations, embankments, depositing waste earth, and borrowing pits, as follows: Two strip[s] of land each fifty (50) feet in width and bordering one on either side of the strip of land first above described..."
          [Brown v. State of Washington (1996)]

            The Brown deed was construed in Brown v. State of Washington (1996), which is hyperlinked above. The Brown deed was found to grant the Milwaukee Railroad fee simple title because a "strip of land" was conveyed in the granting clause of its premises. There is no mention in Brown of the significance of the secondary grant with respect to the determination of easement or fee.

          Federal Judges Fletcher and Rothstein found unjustified meaning in the Hilchkanum secondary grant. They supplied no citation to justify their rulings that the words in the secondary grant indicated the intentions of the Hilchkanums to grant fee simple title in the main granting clause of their deed. They ignored previous opinions which construed deeds that contained similar secondary grants and did not support their conclusion. These judges simply made up a new precedent, a precedent that is illogical but supports their predetermined opinion that the Hilchkanum deed granted fee simple title. It was my right, under the Constitution, to present facts to a jury that would resolve the intentions of the Hilchkanum's with their secondary grant. Rothstein Fletcher denied my constitutional rights in order to enforce their unsubstantiated set of facts and their predetermined outcome to my lawsuit.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Open the previous discussion on railroad secondary grants.

    In her Footnote 13, Judge Fletcher violates the rules of summary judgment and dishonestly establishes Hilchkanum's ability to participate in his deed.

          In our briefs to Federal District Judge Rothstein and to this appeals panel, we described the fact that Hilchkanum was an illiterate "Indian" (Native American) and that he was limited in his ability to participate in his deed. Judge Rothstein struck our statements, for very questionable reasons, and then treated Hilchkanum as a legal expert and author of the words in his deed. Rothstein cited no legal authority for her conclusions and provided no document in support. In this opinion, we briefed the issue in greater detail. Judge Fletcher protected Rothstein's unfounded conclusions in her above paragraph. I'll reprint Fletcher's above paragraph. Then, I'll explain her complete dishonesty.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        [4] First, the district court compared the Hilchkanum deed's language granting an interest in the strip of land with its language granting the Railway the right to enter the adjacent land to cut trees:

          The deed grants a "strip" of land described in metes and bounds rather than merely a right "over" the land (as it does with the tree-cutting grant). The deed uses the word "convey" when granting the strip, which is associated with fee transfers (notably, "convey" is absent in the tree-cutting grant). See Hanson, 208 P.2d at 119.

        Id. We agree with the district court that these factors indicate that Hilchkanum intended to convey a fee simple interest in the strip of land described. Furthermore, the fact that he explicitly limited the purpose of the Railway's right to enter the adjacent land demonstrates that he was aware of the distinction between an easement and a fee simple conveyance.(13)

        [Judge Fletcher's above paragraph]

          Notice that there is a small (13) at the end of Fletcher's paragraph. As I've previously stated, dishonest judges like to hide their dishonesty in the footnotes. Fletcher doesn't disappoint here. Here is footnote 13.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        13. The Rasmussens provided evidence to the district court that Hilchkanum could not read or write the English language, suggesting that he was not aware of the wording in the deed and its effect. While the district court struck this argument from their response brief, the evidence itself was not struck. We have considered the evidence since it is part of the district court record. Nevertheless, the evidence indicates that Hilchkanum relied on friends in transacting his business. With the help of his friends, he was able to comply with the Homestead Act and make numerous conveyances of property. There is no evidence that his friends did not assist him with the transaction with the Railway such that he understood the deed's language and could reflect his intent therein.
        [Judge Fletcher's Footnote 13]

          In Judge Fletcher's above paragraph and footnote 13, she concludes that Hilchkanum was able to participate in his deed with the help of his friends. Further, she decides that Hilchkanum actually wrote the secondary grant in his right-of-way deed. I'll deal with Fletcher and Rothstein's dishonest assignment of Hilchkanum as author in the next section of this note. In this section, I'll discuss his ability to participate in his deed.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          Bill Hilchkanum was a Native American, born in a tribal environment before the significant settlement of Western Washington in the mid 1800's. He was illiterate. In his youth, and as an adult, he witnessed the destruction of his tribe's traditional way of life. He witnessed his tribe's relocation to a reservation in order to make its lands available for white settlement. He witnessed the Indian wars in the 1850's and 1860's, and the defeat of the Natives by the whites. He certainly was aware of the sham trials of Indians when they resisted the will of the white settlers. An example is the hanging of Chief Leschi of the Nisqually Tribe on February 19, 1858. The trial was a disgrace. It wasn't until March 4, 2004 that the injustice was formally recognized in a resolution by the Washington State Senate. Natives were on the bottom rung of white society during Bill Hilchkanum's life. It is not my job to brief basic American history to crooked federal judges who re-write history to justify their predetermined outcomes to lawsuits.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          In footnote 13, Judge Fletcher admits that we briefed Hilchkanum's limitation in dealing with his deed. Further, she admits that we properly admitted documents to justify our statements. But, then Judge Fletcher appoints herself as the jury. She reviews the documents and establishes the material fact that Hilchkanum "...understood the deed's language and could reflect his intent therein." A judge has no right to resolve a contested material fact, but Fletcher does exactly that in her footnote 13.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          Here is the portion of my lawyer's brief which Judge Fletcher resolved as her self-appointed jury.
             My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

            "Bill Hilchkanum was the original homesteader of the Rasmussens’ lands in this case. ER, 446. On June 15, 1876 David T. Denny (2) and Luke M. Redmond stated under oath that Bill Hilchkanum was an Indian who had abandoned his membership in the Snoqualmie tribe, and “adopted the habits and pursuits of civilized life”. ER, 494. The entire chronology of events explaining the homestead efforts of Bill Hilchkanum are found as exhibits to the expert witness Graddon declaration, at ER 446-522. On March 6, 1884 David T. Denny testified by sworn affidavit that “Bill Hilchkanum is an Indian and unable to read or write the English language***That said Indian Bill Hilchkanum relied on this affiant to take care of his said business…”. ER, 486. On March 24, 1884 Bill Hilchkanum “made his mark” upon an affidavit, which stated he “is an Indian and unable to read or write the English language and hence depends entirely upon the assistance of his white friends to aid him in transacting his business for him. That one D.T. Denny of Seattle W.T. had the care of his homestead papers for him…” ER, 483. David T. Denny was one of the witnesses to the original Hilchkanum deed in this case. ER, 502. On March 25, 1884 George W. Tibbetts swore by affidavit that he was “well acquainted with Bill Hilchkanum…” and that “…Bill Hilchkanum is an Indian and unable to read or write the English language and that he depended upon other parties to manage his business for him so that said Indian did not understand how to proceed in his homestead proof…”. ER, 485. In all documents of record, including the original Hilchkanum deed to SLS&E, Bill Hilchkanum signed his name by “making his mark”, which was an “X”, rather than a written or printed signature. ER, 476-522. The quitclaim deed from Bill Hilchkanum to SLS&E was signed (by his “mark”) and delivered to SLS&E on May 9, 1887. ER, 501-503. Bill Hilchkanum received the United States’ fee patent to his homestead lands on July 24, 1888. ER, 505-507.

            The above uncontroverted material facts describe the grantor whom the district court in this case found as being competent to limit a grant and to distinguish between an easement and a conveyance of fee simple absolute. ER, 592-597. The district court even found that Bill Hilchkanum was aware of 17 U.S. Stat. 602, and chose the phrase “right of way” out of necessity rather than to create an easement, because Bill Hilchkanum knew the then existing federal law allowed the conveyance of a railroad right of way before he had received his fee patent. ER, 595. The Rasmussens contest these factual findings of the district court, with the above evidence that was before the district court."

          Footnote 2: Affiant David T. Denny was one of the founders of the Seattle Lake Shore & Eastern Railway [henceforth “SLS&E”]; see “Orphan Road, The Railroad Comes to Seattle, 1853-1911”, by Kurt E. Armbruster, Washington State University Press, Pullman, Washington ©1999 by Board of Regents of Washington State University, at p. 122.
        ["Defendants-Appellants’ Opening Appeal Brief" (August 19, 2001)] (Citation starts on page 4.)

          The Hilchkanum's inability to participate in their right-of-way deed was supported by reference to the above Excerpts of Record in my lawyer's brief. That brief and the supporting documentation established a legitimate disagreement with the findings of the district court that the Hilchkanums were competent to participate in their deeds. Since the Hilchkanum's inability to participate in their right-of-way deed is a material fact, Judge Fletcher was required by law to send this issue back for a jury trial once she identified this disagreement with the District Court's conclusions of fact. Instead of sending the issue to a jury, Fletcher appointed herself as the jury. She then found, after reviewing the documents, that that her sister federal judge, District Judge Barbara Rothstein, properly handled this issue of fact. We have juries and the rules of summary judgment to keep crooked judges from making dishonest conclusions of fact, but it didn't happen here because Senior Federal Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher doesn't believe in the Constitution or the law. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          To better understand her dishonesty, let's look at her conclusion that Hilchkanum "...was able to comply with the Homestead Act...". If Fletcher actually looked at the documents we provided, she was aware that Hilchkanum applied for homestead but settled on the wrong piece of land. Here is a document that explains.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Hilchkanum provides an affidavit to correct his homestead application. He explains that his original application was in error because of a mistake by the white man who assisted him.

          The next document shows that Hilchkanum missed his requirement to prove his homestead by the legal deadline. Further, it shows that David Denny was the white man who assisted Hilchkanum in those days. This fact becomes important in the construing of Hilchkanum's right-of-way deed because Denny was one of the thirteen owners of the SLS&E Railway. David Denny signed as a witness to the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. Under the rules of summary judgment, Denny should have been assigned the person who advised Hilchkanum to sign his right-of-way deed. This establishes a conflict of interest which should have been resolved by a jury.

        Declaration of David Denny, taking responsibility for the late filing of Hilchkanum's final homestead proof.

          Judge Fletcher states that Hilchkanum "...was able to comply with the Homestead Act...". The documents she claims she read suggest something else. This issue is a critical material fact that is required by be resolved by a jury in a legitimate court of law. The Ninth Circuit is not a legitimate court of law as shown by the criminal activity I expose here.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          In her footnote 13, Judge Fletcher declared Hilchkanum able to participate in his right-of-way deed and subsequent real estate deeds. In her "analysis" of the Hilchkanum secondary grant, Judge Fletcher determined that Bill Hilchkanum "...explicitly limited the purpose of the Railway's right to enter the adjacent land...". With that statement, Fletcher designates Hilchkanum as author of the words in his right-of-way deed. This is another disputed material fact which should have been resolved by a jury. Authorship of the deed will be discussed next.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        View a detailed study of Hilchkanum's participation and intentions with his deeds.

    Without any law or fact in support, Judge Fletcher dishonestly identifies Hilchkanum as author of the words in his deed.

