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Ray v. King County, March 15, 2004

Dissenting Opinion

Court of Appeals Division I
State of Washington

    Gerald and Kathryn Ray, Appellants
    v.
    King County, Respondent

    Docket Number: 50105-4-I



    Note from John Rasmussen:

           This web page contains the dissenting opinion in Ray v. King County (2004), authored by Judge William W. Baker, Court of Appeals Division I, State of Washington.

           While there are serious errors in this weak dissenting opinion, the majority opinion is an obvious criminal act from the bench. In the majority opinion, Judges Cox and Schindler manufactured material facts which controlled the decision. They intentionally misapplied the law. Their opinion hides the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and protects the participants in the crime from prosecution. The judges resolved this lawsuit in violation of Washington State law. State law required a jury trial because of the disagreement with the material facts. No legitimate jury would agree with the contrived facts and misapplication of the law that was established in the majority opinion.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Read the majority opinion: Ray v. King County (2004).

    There are two versions of this dissenting opinion.

      1. The version you are viewing here is annotated to expose the disputed material facts which the judges "resolved" in violation of the rules of summary judgment

      2. A second version contains no annotated comments, and is in pdf format:

        View this dissenting opinion, Ray v. King County (2004), without my additional comments.

    This annotated version concentrates on the illegal use of summary judgment:

           It appears that abuse of summary judgment is rampant in our courts. Summary judgment is allowed only if there is agreement with the material facts. Dishonest judges control the outcome of the cases before them by dishonestly declaring that there is agreement with the material facts, allowing summary judgment, and then applying the law to whichever facts they choose. This annotated opinion concentrates on this illegal use of summary judgment. While Judge Baker correctly identifies the gross misapplication of the law by the majority, Baker fails to demand that the lawsuit be sent back to King County Superior Court for the resolution of the disputed material facts by a jury.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Understand the rules of summary judgment.

    Where is Squire?

           King County v. Squire (1990) is a Division One Opinion which destroys the majority's legal argument and exposes the weakness of this dissenting judge. Since Squire is a prior Division One decision, it is binding precedent on these Division One judges. In Squire, the court published the material portions of the Squire deed which were used to determine the issue of easement-or-fee. Further, the Squire court identified which words were altered and added by Territorial Governor Watson Squire. If one removes Governor Squire's changes, the Squire right-of-way deed to the SLS&E is materially identical to the Hilchkanum deed. Most important, the Squire court found that the words in the granting clause, which had been provided by the SLS&E Railway lawyers, granted an easement. The most important binding precedent to consider in the resolution of this lawsuit is ignored by this weak dissenting judge. This is pathetic, and begs the question: Did this dissenting judge soften his dissent in order to protect the criminal acts by his fellow State and federal judges? (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        View a study comparing the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds to the SLS&E.

        View the March 29, 1887 Squire right-of-way deed to the SLS&E.

        View the May 9, 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E.

        Understand that, prior to the ELS tax fraud scheme, all SLS&E deeds contested in King County courts were determined to be easements.

    Criminal Acts by the Washington State Supreme Court:

           When Ray v. King County (2004) was appealed to the Washington State Supreme Court, the Supreme Court judges denied appeal and allowed that monument-to-dishonesty to stand. The Supreme Court had no right to refuse appeal. While this weak dissenting opinion points out misapplication of the law, the profound dishonesty and violation of constitutional rights is understood by studying my annotated version of Ray v. King County (2004). There is no possibility that the judges of the Washington State Supreme Court made an error in their denial of review. Their denial is a criminal act by the highest court in Washington State.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Read my public letter to the Judges of the Washington Supreme Court accusing them of a criminal act in the denial of appeal of this lawsuit.

    Color Scheme:

           This dissenting opinion is presented in bold blue font. I have added my comments in black font, bracketed by horizontal reference lines, with hyperlinks to documents which support my points. As this annotated version mostly addresses the illegal application of summary judgment, most of my comments will be preceded with the words "Unresolved Material fact:".

    Reference:

      Read the majority opinion: Ray v. King County (2004).

      View this dissenting opinion, Ray v. King County (2004), without my additional comments.

      Understand the rules of summary judgment.



Court of Appeals Division I
State of Washington

Opinion Information Sheet
Docket Number: 50105-4-I

Title of Case: Gerald and Kathryn Ray, Appellants V King County, Respondent

File Date: 03/15/2004

SOURCE OF APPEAL
----------------
Appeal from Superior Court of King County
Docket No: 00-2-14946-8
Judgment or order under review
Date filed: 08/24/2001
Judge signing: Hon. Carol Schapira

JUDGES
------
Authored by Ronald E. Cox
Concurring: Ann Schindler
Dissenting: William W. Baker

COUNSEL OF RECORD
-----------------
Counsel for Appellant(s)
John Maurice Groen
Groen Stephens & Klinge LLP
2101 112th Ave NE
Bellevue, WA 98004-2944

Counsel for Respondent(s)
Scott David Johnson
King Co Admin Bldg
500 4th Ave Ste 900
Seattle, WA 98104-2316

Amicus Curiae on behalf of Building Industry Assn Of Washington
Kristopher Ian Tefft
Association of Washington Business
PO Box 658
Olympia, WA 98507-0658
Ray v. King County
No. 50105-4-I

     BAKER, J. (dissenting) - The majority concludes that the 1887 right of way deed between Bill Hilchkanum and Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway conveyed fee title. For a number of reasons I disagree, and conclude that the deed only conveyed an easement.

     First, contrary to the majority's conclusion, the evidence establishes that the handwritten deed was drafted by the railroad, and must therefore be construed against it. As King County concedes, Hilchkanum did not write the deed. Extrinsic evidence also supports concluding that the deed must be construed against the railroad. The language contained in the handwritten deed is identical to language used on pre-printed forms produced by the railroad. Hilchkanum's attorney, who signed as a witness, was an owner of the railroad. The Rays also provided an affidavit from their expert opining that the deed was drafted by the railroad.



      Unresolved Material fact:

             The authorship of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed is a material fact which bears strongly on the outcome of this lawsuit. Here, Judge Baker admits there is disagreement in the briefs, and between the judges, on this material fact. Authorship is important because a deed is construed against its author. (citation with my emphasis)

          "Initially, it should be noted that contract language subject to interpretation is construed most strongly against the party who drafted it, or whose attorney prepared it. Underwood v. Sterner, supra; Wise v. Farden, 53 Wn.2d 162, 332 P.2d 454 (1958); Restatement, Contracts SS 236 (d) (1932)."
          [Stickney v. Underwood (1966) - Citation is highlighted on page 3.]