          In her above paragraph and in footnote 13, Judge Fletcher identifies Hilchkanum as author of the words in his right-of-way deed. This section will discuss the dishonesty of that conclusion. First, I'll repeat Fletcher's dishonest concluding statements. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        "...the fact that [Hilchkanum] explicitly limited the purpose of the Railway's right to enter the adjacent land demonstrates that he was aware of the distinction between an easement and a fee simple conveyance.
        [Judge Fletcher's above paragraph]

        "...[Hilchkanum] understood the deed's language and could reflect his intent therein.
        [Judge Fletcher's Footnote 13]

          With these statements, Fletcher identifies Hilchkanum as author of his deed without explicitly stating Hilchkanum was the author. Significant also, there is no statement in this opinion which suggests that the lawyers for the SLS&E Railway were responsible for the words in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. This section will discuss these topics:

        1. Why is authorship important in construing a deed?

        2. Who wrote the words in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed?

        3. How does the false assignment of authorship support Judge Fletcher's predetermined outcome to this opinion?

    Why is authorship important in construing a deed?

          The legal significance of authorship is best explained by a citation from the dissenting opinion in Brown v. State of Washington (1996).

            "The railroad was a sophisticated, well financed, and organized party, undoubtedly represented by counsel. Landowners stood at a disadvantage to railroads in the early 1900s. It approached the landowners to purchase their land after it had already laid out or even built its rail line over the land...The railroad and the landowners knew that the railroad possessed the power of eminent domain and would end up in possession of the right of way, if it were not already. These were not arm's-length transactions between parties of equal bargaining power. For these reasons, the deeds, at least the preprinted portions of them, must be construed against the railroad. '[C]ontract language . . . is construed most strongly against the party who drafted it, or whose attorney prepared it.' Guy Stickney, Inc. v. Underwood, 67 Wn.2d 824, 827, 410 P.2d 7 (1966)"
        [Washington State Supreme Court Judge Richard B. Sanders dissenting in Brown (1996)]

          While this citation is in the dissenting opinion, there was no disagreement in the majority opinion with the principle that deed language is construed against its author. This citation from Stickney v. Underwood (1966) is common law precedent in Washington State, and is anchored by its own citations. Here is a more complete citation.

            "Initially, it should be noted that contract language subject to interpretation is construed most strongly against the party who drafted it, or whose attorney prepared it. Underwood v. Sterner, supra; Wise v. Farden, 53 Wn.2d 162, 332 P.2d 454 (1958); Restatement, Contracts SS 236 (d) (1932)."
        [Stickney v. Underwood (1966) - Citation is highlighted on page 3.]

          In the above citation, Supreme Court Judge Sanders recognized the power that railroads have over those from which they obtain rights-of-way or land to build their tracks. Sanders correctly noted that railroads have the right of eminent domain in the establishment of the tracks. Under their charters, Railroads are given the right to establish their tracks irrespective of the wishes of the landowners. Further, Sanders recognized that the railroads prepared generic "form deeds" which they took to the landowners for signature. Since the landowners often made changes to these "form deeds", Sanders correctly recognized that the words from those "form deeds" should be construed against the railroad, as author of the words of the "preprinted portions". In the case of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, Bill and Mary Hilchkanum were at an even greater disadvantage to the SLS&E Railway because they were illiterate Native Americans trying to integrate into white society in the late 1800's.

          Under Washington State common law, Judges Rothstein and Fletcher were required to determine which words in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed are based on the "form deed" prepared by the SLS&E lawyers, and which words were altered or added by the Hilchkanum's. Then, the words from the SLS&E "form deed" should have been construed against the Railway and the words altered or added by the Hilchkanum's should have been construed against the Hilchkanums. That's the law. But, that didn't happen. I'll discuss who wrote the Hilchkanum deed next.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Who wrote the words in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed?

          An examination of King County v. Squire (1990) will reveal the author of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. The Squire court did exactly what I discussed in the above paragraph. The Squire identified the changes made by Governor Squire to the "form deed" composed by the SLS&E Railway lawyers. The court then construed those words to determine what Governor Squire intended with his changes. In King County v. Squire (1990), the significant words in the Squire deed are presented with the changes and additions made by Watson Squire in bold font. By default, the words in the Squire right-of-way deed which are not in bold font were written by the Railway lawyers. The following citation from Squire explains that the court identified the changes made by Territorial Governor Squire. (The emphasis in this citation is the Squire court's.)

        "On March 29, 1887, Watson and Ida Squire executed a deed granting a half-mile right of way to the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company. The material portion of the deed reads as follows with the handwritten additions by Mr. Squire set forth in boldface type:

          In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location, construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway a right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands in said County, described as follows, to-wit: [legal description]. Such right-of-way strip to be twenty-five (25) feet in width on each side of the center line of the railway track as located across the said lands by the Engineer of said Railway Company, which location is described as follows, to-wit [description.] . . . .

          To Have and to Hold the said premises, with the appurtenances, unto the said party of the second part, and to its successors and assigns forever or so long as said land is used as a right-of-way by said railway Company, Expressly reserving to said grantors their heirs and assigns all their riparian rights and water front rights on the shores of Lake Washington. And this grant is upon the condition that said railway shall be completed over said lands on or before January 1st, 1888...."

        [King County v. Squire (1990)].

          In the above cited paragraphs from the Squire right-of-way deed, the first paragraph is the granting clause and the second paragraph is the habendum. What is granted in a deed is almost always expressed in these two parts. One should observe that Governor Squire changed only the width of the right-of-way in his granting clause, but made an extensive addition to the habendum. The Squire court considered what Governor Squire intended with this major change to his habendum. The Squire court first construed the words in the granting clause to "strongly" suggest the intent to convey an easement. Then, the Squire court considered if Governor Squire intended to convey a "fee simple determinable" because of the changes he made in his habendum. (Note: a "fee simple determinable" is not the same as a "fee simple" grant.) The Squire court concluded that Governor Squire did not intend a "fee simple determinable" but rather expressed his intention to reiterate the grant of an easement in his changes to his habendum. Please read the following citation from Squire to understand this point. (The emphasis in this citation is mine.)

        The Squire deed granted a "right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands". This suggests an easement was conveyed. Both King County and Squire note, however, that the habendum clause contains the handwritten language, "or so long as said land is used as a right-of-way by said railway Company," which arguably suggests conveyance of a fee simple determinable. If the granting clause merely conveyed the land to the railroad without reference to a right of way, the "so long as" language would create such a fee. Since the language in the granting clause strongly suggests conveyance of an easement, however, we find it more plausible that the "so long as" language was inserted by Squire to preclude the claim that he conveyed a fee simple to the railroad, particularly since the habendum clause granted the interest to the railroad and "to its successors and assigns forever". The authorities and cases discussed above clearly support construing the Squire deed as an easement.

        In Veach v. Culp, /5 the court construed a deed which granted a right of way and used the standard habendum clause language, but without the additional language conditioning use of the property on its continued use as a railroad right of way. The successor railroad argued that the absence of such limiting language showed a fee was conveyed. The Veach court disagreed, holding that the language of the deed which described the conveyance of a right of way indicated an easement had been conveyed. The instant case is much more compelling since Squire specifically included language in the habendum clause reiterating the limitation of the conveyance to use as a right of way. We hold that an easement was conveyed.
        [King County v. Squire (1990)].

          The words in the Squire right-of-way deed to the SLS&E, combined with the analysis by the Squire court, absolutely destroy Judge Fletcher's analysis in this opinion. So, Judge Fletcher hides the Squire opinion by referring to it as "a Washington Court of Appeals case dealing with a railroad right of way" at the beginning of this opinion, and refuses to discuss the importance of this precedential opinion in this portion of her opinion, which deals specifically with this issue. Senior Federal Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher refuses to address this massive inconsistency in her opinion, but we will. As seen in the above citation from Squire, the Squire granting clause "...strongly suggests conveyance of an easement...". So, let's compare the Squire granting clause to the Hilchkanum granting clause. Here are those two granting clauses. (With my emphasis of the granting words in each deed. The words in red font are the only words changed by Governor Squire.)
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Squire Granting Clause:

        "In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location, construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway a right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands in said County, described as follows, to-wit:"
        [King County v. Squire (1990)].

        Hilchkanum Granting Clause:

        "In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right-of-way one hundred (100) feet in width through our land in said County described as follows to wit"
        [Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

          Since the granting words in the Hilchkanum and Squire deeds are identical, and by default the Squire court identified the Railway as author of those granting words, Judge Fletcher should have found that the granting clause of the Hilchkanum deed was written by the Railway lawyers and not written by Hilchkanum. Further, Judge Fletcher should have acknowledged that the Squire court found the words in the granting clause "...strongly suggests conveyance of an easement...". The Squire opinion is legal precedent. If Judge Fletcher believed that Hilchkanum wrote his granting clause, then she should have acknowledged the finding in King County v. Squire that the Railway lawyers wrote the operative words in the Squire granting clause and explained how Bill Hilchkanum, an illiterate "Indian", wrote exactly the same words in his granting clause. Judge Fletcher could not explain this glaring inconsistency, so she dishonestly hid the comparison. Her actions protect her sister federal judge, District Judge Rothstein, from being held responsible for covering-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. Her actions protect the other active participants in the tax fraud scheme from being held responsible for their participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    How does the false assignment of authorship support Judge Fletcher's predetermined outcome to this opinion?

          The issue of whether Hilchkanum granted easement or fee to the SLS&E had already been decided before it was construed in Judge Rothstein's federal district court and in this opinion. The Hilchkanum granting words to the SLS&E are perfectly identical to the Squire granting words to the SLS&E. In King County v. Squire (1990), the court found these granting words were written by the Railway lawyers and "...strongly suggests conveyance of an easement...". Common law precedent identified. Hilchkanum granted an easement. Case closed. King County loses. Right? Wrong!
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          King County v. Squire was not considered because Federal District Judge Barbara Jacobs Rothstein and Senior Federal Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher decided to suspend Washington State common law and the United States Constitution in order to cover-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. Instead of considering Squire, these judges hid the Squire court's conclusions. The SLS&E "form deed", which is the basis of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, had been construed twice in court and found to grant an easement both times. (Read King County v. Squire (1990) and Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber (1910) to confirm this fact.) Further, about twelve SLS&E right-of-way deeds were before the court in Lawson v. State (1986). The Washington State Supreme Court sent Lawson back to a lower court where King County admitted that all the deeds granted easements, as I understand. Rothstein and Fletcher needed to distance the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed from these other fourteen deeds. To do this, these dishonest federal judges ignored or misrepresented King County v. Squire and Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber. Then, they construed the words of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed against only Hilchkanum as if he wrote the words of the deed. They established Hilchkanum as author. By establishing Hilchkanum as author of his SLS&E deed, the judges established the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed as distinct and different from the other fourteen SLS&E deeds which had been found to grant easements. While there were other significant dishonest tactics, this irrational assignment of Hilchkanum as author was critical for the judges to support their predetermined outcome to my lawsuit. This irrational assignment of Hilchkanum as author allowed the judges to ignore the legal precedent established earlier in the construing of the Squire and Burke right-of-way deeds to the SLS&E.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Summary:  (Use this menu to review each subject.)

      Judge Fletcher lies when she states that Hilchkanum right-of-way deed grants a "strip of land".

      It is a lie that the word "convey" implies a fee simple conveyance.

      Judge Fletcher is completely dishonest to claim the secondary grant in the Hilchkanum deed signals Hilchkanum's intentions in his primary grant.

      In her Footnote 13, Judge Fletcher violates the rules of summary judgment and dishonestly establishes Hilchkanum's ability to participate in his deed.

      Judge Fletcher dishonestly identifies Hilchkanum as author of the words in his deed.