             In its opinion, the majority dishonestly established the material fact that Hilchkanum was responsible for the words of his right-of-way deed, and then the majority construed the words in the deed against only him. The majority did this in spite of briefing and expert testimony provided by the Rays which showed that the Railway lawyers wrote the deed. Use the following link to read the portion of the annotated majority opinion where illegal assignment of authorship is discussed.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          Open the portion of the majority opinion where I discuss Judge Cox' illegally determination of who authored the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed.

             Authorship of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed is a disputed material fact which is required to be resolved by a jury. This requirement is explicitly spelled out in Rule 56 of the Superior Court Civil Rules, and more generally by the "due process clause" of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and in Section Three of the Washington State Constitution. Further, it is required by the Revised Code of Washington, as shown below.

          RCW 4.40.060 - Trial of certain issues of fact Jury.
               An issue of fact, in an action for the recovery of money only, or of specific real or personal property shall be tried by a jury, unless a jury is waived, as provided by law, or a reference ordered, as provided by statute relating to referees.

          RCW 4.44.090 - Questions of fact for jury.
               All questions of fact other than those mentioned in RCW 4.44.080, shall be decided by the jury, and all evidence thereon addressed to them.

             Judge Baker identifies authorship of the Hilchkanum deed as a disputed material fact but fails to demand that the lawsuit be sent back to King County Superior Court for resolution by a jury.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Reference:

        Understand the rules of summary judgment.

        Read the majority opinion: Ray v. King County (2004).

        View this dissenting opinion, Ray v. King County (2004), without my additional comments.



     The majority also mistakenly concludes that the Hilchkanum deed conveyed a strip of land.1 But the deed expressly states that 'we do hereby donate grant and convey . . . a right of way one hundred (100) feet in width through our lands . . . .' The term 'right of way strip' is found only in the legal description, not in the granting provision.



      Unresolved Material fact:

             What is conveyed in a deed is a material fact. This fact is generally determined by simply reading the deed. As Judge Baker states above, the 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed clearly states that a "right of way" is granted to the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway (SLS&E).

             When they construed the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, the majority changed the words in the granting clause by stating the deed grants a "strip of land" instead of a "right of way". In construing a railroad deed to determine easement or fee, "strip of land" and "right of way" are contradictory terms. There is no law which allows judges to change the words in a deed that they are construing. There is no legitimate legal precedent to substitute contradictory terms in a deed before construing it. If the parties to the Hilchkanum deed conveyed a "right-of-way" in the granting clause and intended for those words to mean "strip of land", then that bizarre material fact must be resolved by a jury because there is no basis in law for judges to make that substitution. It is obscene that the majority judges made this determination. In this case it was incumbent on the judges to send this issue of material fact to a jury. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

             This substitution of contradictory terms in the Hilchkanum deed was first contrived by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein in King County v. Rasmussen (2001), then again by Senior Federal Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher in King County v. Rasmussen (2002). Both of these judges violated constitutional rights, covered-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme, and intentionally misapplied the law in their opinions. Their decisions are criminal acts from the bench.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          Federal Judge Rothstein changed the words of the Hilchkanum deed in King County v. Rasmussen (2001).

          Federal Judge Fletcher changed the words of the Hilchkanum deed in King County v. Rasmussen (2002)

             The Ray majority opinion has very little original thought in it. Judge Cox simply copied Rothstein's and Fletcher's dishonesty throughout Ray v. King County (2004). The following link takes the reader to Cox' dishonest substitution of contradictory terms in Ray v. King County (2004).
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          Washington Appeals Judges Cox and Schindler changed the words of the Hilchkanum deed in the majority opinion of this lawsuit, Ray v. King County (2004).

        These dishonest judges ignored common law precedent:

             Prior to these dishonest Hilchkanum decisions, in every case that a "right-of-way" has been conveyed to a railroad in the granting clause, the Washington state courts have found that the deed granted an easement. This one hundred year old precedent was thrown out in the construing of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed because the judges needed to cover-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. These opinions are not legal precedent, but rather are crimes arrogantly committed from the bench. Below, I provide forty-four citations which explain the meaning of the words "right-of-way" in railroad deeds. Further, I single our fourteen citations which hold the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad conveys an easement. The Hilchkanum judges provided no citation which supports the substitution of "strip of land" for "right of way" in the granting clause of a railroad deed. There is none! (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          View forty-four citations explaining the meaning of the words "right-of-way" in railroad deeds.

          View fourteen citations holding the grant of a right-of-way conveys an easement.

             What is plainly written in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed is a fact. Since there is no law or precedent which allows changing the words in a deed, the meaning the parties to the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed intended with their words is a disputed material fact which must be resolved by a jury. This requirement is explicitly spelled out in Rule 56 of the Superior Court Civil Rules, and more generally by the "due process clause" of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and in Section Three of the Washington State Constitution. Further, it is required by the Revised Code of Washington, as shown below.

          RCW 4.40.060 - Trial of certain issues of fact Jury.
               An issue of fact, in an action for the recovery of money only, or of specific real or personal property shall be tried by a jury, unless a jury is waived, as provided by law, or a reference ordered, as provided by statute relating to referees.

          RCW 4.44.090 - Questions of fact for jury.
               All questions of fact other than those mentioned in RCW 4.44.080, shall be decided by the jury, and all evidence thereon addressed to them.

             Judge Baker complains about the majority's substitution of contradictory terms in the Hilchkanum deed, but fails to identify the intended meaning of the words in the deed as a disputed material fact which must be resolved by a jury. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Reference:

        Understand the rules of summary judgment.

        Read the majority opinion: Ray v. King County (2004).

        View this dissenting opinion, Ray v. King County (2004), without my additional comments.



     The majority points to certain subsequent conduct by Hilchkanum to support its conclusion that he intended to convey fee title to the railroad. But these subsequent conveyances only establish that Hilchkanum understood that the railway had a right of way across his lands. The majority ignores other conveyances by Hilchkanum which indicate that he only intended to convey an easement to the railroad.