      The false assignment of Hilchkanum as author supports Judge Fletcher's predetermined outcome to this opinion.

          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions in this "Summary" are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Reference:

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2002) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2002), with brief comments. (More readable!)



    The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2002) by Senior Ninth Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher.

[5] The district court also looked to the behavior of the parties after the execution of the deed to the Railway, which bolsters the conclusion that the deed conveyed the right of way in fee. Rasmussen, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1230. Some of the deeds that the Hilchkanums subsequently used to convey the rest of their property explicitly excepted the strip of land belonging to the Railway. The deeds conveyed the surrounding property "less (3) acres right of way of Rail Road." By excepting the right of way in terms of acres of land, the conveyances betray an understanding that the Railway owned the strip of land and did not merely have a right to enter the strip.

The Rasmussens point out that the Hilchkanums did not mention the railroad right of way in the deed conveying lot 2, which is where most of the strip to which the Rasmussens lay claim is located. However, this does not bring into dispute the fact that the Hilchkanums intended a fee simple. Had they used other language in conveying lot 2 that recognized the Railway's right of way as only an easement, then a factual finding reconciling the contradictory positions might be necessary. But the total failure to except the land subject to the right of way in the lot 2 deed is not significantly probative of whether or not the parties intended to convey a fee simple estate. Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that a scintilla of evidence or evidence that is not significantly probative does not present a genuine issue of material fact).



    Note from John Rasmussen:

          In her above paragraphs, Judge Fletcher cites cherry-picked subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deeds. She then misstates the language in those deeds and misinterprets their legal meaning. Further, she dismisses more relevant subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deeds by stating they provide not a "scintilla of evidence" or are "not significantly probative". These are lies by this very dishonest judge, and will be discussed below in detail.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Topics Discussed in this Note:  (Each topic is presented as a hyperlink. Use this menu to jump to that subject.)

      * A review of the law which got us to this place in this opinion.

      * What were Judge Fletcher's tactics when she misrepresented Hilchkanum's subsequent real estate deeds?

        ** Judge Fletcher changes the words in Hilchkanum's subsequent deeds, and then analyzes her substituted language rather than the actual language.

        ** Judge Fletcher misapplies Washington State common law dealing with exception language.

        ** Judge Fletcher ignores and dismisses the significance of the deeds which destroy her argument, by declaring they provide not a "scintilla of evidence".

      * If one follows Fletcher's flawed logic, then Hilchkanum sold the land under his right-of-way twice!

      * This manipulation of the facts by Judge Fletcher is a violation of my constitutional right of due process.

    A review of the law which got us to this place in this opinion.

          Earlier in this opinion, Fletcher recognized the factors that are used to construe a deed. She recognized this common law precedent:

        "The intent of the parties is of paramount importance in determining what interest the deed conveyed."

          This most basic concept in construing a deed is well established in Washington State common law. Not only is this common law, but it also makes common sense. But, as Fletcher "builds" on this principle, you will find that Fletcher soon departs from common sense and the truth. A deed should be construed to effect the intent of the parties at the time of its execution, not twisted around by opportunistic judges and lawyers to take on a different meaning, many years later. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          Then, Fletcher recognized that:

        "It has been said that it is a factual question to determine the intent of the parties."

          With that statement, Fletcher established the intent of the parties to a deed as the most important material fact to consider in construing a deed. Disputed material facts are required to be resolved before a jury. There was no jury, here, because Fletcher couldn't get the outcome she wanted by allowing a jury to resolve the disputed facts.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          Next, Fletcher recognized that:

        "To ascertain the intent of the parties, one must look to the language of the deed as well as the circumstances surrounding the deed's execution and the subsequent conduct of the parties."

          So, Fletcher reiterated the common law rule that there are three factors to consider in determining the intent of the parties:

          1. The Language of the Deed.

          2. The Circumstances Surrounding the Deed.

          3. The Subsequent Conduct of the Parties.

          When honestly examined, none of these factors support Fletcher's predetermined outcome to this opinion, so Fletcher had a little work to do to misapply these three factors.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          First, she destroyed the "language of the deed" by simply changing the words. Most folks don't realize that federal judges have the "right" to alter the words of the deeds that they are construing, but I do. Fletcher changed the words of the granting clause of the Hilchkanum deed so that it no longer grants a "right of way" and, instead, grants a "'strip' of land". I've discussed this issue several times already in this decision.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Open the portion of this opinion that discusses Fletcher's dishonest substitution of the words in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed.

          Second, Fletcher contradicted herself with her discussion of "circumstances surrounding the deed". Below, at "C. [6]" in this opinion, Fletcher states that the SLS&E "form deed" was written in language designed to convey fee simple title, and that explicit restrictive language along with an reversion statement in the habendum was necessary to change the deed from a fee grant to an easement. She refers to King County v. Squire (1990) as one authority. Apparently, Fletcher forgot that she had already determined just the opposite at "C. [1]" in this opinion. There, she made this statement:
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        "...the Hilchkanum deed does not give rise to the presumption that the deed conveyed a fee simple."
        [Open this quote in a separate window.]

          Did the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed not give rise to the presumption that it is fee simple, as Judge Fletcher stated at "C. [1]"? Or, does it give rise to the presumption that is fee simple, as Judge Fletcher states at "C. [6]"? Apparently, the presumption can switch back and forth to be whatever Fletcher needs to justify her various contradictory conclusions. This is not the first time Fletcher has contradicted herself in this opinion.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          The "circumstances surrounding the deed"" are material facts that need to be established before a jury when there is disagreement. It would have been nice if we had been allowed to establish the fact that Hilchkanum was an illiterate Native American who was at a great disadvantage to participate in his right-of-way deed. Fletcher could not allow my right to establish this fact because she "found" that Hilchkanum was a legal expert who actually wrote his right-of-way deed. In order to establish this obvious lie, Fletcher struck our statement questioning Hilchkanum's ability to participate in his deed, and denied my constitutional right to establish that unresolved material fact before a jury.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        View the history, laws, and specific Hilchkanum documents which explain the "circumstances surrounding" the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed.

          Last, we get to Fletcher's "scintilla of evidence" trick. She uses this trick to manipulate the issue of the "subsequent conduct of the parties". Fletcher needed a trick here because an honest assessment of the evidence describing the subsequent conduct of the parties exposes the dishonesty of her fellow federal judge, Barbara Rothstein in King County v. Rasmussen (2001) and, ultimately, the ELS federal tax fraud scheme. The remainder of this section will examine what Fletcher is hiding with her "scintilla of evidence" dismissal of critical evidence.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    What were Judge Fletcher's tactics when she misrepresented Hilchkanum's subsequent real estate deeds?

          When Fletcher analyzes Hilchkanum's subsequent real estate deeds, in her "effort" to find Hilchkanum's intentions in his right-of-way deed to the SLS&E, she "cherry picks" the subsequent deeds, ignoring the most relevant deeds, and "analyzing" less relevant deeds. She then misapplies the law with respect to these less relevant deeds.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          Fletcher supports Rothstein's dishonest analysis of exception language in these "cherry picked" subsequent deeds. The judges found that, since Hilchkanum excepted the right-of-way in some of his subsequent deeds, that this somehow indicated that he had granted fee title in his right-of-way deed. Of course, they both change the words in these subsequent deeds when they analyzed the language, just as they changed the words in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed when they construed it. As I stated above: "Most folks don't realize that federal judges have the right to alter the words of the deeds that they are construing, but I do."
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          So this gets us to Fletcher's "scintilla of evidence" trick. The most significant Hilchkanum subsequent real estate deeds did not except the right-of-way. This is strong evidence that Hilchkanum understood he had granted an easement to the SLS&E. Fletcher had predetermined that the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed would grant fee simple title, so she needed to not consider the deeds that contradicted her conclusion. This forced Fletcher to pull out her "scintilla of evidence" trick. Without any justification whatsoever, Fletcher eliminated the deeds that she didn't want to consider by declaring they provide not a "scintilla of evidence" or that they were "not significantly probative" to resolve the issue. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          Fletcher's manipulation of the extrinsic evidence (Hilchkanum's subsequent real estate deeds) required her to take these three illegal steps: My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        1. Fletcher changes the words in Hilchkanum's subsequent deeds, and then analyzes her substituted language rather than the actual language.

        2. Fletcher misapplies Washington State common law dealing with exception language.

        3. Fletcher ignores and dismisses the significance of the deeds which destroy her argument, by declaring they provide not a "scintilla of evidence".

          So, now I will take each of these dishonest actions (illegal steps) by Fletcher and explain what she has done, hopefully to the total disgust of Americans who read this section.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Judge Fletcher changes the words in Hilchkanum's subsequent deeds, and then analyzes her substituted language rather than the actual language.

          The legal meaning of the term "right-of-way" in railroad deeds is central to this opinion. Fletcher and Rothstein substitute the term "'strip' of land" for the term "right of way" when they construe the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. When they construe Hilchkanum's subsequent deeds they pull the same trick. I print Fletcher's statement from the above paragraph: My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Some of the deeds that the Hilchkanums subsequently used to convey the rest of their property explicitly excepted the strip of land belonging to the Railway. The deeds conveyed the surrounding property "less (3) acres right of way of Rail Road." By excepting the right of way in terms of acres of land, the conveyances betray an understanding that the Railway owned the strip of land and did not merely have a right to enter the strip.

          In the above statement Fletcher states that the Hilchkanums "...explicitly excepted the strip of land belonging to the Railway." But, she then supports that dishonest statement with a quote showing it was not land that was excepted at all, but rather "...acres right of way of Rail Road." Just read her citation to see that the exception is "right of way of Rail Road" and not a "strip of land" as she states in her set-up sentence. Then this dishonest judge reiterates her substitution of words by stating that Hilchkanum excepted "acres of land". It is critical to realize that "acres right of way of Rail Road" is not the same thing as "acres of land". If Fletcher went to law school, and has any concept of the law, she knows that there is a major difference between the exception of "land" and the exception of a "right-of-way". Let's now look at the law.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Fletcher misapplies Washington State common law dealing with exception language.

          I've found six Washington State decisions that deal with the exception of railroad rights-of-way. One of those decisions, Zobrist v. Culp (1977), deals with the exact situation discussed in this opinion. I've provided a link to a more complete study of the exception of rights-of-way in subsequent deeds at the bottom of this section.

          To understand the exception of a right-of-way in a subsequent deed, one must first understand the definition of an exception in a deed. Zobrist v. Culp (1977) provides this definition:

        "An exception is the withholding from the operation of the deed of something existent which otherwise the deed would pass to the grantee."
        [Zobrist v. Culp (1977)]

          So, this requires an honest judge, or jury, to determine what was "existent" in order to determine what is "excepted". If Hilchkanum granted an easement to the SLS&E with his right-of-way deed, then the exception of that right-of-way in a subsequent deed would simply except an easement. If Hilchkanum granted fee simple title to the SLS&E in his right-of-way deed, then the exception of that right-of-way in a subsequent deed would except fee title to the land under the right-of-way. In fact, this exact issue is discussed in Zobrist.

        "The conveyance of a fee simple interest with a clause excepting an easement...conveys to the grantee all the grantor's rights and interests...yet compels the grantee...from acting...inconsistent with the rights of the third party...described in the exception."
        [Zobrist v. Culp (1977)]

          This abbreviated citation explains that the excepting of an easement in a real estate deed simply identifies the easement to the grantee. So, if Hilchkanum granted an easement to the SLS&E with his right-of-way deed, the exception of that right-of-way in a subsequent real estate identifies the easement, and nothing more. Zobrist made that exact point:

        "The grantor here excepted a right-of-way amounting to an easement from the grant. No reference was made in the conveyance to Custer of an exception of the fee to the 100 feet." "...Custer...received a fee interest in the land...restricted only...that he could not use...in a manner inconsistent with the existing rights of the railroad..."
        [Zobrist v. Culp (1977)]

          Now, I ask this question. Is there a requirement that an easement be identified in a subsequent real estate deed, or is it optional to identify an easement in the words of a subsequent deed? The answer is that it is optional to identify the easement. An easement goes with the property whether it is identified in the subsequent deed or not. Anyone who has purchased property, and obtained a title report, has very likely found easements identified in the title report that are not identified in the deed. This is the common way for a grantee to identify easements. It is uncommon in modern real estate deeds to find easements identified as exceptions, but it is legal to do it in that manner.

          If Hilchkanum granted fee simple title to the SLS&E with his right-of-way deed, he would need to except the land under the right-of-way grant in every subsequent deed. Otherwise, he would be selling land in that subsequent deed that he had already deeded fee simple to the Railway. He would be selling land that he didn't own in that subsequent deed. On the other hand, if Hilchkanum granted an easement to the SLS&E with his right-of-way deed, he wouldn't need to except the right-of-way in every subsequent deed because the easement goes with the property whether it is identified in the deed, or not. So, if some subsequent Hilchkanum deeds excepted the railroad right-of-way and others did not, that would be consistent with the Hilchkanum's granting an easement to the SLS&E with their right-of-way deed.

          Next, we will take an honest look at Hilchkanum's subsequent real estate deeds to determine this fact. Normally, a jury would analyze these facts, but Fletcher does not believe in juries. We won't be "cherry-picking" the subsequent deeds like Fletcher does in her capacity as a self-appointed jury.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Fletcher ignores and dismisses the significance of the deeds which destroy her argument, by declaring they provide not a "scintilla of evidence".

          At last, we get to Fletcher's "scintilla of evidence" trick. In Fletcher's analysis above, the judge cited a deed which wasn't in the chain of title to the land contested in this lawsuit. She then misinterpreted the legal effect of this deed in order to concoct false intentions for the Hilchkanums in their right-of-way deed to the SLS&E. Beside her misrepresentation of the law, Judge Fletcher ignored the implication of the more relevant deeds which where in the chain of title to the land in this lawsuit. She dismissed these deeds by claiming that "...a scintilla of evidence or evidence that is not significantly probative does not present a genuine issue of material fact." We won't ignore these more relevant deeds. We'll look at these more relevant Hilchkanum subsequent real estate deeds and analyze their significance. We'll explain the complete dishonesty of Fletcher in dismissing these deeds.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          There were three deeds that conveyed the land construed in this lawsuit to outside parties. These are the subsequent Hilchkanum deeds that are most relevant to this lawsuit. Select the hyperlinks, directly below, to confirm that none of these deeds excepted the right-of-way or the land under the right-of-way.

        Hilchkanum warranty deed to Chris Nelson, March 15, 1904, conveying 96% of the disputed property.

        Hilchkanum warranty deed to Edward Sanders, September 3, 1904, conveying 3% of the disputed property.

        Hilchkanum warranty deed to John Herder, June 30, 1905, conveying 1% of the disputed property.

          In her second paragraph above, Judge Fletcher acknowledged our brief on the significance of the Hilchkanum warranty deed to Chris Nelson, March 15, 1904, conveying 96% of the disputed property. Here is that Fletcher paragraph for reference.

        "The Rasmussens point out that the Hilchkanums did not mention the railroad right of way in the deed conveying lot 2, which is where most of the strip to which the Rasmussens lay claim is located. However, this does not bring into dispute the fact that the Hilchkanums intended a fee simple. Had they used other language in conveying lot 2 that recognized the Railway's right of way as only an easement, then a factual finding reconciling the contradictory positions might be necessary. But the total failure to except the land subject to the right of way in the lot 2 deed is not significantly probative of whether or not the parties intended to convey a fee simple estate. Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that a scintilla of evidence or evidence that is not significantly probative does not present a genuine issue of material fact)."

          Judge Fletcher dismisses the importance of the Hilchkanum warranty deed to Chris Nelson, March 15, 1904, by stating that the deed "...does not bring into dispute the fact that the Hilchkanums intended a fee simple. Had they used other language in conveying lot 2 that recognized the Railway's right of way as only an easement, then a factual finding reconciling the contradictory positions might be necessary. But the total failure to except the land subject to the right of way in the lot 2 deed is not significantly probative of whether or not the parties intended to convey a fee simple estate." This is a ridiculous lie by this very dishonest judge. An analysis of this more relevant Hilchkanum deed to Chris Nelson destroys Fletcher's analysis that the exception language in Hilchkanum's subsequent real estate deeds indicated his intention to convey fee simple title in his right-of-way deed. I'll explain this next, and show why Fletcher's logic is flawed.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    If one follows Fletcher's flawed logic, then Hilchkanum sold the land under his right-of-way twice!

          If Hilchkanum sold his land, fee simple, to the SLS&E in 1887 right-of-way deed, then he would be required to except that land under the right-of-way in every subsequent real estate deed. If Hilchkanum failed to except that land in a subsequent real estate deed, then he would be selling that land a second time. In Judge Fletcher's analysis above she finds the Hilchkanum warranty deed to Chris Nelson, which sold his interest in "lot 2", to be "...not significantly probative of whether or not the parties intended to convey a fee simple estate.". Using Fletcher's flawed logic, Hilchkanum sold this land to the SLS&E Railway in his 1887 right-of-way deed, and then sold it a second time to Chris Nelson in his March 15, 1904 conveyance of "lot 2". How many times does Judge Fletcher believe that a person can sell the same piece of property to different people? Fletcher's refusal to resolve this inconsistency is dishonest.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          This Hilchkanum warranty deed to Chris Nelson, March 15, 1904, provides strong evidence that Hilchkanum understood that he had granted an easement to the SLS&E. Judge Fletcher had predetermined to find that Hilchkanum granted fee simple interest because that finding covered-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and protected the participants in that crime, including her fellow federal judge, Barbara Rothstein. So, Fletcher dismissed the subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deeds which failed to except the right-of-way. Instead she cherry-picked the deeds which did except the right-of-way and then misrepresented the language in those deeds and the law used to construe these deeds. This misrepresentation of the extrinsic evidence is the most important factor which Fletcher used to defeat the legal meaning of the words in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. It's difficult to imagine how Senior Federal Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher could be any more dishonest.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          As a review, the exception of a right-of-way in a deed requires the judge of jury to determine whether the original right-of-way deed conveyed an easement or fee. If the original right-of-way deed conveyed an easement, then an easement is what is excepted in the subsequent deed. The exception of an easement merely recognizes the existence of the easement, and is not required language in a deed. The fact that Hilchkanum excepted the right-of-way in some subsequent deeds, and failed to except the right-of-way in others, is consistent with Hilchkanum understanding the original right-of-way deed granted an easement. If Hilchkanum had understood that he granted fee simple title to his right-of-way land to the Railway in his 1887 deed, then he would have been required to except that land in every subsequent real estate deed. That's common law.

          Fletcher and her dishonest sister judge, Barbara Rothstein, found that Hilchkanum was an expert in Homesteading law and real estate law. Of course, they provided no documentation. Further, they ignored the history of the times. They ignored the federal and State laws protecting vulnerable Native Americans in those days. They refused to consider the many documents we provided to "their courts" showing Hilchkanum to be anything but a legal expert. They refused our constitutional right to establish the facts before a jury. Now, these dishonest judges get caught in the web of lies they have spun. If, Hilchkanum is the legal expert that they claim he is, and the judges have decided he granted fee simple title of the right-of-way land to the SLS&E, then it is very significant that he apparently conveyed his right-of-way land twice. In the three deeds above, Hilchkanum sells all the land under the right-of-way to Nelson, Sanders and Herder. How could he do that if he had already granted fee simple title of the land under the right-of-way to the SLS&E in 1887? He couldn't have made a mistake, because Fletcher and Rothstein have decided he is an expert in real estate transactions, even though he is an illiterate Native. Rather than attempt to explain this breakdown in her logic, Fletcher just makes these three deeds go away by declaring they provide not a "scintilla of evidence" or are "not significantly probative". My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    This manipulation of the facts by Judge Fletcher is a violation of my constitutional right of due process.

          In Fletcher's second paragraph above, she makes the statement that "Had they used other language in conveying lot 2 that recognized the Railway's right of way as only an easement, then a factual finding reconciling the contradictory positions might be necessary." The lack of the exception of the right-of-way is exactly that "..other language...that recognized the Railway's right of way as only an easement...". The problem is that Judge Fletcher would not allow "...a factual finding reconciling the contradictory positions...". A "factual finding reconciling the contradictory positions" is what juries do. Instead, Judge Fletcher denies my right to establish the material fact of the Hilchkanum's intentions before a jury. Fletcher denies my right to explain the inconsistency in Hilchkanum's subsequent real estate deeds to a jury. No legitimate jury, exposed to the facts and argument I present here, would come to the conclusions that Judge Fletcher made. No legitimate jury would find the Hilchkanum warranty deed to Chris Nelson, March 15, 1904, to be something to dismiss from consideration. Instead of a jury, we get Judge Fletcher's royal pronouncement that this deed to Chris Nelson provides not "...a scintilla of evidence or evidence that is not significantly probative...". Judge Fletcher's illegal use of summary judgment denied my constitutional right of due process. Fletcher's illegal use of summary judgment denied my right to establish the material facts before a jury.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Summary:

          This Note describes Judge Fletcher's manipulation of the extrinsic evidence. In her statements above, Judge Fletcher attempts to explain Hilchkanum's intentions in his right-of-way deed by analyzing Hilchkanum's subsequent real estate deeds. Her statements of fact and law in this analysis are completely dishonest.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions in this Summary are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Fletcher lied when she stated that Hilchkanum excepted "land" in his subsequent real estate deeds. He did not except "land". The fact is that he excepted "right-of-way" in only some of his subsequent real estate deeds.

        Fletcher misrepresented the law by claiming the exception of the "right-of-way" in Hilchkanum's subsequent deeds, excepted the "land" under the right-of-way.

        Fletcher dismissed the more relevant subsequent deeds which suggest Hilchkanum understood he had granted an easement to the Railway with his right-of-way deed.

          Judge Fletcher manipulates the facts and law in order to falsely justify her conclusion that Hilchkanum understood he had granted fee simple title of his right-of-way land to the SLS&E Railway in his 1887 right-of-way deed. Her manipulation of the facts and law are a violation of my constitutional right of due process.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions in this Summary are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Reference:

      View a study of the meaning of the exception of a right-of-way in a deed.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2002) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2002), with brief comments. (More readable!)



    The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2002) by Senior Ninth Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher.