      Unresolved Material fact:

             The intentions of a party in a deed is a material fact. This is the most critical material fact in resolving the effect of a deed. Here are two citations which explain this well understood precedent. (citations with my emphasis)

          "In general, when construing a deed, the intent of the parties is of paramount importance and the court's duty to ascertain and enforce."
          [Brown v. State of Washington (1996)]

          "The interpretation of a right of way deed is a mixed question of fact and law. /4 Determining the parties' intent is a factual question and the courts must look to the entire document in order to ascertain such intent."
          [Roeder v. BNSF (1986)]

             In determining the intentions of the parties to a deed, the primary consideration is to construe the deed itself. While the intentions of the parties in a deed is a material fact, the construing of the deed is an exercise in legal interpretation. This appears to be a limited situation where questions of material fact (the party's intentions) become a function of the court. In the previous note, I discussed the majority's out-of-bounds analysis of the Hilchkanum granting clause. There, the majority substituted contradictory terms in the granting clause when it construed the deed. In that case, the majority failed to apply any law or legitimate precedent in its analysis. Instead, majority determined the material fact that the parties to the Hilchkanum deed intended for the words in their deed to have a meaning that is contrary to their precedential understanding. In that situation, the interpretation of the words in a deed must go to a jury to determine the party's intentions.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          "The instruments of conveyance should reflect the intention of the parties. Gold Bar v. Gold Bar Lumber Co., 109 Wash. 391, 393-94, 186 P. 896 (1920), held:

            [T]he intent of the parties must primarily be gathered from a fair consideration of the deed, and the language employed therein should be consistent with the terms of the deed, including its scope and subject-matter; that the object, in construing the deed, is to ascertain the intention of the parties, especially that of the grantor; that some meaning should be given to every word, clause and expression, if it can reasonably be done and if it is not inconsistent with the general intent of the whole instrument, so that the deed may operate according to the intention of the parties; . . .
          [Zobrist v. Culp (1977)]

             While, the words of a deed are the primary consideration in determining the intentions of the parties, other factors are considered too, In determining the intent of the parties to a deed, common law also allows consideration of extrinsic evidence such as the circumstances at the time of the deed and the subsequent conduct of the parties. This extrinsic evidence establishes contributing material facts which add to the understanding of the primary material fact, which is the intentions of the parties. Here's a citation which explains.

          "The intention of the grantor may be determined from the language contained in the granting clause of the deed, the circumstances surrounding its execution, and the subsequent conduct of the parties with relation thereto."
          [Scott v. Wallitner (1956)]

             In his analysis above, Judge Baker states that the majority "ignores other conveyances" which would cause the majority to come to a different conclusion. These "other conveyances" are extrinsic evidence, as explained in the above citation. The intentions of the parties in these "other conveyances" are material facts which contribute to the understanding of the intentions of the parties to the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. Since Baker and the Ray's attorney dispute the Hilchkanum's intentions in these "other conveyances", this establishes a "question of fact". Baker failed to admit that the contribution of those "other conveyances", to the understanding of the Hilchkanum's intentions, was the function of a jury. In common law, "questions of fact" belong to a jury.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

             What the majority actually did was to "cherry-pick" Hilchkanum's subsequent real estate deeds and then misconstrue those "cherry-picked" deeds to determine the "paramount" material fact in the lawsuit: the Hilchkanum's intentions in their right-of-way deed. Based on the judges dishonest analysis of the "cherry picked" deeds, the deeds they ignored would have sold Hilchkanum's land for a second time. Since these excluded deeds proved the judges reasoning wrong, the judges simply stated they were "not probative of the grantors' intent" and ignored their effect. It is hard to imagine how Judges Cox and Schindler could be any more dishonest. But, of course, they were just copying the dishonest analysis used by the federal judges in King County v. Rasmussen. Below, I provide links to the discussion of this dishonesty and illegal resolution of material fact in the three decisions which construed the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          Understand how Judge Cox misrepresented the legal meaning of the exception of a right-of-way in Ray v. King County (2004).

          Understand how Judge Cox "cherry-picked" the extrinsic evidence in the process of illegally resolving the intentions of the Hilchkanums in Ray v. King County (2004).

          Understand how Federal Judge Barbara Rothstein "cherry-picked" and misrepresented the extrinsic evidence in King County v. Rasmussen (2001).

          Understand how Federal Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher "cherry-picked" and misrepresented the extrinsic evidence in King County v. Rasmussen (2002).

             In common law, the Hilchkanum's intentions in these subsequent deeds is a material fact. Since their intentions were in dispute, Judge Cox was required to send this fact to a jury for resolution. This requirement is explicitly spelled out in Rule 56 of the Superior Court Civil Rules, and more generally by the "due process clause" of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and in Section Three of the Washington State Constitution. Further, it is required by the Revised Code of Washington, as shown below.

          RCW 4.40.060 - Trial of certain issues of fact Jury.
               An issue of fact, in an action for the recovery of money only, or of specific real or personal property shall be tried by a jury, unless a jury is waived, as provided by law, or a reference ordered, as provided by statute relating to referees.

          RCW 4.44.090 - Questions of fact for jury.
               All questions of fact other than those mentioned in RCW 4.44.080, shall be decided by the jury, and all evidence thereon addressed to them.

             Judge Baker identifies the intentions of the Hilchkanums in their subsequent real estate deeds as a disputed material fact, but fails to demand that it be resolved by a jury.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Reference:

        Understand the rules of summary judgment.

        Read the majority opinion: Ray v. King County (2004).

        View this dissenting opinion, Ray v. King County (2004), without my additional comments.



     When the language of the deed is properly construed against the railroad, the granting clause conveys only a right of way.

     Language in the deed must be construed against the railroad.

     It is a well established principle that ambiguity must be construed against the grantor.2 But as we explained in Harris v. Ski Park Farms, Inc.,3 when the grantee drafts the deed, this rule does not apply.4 Hilchkanum was illiterate and the handwritten deed contained identical language to that found in a contemporaneous pre-printed deed bearing the railroad's name. The Rays also submitted an affidavit from an expert who opined that 'given the use of pre-printed deeds, and given Hilchkanum's illiteracy, there appears no doubt that Hilchkanum did not draft the deed; but rather, it was the product of the railroad company.'

     The majority states that because Hilchkanum must have understood the nature and extent of his conveyance, the fact that the deed was handwritten by someone else is of no consequence. And the majority holds that because there is nothing in the record indicating that the drafter was an agent of the railway, Hilchkanum must have been the drafter. This conclusion wrongly focuses on the identity of the grantor instead of the identity of the drafter of the deed. It is undisputed that the deed's language was taken from the railroad's standard deed. And the affidavit by the Rays' expert creates a material question of fact concerning who actually drafted the document. Taking this affidavit in a light most favorable to the Rays as the nonmoving party, any ambiguities in the deed must be construed against the railroad.5



      Unresolved Material fact:

             In his above paragraph, Judge Baker states that "...the affidavit by the Rays' expert creates a material question of fact concerning who actually drafted the document." With that statement, Baker explicitly states that there is disagreement with a critical material fact in the resolution of the lawsuit. The Constitution and the law require disputed material facts to be resolved by a jury. This issue of disputed material facts is the primary consideration in allowing summary judgment. After stating that there was a "material question of fact", Baker was required to then make the statement that the only legitimate resolution of this "material question of fact" must be made by a jury. Did Baker go to law school? The difference between "fact" and the "law" is elementary. I believe that lesson is taught about the first day.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

             The authorship of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed is a material fact which bears strongly on the outcome of this lawsuit. I discussed this issue at the beginning of this annotated opinion and will repeat that discussion here. Above, Judge Baker admits there is disagreement in the briefs, and between the judges, on this material fact. Authorship is important because a deed is construed against its author. (citation with my emphasis)

          "Initially, it should be noted that contract language subject to interpretation is construed most strongly against the party who drafted it, or whose attorney prepared it. Underwood v. Sterner, supra; Wise v. Farden, 53 Wn.2d 162, 332 P.2d 454 (1958); Restatement, Contracts SS 236 (d) (1932)."
          [Stickney v. Underwood (1966) - Citation is highlighted on page 3.]