[6] Finally, the district court properly looked to the circumstances surrounding the execution of the Hilchkanum deed and concluded that they confirmed the parties' intent to convey a fee simple estate. Rasmussen, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1230. Deeds to the Railway from other landowners executed in the same year as the Hilchkanum deed used the same form but contained additional language explicitly restricting the grant to railroad purposes and providing that the interest would revert to the grantor if the railroad ceased to operate. See Squire, 801 P.2d at 1023; Northlake Marine Works, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 857 P.2d 283, 286-87 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993). The differences in these deeds reflected the common practice of the railroads of using fee simple form deeds and adding language to include limitations requested by landowners. See Danaya C. Wright & Jeffrey M. Hester, Pipes, Wires, and Bicycles: Rails-to-Trails, Utility Licenses, and the Shifting Scope of Railroad Easements From the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Century, 27 Ecology L.Q. 351, 378 (2000). The deed in question here suggests that the Hilchkanums requested no such limitations.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

    There are Four Issues Discussed in this Note:  (Each issue is presented as a hyperlink. Use this menu to jump to that subject.)

      * Judge Fletcher contradicts herself with this discussion of railroad "form deeds".

      * The SLS&E "form deed" was established in King County v. Squire (1990).

      * Judge Fletcher refused to consider the most important "circumstance[] surrounding the execution of the Hilchkanum deed".

      * Judge Fletcher adopts Norm Maleng's "legal theory" in her above discussion.

    Judge Fletcher contradicts herself with this discussion of railroad "form deeds".

          In her paragraph directly above, Fletcher states that the SLS&E "form deed" was written in language designed to convey fee simple title, and that explicit restrictive language, along with a reversion statement in the habendum, was necessary to change the deed from a fee grant to an easement. She refers to King County v. Squire (1990) as one authority. Apparently, Fletcher forgot that she had already determined just the opposite at "C. [1]" in this opinion. There, she made this statement (my emphasis):
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        "...the Hilchkanum deed does not give rise to the presumption that the deed conveyed a fee simple."
        [Open this portion of Fletcher's opinion in a separate window.]

          Did the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed not give rise to the presumption that it is fee simple, as Judge Fletcher states at "C. [1]"? Or, does it give rise to the presumption that is fee simple, as Judge Fletcher states at "C. [6]", directly above? Apparently, the presumption can switch back and forth to be whatever Fletcher needs to justify her various contradictory conclusions. This is not the first time Fletcher has contradicted herself in this opinion.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          Even though Fletcher appears to be completely confused as to whether the Hilchkanum deed presumes to convey fee simple title or if it presumes to convey an easement, there is no "confusion" about the issue when one reads King County v. Squire (1990). The Squire court answers this question, emphatically. It is a shame that Senior Federal Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher didn't acknowledge our briefing on this issue, because it would have helped to clear her "confusion". Squire is discussed next.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    The SLS&E "form deed" was established in King County v. Squire (1990).

          King County v. Squire (1990) answers Fletcher's "dilemma" about whether the SLS&E "form deed" grants and easement or fee simple title. The Squire court looked at the right-of-way deed that Territorial Governor Watson Squire granted to the SLS&E Railway. The court identified which words were written by the Railway lawyers, and which words were added or changed by Governor Squire. When the words prepared by the SLS&E lawyers in the Squire deed are compared to the words in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, it is obvious that the SLS&E lawyers wrote both of the deeds. The granting words are identical. These words, written by the Railway lawyers, establish the SLS&E "form deed" that Fletcher refers to with this statement in her paragraph, above:

        "Deeds to the Railway from other landowners executed in the same year as the Hilchkanum deed used the same form..."

          So, let's compare the Squire granting clause to the Hilchkanum granting clause. (With my emphasis of the granting words in each deed. The words in red font are the only words changed by Governor Squire.)

        Squire Granting Clause:

        "In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location, construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway a right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands in said County, described as follows, to-wit:"
        [King County v. Squire (1990)].

        Hilchkanum Granting Clause:

        "In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right-of-way one hundred (100) feet in width through our land in said County described as follows to wit"
        [Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

          It's obvious that each of these deeds is based on a "form deed" because of the identical wording. Since the Squire court established which words were written by the SLS&E lawyers, and analyzed the intent expressed with those words, it would have been helpful if Fletcher had acknowledged the Squire court's conclusions. It's always possible that Senior Federal Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher is not familiar with the concept of common law precedent. Squire is common law precedent. The Squire court construed the Railway's "form deed" words to convey an easement. Specifically, the Squire court found the granting clause "strongly suggests" the intention to convey an easement. These words in the Squire and Hilchkanum granting clauses are identical. But, then the court considered the reverter clause that Governor Squire added to the habendum. The question before the court was: Did the reverter clause indicate Squire's intention to grant a fee simple determinable, instead of an easement? (Note: A fee "simple determinable" is not the same as a "fee simple".)

          Here is a citation from Squire (with my emphasis) that supports my points. Use the hyperlink at the end to read the complete citation in the context of its opinion.

        "The Squire deed granted a "right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands". This suggests an easement was conveyed. Both King County and Squire note, however, that the habendum clause contains the handwritten language, "or so long as said land is used as a right-of-way by said railway Company," which arguably suggests conveyance of a fee simple determinable. If the granting clause merely conveyed the land to the railroad without reference to a right of way, the "so long as" language would create such a fee. Since the language in the granting clause strongly suggests conveyance of an easement, however, we find it more plausible that the "so long as" language was inserted by Squire to preclude the claim that he conveyed a fee simple to the railroad, particularly since the habendum clause granted the interest to the railroad and "to its successors and assigns forever". The authorities and cases discussed above clearly support construing the Squire deed as an easement.

        In Veach v. Culp, /5 the court construed a deed which granted a right of way and used the standard habendum clause language, but without the additional language conditioning use of the property on its continued use as a railroad right of way. The successor railroad argued that the absence of such limiting language showed a fee was conveyed. The Veach court disagreed, holding that the language of the deed which described the conveyance of a right of way indicated an easement had been conveyed. The instant case is much more compelling since Squire specifically included language in the habendum clause reiterating the limitation of the conveyance to use as a right of way. We hold that an easement was conveyed."
        [King County v. Squire (1990)]

          It is profoundly dishonest for Judge Fletcher to misrepresent the conclusions of the Squire court. Fletcher makes this statement in her above paragraph: "Deeds to the Railway from other landowners executed in the same year as the Hilchkanum deed used the same form but contained additional language explicitly restricting the grant to railroad purposes and providing that the interest would revert to the grantor if the railroad ceased to operate. See Squire, 801 P.2d at 1023..." With that statement, Fletcher is claiming the reverter clause, added by Governor Squire, is the only reason the Squire court found the deed to grant an easement. This was not the conclusion of the Squire court. The court concluded that the reverter language was simply "reiterating" Squire's intention to grant an easement. The intention to grant an easement had already been "strongly suggest[ed]" by the language in the granting clause of the "form deed".
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          An honest examination of King County v. Squire destroys Fletcher's conclusions in this opinion. Fletcher refused to acknowledge the Squire court's conclusions. Instead, Fletcher attributes all the words in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to Hilchkanum, an illiterate Native who couldn't even sign his own name in the English language. Fletcher refuses to admit the words attributed to the Railway in the Squire deed are identical to the words of the Hilchkanum deed. She refuses to admit that those identical words were found to grant an easement in King County v. Squire. Most important, Judge Fletcher refused my constitutional right as an American citizen to establish these material facts in court. By her actions, Fletcher demonstrates that she doesn't believe in the U.S. Constitution.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        View a more detailed comparison of the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds to the SLS&E.

          In her paragraph above, Fletcher stresses the importance of the other SLS&E deeds executed in the same year. None of the SLS&E deeds executed by Native Americans were altered, while most of the deeds executed by white settlers were changed by the settlers. This fact contributes to the issue of the Natives American's ability to participate in the execution of the deeds. This was a time in our history when Native Americans were pushed onto reservations to make room for whites to take over their lands. "Indians" were not allowed to homestead until Congress passed the Act of March 3, 1875. This was the situation with the Hilchkanums. This issue is discussed next.

    Judge Fletcher refused to consider the most important "circumstance[] surrounding the execution of the Hilchkanum deed".

          The most important circumstance surrounding the execution of the Hilchkanum deed was the ability of the Hilchkanums to participate in their right-of-way deed. This ability to participate in their railroad right-of-way deed is a material fact. The Hilchkanums were illiterate Native American "Indians" who gave up their tribal affiliation in order to homestead on off-reservation land. Fletcher ignored the history of the settlement of the American west, and the history of the settlement in Washington Territory. She ignored the laws that protected Natives in those days. She ignored the many documents that we provided as exhibits which showed the Hilchkanums were at great disadvantage in legal proceedings. Instead she supported District Judge Rothstein's finding that the Hilchkanums were essentially skilled lawyers, capable of dealing with complex legal issues. Fletcher made this finding without any documentation or justification, whatsoever. With these contradictions glaring in her face, Fletcher was required by law to send the case back to district court for resolution of the disputed material facts before a jury. She refused.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          I've prepared a study of the disadvantage the Hilchkanums suffered in white society in the late 1800's. The study explains the history of the times, the laws which protected Natives, and specific Hilchkanum documents which were presented to the federal and district courts.

        View a study of Hilchkanum's participation and intentions in his right-of-way deed to the SLS&E.

          It was not my job to teach basic American history to "educated" federal judges. Further, the disadvantage Natives suffered in dealing with legal issues in the late 1800's are reflected in the laws which protected "Indians" in those days and are the responsibility of the judge, and her/his clerks, to understand. However, it was my responsibility to provide specific documents which identified the inability of Hilchkanum to participate in his deeds. I did this. I paid a researcher more than $10,000 to find documents associated with the Hilchkanum's and the other real estate transactions which established the chain of title to my land under the SLS&E (BNSF) right-of way. These documents were presented to Federal District Judge Barbara Jacobs Rothstein, this three judge appeals panel headed by Senior Federal Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher, the full Ninth Circuit Federal court, and the United States Supreme Court. I provide just a few of the Hilchkanum documents here. These Hilchkanum documents show that the Hilchkanums were limited in their ability to participate in their deeds. These documents support the material fact that the Hilchkanums signed an unaltered "form deed" which was composed by the Railway lawyers. These documents contradict Judge Fletcher's conclusions about the Hilchkanum's ability to participate in any of their deeds. These documents show the need to resolve these issues of material fact before a jury, as required by the rules of summary judgment. Please review the following documents which Judge Fletcher claims she studied in her illegal "resolution" of this contested material fact. Judge Fletcher has no legal right to resolve disputed issues of material fact. Of course, "legal rights" have nothing to do with this opinion. Something more "important" that "legal rights" is involved here. Judge Fletcher needed to illegally and irrationally support her sister federal judge, Barbara Rothstein, in order to keep Barbara Rothstein out of federal prison for her participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        June 28, 1876: Hilchkanum provides an affidavit of his eligibility to homestead as an "Indian" under the Act of March 3, 1875. He swears that he has given up his affiliation with the Duwamish tribe. (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)

        June 28, 1876: Hilchkanum's 1876 homestead application form. There is a handwritten correction, at a 45 degree angle, made on January 12, 1883. Hilchkanum had settled on lot 1, but lot 1 was not included in his 1876 homestead application. This is inconsistent with Federal District Judge Rothstein's and Federal Circuit Judge Fletcher's description of Hilchkanum as an expert in homestead law, and an expert in the construction of real estate deeds. If he were an expert on real estate deeds, as Rothstein and Fletcher decided, he would have understood how to properly apply for his homestead. (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        December 4, 1879: Hilchkanum provides an affidavit to correct his homestead application. He explains that his original application was in error because of a mistake by the white man who assisted him. In the declaration on March 6, 1884, shown below, we learn that David Denny was the white man who assisted Hilchkanum. (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)

        October 24, 1882: Petition to correct Hilchkanum's homestead application is filed. Item 2: June 28, 1876, above, shows that this requested change to Hilchkanum's homestead application was entered on January 12, 1883. (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)

        November 10, 1883: Hilchkanum files notice to give final proof of his homestead on January 9, 1884. (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)

          There was a problem with Hilchkanum making Homestead Proof on January 9, 1884. By law, Hilchkanum was required to make final proof within seven years of entry. Since he entered his homestead on June, 28 1976, his final proof should have been made by June 28, 1883. This error generated explanations and declarations that showed Hilchkanum to be illiterate and completely dependent on his white friends to aid him in legal matters. The following documents on this page explain this situation. These documents, describing Hilchkanum's homesteading error, cast serious doubt on the honesty of the federal and state judges who found that Hilchkanum was an expert in homesteading law and real estate deeds. The judges came to their conclusions without any document or fact to support their opinion. The mischaracterization of the Hilchkanums, as legal experts, was critical to the judge's dishonest finding that the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E Railway was written by Hilchkanum. The judges were required by the Constitution and the law to allow disputed facts to be resolved by a jury. The federal and state judges, who construed the Hilchkanum deeds, intentionally violated the rights of the Rasmussens (King County v. Rasmussen (2001)) and the Rays (Ray v. King County (2004)) in order to hide the federal tax fraud scheme involved in the railbanking of the ELS right-of-way.
              (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        January 9, 1884: Hilchkanum final affidavit for homestead proof. (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)

        January 9, 1884: Hilchkanum testimony for homestead proof. This document establishes Hilchkanum's age and approximate year of birth. (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)

        January 9, 1884: Testimony of Martin Monohon for Hilchkanum's homestead proof. Monohon was a neighbor of the Hilchkanums. (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)

        March 6, 1884: Declaration of David Denny, taking responsibility for the late filing of Hilchkanum's final homestead proof. This document shows Denny's participation in Hilchkanum's legal affairs, and explains Hilchkanum's dependence on Denny for legal assistance. This, and the other documents, paint a very different picture of Hilchkanum than was found by the judges who construed the Hilchkanum deed. (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        March 24, 1884: Hilchkanum's declaration relating to late homestead proof. This document describes Hilchkanum's illiteracy and establishes his dependence on David Denny to assist him with business matters. This is inconsistent with the court's depiction of Hilchkanum's legal abilities. This document begs the question: Why was this a disputed material fact which not resolved by a jury? (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.) (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        March 25, 1884: Declaration of George Tibbets explaining Hilchkanum's late homestead proof. Tibbets was one of Hilchkanum's neighbors. This, again, confirms Hilchkanum's illiteracy and his dependence on white friends to aid him with his legal matters. (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)

        March 29, 1884: Final Homestead Certificate declaring Hilchkanum eligible for his homestead patent. (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)

        May 9, 1887: Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the Seattle Lake shore and Eastern Railway. The granting clause of the deed is essentially identical to the Squire right-of-way deed, yet the judges characterized the deed as being written by Hilchkanum. The truth is that not one word in the deed was written by Hilchkanum. The lawyers for the Railway wrote the right-of-way deeds. Hilchkanum could not read or write the English language, as shown in the documents above. It was the Rasmussen's and the Ray's constitutional right to establish these facts before a jury. This right was denied in Ray v. King County and King County v. Rasmussen. (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        July 24, 1888: Hilchkanum homestead patent granted by the President of the United States. (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)

        December 16, 1898: Hilchkanum grants a warranty deed to his wife, Annie, for government lots one, three and five. (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)

          It is significant that Hilchkanum excepts the railroad right-of-way in Government Lots one and three. But, there is no consistency in the subsequent Hilchkanum deeds with this exception language. The federal judges in King County v. Rasmussen decided that the exception of the right-of-way in this deed indicated that the Hilchkanums intended their SLS&E right-of-way deed to grant fee simple title of the land under the right-of-way to the Railway. But, common law holds that an exception in a deed excepts whatever was originally granted. The exception of a right-of-way granted to a railroad would except an easement, under common law, and would not except fee simple title to the land. The exception of an easement in a deed merely notifies the grantee of the easement. It does not exempt, or withhold, fee simple transfer of land. The federal judges in King County v. Rasmussen came to their dishonest conclusion about the Hilchkanum's intentions in order to hide the federal tax fraud scheme used to railbank the East Lake Sammamish BNSF right-of-way. That's criminal of the federal judges, but what can we-the-people do about dishonest judges? The answer: Very little or nothing. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          R.C.W. 64.20.020, which was enacted in 1890, required that Hilchkanum be briefed by a judge as to the effect of this deed, and a notation be made on the deed that this briefing has occurred. This required notation is not present. The federal and state judges that reviewed these subsequent Hilchkanum deeds ignored this important consideration in their predetermined opinions.
              (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          In Hilchkanum's May 9, 1887 right-of-way deed to the SLS&E, he and his wife, Mary, granted the Railway a right-of-way on his government lots one, two and three. Subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deeds refer to two other wives. We were not able to document the reason that he had three different wives, Mary, Annie and Louise, as shown in his real estate deeds on this website. This deed to his wife, Annie, probably was for the purpose of sharing his homestead land with this new wife.

        August 25, 1899: Annie Hilchkanum quit claims back to her husband, Bill Hilchkanum, the property that he granted to her in the December 16, 1898 warranty deed. Government lots one and three were granted with the exception of the railroad rights-of-way. (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)

          R.C.W. 64.20.020, which was enacted in 1890, required that Hilchkanum be briefed by a judge as to the effect of this deed, and a notation be made on the deed that this briefing has occurred. This required notation is not present. The federal and state judges that reviewed these subsequent Hilchkanum deeds ignored this important consideration in their predetermined opinions.
              (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        March 15, 1904: Hilchkanum sells all of his government lot 2 to Chris Nelson. (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)

          In King County v. Rasmussen, Federal Judges Rothstein and Fletcher ignored the meaning of the words in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, and instead "found" the Hilchkanum's intentions in their right-of-way deed by looking at their subsequent real estate deeds. That is a very unusual, if not bizarre, method to examine a party's intentions in a deed. Assuming that Rothstein and Fletcher were justified with their unconventional approach, this deed should have been the most important subsequent real estate deed for these federal judges to consider, because it transferred 96% of the right-of-way land contested in the King County v. Rasmussen lawsuit. But, Rothstein and Fletcher ignored the implications of this deed, and instead concentrated on a deed that was not in the chain of title to the property involved in the lawsuit. What complete dishonesty by these federal judges! They did that because this deed to Chris Nelson did not except the right-of-way. This lack of the exception language in the deed suggests that the Hilchkanums granted only an easement to the Railway. So, Rothstein and Fletcher pretended that this deed did not exist. Instead, they "cherry picked" the Hilchkanum's subsequent deeds in order to find one they could misconstrue to support their predetermined outcome to King County v. Rasmussen. In their right-of-way deed to the SLS&E, the Hilchkanum's granted the Railway a right-of-way on their government lots one, two and three. In his deed to his wife, Annie, on December 16, 1898 (shown above) Bill Hilchkanum excepted the right of way with his grant of government lots one and three. So, why didn't he except the right-of-way on this deed, which granted his ownership of government lot 2? It was the Constitutional right of the Rasmussens to resolve this fact before a jury. Federal Judges Rothstein and Fletcher do not believe in the Constitution. They intentionally denied the Rasmussen's right to establish the fact that Hilchkanum did not except the right-of-way, or the land under the right-of-way, in this most relevant deed.
              (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

            View maps and discussion that depict this issue with the Chris Nelson deed.

          R.C.W. 64.20.020, which was enacted in 1890, required that Hilchkanum be briefed by a judge as to the effect of this deed, and a notation be made on the deed that this briefing has occurred. This required notation is not present. The federal and state judges that reviewed these subsequent Hilchkanum deeds ignored this important consideration in their predetermined opinions.
              (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          In King County v. Rasmussen (2001) and King County v. Rasmussen (2002) the federal judges found that the Hilchkanums were legal experts in deed construction and homesteading law. The documents, history, and laws of the times, suggest just the opposite. Read this deed to Chris Nelson and compare it to the other deeds by Hilchkanum. Then, decide if Hilchkanum wrote these very differently worded deeds, or if Hilchkanum allowed his friends and advisors to write his deeds. Decide if Hilchkanum was a legal expert, as the federal judges describe, or if Hilchkanum got his friends to write his deeds for him, with little understanding of the effect of those deeds. It was the cherished Constitutional right of the Rasmussens to have these facts resolved before a jury. Instead, the readers of this website become a "jury without power" in a judgment of our very corrupt judicial system.
              (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        June 30, 1905: Hilchkanum sells portions of his government lots three and five to John Herder. (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)

          R.C.W. 64.20.020, which was enacted in 1890, required that Hilchkanum be briefed by a judge as to the effect of this deed, and a notation be made on the deed that this briefing has occurred. This required notation is not present. The federal and state judges that reviewed these subsequent Hilchkanum deeds ignored this important consideration in their predetermined opinions.

          It is very significant that Hilchkanum, again, does not except the railroad right-of-way in this deed. Since Hilchkanum excepted the railroad right-of-way on government lot three in his December 16, 1898 deed to his wife, Annie, why, oh why, oh why, did he not except the same right-of-way in this deed? Since the federal judges, who denied the Rasmussen's Constitutional right to establish this critical material fact before a jury, found so much meaning in the exception language, why did they not find significance in the lack of that exception language in this deed. Even more significant, why did the judges not explain the this inconsistency. The answer is this: The federal judges, that construed the Hilchkanum deeds in King County v. Rasmussen, had a dishonest agenda to hide the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. That is the only logical explanation for their actions. That question might have been answered in court if the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit did not lie and dismiss John Rasmussen's Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, February 10, 2004.
              (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

            View maps and discussion that depict this issue with the John Herder deed.

          The lack of an exception for the right-of-way land, in this deed to Herder, is an indication that Hilchkanum believed he owned the land under the right-of-way, and his right-of-way grant to the SLS&E Railway was merely an easement. In King County v. Rasmussen this fact was briefed to the federal judges that construed the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. They ignored this implication, and instead concentrated on another, less relevant, deed that they then misconstrued to indicate that the Hilchkanums granted fee simple title of their land to the Railway. The federal judges "cherry picked" the extrinsic evidence in order to use less relevant and conflicted facts to support their dishonest opinions.
              (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          The disagreements with material facts that I describe, here, are required to be resolved before a jury. A jury trial was not allowed by the very dishonest federal Ninth Circuit judiciary. There is no Constitution or law in the Ninth Circuit courts, just the power of an unchecked and arrogant judiciary to do whatever it pleases. It's the wild, wild west in these courts.
              (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

             These Hilchkanum documents, which were presented to the court, do not support the dishonest conclusion of the federal and state judges that the Hilchkanums were the author of their deeds and were knowledgeable in real estate and homesteading law. These documents paint a completely different picture. They show that the Hilchkanums were illiterate and dependent on white friends to help them with their legal needs. The variations and inconsistencies in their deeds indicate the Hilchkanums were not the authors of their real estate deeds, but rather various unidentified authors constructed their deeds for them. The history of the times, the laws enacted to protect Natives, and the specific Hilchkanum documents suggest that the Hilchkanums had very little participation in their deeds. It is particularly significant that the railroad right-of-way was excepted on some subsequent real estate deeds, but not excepted on others. Not only did the federal and state judges misconstrue the Hilchkanum's intentions based on this exception language, but they also refused the constitutional right of the parties to establish this critical material fact, the Hilchkanum's intentions, before a jury.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    Judge Fletcher adopts Norm Maleng's "legal theory" in her above discussion.