             In its opinion, the majority dishonestly established the material fact that Hilchkanum was author of his right-of-way deed, and then the majority construed the words in the deed against only him. The majority did this in spite of briefing and expert testimony provided by the Rays which showed that the Railway lawyers wrote the deed. Use the following link to read the portion of the annotated majority opinion where illegal assignment of authorship is discussed. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          Open the portion of the majority opinion where I discuss Judge Cox' illegally determination of who authored the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed.

             Authorship of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed is a disputed material fact which is required to be resolved by a jury. This requirement is explicitly spelled out in Rule 56 of the Superior Court Civil Rules, and more generally by the "due process clause" of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and in Section Three of the Washington State Constitution. Further, it is required by the Revised Code of Washington, as shown below.

          RCW 4.40.060 - Trial of certain issues of fact Jury.
               An issue of fact, in an action for the recovery of money only, or of specific real or personal property shall be tried by a jury, unless a jury is waived, as provided by law, or a reference ordered, as provided by statute relating to referees.

          RCW 4.44.090 - Questions of fact for jury.
               All questions of fact other than those mentioned in RCW 4.44.080, shall be decided by the jury, and all evidence thereon addressed to them.

             Judge Baker identifies authorship of the Hilchkanum deed as a "material question of fact", but fails to demand that the lawsuit be sent back to King County Superior Court for resolution of this and the other "material question[s] of fact" by a jury.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Reference:

        Understand the rules of summary judgment.

        Read the majority opinion: Ray v. King County (2004).

        View this dissenting opinion, Ray v. King County (2004), without my additional comments.



     Hilchkanum's use of the term 'right of way' granted only an easement Washington courts have given special significance to the words 'right of way' in railroad deeds, explaining that the term 'right of way' generally creates only an easement when used 'as a limitation or to specify the purpose of the grant.'6 In fact, most Washington cases have construed 'right of way' language in such instruments as granting only an easement to the railroad.7

     The majority discounts Veach v. Culp8 because it did not consider the full range of factors later articulated in Brown v. State.9 But Brown cites Veach with approval. The majority's selective reading of our Supreme Court's precedent is unsupported by the Brown decision. Veach clarified the rule set forth in the earlier case of Morsbach v. Thurston County,10 that merely using the term 'right of way' in a granting clause is enough to establish that the original grantor intended only to convey an easement.11 In Brown, our Supreme Court explained this holding by stating that a 'deed in statutory form grants {an} easement where additional language in the deed expressly and clearly limits or qualifies the interest granted.'12

     Conversely, when the deed contains no language relating to the purpose of the grant or limiting the estate conveyed, and it conveys a definite strip of land, the deed will be construed to convey fee simple title.13 Here, Hilchkanum did explain the purpose of the grant ('the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway') and limited the estate conveyed ('we do hereby donate grant and convey . . . a right of way').

     The majority opinion extensively analyzes various factors discussed in Brown, and concludes that conveyance of fee simple title was Hilchkanum's intent. But in Brown, the court analyzed prior case law and noted that 'use of the term 'right of way' as a limitation or to specify the purpose of the grant generally creates only an easement.'14 That term is used in the deed in question, both in its title and in its granting clause. In contrast, the deeds considered in Brown expressly conveyed fee title to definite strips of land. No such language appears in the Hilchkanum deed's granting clause. Further, although the deed does not explicitly limit the grant to railroad purposes, the consideration recited immediately above the right of way grant does state that to be the purpose of the deed. The majority ignores this language when concluding that there is nothing in the deed limiting the grant to operating a railroad.15

     For example, in Swan v. O'Leary,16 the deed stated that the conveyance was 'for the purpose of a Railroad.'17 And in Morsbach, the deed explained that the right of way was 'for the construction of said company's railroad.'18 Here, although there are no explicit words limiting the right of way to railroad use, the Hilchkanum deed does explain that the purpose of the grant was for 'the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway.'

     A reversionary clause in not necessary to convey only an easement The majority places great emphasis on the absence of a reversionary clause in the subject deed. But a railroad right of way deed need not contain a reverter clause to effect an automatic reversion to the grantor upon abandonment.19 As Hanson Industries, Inc. v. County of Spokane20 notes, railroad rights of way expire automatically upon abandonment.21 And in Veach, our Supreme Court found that a railroad owned only an easement, despite the absence of a limiting or reversionary clause.22 The Veach court explained that language intending to limit the grant was only 'one element in examining the whole of the deed.'23 Instead, the court focused on the use of 'right of way' in the granting clause, and concluded that the original grantor intended to limit the right of way to only an easement.24 In King County v. Squire Inv. Co,25 we noted that the phrase 'so long as' in the habendum arguably suggested conveyance of a fee simple determinable.26 But because language in the granting clause strongly suggested conveyance of an easement, we concluded that Squire had instead inserted this language to clarify that he was granting an easement.27

     And in Hanson Industries, Division Three also found an easement despite the absence of a limiting or reversionary clause.28 As a recent article explains, a reversionary clause is not necessary to conclude that the landowner only granted an easement:

    If a railroad acquired a perpetual or general easement, then the easement exists in perpetuity, regardless of whether or not the company operates a railroad on the land. These rare perpetual or general easements are found only where no language in the grant specifies the type of use the railroad may make of the land.{29}

     It is clear that the Hilchkanum deed did not include a reversionary clause. But contrary to the majority's interpretation of the Brown decision, this does not necessarily mean that Hilchkanum intended to convey fee title.30 As Wright and Hester explain, the fact that a grantor (Hilchkanum) did not limit the right of way to railroad use may only serve to make the grant an unconditional easement.31

     Absence of exceptions or reservations is indicative of intent to grant an easement.