          In her above paragraph, Judge Fletcher adopts Norm Maleng's "legal theory" with this contracted statement: "Deeds to the Railway from other landowners executed in the same year as the Hilchkanum deed used the same form but contained additional language explicitly restricting the grant to railroad purposes and providing that the interest would revert to the grantor if the railroad ceased to operate. [ ] The deed in question here suggests that the Hilchkanums requested no such limitations.". Fletcher's requirement for a separate statement limiting the grant ignores the "Railroad Right-of-Way Granting Rule" and one hundred years of Washington State legal precedent.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Reference:

      View a detailed comparison of the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds to the SLS&E.

      Understand Norm Maleng's "legal theory".

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2002) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2002), with brief comments. (More readable!)



    The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2002) by Senior Ninth Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher.

[7] In conclusion, "[t]he language of the deed, the behavior of the parties, and the circumstances converge to show the Hilchkanums' intent to convey a fee simple." Rasmussen, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1230-31. The underlying facts are undisputed, and, viewing these facts in the light most favorable to the Rasmussens, as we must on summary judgment, we conclude that King County, as the Railway's successor, possesses a fee simple in the strip of land.(14) We, therefore, affirm the district court's summary judgment in favor of King County.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

    Here, Judge Fletcher summarizes her dishonesty.

      Follow these hyperlinks to the items in her conclusion which were discussed previously:

        * Fletcher changed the "language of the deed" and then construed her substituted words.

        * Fletcher misrepresented the "behavior of the parties" by changing the language in cherry picked subsequent deeds.

        * Fletcher misrepresented the "circumstances" by refusing to identify the true author of the deed and by treating an illiterate Indian as a skilled lawyer.

    Above, Judge Fletcher makes this outrageous statement:

        "The underlying facts are undisputed..."

          The truth is that Judge Fletcher cherry picked the "underlying facts", ignoring "underlying facts" that destroy her argument, and misconstruing the effect of the "underlying facts" she allowed to be considered. To imply that there is agreement on this issue is obscene. But, there is a more important aspect to this cherry picking of "underlying facts": an issue of constitutional rights.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          The "underlying facts" contribute to the understanding of the intentions of the parties in a deed. The intentions of the parties is the most critical material fact in construing the deeds in this opinion. Disputed material facts are resolved by a jury. That is a requirement which disallows the use of summary judgment. In turn, that rule is required by the "right of due process" clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Judge Fletcher knew she was destroying my constitutional rights when she confirmed Rothstein's illegal use summary judgment. There is no possibility that a legitimate jury would come to the dishonest conclusions of facts that Fletcher has made in this opinion. The only possible explanation for Fletcher's actions is that she is covering up the federal tax fraud scheme used to railbank the ELS right-of-way in order to protect the active participants in crime.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Reference:

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2002) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2002), with brief comments. (More readable!)



    The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2002) by Senior Ninth Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher.

V.

Counterclaims

The district court dismissed all of the Rasmussens' counterclaims either for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). We review these dismissals de novo, see Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 737 (9th Cir. 2001) (reviewing 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo); La Reunion Francaise SA v. Barnes, 247 F.3d 1022, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001) (reviewing 12(b)(1) dismissal de novo), and we affirm.

A. Takings

The Rasmussens argue that they are entitled to just compensation for the taking of their land by the government under the state constitution and the Fifth Amendment. See Wash. Const., Art. 1, § 16. Their takings claim requires a finding that the Rasmussens own the strip of land. Because King County owns the strip of land in fee simple, the Rasmussens' land was not taken, and they can state no claim for which relief can be granted.

B. Spur Line Arguments

The Rasmussens argue that King County's title to the right of way is invalid because the STB lacked subject matter jurisdiction to order interim trail use over the railroad right of way. They claim the rail line in question is a spur line over which the STB has no jurisdiction. As the district court wrote, "[b]y challenging the STB proceedings, the Rasmussens are asking the court to reverse an STB order." The courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction over any proceeding "to enjoin or suspend, in whole or in part, a rule, regulation, or order of the STB . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2321(a); Dave v. Rails-to-Trails Conservancy, 79 F.3d 940, 942 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that district court has no jurisdiction to hear claims that have the practical effect of seeking review of an ICC (now STB) order).

No authority supports the Rasmussens' proposition that, in spite of 28 U.S.C. § 2321, the district court had jurisdiction to consider the subject matter jurisdiction of the STB. The Rasmussens cite Powelson v. United States, 150 F.3d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 1998), which holds that a statute may create subject matter jurisdiction yet not waive sovereign immunity. They then argue that, because it is not clear whether Congress has waived sovereign immunity of the STB deliberations, there must be subject matter jurisdiction. This argument has no merit. The non-waiver of sovereign immunity does not supply subject matter jurisdiction.

The Rasmussens also rely on 28 U.S.C. § 1336(b), which allows a district court to refer a question or issue to the STB and to exercise "exclusive jurisdiction of a civil action to enforce, enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend, in whole or in part, any order of the STB arising out of such referral." This case involves no such referral, and § 1336(b) does not give the district court any power to refer a question that challenges the STB's jurisdiction to issue an order that it has already issued. The STB implicitly has answered this question by asserting jurisdiction over the rail line; judicial review of the order must be obtained directly from a court of appeals as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2321(a).

C. First Amendment

The Rasmussens contend that their First Amendment right to petition the government for redress has been violated because King County refused to communicate with them. In the Rasmussens' Answer and Counterclaim and in their briefing to the district court, the Rasmussens also argued that King County had violated their right to free speech. They argued that a letter from King County officials threatening to bring criminal harassment charges against Mr. Rasmussen constituted an impermissible prior restraint on his ability to say that "he shall defend his life and his property, and that he shall arm himself." The letter apparently arose after Mr. Rasmussen threatened county employees who entered the railroad right of way bisecting his land. The Rasmussens now focus only on their right to petition the government for redress of grievances.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

        Here, Fletcher convicts me of a crime without any trial or legitimate hearing. Fletcher lies with her above statement:
        My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

      "...Mr. Rasmussen threatened county employees who entered the railroad right of way bisecting his land."

        If I had "threatened county employees", King County would have prosecuted me. King County didn't prosecute me because there were no illegal threats. This issue is discussed in the annotated record of the hearing in King County Superior Court preliminary to our move of the lawsuit to federal court. In that hearing the prosecutor stated lies and undocumented facts that were never adjudicated. The lies and undocumented facts threatened my livelihood as a commercial pilot. A false felony conviction would have taken away my pilot license. King County threatened my ability to take care of my family. Now, Fletcher repeats these lies in order to bias the court against me.
        My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

      Read the annotated King County v. Rasmussen Preliminary Injunction September 14, 2000 to understand the perjurious false claims made against me.

        If King County could have prosecuted me for wrong doing, it would have. I blew the whistle on the ELST crime the King County Prosecutor committed. King County responded like most crooked entities do. The County manufactured lies about me in order to threaten me and put me in a defensive position. Superior Court Judge Donald Haley was made aware of the crimes that were being committed by the County, and the perjurious declarations by County employees, but he ignored them and accepted the lies of the County as fact. We moved to federal court to escape this biased King County judge. Here in federal court, Fletcher simply convicts me of criminal acts with no trial, no prosecutor placed under oath, no witness placed under oath, no jury, no establishment of the facts. Instead, Fletcher saves that process and simply convicts me with her biased, unfounded statement.
        My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

      Read my letter to Sims and Council on February 7, 2000, describing the federal tax fraud scheme which inspired the County's false claims about me.

        That letter has never been answered by any member of the King County leadership, and the evidence of federal tax fraud that I described has been covered up by federal judges. Read the letters that follow that letter to understand the stonewalling that led to my decision to defend my property with a gun. Gosh, did I just use the politically incorrect word "gun"? My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Reference:

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2002) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2002), with brief comments. (More readable!)



    The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2002) by Senior Ninth Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher.

Counties are liable for constitutional violations under § 1983 only if the individual officer who committed the violation was acting pursuant to a local policy, practice or custom. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The Rasmussens have failed to allege any local policy, practice or custom here. They attempt no response to this argument in their briefing to this court. The First Amendment claim was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

        We described fifteen months of stonewalling by the County. In a legitimate court, we would have had the right to show how the intentional stonewalling by county officials would constitute a policy to violate my constitutional rights. This is a fact that is not Fletcher's right to establish. It is my right to establish this fact before a jury. Judge Fletcher does not believe in a person's legal right to a jury. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

      View evidence of stonewalling: Fifteen months of unanswered letters.



    The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2002) by Senior Ninth Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher.

D. Second Amendment

John Rasmussen contends that King County violated his Second Amendment right to bear arms when it obtained an order prohibiting Rasmussen from possessing a gun. This claim must fail for the same reason the First Amendment claim fails — the failure to allege that the violation occurred pursuant to a county custom or practice. Id.

E. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Eminent Domain

The Rasmussens argue that they have lost their property right in the railroad right of way without due process of law and that their property has been condemned by the government. They also claim that King County owes them compensation for the wrongful exercise of the federal government's power of eminent domain through the STB. These claims presume that the Rasmussens held a reversionary interest in the right of way because the original deed conveyed only an easement. Because we affirm the district court's holding that the original deed conveyed a fee simple, the Rasmussens have no rights in the subject property on which to base a due process or eminent domain claim. The district court properly dismissed these claims.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

        This conclusion is based on the house of cards that Fletcher and Rothstein have built to hide the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.
        My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.



    The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2002) by Senior Ninth Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher.

F. Violations of Local Ordinances

The Rasmussens contend that King County violated various local ordinances in using the railroad right of way. These claims do not appear in the Rasmussens' Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims. The Rasmussens never amended their counterclaims to include these new claims. The district court did not consider them. Neither will we.

VI.

CONCLUSION

We affirm summary judgment in favor of King County because there are no genuine issues of fact that disparage King County's claim to a fee simple estate in the strip of land formerly used as a railroad right of way. Further, the district court properly dismissed the Rasmussens' counterclaims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b).

AFFIRMED.



        My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions in this "Conclusion" are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Conclusion by John Rasmussen:

    Where do I go to have my rights as an American citizen reinstated?

        I went to Federal District Court with evidence of a federal tax fraud scheme that not only stole millions from the American people, but stole hundreds of thousands from my family and my neighbors. Federal District Judge Barbara Jacobs Rothstein struck evidence of the fraud, denied my right to establish the facts, and then illegally used summary judgment to cover up the crimes of the powerful folks who worked the federal tax fraud scheme. I still believed in our judicial process. I believed I would get justice with this appeal.