     Another important factor in the Brown deeds was the presence of reservations by the grantors. The court found these significant in establishing that the railroad had obtained fee simple title, because had the railroad only obtained an easement, the grantors would not have needed to explicitly reserve access crossings and irrigation ditches: Several of the deeds reserve or except the right of the grantor to make some use of the land conveyed . . . . The reservation or exception of mineral or irrigation rights is consistent with the conveyance of a fee; it would not have been necessary to reserve such rights had the parties intended an easement because the grantors would have retained use of the land. Similarly, the obligation to construct or maintain farm crossings or irrigation channels is consistent with the conveyance of fee simple title. These provisions secure easements to the grantors across the land conveyed to Milwaukee, and probably would have been unnecessary had Milwaukee only held the rights of way as easements.{32}

     The Hilchkanums made no exceptions in their deed even though the granted right of way bisected their land. The majority fails to acknowledge that this factor supports concluding that Hilchkanum only granted an easement. Language in Hilchkanum's deed conveying the right to cut dangerous trees is not evidence that Hilchkanum intended to grant fee title. The majority also holds that the 'dangerous trees' easement supports concluding that the right of way deed granted fee title because the easement grant is more limited than the right of way grant in the same deed. Specifically, the deed grants the railway the right to 'go upon the land adjacent to said line . . . and cut down' dangerous trees within 200 feet of the centerline of the track. But railroad corporations were prohibited from appropriating rights of way wider than 200 feet.33 The railroad's right to cut trees extended outside of the right of way area allowed by the territorial code because the easement allowing the railroad the right to cut trees was distinct from its right of way. This secondary access grant was not exclusive, as the right of way was, and terminated if the railroad use terminated, whereas the railroad right of way was exclusive and akin to a street right of way. Subsequent behavior by the parties is inconclusive to show intent The majority also concludes that subsequent behavior by the parties supports a conclusion that the deed conveyed fee title.34 The majority focuses on three subsequent deeds that acknowledge the presence of the railroad right of way, while ignoring an earlier deed that does not make any such reservations. The majority justifies this by explaining that Hilchkanum's failure to reserve the right of way is not probative of whether or not the parties intended to convey a fee simple estate.35 But we should not selectively emphasize Hilchkanum's subsequent conveyances. Instead, we should conclude that the subsequent behavior of the parties does not aid our inquiry because it does not conclusively show that Hilchkanum intended to convey either an easement or fee title. Moreover, Hilchkanum granted the deed omitting reference to the right of way in 1890, just three years after granting the railway right of way. The deeds that the majority focuses on were granted much later Hilchkanum's grant to his wife was 11 years after the railway grant, and the other two several years after that. While this is not conclusive evidence of Hilchkanum's intent, it is interesting that the deed closest in time to the subject conveyance omitted any reference to the railroad right of way. If that right of way was owned in fee by the railroad, the omission was strange indeed.

     The majority concludes that the three later deeds show that Hilchkanum intended to convey the right of way as fee, and not as an easement. But if Hilchkanum had conveyed a fee to the railroad, he would not have used the term 'right of way' and instead would have simply indicated that the land itself was previously conveyed to the railroad.



      Unresolved Material fact:

             In his analysis above, Judge Baker states that "The majority concludes that the three later deeds show that Hilchkanum intended to convey the right of way as fee, and not as an easement." Since the intentions of a party in a deed is a material fact, and that material fact was in dispute, the majority had no legal right to make that determination. In this case the majority manufactured unjustified intentions for the Hilchkanums in their 1887 right-of-way deed by "cherry-picking" Hilchkanum's subsequent real estate deeds and then misapplying the law when construing them. While there were a number of deeds which did not except the right-of-way, all of the "cherry-picked" deeds excepted the right-of-way. Using only their hand-picked evidence, the majority then incorrectly concluded that the exception of a right-of-way excepts the land under the right-of-way. That is not a fair consideration of the extrinsic evidence and it is not the correct legal analysis of the extrinsic evidence. Both of these issues are discussed in this note.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

             The intentions of a party in a deed is a material fact. This is the most critical material fact in resolving the effect of a deed. This issue was discussed near the top of this annotated opinion and parts of that discussion will be repeated here. Here are two citations which explain this well understood precedent. (citations with my emphasis)

          "In general, when construing a deed, the intent of the parties is of paramount importance and the court's duty to ascertain and enforce."
          [Brown v. State of Washington (1996)]

          "The interpretation of a right of way deed is a mixed question of fact and law. /4 Determining the parties' intent is a factual question and the courts must look to the entire document in order to ascertain such intent."
          [Roeder v. BNSF (1986)]

             In determining the intentions of the parties to a deed, the primary consideration is to construe the deed itself. While the intentions of the parties in a deed is a material fact, the construing of the deed is an exercise in legal interpretation. This appears to be a limited situation where questions of material fact (the party's intentions) become a function of the court. Near the top of this annotated opinion, I discussed the majority's out-of-bounds analysis of the Hilchkanum granting clause. There, the majority substituted contradictory terms in the granting clause when it construed the deed. In that case, the majority failed to apply any law or legitimate precedent in its analysis. Instead, majority determined the material fact that the parties to the Hilchkanum deed intended for the words in their deed to have a meaning that is contrary to their precedential understanding. In that situation, the interpretation of the words in a deed must go to a jury to determine the party's intentions.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          "The instruments of conveyance should reflect the intention of the parties. Gold Bar v. Gold Bar Lumber Co., 109 Wash. 391, 393-94, 186 P. 896 (1920), held:

            [T]he intent of the parties must primarily be gathered from a fair consideration of the deed, and the language employed therein should be consistent with the terms of the deed, including its scope and subject-matter; that the object, in construing the deed, is to ascertain the intention of the parties, especially that of the grantor; that some meaning should be given to every word, clause and expression, if it can reasonably be done and if it is not inconsistent with the general intent of the whole instrument, so that the deed may operate according to the intention of the parties; . . .
          [Zobrist v. Culp (1977)]

             While, the words of a deed are the primary consideration in determining the intentions of the parties, other factors are considered too, In determining the intent of the parties to a deed, common law also allows consideration of extrinsic evidence such as the circumstances at the time of the deed and the subsequent conduct of the parties. This extrinsic evidence establishes contributing material facts which add to the understanding of the primary material fact, which is the intentions of the parties. Here's a citation which explains.

          "The intention of the grantor may be determined from the language contained in the granting clause of the deed, the circumstances surrounding its execution, and the subsequent conduct of the parties with relation thereto."
          [Scott v. Wallitner (1956)]

             In order to falsely establish the intentions of the Hilchkanums in their 1887 right-of-way deed, the majority ignored the subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deeds which did not except the right-of-way. All three Hilchkanum opinions ignored the legal implication of those deeds. In King County v. Rasmussen (2001), Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein stated that all the Hilchkanum subsequent real estate deeds excepted the right-of-way. Rothstein simply lied. On appeal, we challenged Rothstein's lie and showed that none of the most relevant subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deeds, which were associated with the Rasmussen lawsuit, excepted the right-of-way. In King County v. Rasmussen (2002), Federal Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher declared these deeds which failed to except the right-of-way "not significantly probative" of the Hilchkanum's intentions. In the Ray majority opinion, Judge Cox agrees with Fletcher and finds these excluded deeds to be "not probative".
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

             The subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deeds which did not except the right-of-way were very important to consider in the analysis. The federal and state judges had no right to ignore their effect. Since the majority decided that Hilchkanum had previously granted the land under the right-of-way to the SLS&E Railway in his 1887 deed, the majority was then required to conclude that the subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deeds which did not except the right-of-way would have sold that land a second time. Of course, selling land twice is a violation of common law which the majority judges should not have ignored or dishonestly declared to be "not probative". In this weak dissent, Judge Baker alludes to this issue but fails to discuss the consequences of the majority's analysis. I repeat his statement here.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          "The majority concludes that the three later deeds show that Hilchkanum intended to convey the right of way as fee, and not as an easement. But if Hilchkanum had conveyed a fee to the railroad, he would not have used the term 'right of way' and instead would have simply indicated that the land itself was previously conveyed to the railroad."
          [Baker's statement above.]

             The majority incorrectly construed the subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deeds which excepted the right-of-way, and then hid their flawed analysis by refusing to consider the deeds which did not except the right-of-way. The following hyperlinks explain.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          Understand how Judge Cox misrepresented the legal meaning of the exception of a right-of-way in Ray v. King County (2004).

          Understand how Judge Cox "cherry-picked" the extrinsic evidence in the process of illegally resolving the intentions of the Hilchkanums in Ray v. King County (2004).

          Understand how Federal Judge Barbara Rothstein "cherry-picked" and misrepresented the extrinsic evidence in King County v. Rasmussen (2001).

          Understand how Federal Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher "cherry-picked" and misrepresented the extrinsic evidence in King County v. Rasmussen (2002).

             As I explained above, the intentions of the Hilchkanums in their 1887 right-of-way deed is a material fact. While the words of the deed are the most important element in determining the intentions of a party, extrinsic evidence such as the circumstances at the time of the deed and the subsequent conduct of the parties is also considered. I believe it is common for judges to establish the intentions of the parties by legally construing the deed. Since each word and phrase in a deed has a legal meaning, as does the deed considered as a whole, it may be proper for the judge to determine this material fact (the intentions of a party in a deed) if the only consideration is the deed. But in King County v. Rasmussen and Ray v. King County the judges exceeded that authority (if it even exists). Instead of providing a legal analysis of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, the judges ignored the legal implication of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed and instead determined the intentions of the Hilchkanums by "cherry-picking" the extrinsic evidence. This is not an authority allowed the judge. This is a manipulation of the intentions of a party in a deed. Therefore, this is a manipulation of the most important material fact. In common law, we require that this disputed material fact (the intentions of a party in a deed) be resolved by a jury for exactly the reason we see here. If disputed material facts are resolved by the judges, they can guarantee whatever outcome they choose. This is exactly what happened in King County v. Rasmussen and Ray v. King County.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

             In common law, the Hilchkanum's intentions in these subsequent deeds is a material fact. Since their intentions were in dispute, Judge Cox was required to send this fact to a jury for resolution. This requirement is explicitly spelled out in Rule 56 of the Superior Court Civil Rules, and more generally by the "due process clause" of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and in Section Three of the Washington State Constitution. Further, it is required by the Revised Code of Washington, as shown below.

          RCW 4.40.060 - Trial of certain issues of fact Jury.
               An issue of fact, in an action for the recovery of money only, or of specific real or personal property shall be tried by a jury, unless a jury is waived, as provided by law, or a reference ordered, as provided by statute relating to referees.

          RCW 4.44.090 - Questions of fact for jury.
               All questions of fact other than those mentioned in RCW 4.44.080, shall be decided by the jury, and all evidence thereon addressed to them.

             In his above analysis, Judge Baker identifies the intentions of the Hilchkanums in their subsequent real estate deeds as a disputed material fact, but fails to demand that the issue be resolved by a jury.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Reference:

        Understand the rules of summary judgment.

        Read the majority opinion: Ray v. King County (2004).

        View this dissenting opinion, Ray v. King County (2004), without my additional comments.



     The second deed that the majority relies upon also uses the term 'right of way,' but as a point of reference forming one border of the property. Use of the term 'right of way' in this manner has no bearing on whether Hilchkanum believed he had conveyed an easement or fee.

     As with street easements, although the abutting owner might refer to the boundary as the adjacent street, this does not necessarily mean that the abutting owner does not also own to the centerline of the street. Because railroad easements like street easements are exclusive, referencing them in the deed as a right of way does not establish that the owner transferred fee title to the railroad.

     I acknowledge that in King County v. Rasmussen,36 a federal district court interpreted the Hilchkanum deed and held that it conveyed fee simple title to the right of way.37 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the term 'right of way' appeared in the Hilchkanum deed's granting clause as well as in the legal description. But the court did not find the phrase determinative of intent, because the language did not clearly limit the use of the land to a specific purpose.38 The court went on to explain that in 'virtually all cases' finding that the term 'right of way' only granted an easement, the granting or habendum clause contained language clearly limiting the use of the land to a specific purpose.39 The court concluded that Hilchkanum's deed did not restrict the conveyance by designating a specific purpose, limiting use of the land, or adding a reversionary clause.40 Noticeably absent from the court's discussion on this issue was any reference to Veach.



      Note from John Rasmussen:

             Above, Judge Baker refers to my lawsuit in federal court. The King County v. Rasmussen opinions are criminal acts from the bench by federal judges who know they will not be held responsible. King County v. Rasmussen was filed by King County after I discovered the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and challenged the County to explain its criminal actions. There is no question that Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein actively participated in the tax fraud scheme with her opinion. Submitted evidence of the tax fraud was struck by Rothstein on a motion from King County. She then failed to turn that un-refuted evidence over to federal prosecutors. Rothstein granted herself complete control of the lawsuit by allowing summary judgment in the face of a number of disputed material facts. Rothstein misapplied common law in the construing of the 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way-deed to the SLS&E. She ignored the legal precedent set in King County v. Squire (1990), an opinion which construed a SLS&E right-of-way deed which had granting language identical to Hilchkanum's. After misstating common law and ignoring legal precedent, Rothstein illegally determined Hilchkanum's intentions in his right-of-way deed by "cherry-picking" the extrinsic evidence. She based her analysis on Norm Maleng's "legal theory", a dishonest legal analysis of railroad right-of-way law concocted by Norm Maleng and his staff after he accepted a phony donation of all the land under the ELS right-of-way. In addition to his "legal theory", Maleng altered public documents which showed that he knew he was accepting a phony donation of land that BNSF did not own.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