        In this opinion, Senior Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher, Circuit Judge Ronald M. Gould, and Federal District Judge Mary H. Murguia made the choice to protect Judge Rothstein rather than to recognize and uphold my rights as an American citizen. They refused to expose the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. While there is dishonesty and misapplication of the law in essentially every paragraph of this opinion, I identify the most dishonest tactics with the hyperlinks directly below.

      * Judge Fletcher illegally allowed summary judgment.

        Summary judgment is allowed only when there is agreement with the material facts. I identify eight disputed material facts. Fletcher ignored the truth and used lies in the place of each of these facts.

          Open the section of this annotated opinion which discusses the illegal application of summary judgment.

      * Judge Fletcher changed the words in the deeds she construed.

        The grant of a right-of-way to a railroad has always been held to grant an easement under Washington common law. Judge Fletcher and her fellow federal judge, District Judge Rothstein, changed the words of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed when they construed its meaning. Fletcher and Rothstein state that a "strip of land" was conveyed to the railroad in spite of the fact that the deed states a "right of way" is conveyed.

          Open the section of this annotated opinion in which Judge Fletcher states that the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed grants a "strip of land".

        In her "analysis" of extrinsic evidence, Judge Fletcher changes the words in Hilchkanum's subsequent deeds and then analyzes her substituted language instead of the actual words in those deeds.

          Open the section of this annotated opinion in which Judge Fletcher changes the words in Hilchkanum's subsequent deeds, and then analyzes her substituted language rather than the actual language.

      * Judge Fletcher cherry-picked the intrinsic evidence in order to misrepresent the Hilchkanum's intentions.

        In her "analysis" of Hilchkanum's subsequent real estate deeds, Fletcher ignored the deeds in the chain of title of the land contested in the lawsuit and used less relevant subsequent deeds. As, explained above, Fletcher then changed the words in these less relevant deeds in her "analysis". Further, Fletcher refused to admit that the consequence of her dishonest analysis would have Hilchkanum selling his land twice.

          Open the section of this annotated opinion in which Judge Fletcher ignores and dismisses the significance of the deeds which destroy her argument, by declaring they provide not a "scintilla of evidence".

      * Judge Fletcher hid the common law opinion which destroys her argument, King County v. Squire (1990).

        Two SLS&E right-of-way deeds had been construed in Washington courts prior to the Hilchkanum deed. Both were found to be easements. Further, about twelve SLS&E deeds were involved in Lawson v. State (1986). My understanding is that King County admitted that they all conveyed easements to the Railway. The common law opinion which is most destructive to Judge Fletcher's dishonest argument is King County v. Squire (1990). Fletcher refused to even name Squire when she referred to our analysis of that opinion. More important, Fletcher refused to consider Squire when she was required to in her "analysis".

          Open the section of this annotated opinion in which Judge Fletcher ignores and refused to discuss King County v. Squire (1990).

      * Judge Fletcher became an active participant in the East Lake Sammamish Federal Tax Fraud Scheme by striking all evidence of the crime and adopting Norm Maleng's "Legal Theory".

        The East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme is the unstated event that is the reason for the complete dishonesty in this opinion. Judge Fletcher hid evidence of the tax fraud scheme by upholding the striking of that evidence which I presented to federal district court. Fletcher further hid the tax fraud scheme by adopting Norm Maleng's "legal theory", the dishonest legal argument concocted by Norm Maleng and his staff to cover their participation in the tax fraud.

          Open the section of this annotated opinion in which Judge Fletcher upholds the striking of evidence of the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.

          Open the section of this annotated opinion in which Judge Fletcher adopts Norm Maleng's "legal theory", which dishonestly contends the Washington State Supreme Court reversed one hundred years of common law in Brown v. State of Washington.

        We will always have dishonest judges, like Rothstein, Fletcher, Gould and Murguia, in our courts. That's why we have courts of appeal. A legitimate legal system corrects the bad opinions issued by crooked or incompetent judges. But, that didn't happen here. My appeal to have the opinion reviewed by the Ninth Circuit, en banc, was denied. The U.S. Supreme Court also refused to accept my appeal.

        I foolishly believed, at each level of government and every court level, that my rights would be recognized under the law and the Constitution. This never happened. I never found an honest politician who would stand up for the law. I never found an honest judge who would recognized my rights under the law.

        Neighbors of mine along Lake Sammamish, the Rays, took a "sister case" through State court. Since the Ray's property is located within the original Hilchkanum homestead, the State courts construed the same Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E that was "construed" in this opinion. The Rays lost, too. The Chief Judge of the Washington State Appeals Court, Division One, Ronald Cox, based his opinion on these dishonest federal decisions. The Washington State Supreme Court denied appeal. I believe that the most cowardly and dishonest decisions by appeals judges are the denial of appeal of worthy cases. The refusal of the Ray's appeal required no written justification or oral statement by the judges of the Washington State Supreme Court. These judges had a responsibility to protect the property rights of the Rays, and an obligation to correct the harm done to Washington State property law precedent by the federal judges. The Washington State Supreme Court had no moral or legal right to refuse the Ray's appeal, but they did.

      View my March 31, 2009 public letter to the Judges of the Washington State Supreme Court.

        With the exception of the judges of the U.S. Supreme Court, I believe that the judges at every level were aware of the dishonesty and corruption involved in these decisions, and were aware of the tax fraud scheme that influenced these federal decisions.

        The United States Supreme Court is isolated from we-the-people. It is unlikely the United States Supreme Court was aware of the federal tax fraud scheme that caused the theft of my land and the denial of my rights in court. But the United States Supreme Court is well aware that it overturns a disproportionate number of Ninth Circuit decisions. The Supreme Court is aware of the outright dishonesty of some of these decisions. Yet, the United States Supreme Court does nothing to correct the criminal activity of its lower court judges and protect the rights of Americans. The United States Supreme Court is ultimately responsible for these treasonous federal court decisions. By its policy of refusing to condemn dishonest lower court judges, the United States Supreme court became the enabler for the criminal actions against me in the Ninth Circuit.

        My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions in this "Conclusion" are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Listed below are the other opinions and rulings that relate to the issues I describe on this website:

      King County v. Rasmussen (2001)

      Ray v. King County (2004)

      Ray v. King County (2004) (Dissenting)

      Understand How My Complaint of Judicial Misconduct was Dismissed

      Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, February 10, 2004

      Schroeder denial of Complaint of Judicial Misconduct

    Reference:

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2002) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2002), with brief comments. (More readable!)



    The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2002) by Senior Ninth Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher.

Footnotes:

1. The Honorable Mary H. Murguia, United States District Court Judge for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.

2. To the extent a portion of the right of way bisects lot 5, that portion is not at issue in this quiet title action. King County bases its claim on the Hilchkanum deed conveying a right of way bisecting lots 1, 2, and 3 to the Railway. The County presented no deed conveying a right of way across lot 5 to the Railway.

3. The Rasmussens contend that King County has not provided evidence that it has an interest in a significant portion of the strip of land bisecting the Rasmussens' property. They claim that the only evidence provided by the County is a title insurance document that refers solely to the portion of the strip on Government Lot 3; only 3% of the subject strip is on Government Lot 3. However, King County has also provided the quitclaim deed by which TLC transferred its interest to King County. This deed indicates that the portion of the strip on Government Lot 2 was also conveyed; the Rasmussens assert that 96% of the strip lies on Government Lot 2. Thus, King County has submitted undisputed evidence that it has an interest in the subject property.

4. The Rasmussens claim that their failure to obtain prior approval to file over-length briefs was due to a miscommunication with the district court's law clerk. However, Rule 7 unambiguously requires prior approval to file briefs exceeding the page limitations set forth in the rule.

5. The Act provides that:
[A]ny person who has already settled or hereafter may settle on the public lands of the United States, either by pre-emption, or by virtue of the homestead law or any amendments thereto, shall have the right to transfer by warranty, against his or her own acts, any portion of his or her said pre-emption or homestead for church, cemetery, or school purposes, or for the right of way of railroads across such pre-emption or homestead, and the transfer for such public purposes shall in no way vitiate the right to complete and perfect the title to their pre-emptions or homesteads. Act of March 3, 1873, ch. 266, 17 Stat. 602 (1873) (emphasis added). This statute remains on the books, in slightly altered form, at 43 U.S.C. §174.

6. A finding of ambiguity in the language of the deed is not required to consider extrinsic evidence of the surrounding circumstances and the subsequent conduct of the parties. Brown, 924 P.2d at 912; Roeder Co. v. K&E Moving & Storage Co., 4 P.3d 839, 841 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).

7. The Brown court examined deeds created from 1906 to 1910.

8. The Washington courts in recent years have not given much weight to the amount of consideration in determining the intent of the parties, particularly if the record does not establish the consideration typically paid for easements as opposed to fee simple estates. For example, the Brown court did not give this factor much weight because it could not be ascertained from the record whether the consideration paid for the conveyances repre- sented the value of an easement or a fee simple. Brown, 924 P.2d at 914. Likewise, in Roeder, 4 P.3d at 842, the Washington Court of Appeals noted that the fact that nominal consideration was paid did not reveal much because railroads paid significant amounts for both easements and fee simple purchases. In this case, the Hilchkanums received no monetary consideration for the conveyance to the railroad. However, like the nominal consideration in Roeder, the lack of monetary consideration here reveals little about the Hilchkanums' intent. Both an easement and a fee simple would have had monetary value, but the Hilchkanums declined to require any payment.

9. Washington Revised Code § 64.04.030 states that every deed that follows the statutory warranty deed form "shall be deemed and held a conveyance in fee simple to the grantee, his heirs, and assignes . . . ." This rule originated in 1886. Roeder, 4 P.3d at 841 n.8.

10. In a previous case, the Washington Supreme Court had held that the legal description of the interest conveyed is part of the granting clause. Veach, 599 P.2d at 527. But Brown distinguished the language used in the legal description from the language used in the granting clause. Brown, 924 P.2d at 914.

11. The Hilchkanum deed is also captioned as a "Right of Way Deed." However, the Brown court rejected the contention that use of the term "right of way" in the caption would preclude a holding that a deed conveyed a fee simple interest. Brown, 924 P.2d at 915.

12. The deed provided: "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the County of King in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way one hundred (100) feet in width through our lands . . . ." DeGoojer Decl. Ex. 1 (emphasis added).

13. The Rasmussens provided evidence to the district court that Hilchkanum could not read or write the English language, suggesting that he was not aware of the wording in the deed and its effect. While the district court struck this argument from their response brief, the evidence itself was not struck. We have considered the evidence since it is part of the district court record. Nevertheless, the evidence indicates that Hilchkanum relied on friends in transacting his business. With the help of his friends, he was able to comply with the Homestead Act and make numerous conveyances of property. There is no evidence that his friends did not assist him with the transaction with the Railway such that he understood the deed's language and could reflect his intent therein.

14. The Rasmussens argue that the Hilchkanum deed incorrectly describes the boundaries of the right of way on which the railroad tracks lie. This does not alter King County's right to the strip of land in question. According to DD&L, Inc. v. Burgess, 51 Wn. App. 329, 753 P.2d 561, 564 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988), "[t]hough the monument referred to in a deed does not actually exist at the time the deed was drafted, but is afterward erected by the parties with the intention that it shall conform to the deed, it will control." The Hilchkanum deed describes the location of the railroad right of way by referring to railroad tracks not yet erected but which were erected with the intention that the location of the tracks would conform to the deed. Thus, the location of the tracks bisecting the Rasmussens' property controls.