             On appeal of the federal district court opinion, the three judge panel, headed by Senior Federal Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher, supported every dishonest point in Rothstein's opinion. In this opinion, Ray v. King County, the majority use all the same dishonest tactics. Fletcher's and Cox' opinions are little more than copies of Judge Rothstein's. We have profound dishonesty in our courts because appeals judges willingly suspend the Constitution and the law in order to protect their fellow judges who have committed criminal acts from the bench. We've lost the legal branch of our government to arrogant judges who rule by the misuse of the power we grant to enforce our laws.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

             In his above paragraph, Judge Baker shows that he doesn't understand that common tactics were used in the Rasmussen and Ray opinions. Baker states: "Noticeably absent from the court's discussion on this issue was any reference to Veach." Of course, he is wrong. Judge Rothstein discussed Veach and established the same dishonest legal analysis that was used in the other two opinions. Here is the citation from King County v. Rasmussen (2001) which shows that Judge Baker did not carefully read the opinion before making his statement that it did not address Veach.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          "One Washington case did find that a deed containing the term "right of way" without additional limiting language granted an easement rather than a fee. Veach v. Culp, 92 Wn.2d 570, 599 P.2d 526 (1979). Veach, however did not analyze the circumstances surrounding the transfer or the subsequent behavior of the parties. Evidence on both factors exists here and provides context that was lacking in Veach."
          [King County v. Rasmussen (2001)]

             In her analysis of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, Rothstein ignored King County v. Squire because it destroys her analysis. Instead she changed the words in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed and claimed it granted a "strip of land" instead of a "right of way". She incorporated the dishonest legal argument concocted by King County which I've named "Norm Maleng's legal theory". Rothstein then admitted that the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed was similar to the deed in Veach, but distinguished the two in the light of her "cherry-picked" extrinsic evidence (Hilchkanum's subsequent real estate deeds). Marching in "lock step", Fletcher used the same dishonest analysis. Then, contrary to Baker's statement above, Cox used exactly the same dishonest legal analysis in Ray v. King County (2004). There is essentially no original or honest analysis in the Ray v. King County (2004).
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Reference:

        Understand the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.

        View evidence of the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.

        Identify the active participants in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.

        Read my "whistle blower" email to the King County leadership on February 7, 2000.

        Read my in-depth analysis of King County v. Rasmussen (2001).

        Read my in-depth analysis of King County v. Rasmussen (2002).

        Understand how a comparison of the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds to the SLS&E destroys the analysis in King County v. Rasmussen and Ray v. King County.

        Understand Norm Maleng's "legal theory".

        Understand the rules of summary judgment.



     On appeal, the Ninth Circuit distinguished Veach on the basis of (1) other language in the Hilchkanum deed and (2) extrinsic evidence indicating an intent to convey a fee simple estate, neither of which was present in Veach.41 For reasons discussed above, I disagree with the Rasmussen court's analysis.

Conclusion

     Use of the term 'right of way' in the granting clause of the Hilchkanum deed did not conclusively establish that Hilchkanum only granted the railroad an easement. But because Washington courts give great weight to the term 'right of way' when it is used in the granting clause, and nothing else establishes that Hilchkanum instead intended to grant the railroad fee title, I conclude that the conveyance granted only an easement. I therefore dissent.



      Conclusion by John Rasmussen:

      Baker failed in his duty to defend the Ray's Constitutional rights.

             Judge Baker is correct in his analysis of the Hilchkanum deed, but fails to protest the violation of constitutional rights in the denial of the Ray's right for a jury to resolve disputed material facts. Baker fails to protest the majority's illegal use of summary judgment in the face of these disputed material facts.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Judge Ronald Cox and Judge Ann Schindler participated in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.

             The profound dishonesty in the legal analysis and the denial of the right to a jury is the proof that Cox and Schindler knowingly participated in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. While I doubt that John Groen, the Ray's attorney, described the tax fraud scheme in his briefs, the proof of these judge's involvement is in the complete dishonesty of their opinion and the fact that they use the identical dishonest tactics which were used in the King County v. Rasmussen federal opinions.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      The Washington State Supreme Court participated in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.

             The denial of appeal of this opinion at the Washington State Supreme Court is an act of cowardice, dishonesty, and betrayal by the highest judges in the State. These judges ignored the Constitution and the laws of the State in their denial of appeal. The only possibility for the Washington Supreme Court to deny appeal is for the judges to have been made aware of the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and then to have decided to cover-up the crime by refusing to correct this lower court opinion. Not only were the Rays harmed, but significant harm was done to Washington property law in King County v. Rasmussen (2001), King County v. Rasmussen (2002), and Ray v. King County (2004). A new precedent was established which allows judges to change the words in a deed and then construe their substituted language. Another new precedent was set which allows judges to ignore the words in a deed and instead use "cherry-pick" intrinsic evidence to determine the intentions of the parties to a deed. By refusing appeal, the Washington State Supreme Court has adopted Norm Maleng's "legal theory", the dishonest legal analysis which holds that the Washington State Supreme Court threw out one hundred years of consistently enforced precedent in its Brown v. State of Washington (1996) opinion. Now, the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad in the granting clause of a deed can mean whatever satisfies the whim of the judge construing the deed. The words "right-of-way" in the granting clause are no longer "magic words" which always convey an easement. The Washington State Supreme Court denied the Ray's right of due process by agreeing with the lower court's illegal use of summary judgment. The Supreme Court let stand Ray v. King County (2004) with the knowledge that the Supreme Court was acting criminally from the bench by denying appeal. The Court's decision to participate in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme establishes anarchy as the rule of law in all the courts of Washington State. It establishes the right of the judges of the State to misuse their power in order to guarantee a predetermined outcome to a lawsuit. The Washington State Supreme Court committed a criminal act in its denial of the Ray's appeal.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          View my March 31, 2009 public letter to the Judges of the Washington State Supreme Court.

      Reference:

        Understand the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.

        View evidence of the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.

        Identify the active participants in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.

        Read my "whistle blower" email to the King County leadership on February 7, 2000.

        Read my in-depth analysis of King County v. Rasmussen (2001).

        Read my in-depth analysis of King County v. Rasmussen (2002).

        Understand how a comparison of the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds to the SLS&E destroys the analysis in King County v. Rasmussen and Ray v. King County.

        Understand Norm Maleng's "legal theory".

        Understand the rules of summary judgment.



Footnotes:

1 Majority Op. at 12.

2 Hodgins v. State, 9 Wn. App. 486, 492, 513 P.2d 304 (1973).

3 62 Wn. App. 371, 814 P.2d 684 (1991), aff'd, 120 Wn.2d 727, 844 P.2d 1006 (1993).

4 Harris, 62 Wn. App. at 376 (holding that rule that ambiguities in deed are to be interpreted most favorably to grantee and most strictly against grantor did not apply where alleged ambiguity arose in language incorporated in deed from purchase and sale agreement drafted by grantee); see also Hanson Indus., Inc. v. County of Spokane, 114 Wn. App. 523, 531, 58 P.3d 910 (2002) rev. denied, 149 Wn.2d 1028 (2003) (recognizing that ambiguities must be construed against railroad because it drafted deed).

5 See Hanson Indus., 114 Wn. App. at 531.

6 Brown v. State, 130 Wn.2d 430, 439, 924 P.2d 908 (1996).

7 See, e.g., Roeder Co. v. Burlington N., Inc., 105 Wn.2d 567, 569, 716 P.2d 855 (1986) (holding that deed granted an easement based on the specifically declared purpose that the grant was a right of way for railroad purposes, and there was no persuasive evidence of intent to the contrary); Morsbach v. Thurston County, 152 Wash. 562, 564, 278 P. 686 (1929) (deed granted 'the right-of-way for the construction of said company's railroad in and over . . . .'); Swan v. O'Leary, 37 Wn.2d 533, 534, 225 P.2d 199 (1950) (granted property 'for the purpose of a Railroad right-of-way . . . .'); Veach v. Culp, 92 Wn.2d 570, 572, 599 P.2d 526 (1979) (granted '{a} right-of-way one hundred feet wide . . . .'). See also Reichenbach v. Washington Short Line Ry. Co., 10 Wash. 357, 358, 38 P. 1126 (1894) ('so long as the same shall be used for the operation of a railroad' construed as granting easement); Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber & Shingle Mill Co., 60 Wash. 502, 505, 111 P. 578 (1910) (deed providing 'to have and to hold the said premises . . . for railway purposes, but if it should cease to be used for a railway the said premises shall revert to said grantors' grants easement not determinable fee); Hanson Indus., 114 Wn. App. at 536 (holding that right of way deed conveying strip of land over and across grantor's lands conveyed easement); King County v. Squire Inv. Co., 59 Wn. App. 888, 890, 801 P.2d 1022 (1990) (holding that 'grant and convey . . . a right-of-way . . . . To Have and to Hold . . . so long as said land is used as a right-of-way . . . .' grants easement).

8 92 Wn.2d 570, 572, 599 P.2d 526 (1979).

9 130 Wn.2d 430, 439, 924 P.2d 908 (1996); Majority Op. at 11-12.

10 152 Wash. 562, 565-66, 278 P. 686 (1929).

11 Veach, 92 Wn.2d at 574. In Veach, the court held that the legal description is part of the granting clause. Although Brown appears to contradict this, the court in Brown cited Veach with approval for the proposition that the term 'right of way' in the granting clause limits the estate conveyed. Brown, 130 Wn.2d at 437-38.

12 Brown, 130 Wn.2d at 438 (citing Veach, 92 Wn.2d at 570).

13 Brown, 130 Wn.2d at 439-40 (citing Swan, 37 Wn.2d at 536; 65 Am.Jur.2d Railroads sec. 76 (1972); Urbaitis v. Commonwealth Edison, 575 N.E.2d 548, 552 (1991)).

14 Brown, 130 Wn.2d at 439 (emphasis added).

15 Majority Op. at 12-13.

16 37 Wn.2d 533, 534, 225 P.2d 199 (1950).

17 Swan, 37 Wn.2d at 534.

18 Morsbach, 152 Wash. at 564.

19 Hanson Indus., 114 Wn. App. at 533; Veach, 92 Wn.2d at 572-73; Lawson v. State, 107 Wn.2d 444, 452, 730 P.2d 1308 (1986); see also Morsbach, 152 Wash. at 567.

20 114 Wn. App. 523, 531, 58 P.3d 910 (2002) rev. denied, 149 Wn.2d 1028 (2003).

21 Hanson Indus., 114 Wn. App. at 533 (citing Lawson, 107 Wn.2d at 452).

22 See Veach, 92 Wn.2d at 573 (reciting deed language).

23 Veach, 92 Wn.2d at 574.

24 Veach, 92 Wn.2d at 574.

25 59 Wn. App. 888, 801 P.2d 1022 (1990).

26 Squire Inv. Co., 59 Wn. App. at 894.

27 Squire Inv. Co., 59 Wn. App. at 894.

28 Hanson Indus., 114 Wn. App. at 533.

29 Danaya C. Wright and Jeffrey M. Hester, Pipes, Wires, and Bicycles: Rails- to-Trails, Utility Licenses, and Shifting Scope of Railroad Easements From the Nineteenth to the Twenty- First Centuries, 27 Ecology L.Q. 351, 382 (2000).

30 See, e.g., Hanson Indus., 114 Wn. App. at 533 ('A railroad right-of-way deed need not, however, contain a reverter clause to effect an automatic reversion to the grantor upon abandonment') (citing Veach, 92 Wn.2d at 572- 73; Lawson, 107 Wn.2d at 452; and Morsbach, 152 Wash. at 567).

31 Even the conclusion that the easement is unconditional is not necessarily true. As Hanson Industries recently explained, 'A railroad right-of-way need not, however, contain a reverter clause to effect an automatic reversion to the grantor upon abandonment.' Hanson Indus., 114 Wn. App. at 533.

32 Brown, 130 Wn.2d at 442 n.9 (citation omitted).

33 Code of 1881, sec. 2456 provides: Such corporation may appropriate so much of said land as may be necessary for the line of such road or canal, or the site of such bridge, not exceeding two hundred feet in width, besides a sufficient quantity thereof for toll-houses, work-shops, materials for construction, a right of way over adjacent lands to enable such corporation to construct and repair its road, canal, or bridge, and to make proper drains; and in the case of a railroad, to appropriate sufficient quantity of such lands, in addition to that before specified in this section, for the necessary side tracks, depots, and water stations . . . . (emphasis added).

34 King County v. Rasmussen, 299 F.3d 1077, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2220 (2003).

35 Majority Op. at 18.

36 143 F. Supp. 2d 1225 (W.D. Wash. 2001) aff'd, 299 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2002).

37 Rasmussen, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1230.

38 Rasmussen, 299 F.3d at 1086.

39 Rasmussen, 299 F.3d at 1086.

40 Rasmussen, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1229.

41 Rasmussen, 299 F.3d at 1087 (citing Rasmussen, 143 F.Supp.2d at 1230 n.4).